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ABSTRACT
ON THE SEMANTICS OF VERBAL AND NOMINAL
TENSE IN MVSKOKE (CREEK)
MAY 2022
KIMBERLY JOHNSON
B.A., LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Seth Cable

This dissertation is concerned with the past tense system in Mvskoke (Creek),
an endangered Muskogean language spoken by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, as well as by the Seminole Tribe of Florida. Mvskoke
has four (previously ve) past tenses and a speaker's choice between them depends
on both i) how far in the past the eventuality took place and ii) whether the speaker
learned of that eventuality as it happened. Additionally, three of the past tenses
appear on nouns where they either receive interpretations similar to English former
or provide a relevant past time from which the NP's referent is known, similar to the
English expression that N from this morning. While the past tense system of Mvskoke
has been described by numerous sources in the 1800's and 1900's, this dissertation
constitutes the most extensive semantic investigation of the tenses.
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The rst two chapters provide the background for the dissertation. Chapter 1 discusses the motivation and methodology for the dissertation and provides background
on the Mvskoke language, on some key elements of Mvskoke grammar, and on the
communities where it is spoken. Chapter 2 gives a more detailed description of several topics of special interest, namely the tense and aspect system, evidentiality, and
the structure and semantics of nominals. I then discuss my theoretical assumptions
regarding tense, aspect, and evidentiality.
Chapter 3 presents novel data regarding the evidential inferences of the verbal
tenses. It is shown that Pasts 1-3 are accompanied by direct evidence inferences and
Past 5 is accompanied by an indirect evidence inference. After discussing data that
proves problematic for giving Past 5 semantics encoding an indirect evidential restriction, I argue that the evidential inferences can be explained by analyzing Past 5 as
unspecied for evidence and Past 1-3 as encoding a direct evidential restriction. I
then turn to the nature of this evidential restriction and show that Past 1-3 are compatible with two specic kinds of indirect evidence contexts: Simultaneous Learning
Contexts and Learning After-the-Fact Contexts. I argue that Pasts 1-3 pattern with
morphemes that have been proposed to make reference to an Evidence Acquisition
Time (EAT) in Korean (Lee 2013) and Bulgarian (Smirnova 2013). I provide a novel
formalization of EAT as a moment of belief-state change. I propose that Mvskoke
Pasts 1-3 encode a moment of coming to believe the proposition is true. Temporal
relations contributed by viewpoint aspect derive the direct and indirect evidence uses
of Pasts 1-3.
Chapter 4 addresses the temporal intervals of the graded tense system of Mvskoke.
In general, Mvskoke tenses are used to refer to increasingly remote, adjacent intervals
of past time (Past 1 - just now to last night, Past 2 - yesterday to 1 year ago, Past 3 1 year ago to 20 years ago, Past 5 - 20 years ago to ancient times). I present evidence
that Past 3 covers a much larger interval than previously described and that Past 5
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can be used at any past time. I then demonstrate that Pasts 1-3 cover nested, not
adjacent, intervals of past time. When speakers are unsure whether an event took
place in the Past 1, 2, or 3 interval, they chose Past 2 to ask what time an event
took place. I argue that Mvskoke tenses have a pattern of nested intervals much like
the one proposed for South Ban Inuktitut by Hayashi (2011). Past 2 covers the
largest interval, and Past 1 and Past 3 cover more restricted intervals. It is argued
that Past 3 encodes an interval with subjective, rather than objective, boundaries. I
demonstrate how Gricean pragmatic reasoning and competition between the tenses
results in the surface distribution of Pasts 1-3 as well as the temporal remoteness and
indirect evidence inferences associated with Past 5.
Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the nominal uses of Pasts 1, 2, and 5. I propose a division in NTMs between those encoding Change of State - such as those in Halkomelem
(Wiltschko 2003) and Paraguayan Guaraní (Tonhauser 2008) - and those with Discourse Related uses - such as the tensed determiners in Somali (Lecarme 1999, et seq.).
It is shown that Mvskoke Pasts 1 and 2 have both Change of State and Discourse
Related interpretations, but that Past 5 has only Change of State interpretations. I
evaluate Thomas' (2014) analysis of the Mbyá Guaraní NTM -kue in which -kue is
a past tense operator within the NP. An NP with a past tense is accompanied by
an obligatory cessation implicature indicating that the nominal property held in the
past but not at the NP evaluation time. I nd that while this approach can account
for nominal Past 5, it cannot provide an adequate account for nominal Pasts 1 and
2. Instead, I propose that Pasts 1 and 2 provide the temporal location of the domain
restriction variable of a strong DP, its resource situation (Schwarz 2009). On their
discourse related interpretations, Past 1 and Past 2 provide temporal information
helping the addressee to identify the situation from which the NP's referent is known
to the interlocutors. When the context does not provide a value for the resource situation, it receives a default interpretation as the maximal situation exemplifying the

xii

nominal predicate (Kratzer 2007). Pasts 1 and 2 place this situation entirely in the
past, thereby entailing change of state. My analysis thus motivates a view wherein
there are two syntactic locations in a noun phrase for NTMs. The lower NP-internal
position is associated with Change of State NTMs; the higher D-level position is associated with Discourse Related NTMs which are often linked with denite semantics
and may also give rise to change of state meanings (though by dierent means).
In Chapter 7, I explore two paths to a unied account of Mvskoke tenses in
the verbal and nominal domain. I rst discuss how evidentiality might be worked
into the semantics of the nominal tenses. The verbal tenses were argued to indicate
a moment of coming to believe a proposition; on nouns, the tenses would need to
indicate something more like a moment of acquaintance with an individual. The
alternative option would be for the belief-change semantics to be associated with a
dierent functional projection, leaving the tenses to contribute temporal information
only. I discuss what such a functional projection might be. In the last part of this
chapter, I address the consequences of this investigation for the cross-linguistic picture
of graded tenses as well as for nominal temporal morphology. The Mvskoke past tense
system, having both graded and non-graded tenses in both the nominal and verbal
domains, adds a new dimension to the typologies of graded tense systems and nominal
temporal morphology.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND ON THE MVSKOKE LANGUAGE
This chapter has two parts. First, I will introduce the context of my eldwork with
Mvskoke speaking communities in Oklahoma and the methodology of my semantic
investigation. In the second part of this chapter, I give a brief sketch of relevant parts
of the Mvskoke grammar.

1.1 Background on Mvskoke
Mvskoke is an endangered Muskogean language spoken by roughly 6001 individuals
who use it uently with friends and relatives. Mvskoke is spoken in the Seminole
and Muscogee (Creek) Nations of Oklahoma, as well as in the Seminole Tribe of
Florida. The Mvskoke language is also known as Muskogee, Creek, or Seminole.
Historically, the Mvskoke language was the language of the once prominent Creek
Confederacy - a powerful confederation of native peoples including the Creek people.
In the 1830's and 1840's the Creeks and the Seminoles along with the other members
of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw) were
forcibly removed from their homelands in what is now Georgia, Alabama, and Florida,
and were resettled in Indian Territory, (now eastern Oklahoma). In 1940, following the
removal of its speakers to Indian Territory and the introduction of English boarding
schools, it was estimated that 4,000 individuals spoke Mvskoke (Haas 1940). Today,
1 This

number was estimated based on a survey of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma in 2009 and
an estimate by Judy Montiel, director of the Mvskoke Language Program for the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation of Oklahoma.
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only a relatively small group of speakers remain in Oklahoma and Florida. The
youngest speakers are in their 40's or 50's, and uent speakers form a minority in
communities where the language is spoken. Outside the small group of uent speakers,
Mvskoke is primarily heard in ceremonial and religious settings.
Haas (1941) classies Mvskoke and Seminole as Eastern Muskogean languages,
along with Hitchiti/Mikasuki and Alabama/Koasati. Like Creek and Seminole, these
are mutually intelligible dialects of one language. Western Muskogean languages are
Choctaw and Chickasaw. Haas' classication is represented in Figure 1.1. (The asterisk marks Muskogean languages that are now dormant.) Mvskoke has two Oklahoma
dialects (Muskogee Creek and Oklahoma Seminole) and one Florida dialect (Florida
Seminole). The data in this dissertation come from the two Oklahoma dialects. The
dialectal dierences that I have come across in eldwork are limited to variations
in pronunciation, dierent words for certain objects, and a dierence in choice of
positional verb for certain objects, such as cars. These dierences do not aect the
empirical generalizations made in this dissertation, however for the sake of comparison
I note the dialect of the speaker for each piece of data I elicited.
Proto-Muskogean
Eastern

Western

Choctaw Alabama/Koasati *Hitchiti/Mikasuki Creek/Seminole
Chickasaw
*Apalachee

Figure 1.1.

Haas's (1941) Classication of the Muskogean Languages

In the late 1800's and early 1900's literacy in Mvskoke was widespread within
the Muscogee and Seminole Nations. Native speakers of Mvskoke and missionaries
produced a number of written works from this time period. These include word
lists, hymn books, newspaper articles, advertisements, essays on religion, translated
2

portions of the Bible, and collections of personal letters. An important advocate for
literacy in Mvskoke was missionary and linguist Ann Elizabeth Worcester Robertson.
A.E.W. Robertson translated much of the New Testament into Creek and a collection
of her correspondence in the Mvskoke language constitutes a valuable part of the
existing documentation of the language.
Compared to other North American languages, Mvskoke is relatively well documented. The major documentary works on Mvskoke are dictionaries (Loughridge &
Hodge 1890; Martin & Mauldin 2000), reference grammars (Nathan 1977; Innes et al.
2004, 2009; Martin 2011), grammatical sketches (Buckner & Herrod 1860; Brinton
1870; Grayson 1885), and formal investigations of Mvskoke morphosemantics (Hardy
1988) and morphophonology (Guekguezian 2017, 2021). A partnership between linguist Jack Martin and native speaker and language teacher Margaret Mauldin produced not only a dictionary (Martin & Mauldin 2000) and reference grammar Martin
(2011), but also glossed and translated texts accompanied by audio recordings. These
texts were originally collected in 1915 and 1940 and the curated collections were published recently as Gouge (2004) and Haas & Hill (2015). Additionally, in the 1970's
the Seminole Nation produced a number of bilingual education materials. Most of
the existing documents in the Mvskoke language have been digitized by Jack Martin
as part of the NSF and NEH funded `Muskogee (Seminole/Creek) Documentation
Project.' In addition to older texts, this documentation project has produced a large
collection of video-recorded interviews, many of which have been transcribed and
translated.

1.1.1 Motivation for the Dissertation
Mvskoke, like other Muskogean languages, is highly agglutinative and has complex verbal morphology, especially in the tense-aspect domain (Haas 1940; Fitzgerald
2017). All extant Muskogean languages have at least two past tenses diering in
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remoteness (Booker 1980). Mvskoke stands out in having ve past tenses, though
one has largely fallen out of use in the modern language. Additionally, verb stems
in Mvskoke have ve ablaut patterns to communicate aspectual meaning. Described
in great detail in Haas (1940) and Martin (2011), these patterns aect vowel length
and the tonal accent of the stem. On top of this, there are three ways in which
the Mvskoke tense system is more complex than the proto-typical tense system as
explained below. As such, Mvskoke's elaborate tense system poses a number of problems for current theories and has great potential to shape theoretical debates on the
nature of tense.
Linguists use the term `tense' to refer to a grammaticalization of reference to time
in natural language  specically to past, present, or future time. It is often popularly assumed that tense morphemes (i) communicate one of those three values, (ii)
only refer to intervals of time, and (iii) are intimately related to verbs, since tense
locates the time of the action or state contributed by the verb. However, linguistic
study of certain lesser-known languages has revealed that these are oversimplied
assumptions. First, tense is not limited to the categories `past,' `present,' and `future.' Languages have been found that make more or fewer distinctions in their tense
systems (Matthewson 2006; Botne 2012; Cable 2013).Additionally, in some languages
there appears to be a puzzling relationship between reference to time and reference to
the evidential source for an assertion. This relationship is suggested by the fact that in
certain languages both are communicated by the same morpheme. These evidentialtemporal morphemes are found in Turkish, Bulgarian, and Norwegian present perfect morphology, what Izvorksi buds the perfect of evidentiality Izvorski (1997);
Smirnova (2013); Koev (2017). They are also attested in Korean (Chung 2007; ?;
Lee 2013) and in so-called experienced/non-experienced past systems in Cherokee
(Pulte 1985) and Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2004). Furthermore, tense is not a strictly
verbal category. Nouns can bear tense morphology in some languages, where it lo-
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cates the time of the property contributed by the noun (Nordlinger & Sadler 2004;
Lecarme 1996, 1999; Tonhauser 2007; Thomas 2014). This dissertation furthers our
understanding of the category of tense by investigating these three phenomena in
Mvskoke.
The Mvskoke language presents a unique opportunity to advance knowledge concerning three central research questions about the syntactic and semantic properties
of tense. The rst such question concerns the range of variation to be found in the
inventory of tense features across languages. As mentioned above, the tense systems
of human languages are not limited to the categories `past,' `present,' and `future.'
Notably, Mvskoke boasts of four graded past tenses, which locate events at increasingly remote past times (Martin 2010). Such systems promise to inform our theory of
the variety of tense categories to be found across languages. Chapter 4 addresses the
graded tense system of Mvskoke in great detail and in Chapter 7 I return to the topic
with a cross-linguistic comparison of Mvskoke with other graded tense languages. I
argue that Mvskoke supports a restrictive theory of features relevant for graded tense
systems as well as two divisions or domains in graded tense systems, as proposed by
Hayashi & Oshima (2015) and Botne & Kershner (2008).
The second question concerns the semantic relationship between `tenses' and time.
It is commonly assumed that tense morphemes only refer to intervals of time and
encode relations between such intervals. A challenge for this view is the existence in
some languages of morphemes that appear to encode tense and evidential source. In
Chapter 3, I provide data to the eect that only three of the four Mvskoke tenses
are graded, and that they additionally encode the evidential source for the assertion.
The fourth Mvskoke tense is thus non-graded and is underspecied for evidentiality.
This split between the graded/evidential tenses and non-graded/non-evidential tense
makes possible an intra-linguistic comparison that sheds new light on the nature of
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the evidential meaning encoded in the tense system. Chapter 3 provides a detailed
comparison of competing theories concerning the nature of the evidential meaning.
The third research question concerns whether tense is necessarily represented in
the structure of a verb rather than that of a noun. Tonhauser (2006, 2007, 2020)
has argued that tense is not represented in the structure of a noun and that nominal
temporal morphology is better understood as aspectual rather than tense. As only
a limited number of languages have nominal temporal morphology and even fewer
have been the subject of semantic investigation, there is much to learn about the
phenomena before attempting to address the larger research question. Mvskoke oers
a unique opportunity to expand the typology of nominal temporal morphology and
further our understanding. This is because two of Mvskoke's graded, evidential tenses
may sux to nouns in addition to Mvskoke's non-graded, non-evidential tense. These
tense morphemes are associated with dierent interpretations and features when they
ax to nouns. Chapter 5 is a descriptive presentation of the novel empirical data
uncovered in this dissertation research. Chapter 6 engages with the literature on
nominal temporal morphology and proposes an analysis that paves the way to a new
typological picture which I frame in Chapter 7. In Chapter 7, I additionally address
the question of whether these morphemes can be thought of as tense in a technical
sense. I conclude that in Mvskoke we nd the most convincing examples of tense on
nouns.
The presence of tense in the nominal domain not only allows for a comparison
between nominal tenses, but also a comparison of tense across these two domains
 nominal and verbal. In Chapter 7, I pay particular attention to the question of
how the evidential meaning of Mvskoke's tenses is communicated in the verbal and
nominal domain. I sketch two possible approaches to a unied semantics for Mvskoke
tenses and note where the open questions lie.
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1.1.2 Methodology
The majority of the data presented in this dissertation comes from my eldwork
conducted between June 2017 and March 2022 with uent elders in the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma. Additional data
comes from existing documentation. For my research, I adopted as much as possible
a participatory Community-Based Language Research (CBLR) model (CzaykowskaHiggins 2009; Leonard & Haynes 2010; Rice 2011). The support of the language
community for the project is especially important in this research model. Consequently, my project began by reaching out to the language program directors of the
Seminole and Muscogee (Creek) Nations. Former Seminole Language Program director, Jennifer Johnson, and Mvskoke Language Program director, Judy Montiel, were
both instrumental in assessing interest and support for the project with community
members. Ms. Johnson drove with me to the homes of respected, uent elders. She
introduced me and we both explained my research project. If the elder was interested
in participating, I scheduled an interview with them at a later date. Having Ms.
Johnson present and leading the discussion in these initial meetings was extremely
helpful in ensuring that no elder felt undue pressure to participate in my research.
The CBLR research model prioritizes the role of the language community in shaping and guiding the project. Projects strictly following the CBLR model require that
the language community determine the research questions. Since my theoretical research questions were very specic and technical, my research included a documentation component, the goals of which were guided by the community's needs and
interests. Elders who participated in my research were asked if they had anything
they would like to record in the language to preserve for future generations. Some
elders sang hymns and explained the meaning of the hymns, others recorded some
prayers, most recorded discussions of cultural and historical values they feel are important to pass on. The documentation component of my project was also guided
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by the needs expressed by the Seminole and Muscogee (Creek) language program
directors for documentation of casual conversation and culturally signicant genres
such as clan origin stories and lullabies.
My research involved one-on-one interviews with rst-language speakers of Mvskoke
who served as language consultants for my study. All my language consultants are
uent in English, which was our language of communication. The methods that
I employed in these interviews are elaborated in Matthewson (2004), Tonhauser &
Matthewson (2015), and Bochnak & Matthewson (2015). In these interviews I asked
language consultants to perform (typically) three tasks designed to elicit sentences
and acceptability judgments that would shed light on my main research questions.
These included the Translation Task, the Contextual Acceptability Judgment Task,
and the Storyboard Task. Below I discuss each of these techniques and how I implemented them in my context of research.
The Translation Task, as its name suggests, involves asking the consultant to
provide a translation in their language for an English word or sentence. My elicitation
sessions very often began with collecting translations for the key words (only openclass lexical items such as nouns and verbs) that would be used in the rest of the
session. This was done for two reasons. First, it made it possible for me to transcribe
the sentences more quickly and accurately since I would be able to recognize the words.
Secondly, it served to help the consultant warm up and gave them time to recall the
words I would be asking about. Because Mvskoke is a highly endangered language,
uent speakers often have little occassion to regularly use the language. As a result
it was helpful to begin with a few simpler tasks. Whenever I asked for a translation
of an English sentence, I always used a complete, grammatical sentence presented
in a clarifying context. The clarifying context served two purposes. First, it served
to disambiguate between other possible interpretations of the English sentence. And
secondly, this was done in order to elicit a Mvskoke sentence that would be felicitous
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and true in the context. Once the consultant translated the English sentence into
Mvskoke, I repeated it back to them. This sometimes prompted the speaker to make
slight alterations to their translation. Then, I asked them to translate the Mvskoke
sentence back into English. These tasks were almost always followed with contextually
acceptability judgment tasks using the Mvskoke sentence or a variation of it.
In the works cited above on best-practices in semantic eldwork, the Contextual
Acceptability Judgment Task is commended as a replicable and straightforward task
suitable for non linguistically-trained consultants. In this task, the language consultant is asked to imagine a scenario and judge a sentence in the target language as
acceptable or unacceptable in that scenario. The sentence judged in this task can
be constructed by the linguist, drawn from existing documentation, or result from
a Translation Task. If the sentence is judged to be acceptable, it is by hypothesis
grammatical, true, and felicitous in the scenario. If it is unacceptable, it could be
that the sentence is ungrammatical (if the sentence was constructed by the linguist),
that it is false, or that it is infelicitous. I use the pound sign (#) to represent when
I hypothesize that a judgment of unacceptability indicates falsity or infelicity. I use
an asterisk (*) to indicate that a sentence or string of morphemes is ungrammatical.
In Acceptability Judgment Tasks, I asked consultants if the sentence sounds good
in the scenario, or if the could imagine themselves or another native speaker saying
the sentence in that scenario. Sometimes, when I suspected that a certain sentence
might be false or generate an implicature contradicting with the scenario, I asked the
consultant if the sentence would be misleading. When giving negative judgments,
speakers often volunteered an alternate context in which the sentence would be acceptable. To follow up on this type of comment, I asked them to imagine a scenario
like the one they suggested and asked for an acceptability judgment for the sentence.
Due to the complexity of the scenarios that I used, I employed a few variations
on this task. One of the variations I used was to incorporate the relevant part of
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the context into the target sentence. This ensured that the speaker was judging
the target sentence in the correct context. An example of this type of variation is
illustrated below. In (1) the speaker incorporated the evidence source into the target
sentence through an adverbial clause cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat `as it was written in the
newspaper.'
(1)

P3 Reportative Context: Imagine you read a newspaper story about the chief
in which you learned that he frequented a certain church when he was young.
Could you say the sentence in (1-a)?
a.

#Cokv-tvlvme

hoccihocat,

Mēkko mv

coka-talamí

hoccéy<ho:>c-â:t

mí:kko má

write.ipfv-caus<pass>-comp chief

paper-daily

mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

owemvts.

mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

ô:w-imát-s

prayer-house

dem

p3-ind

go.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.pfv-

Intended: As it was written in the newspaper, the chief went to that
church.
Speaker Comment: No, if it's according to the paper it would be [the
sentence in (1-b)]
b.

Cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat,

Mēkko mv

coka-talamí hoccéy<ho:>c-â:t

mí:kko má

paper-daily write.ipfv-caus<pass>-comp chief
mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

owvtēs.

mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

o:w-atí:-s

prayer-house

go.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.ipfv-

dem

p5-ind

`As it was written in the newspaper, the chief went to that church.'
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
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Another variation on the Contextual Acceptability Judgment Task that I employed
was to use visual stimuli to set up the scenarios. This was done with pictures illustrating the crucial dierences between a few scenarios and with storyboards (Burton
& Matthewson 2015). The Storyboard Task has proved successful in eliciting contextual acceptability judgments. Storyboards are a series of illustrations designed to
tell a story and naturally elicit specic types of language by developing sometimes
quite complex scenarios in storytelling fashion. The use of illustrations is an attempt
to avoid interference with English where the consultant might try to translate the
target sentence word-for-word. By asking the consultant to tell a story using the
pictures, the linguist can elicit naturalistic connected speech while still guiding the
task through an overarching storyline. Once the story is elicited, I also was able to go
back through it with the consultant and ask about minimally dierent sentences for
a particular illustration, eectively conducting a contextual acceptability judgment
task with a (possibly) complex scenario.
Example (1) is illustrative of the pieces of linguistic data that I present in this
dissertation. It begins with a context as it was presented to the consultant in English.
In this context, I asked the speaker for an acceptability judgment on (1-a). This
sentence was a combination of two sentences they had provided in translation tasks.
The adverbial clause came from a translation task for a similar scenario compatible
with a dierent time frame. The matrix clause was provided as a translation for the
sentence The chief went to that church in a direct witness context for the Past 3
time frame. I hypothesized that the entire sentence was grammatical since the two
parts were grammatical. Consequently, I concluded that the speaker's judgment of
the sentence as unacceptable was due to the truth conditions of the sentence being
incompatible with the context. As such, I labeled the sentence as infelicitious (#).
The speaker's response to the oered sentence is represented below the intended
English translation and informed my hypothesis about the reason for unacceptability.
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The speaker then volunteered an alternate sentence for that context by switching out
the Past 3 morpheme for a Past 5 morpheme.2
In all the data from my eldwork, the rst line of the example is in the traditional
orthography as represented in Martin and Mauldin's dictionary (Martin 2000) and
their annotated text collections (Gouge 2004; Haas & Hill 2015). The second line is
a phonemic transcription following Martin's (2011) conventions. The third line is a
morpheme-by-morpheme gloss. The abbreviations I use are dened in Appendix A. I
largely follow Martin's glossing conventions, but have adapted some Mvskoke-specic
glosses to make them more transparent. Following the gloss are an English translation
of the sentence (often the one provided by my consultant) and a speaker comment if
one was given. I cite my examples by speaker code, their dialect (Mus for Muskogee
Creek and Sem for Oklahoma Seminole), and the date of elicitation.

1.1.3 Logistics of Fieldwork
As mentioned above, my data come from my eldwork with Mvskoke speaking
elders from 2017 to present. I initially began working with Linda Sulphur Wood
(formerly Bear) in 2017 who was then an employee of the Seminole Language Program.
As part of this work with Ms. Wood, we recorded audio in Mvskoke for 25 short
children's books for the Seminole Language Program's library project. I also created
two videos from Ms. Wood's narration of two Storyboards - Feeding Fluy and
Chameleon Story (TFS Working Group 2012).
In June and July 2018, with the help of Jennifer Johnson, former Seminole Language Program director, I began working with six uent Mvskoke speakers in the
Seminole Nation and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation: Mr. Paul Fixico, Ms. Inna Ann
(Micco) Hickey, Ms. De Lois Roulston, Ms. Mary Ann Emarthla, Ms. Lucy Tiger,
2 The speaker also changed the aspectual operator to one that accompanies Past 5 in this time
frame. See Chapter 2, section 2 for discussion of these tense-aspect interactions.
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Mr. Richard Harjo, and Ms. Juanita Walker Harris. This work was funded by the
UMass Amherst Graduate School Predissertation Research Grant. In summer 2019,
I returned and continued this work with the same language consultants. My work in
2019 was funded by the UMass Linguistics Department's Selkirk Outreach Fund and
by the American Philosophical Society's Phillips Fund for Native American Research.
In 2020 and part of 2021, I conducted remote eldwork with three of my language
consultants over Zoom video conferencing software or over the phone. In Fall 2021, I
hosted a conversation workshop in Okmulgee, Oklahoma with six uent elders (Mr.
Paul Fixico, Ms. De Lois Roulston, Ms. Annajo Fife, Ms. Elouise Factor, Mrs.
Rosemary McCombs Maxey, and Mrs. Lillian Thomas) and two advanced second
language learners (Elizabeth Rowland and Darrell Proctor II). The remote eldwork
and conversation workshop was possible due to funding from an NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (BCS-2024065). During this time, I taught
an online Mvskoke Immersion Course focusing on the new discoveries detailed in this
dissertation.
The audio from all my interviews were digitally recorded, with the consent of the
consultants, and stored on a secure external hard drive. My recordings and eldnotes
from 2019 are archived at the American Philosophical Society Library as a collection
funded by the Phillips Fund for Native American Research. All of these recordings are
open acess except for two narratives containing culturally sensitive information. The
rest of my recordings (from 2017 - present) and notes will be archived in the Native
American Languages Collection at the Sam Noble Oklahoma Museum of Natural
History housed at the University of Oklahoma. Many of these recordings will also be
deposited at the Seminole Nation Museum to facilitate local access to the deposit.
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1.2 Sketch of the Grammar of Mvskoke
In this section, I provide a basic introduction to topics in the Mvskoke grammar
that I hope will aide the reader in understanding and parsing the data presented
in the dissertation. In section 1.2.1, I provide a general overview of the syntax of
Mvskoke including what elements of a clause are necessarily overt and which are only
optionally realized. Section 1.2.2 provides an introduction to person agreement in
Mvskoke and how these markers are used in the verbal and nominal domain.

1.2.1 Basic Syntax
Mvskoke is a head nal language with SOV word order. Although a predominantly head-marking language, Mvskoke does have optional morphological case on
nouns. Subject and non-subject case is optional on the two arguments in (2). Either
argument can have overt morphological case, or both, or neither without aecting the
grammaticality of the sentence.3
(2)

Efv(t)

pose lvstē(n)

assēcis.

ifá(-t)

pó:si lást-i:(-n)

á:ssi:c-êys-s

subj) cat

dog(-

nsubj) chase.impf-p1-ind

black-dur(-

`The dog was chasing the black cat.'

(LSB-Mus-01/30/2018)

Case makes a binary distinction between the subject and all non-subject constituents.
In (3), non-subject case appears on three constituents other than the direct object:
a temporal adverb mocv nettvn `today', a location vncuokn `my house', and a benefactee ecken `her mother'.
3 Example

(2) is based on an example appearing in (Martin 2011: 22). However, it was independently elicited in my own eldwork.
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(3)

Mucv-nettvn

Milet

vncukon

vpvtvkvn

moca-nítta-n

Méyli-t

an-cóko-n

apataká-n

nsubj Mary-subj 1sg.dat-house-nsubj bread-nsubj

this-dayecken

enhayes.

ícki-n

in-ha:y-ís

3.pat.mother-

nsubj 3.dat-make.ipfv-ind

`Today, Mary is making traditional bread at my house for her mother.'
(LSB-Mus-11/2017)
Case marking is beginning to disappear from the grammar of Mvskoke. Younger
speakers only reliably use case in certain obligatory environments, which are detailed
in Johnson (2019a). As such, nominals in the examples presented in the dissertation may or may not have case. Following Johnson (2019a), I gloss subject case as
Nominative and non-subject case as Accusative.
Most nominal constituents are not overtly expressed in Mvskoke when they can be
recovered from context or from agreement axes on the verb. Third person nominal
arguments are most often left unexpressed, as are rst and second person unstressed
pronouns unless they are not associated with an agreement ax on the verb (as in
certain ditransitive constructions). Example (4) illustrates a sentence in which the
speaker has dropped all but the temporal adverb.
(4)

Context: Imagine we are talking about a certain Mvskoke hymn. It happens
to be the one you heard them sing at church yesterday evening. How would
you tell me this in Mvskoke?
Paksvnkē yafken

pro

pro

pohhis.

paksankí: yâ:fki-n

pro

pro

pó<h>h-ey-s

yesterday evening-acc 1sg.ag 3sg.pat hear<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind
`Yesterday evening I heard it.'

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)
15

Agent
sg

1
2
3

Table 1.1.

-ey-ick-

pl

-iy-a:ck∅

Patient
sg

ca-

pl

poci∅

Dative
sg

pl

am- pomcimim-

Three Series of Cross-Referencing Morphology in Muskogee

Following the conventions in Martin's work, I do not represent dropped constituents
but gloss examples like (4) as in (5).
(5)

Context: Imagine we are talking about a certain Mvskoke hymn. It happens
to be the one you heard them sing at church yesterday evening. How would
you tell me this in Mvskoke?
Paksvnkē yafken

pohhis.

paksankí: yâ:fki-n

pó<h>h-ey-s

yesterday evening-acc hear<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind
`Yesterday evening I heard it.'

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)

As these examples demonstrate, person agreement on the verb is a crucial element in
Mvskoke sentences. I turn to the system of person agreement in the next section.

1.2.2 Split-S Person Agreement
As the reader will have noticed, Mvskoke arguments are cross-reference by agreement axes which dierentiate between arguments based on their thematic role (with
a few exceptions) (Martin 1991). Mvskoke cross-referencing morphemes distinguish
between agents, patients, and what Muskogeanists call dative arguments, which
are typically experiencers. There are three series of person agreement morphemes,
represented in Table 1.1.
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The agent series are suxed to the verb stem and the patient and dative series
are prexed. Third person is arguably not overtly realized at all. Following Munro
(1993), the dative series can be reanalyzed as involving the patient series plus a dative
applicative morpheme im-.
The rst series cross-references agents of transitive verbs (6-a) and subjects of
unergative intransitives (6-b). (There are exceptions to this and alternative characterizations of the agreement morphemes which will be discussed below.)
(6)

a.

Pohhis.
pó<h>h-ey-s

1sg.ag-ind

hear<pfv.p1>`I heard it.'
b.

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)

Tewolēn

yvhikit

owēs.4

(i)tiwolí:-n

yaheyk-éy-t

ô:w-i:-s

close.together-ds sing.ipfv`I sing all the time.'

1sg.ag-ss be.pfv-dur-ind
(IAH-Sem-07/05/2018)

The second series cross-references patients of transitive verbs (7-a) and subjects
of unaccusative intransitives and property-concept terms (7-b).
(7)

a.

Cehēcis.
ci-hî:c-ey-s

2.pat-see.pfv-1sg.ag-ind
`I see

you.'

(Martin 1991: 151, glossing adapted )

4 The speaker pronounced this sentence with a shortened form of the habitual construction. The
full underlying form of this sentence has an additional durative marker on the main verb, as illustrated below.

(i)

Tewolēn
yvhikvyēt
owēs.
(i)tiwolí:-n
yaheyk-ay-í:-t
ô:w-i:-s
close.together-ds sing.ipfv-1sg.ag-dur-ss be.pfv-dur-ind
`I sing all the time.'
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(IAH-Sem-07/05/2018)

b.

Cenuckelē

tē?

ci-nockil-í:

-ti'

2.pat-sleepy-dur be.q
`Are

you sleepy?'

(RH-Sem-06/28/2019)

Finally, the third series cross-references indirect objects and experiencer arguments.
(8)

a.

Vmonahoyvnk(s).
àm-ona:<ho:>y-ánk-s

1sg.dat-tell.ipfv<pass>-p2-ind
`They were telling (it)
b.

to me.'

(JWH-Sem-06/28/2019)

Vmmvttēs.
am-mátt-i:-s

1sg.dat-wrong-dur-ind
`I

am wrong.'

(Martin 2011: 187, glossing adapted )

This pattern of agreement is called a Split-S alignment in the typological literature. Essentially, this means that Mvskoke splits intransitive subjects into three
dierent categories with respect to agreement morphology. This contrasts with the
Nominative-Accusative alignment reected by morphological case in which intransitive subjects and agents of transitives are all marked with nominative case. This
asymmetry is illustrated for four types of subjects in (9) and (10).
(9)

Agent of a Transitive
Efv(t)

pose lvstē(n)

assēcis.

ifá(-t)

pó:si lást-i:(-n)

á:ssi:c-êys-s

nom) cat

dog(-

black-dur(-acc) chase.ipfv-p1-ind

`The dog was chasing the black cat.'
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(LSB-Mus-01/30/2018)

(10)

Intransitive Subjects
a.

Efv(t)

wohkis.

ifá(-t)

wo:hk-êys-s

dog(-

nom) bark.ipfv-p1-ind

The dog was barking.'
b.

Vnet

cvnokkēs.

aní-t

ca-nókk-i:-s

I-nom

(LSB-Mus-01/30/2018)

1sg.pat-sick-dur-ind
(Martin 2011: 27, glossing adapted )

`I(focused) am sick.'
c.

Vnhesse(t)

emmvttēs.

anhíssi(-t)

im-mátt-i:-s

my.friend(-

nom) 3.dat-wrong-dur-ind
(Martin 2011: 186, glossing adapted )

`My friend is wrong.'

In summary, nominative case marks all syntactic subjects regardless of their thematic
role, but person agreement distinguishes between agents, patients, dative arguments.
There are two ways that scholars have attempted to account for systems of this
kind: syntactically and semantically. Syntactically, there is a denite trend for agents
to be associated with external arguments, patients with internal, direct object arguments, and datives with indirect arguments. However, as noted in Martin (1991) and
Martin (2011) there are exceptions to this trend with Mvskoke agentive agreement
being used with numerals and quantiers, in equitive colupar clauses, and in comparative constructions. To illustrate, in Mvskoke words expressing quantication take
verbal morphology and agree with their argument using the agentive series. This is
seen in (11).
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(11)

Omvlkeyat

vpehyēs.

omálk-iy-a:t

apí<h>y-i:-s

be.all-

1pl.ag-comp go.tpl<pfv.p1>-1pl.ag-ind
(Martin 2011: 176, glossing adapted )

`All of us went.'

Data of this kind proves to be problematic for syntactic as well as semantic explanations of the agreement system. Recently, however, Tyler (2018) has proposed a
syntactic analysis of agentive agreement in Choctaw that accounts for these exceptions.
There is a great deal of literature attempting to account for agentive agreement
systems with semantic features. Mithun (1991), in a study of other languages with
agentive agreement, hypothesizes as to the precise semantic features that govern
these kinds of systems, be that volition, control, instigation, or some other feature of
agency. Hardy & Davis (1993) argue that control is the relevant semantic feature
for agentive agreement in Alabama (a related Muskogean language). Martin (1991)
nds a close correlation between volition and agentive agreement axes in Mvskoke,
but the exceptions mentioned above prove problematic for a semantic account as well.
The patient and dative series are also employed to mark possession in the nominal
domain. The patient series marks inalienable possession (such as with kinship terms
and body parts) and the dative series is used to mark alienable possession. The
following examples are drawn from Martin & Mauldin's dictionary (Martin & Mauldin
2000).
(12)

a.

cvpvwv
ca-páwa

1sg.pat-maternal.uncle
`my (maternal) uncle'
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b.

vm

efv

am-

ífa

1sg.dat- dog
`my dog'
For a syntactic proposal regarding the use of these agreement markers in possessive
DPs, see Tyler (2021) on these constructions in Mississippi Choctaw.

1.2.3 Switch Reference and Clause Types
In this section I briey introduce the notion of switch-reference and discuss chained
and adverbial clauses, two types of non-matrix clauses that recur in the examples
throughout this dissertation.
In Mvskoke, switch-reference marking is obligatory on all non-nal clauses.5 McKenzie (2015) denes switch-reference as a grammatical phenomena associated with
the juncture of two clauses that indicates whether a certain prominent argument
in each clause co-refers (McKenzie 2015: 409). The most common argument that
is tracked between clauses is the subject. As such, the switch-reference morphemes
in Mvskoke are traditionally refered to as same-subject (ss) and dierent-subject
(ds). Mvskoke switch-reference morphemes are homophonous with case morphology. Both nominative and same-subject are marked with -t and both accusative and
dierent-subject are marked with -n. I continue to gloss switch-reference morphology
in this way, although Martin (2011) and McKenzie (2015) both demonstrate that
switch-reference marking is more complex than these labels suggest.
I will discuss two types of non-matrix clauses that are marked with switchreference in Mvskoke: chained clauses and adverbial clauses. To illustrate switchreference, consider the following two examples which consist of two chained clauses,
5I

use the theory-neutral term non-nal as opposed to non-matrix because at present we do not
know the status of chained clauses.
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the rst of which is obligatorily marked with switch-reference morphemes. In (13),
the rst chained clause ends with the same-subject marker, and both clauses are
interpreted as having `the dog' as their subject.
(13)

Efvt

wohket

posen

ifá-t

wo:hk-ít

pó:si-n á:ssi:c-ís

dog-nom bark.ipfv-

assēces.

ss cat-acc chase.ipfv-ind

`The dog is barking and chasing the cat.'
(Martin 2011: 22, glossing adapted )
In (14), the rst chained clause ends with a dierent-subject marker, signaling that
there is a new subject in the second chained clause.
(14)

Efvt

wohken

poset

assēces.

ifá-t

wo:hk-ín

pó:si-t

á:ssi:c-ís

dog-nom bark.ipfv-

ds cat-nom chase.ipfv-ind

`The dog is barking, and the cat is chasing him.'
(Martin 2011: 23, glossing adapted )
Chained clauses are extremely common in connected speech and in narratives.
Although no syntactic investigation has been done in Mvskoke, there are some indications as to the syntactic structure of chained clauses. In particular, verbs in a
chained clause are inected for aspect, but they do not bear tense marking. Each
of the chained clauses are interpreted at the time indicated by the tense on the nal
auxiliary. Because of facts like these, Broadwell (1997, 2006) has argued that chained
clauses in Choctaw are subordinate clauses that lack a position for a tense morpheme.
A syntactic investigation of Mvskoke chained clauses will have to wait for future research. The syntactic status of chained clauses does not aect the generalizations or
proposals of the dissertation.
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A variety of non-matrix clauses are marked with what Martin (2011) calls the
referential sux -at /-a:t(i)/, which I gloss as a complementizer. These include
present tensed relative clauses, adverbial clauses, complement clauses, and (in a specic construction) if-clauses. In older sources, the referential sux combined with
switch reference endings, taking the form -atet /a:ti-t/ for same subject and -aten
/a:ti-n/ for dierent subject. The only remnant of this in modern speech is a dierent
subject form of the referential clitic which surfaces as -an /-a:n/. Following Martin
(2011), I only gloss switch reference in the dierent-subject cases.
Mvskoke relative clauses, adverbial clauses, and complement clauses all end with
the complementizer -at. According to Martin (2011: 341-42), only the adverbial and
complement clauses allow nouns within them to be case-marked. However, since case
marking is inconsistent at best in modern speech, I do not consider the absence of
case-marking to be a telling dierence between clause types with -at. The following
are examples of these three clause types.
(15)

Relative Clause
[Vsi

efv ahuerat]

lopicēt

os.

[asêy

ifá a:-hôyì-a:t]

lopéyc-i:-t

ô:-s

[yonder dog dir-stand.pfv-comp] nice-dur-ss be.pfv-ind
`That dog standing over there is friendly.'
(Martin 2011: 391, glossing adapted )
(16)

Complement Clause
[0 Tolose

hompat]

[(i)tolô:si homp-â:t]

kērres.
kî:ìì-is

[chicken eat.ipfv-comp] know.pfv-ind
(Martin 2011: 390, glossing adapted )

`He knows he is eating chicken.'
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(17)

Adverbial Clause
[hvlket

ayeckan]

ocvrēs,

[halk-ít

a:y-íck-a:n]

ó:c-áìi:-s

[crawl.sg.ipfv-ss go.sg.ipfv-2sg.ag-comp.ds] exist-fut-ind
kicaken
kéyc-a:k-ín
tell-pl.ipfv-ds
`As you crawl forward, it will be there, they said to him...'
(Martin 2011: 363, glossing adapted )
The syntactic structure of these clauses is not well understood, although Martin
(2011) provides discussion of the structure of relative clauses in Mvskoke on pp. 391397 of his reference grammar.
As a nal note on switch-reference marking, there is one other location where
same-subject marking appears outside of a chained clause. Mvskoke speakers make
frequent use of a cleft-like construction consisting of the main verb suxed with
what appears to be same-subject marking followed by the copular verb ometv `to be'
inected for tense. Agentive person agreement can appear on either the main verb or
the copula. An example of this construction is given below.
(18)

Mv mēkusvpkv-cuko ayit

owemvts.

ma mi:kosapka-cóko a:y-êy-t

ô:w-imát-s

dem church

ss be.pfv-p3-ind

go.sg.ipfv-1sg.ag-

`I used to go to that church.'

(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)

Following Martin (2011) and other Muskogean literature, this -t marker can be
thought of as a linking morpheme.
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1.2.4 Summary
This chapter has provided essential background on the Mvskoke language and
my research with Mvskoke speaking communities in Oklahoma. In the next chapter I
provide more extensive background on the topics of special interest in this dissertation,
namely the graded tenses, aspectual operators, evidentials, and the interpretation of
nominals. I also give an introduction to the semantic framework I adopt for tense
and aspect and an introduction to the semantics of evidentials.
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CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION TO TOPICS OF INTEREST
This dissertation is concerned with the Mvskoke tense system and its interaction
with nominals and evidential semantics. In this chapter, I present an overview of
some areas of the Mvskoke grammar that are of special interest in the succeeding
chapters. In section 2.1, I introduce the basics of the Mvskoke tense system with
special focus on the graded temporal intervals covered by each tense. Section 2.2
provides a description of the aspectual system in Mvskoke and some peculiarities
of tense-aspect interactions. In addition to the descriptive presentation, I lay out
my theoretical assumptions about the aspectual operators that become important in
subsequent chapters. In section 2.3, I turn to the topic of evidentiality. In addition
to the evidential inferences I argue are at play with the past tense system, there
are a few constructions in Mvskoke that are sensitive to evidential source. Section
2.4 introduces Mvskoke nominals, the possible construals of bare nouns, and my
assumptions about the denotation of bare nouns. Finally, before I end this chapter,
I lay out my theoretical assumptions on tense, aspect, and evidentiality.

2.1 Mvskoke's Graded Tenses
A non trivial number of the world's languages have multiple tenses that indicate
how far in the past or future an eventuality occurs. According to Botne (2012),
languages with so-called graded tense systems are primarily found in Africa and
Oceania, but they also exist in North America, notably within the Muskogean languages. All extant Muskogean languages have at least two past tenses diering in
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remoteness (Booker 1980). Mvskoke stands out in having ve past tenses, though
one has largely fallen out of use in the modern language (Loughridge & Hodge 1890;
Haas 1940; Martin 2010).
Descriptions of Mvskoke's past tenses as early as 1860 associate each tense with
a distinct time frame (Buckner & Herrod 1860; Grayson 1885; Loughridge & Hodge
1890). Martin (2010) - following Haas (1940) - provides a more precise description
of the system in which the tenses cover disjoint, adjacent intervals of time that are
increasingly remote from the present. In his 2010 paper, Martin also notes that the
fourth past (P4) has fallen out of use and is no longer recognized by speakers. As a
result the temporal intervals which are compatible with each tense have shifted. His
representation of the older and more modern systems are summarized below.
(1)

Older Tense System

(2)

Modern Tense System

P1

today  last night

P1

today  last night

P2

yesterday  2-3 weeks

P2

yesterday  1 year

P3

2-3 weeks 1-2 years

P3

1 year  20 years

P4

1-2 years  60 years

P4

- no longer used -

P5

60 years  ancient

P5

20 years  ancient
(Martin 2010: 54)

Martin (2010) shows that although the temporal intervals above accurately reect speaker judgments about when they would use each tense, he argues based on
textual data that the tenses are not exclusively tied to objective intervals of time.
Instead more recent tenses can be used to create a pragmatic eect of vividness of
the described event much like the use of historic present in English. Flexibility in the
temporal intervals is a common phenomena in graded tense languages and a complex
issue. In this dissertation, I will not deal with the type of exibility that Martin
discusses in his 2010 paper.
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I also refrain from discussing a second kind of exiblity that Botne (2012) calls
scaling up. When a current past form is scaled up, it can be used for the current
day, the current month, or the current year depending on what time unit is relevant
in the context. This type of exibility is evident in some Bantu languages. Bochnak
& Klecha (2015) demonstrate that Luganda recent past can be scaled up. The recent
past is usually restricted to events taking place within 4 hours of the utterance as
witnessed by (3). However, it can be used to refer to the current planting season if
the context supports it, as seen in (4).
(3)

Nzinye

saawa {satu/#tano} emabega.

1sg.dance.

rec.pst hour

{three/ve}

`I danced {three/ve} hours ago.'
(4)

behind
(Bochnak & Klecha 2015: 380)

Planting Season Context: You plant your crops every year in February. It is
now April, and I ask you what you planted this year. You tell me that you
planted maize.
Nsimbye

kasooli.

rec.pst maize

1sg.plant.

`I planted maize.'

(Bochnak & Klecha 2015: 383)

Not every graded tense system allows this type of exibility. South Ban Inuktitut's
recent past -qqau, for example, cannot be scaled up.
(5)

This Week Context: John arrived the day before yesterday.
*Jaan tiki-qqau-juq

pingasuarusingmit.

qqau-part.3sg this.week

John arrive-

Intended: John arrived this week.

(Hayashi & Oshima 2015: 783, fn.11)
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(6)

This Month Context: John arrived two weeks ago.
*Jaan tiki-qqau-juq

taqqigijattannit.

qqau-part.3sg this.month

John arrive-

Intended: John arrived this month.

(Hayashi & Oshima 2015: 783, fn.11)

This particular kind of exibility may be related to a third phenomena that is evident
in many graded systems.
In his analysis of the graded system in Gk
uy
u, Cable (2013) discusses how the
intervals for the graded morphemes in this language, though usually dened by an
objective unit of time, exhibit exibility. This exibility is best captured by dening
the intervals with more vague notions like near and current. The near past is usually
used for events taking place yesterday and the current past for events happening today.
However, the tenses are more exible and their acceptability depends on complex
pragmatic considerations (Cable 2013: 224). For example, Cable shows that in the
general case the near past is not possible with events taking place before yesterday,
(7-a). However, with certain verbs like kua `die', several days ago is considered near
enough to use the near past, (7-b).
(7)

Gk
uy
u Near Past
a.

Mwangi narainaga

(*iyo).

Mwangi n-a-ra-in-aga

(*iyo)

nrp-dance-pst.ipfv day.before.yesterday

Mwangi asrt-3sg.subj`Mwangi was dancing.'

Speaker judgment: Not correct is Mwangi was dancing two days ago.
b.

Guuka

narakwire

(iyo).

Guuka

n-a-ra-ku-ire

(iyo)

nrp-die-pst.pfv day.before.yesterday

grandfather asrt-3sg.subj`Grandfather died.'
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Speaker judgment: With or without iyo, could be said if he died several
days ago.
(Cable 2013: 224)
The exibility of Gk
uy
u near and current past appears to depend on the type of
event and with what frequency this type of event usually occurs. Bochnak & Klecha
(2015) propose to capture this exibility for a similar graded tense system in Luganda
by analyzing the intervals using the semantics of gradable adjectives. Their analysis
and whether it can be extended to Mvskoke is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Whereas most descriptive works on Mvskoke list adjacent intervals for each tense,
Innes et al. (2004) provide a second, and seemingly incompatible, description of the
past tense system in their teaching grammar. Innes and her co-authors separate
Recent Past (P1) from the other pasts, which they claim cover overlapping time
spans which begin yesterday and extend into the past. Under this view, middle (P2),
distant (P3) and remote (P5) pasts dier in how far back in time they extend.
(8)

Innes et al.'s (2004) description of Mvskoke tenses
Recent Past

(P1)

a short time has passed

Middle Past

(P2)

from yesterday to one year ago

Distant Past

(P3)

from yesterday to a long time ago

Remote Past

(P5)

from yesterday to mythic past
(Innes et al. 2004: 119, 135)

These very dierent descriptions of the time spans associated with the Mvskoke tense
naturally raise the question of whether Martin's and Innes et al.'s description is more
accurate. The dierence between the descriptions reects two structures that graded
tense systems have been shown to have cross-linguistically.
According to diagnostics developed by Hayashi (2011), South Ban Inuktitut,
Gk
uy
u (Cable 2013), and Luganda (Klecha & Bochnak 2016) have been shown to
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have graded tense systems in which the tenses cover overlapping, nested intervals of
time. The same diagnostics have shown that Medumba (Mucha 2017) has a graded
tense system in which the tenses cover disjoint, adjacent intervals. In Chapter 4, I apply these diagnostics to Mvskoke for the rst time and present novel data adjudicating
between the descriptions above.
The data I present in Chapter 3 motivates a split in the tense system between
Pasts 1-3 which I show are sensitive to graded temporal intervals and Past 5 which I
argue is not graded. In making this argument, I build on a early descriptive work on
the Mvskoke language that hints at a more complex system than those represented
in either of the tables above. In the earliest descriptions of the tense system, native
speakers and linguists have expressed the intuition that there is a divide between
Pasts 1-3 and Past 5. Past 5 is most often used at remote times compatible with the
interval listed in (2) and (8), such as in folktales and to describe events long past.
However, many have noticed that it has a wider use.
Several authors agree that Past 5 does not take part in the graded system of the
rst three past tenses but can be used for any past time. They label it historic past
(Buckner & Herrod 1860) or indenite past (Loughridge & Hodge 1890). Grayson
(1885), a native speaker of Mvskoke, also sets Past 5 apart from the other tenses.
He labels it past perfect tense in his description and does not translate it as having
a graded time span like the other tenses. Martin also notes the wider use of Past
5 in his 2010 paper. He mentions that in relative clauses, Past 5 seems to have a
nongraded meaning. Martin writes it shifts time and is simply vague about when
in the past the event occurred (Martin 2010: 54).

2.2 Verb grades and aspect
As this dissertation deals with Mvskoke tenses, some background on the aspectual
operators is warranted. In Mvskoke every verb is inected for aspect through a
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process of stem-internal ablaut called verb grades in the Muskogeanist literature.1
In her early work on Mvskoke, Haas (1940) classied the rst three of these grades as
completive and the last two as incompletive. Table 2.1 illustrates the ablaut patterns.

Table 2.1.

Mvskoke aspectual ablaut following Haas (1940) and Martin (2011)

Verb Grade
Zero Grade
Aspirating Grade
Falling Tone Grade
Lengthening Grade
Nasalizing Grade

zgr
hgr
fgr
lgr
ngr

Root
nisnisnisnisnis-

Stem
nisníhsnî:sni:sn:n s-

Example
nis-ás
níhs-is
nî:s-is
ni:s-ís
n:n s-is

Gloss
`Buy it!'
`he bought it (today)'
`he has bought it'
`he is buying it'
`he keeps buying it'

There are three ablaut patterns that are relevant for the data in this dissertation.
The rst is the Lengthening Grade (lgr). Verb stems inected for the lgr have a
lengthened nal vowel and high tone across the word. As is suggested by the gloss
in Table 2.1, I argue this pattern expresses imperfective aspect. The second is the
Falling Tone Grade (fgr). Verb stems inected for the fgr have a lengthened nal
vowel with falling tone on that vowel. I propose this pattern expresses perfective or
perfect aspect. The third is the Aspirating Grade (hgr). The hgr usually involves
inxed aspiration in the coda of the nal syllable of the stem. On my account, this
pattern expresses perfective aspect. In the next section I present some foundational
data on the verb grades and address some peculiar tense-aspect interactions. I then
sketch a way to think about these interactions and the semantics I assume for the verb
grades. Although the semantics of the verb grades and the tense-aspect interactions
are complex, for the sake of having a compositional semantics, I take a univocal
approach to the verb grades and propose a basic semantics upon which I build in the
subsequent chapters.
1 See

Haas (1940) and Martin (2011) for detailed morpho-phonological descriptions.
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2.2.1 Aspect and Pasts 1-3
In Mvskoke texts and speech, the lgr and the fgr are the most commonly used
verb grades. With Pasts 1, 2, and 3 the lgr is associated with an on-going event
interpretation.2
lgr with Pasts 1-3

(9)

a.

Nēsis.
ni:s-êys-s
buy.

lgr-p1-ind

`He/she was buying it.' (today up to last night)
b.

(Martin 2011: 257)

Nēsvnks.
ni:s-ánk-s
buy.

lgr-p2-ind

`He/she was buying it.'
c.

(Martin 2011: 265)

Nēsemvts.
ni:s-imát-s
buy.

lgr-p3-ind

`He/she was buying it.'

(Martin 2011: 266)

The fgr is the most common aspectual inection for Pasts 2 and 3 and corresponds to a completed event interpretation.
(10)

fgr with Pasts 2 and 3

a.

Nēsvnks.
nî:s-ánk-s
buy.

fgr-p2-ind

`He/she bought it.
2 The lgr,

(Martin 2011: 265)

according to Martin (2011), is not common with Pasts 2 and 3 but is possible.
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b.

Nēsemvts.
nî:s-imát-s
buy.

fgr-p3-ind

`He/she bought it.'

(Martin 2011: 266)

This pattern strongly suggests that lgr expresses imperfective aspect and fgr
perfective aspect. Curiously, fgr does not co-occur with Past 1, instead Mvskoke
employs a dierent strategy to communicate a completed event in the P1-interval.

2.2.2 Past 1 Perfective
A common trait with Eastern Muskogean languages, there are two ways to express
Past 1 depending on whether the event is to be understood as on-going or completed
at some time in the Past 1 interval. An ongoing event involves lgr and the Past 1
tense sux, as illustrated above in (9-a). A completed event, however, is expressed
with the hgr and no overt tense marking.3 These two forms are illustrated in (11).
(11)

Tense and Aspect in the Past 1 Interval
a.

Nēsis.
ni:s-êys-s
buy.

lgr-p1-ind

`He/she was buying it.' (today up to last night)
b.

Nehses.
ní<h>s-is
buy

<hgr>-ind

`He/she [has] bought it.' (today up to last night)

(Martin 2011: 257)

3 The hgr takes on various forms depending on the phonological content of the stem. Although
it usually involves inxed aspiration, between two consonants the inx is the vowel /-ey /.
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There are several analytical options for this construction, however for the purposes
of this dissertation, I assume that the `hgr + unmarked' constructions are a surface
realization of both the underlying category of perfective aspect and Past 1. This
might arise due to joint contextual allomorphy; hgr realizes perfective aspect in the
environment of a Past 1 tense node and Past 1 surfaces as ∅ in the environment
of a perfective Asp0 . In adopting this approach, I predict that `hgr + unmarked'
constructions should pattern with Past 1 as an evidential tense encoding a moment
of coming to believe. Another option for the `hgr + unmarked' would be to treat
the combination of verb grade and tense as a grammatical construction associated
with a particular meaning. On this Construction Morphology approach, hgr would
not have a single lexical semantics that combines compositionally with the rest of the
structure to yeild the range of interpretations we see. Instead, hgr with an unmarked
verb would be a construction associated with a perfective Past 1 interpretation. See
Booij (2013) for an overview of this type of approach.4

2.2.3 Aspect and Present Tense
The pattern of meanings associated with each verb grade becomes more complicated when they combine with (morphologically unexpressed) present tense. As
seen in (12) and as expected from its behavior with Past tenses, the lgr most often
presents an event as on-going. When it combines with a positional verb like leyk`sit', it presents the mid-point of assuming that position as in-progress, (12-a). When
it combines with a property concept like enokk- `sick' it presents the change of state
as in-progress, (12-b).5
4 According

to most modern Mvskoke speakers, the hgr does not co-occur with the other past
tenses. The restriction of hgr to Past 1 may be the result of language change. Loughridge & Hodge
(1890) provide paradigms for all ve past tenses in which they combine freely with each verb grade.
Haas (1940) also provides data showing that Pasts 2-4 can combine with the hgr.
5 Although

property concept terms like `sick' are stative in English, it is unknown whether the
root enokk- `sick' in Mvskoke is stative, eventive, or underspecied. Because of this gap in our
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(12)

a.

Likes.
leyk-ís
sit.sg.

lgr-ind

`He/she is sitting down.' (getting seated)
b.

Enokkes.
ino:kk-ís

lgr-ind

sick.

`He/she is getting sick.'

(Martin 2011: 254)

Although these examples align with the pattern of lgr expressing imperfective asepct,
when it combines with a predicate like `fall', Martin notes that lgr can describe either
an on-going event of falling or a recently completed fall.
(13)

Latkes.
la:tk-ís
fall.

lgr-ind

`It's falling (right now).' /`It fell (up to a few seconds ago).'
(Martin 2011: 258)
Furthermore, as will be seen in the next section, the lgr is regularly used for completed events at remote past times with Past 5. Thus, although lgr is most often
associated with on-going event interpretations, it is compatible with completed events
in certain environments.
With present tense, the fgr has a semantics much like the resultative reading
of the perfect in English. Martin labels this aspectual grade the resultative stative,
capturing the fact that when it applies to a positional verb like leyk- `sit' it describes
knowledge, it is possible that the verb grades coerce an eventive interpretation of a stative root or
apply to an eventive root.
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the state of being seated that results from the event of assuming that position. When
it applies to a property concept, this grade describes the state that results from a
change of state.
(14)

a.

Likes.
lêyk-is
sit.sg.

fgr-ind

`He/she is sitting down.' (already in that position)
b.

Enokkēpet

os.

inokk-î:p-it

ó:-s

fgr-ss be.lgr-ind

sick-ip.

`He/she got sick.' (and is sick now)

(Martin 2011: 255)

The fgr requires both the event and its result state to hold in the topic time interval. When it combines with present tense, the result state must hold at the utterance
time but the event necessarily occurs in the recent past. Since most events are not
instantaneous, a completed event cannot be contained within the moment of speech.
To unify the present tense and past tense uses of the fgr, one could understand the
event to take place within an Extended Now (McCoard 1976). Consider the example
below, where the verb is in the present tense, but is compatible with the temporal
adverb fvccv likat `high noon'. The fgr contributes both that the event of arriving
was completed and that the result state is ongoing.
(15)

Vncēpanat

fvccv likat

vlakes.

an-ci:pa:n-a:t

fácca leyk-â:t

alâ:k-is

1sg.dat-boy-comp right sit.sg.lgr-comp come.sg.

fgr-ind

`My son is here since noon.'
Speaker comment: He came and stayed and hasn't left yet.
(RMM-Mus-03/16/2021)
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Given this interpretation of fgr with the present tense, I assume that fgr can realize
either perfective or perfect aspect. Due to the incompatibility of perfective aspect
with present tense, in present tensed constructions only the perfect interpretation of
fgr with the result state inference is possible.

2.2.4 Aspect and Past 5
The remoteness of an event marked with Past 5 depends on the verb grade. When
Past 5 combines with the lgr, it refers to a time more remote than a year ago, as seen
in (16). With Past 5, the lgr almost always yields a completed event interpretation.
When P5 combines with the fgr, it covers more recent times, as seen in (17).
(16)

Pokkeccakvtēs.
pókkicc-a:k-atí:-s

lgr-p5-ind

play.ball-pl.

`They played stickball.' (long ago)
(17)

(RH-Sem-07/13/2019)

Pokkeccakvtēs.
pokkicc-â:k-ati:-s

fgr-p5-ind

play.ball-pl.

`They played stickball.' (recently)

(RH-Sem-07/13/2019)

It is unclear why similar recency eects are not attested with Pasts 2 and 3. However,
since the lgr is rare with Pasts 2 and 3, there may indeed by recency eects that have
not yet been discovered. Indeed, the recency eects with Past 5 went unnoticed until
2019 when Jack Martin and myself independently discovered the contrast represented
in (16) and (17).
In the next section, I sketch a way to think about the meaning contribution of the
lgr and the fgr and lay out the semantics I will assume for the verb grades moving

forward.
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2.2.5 Semantic Assumptions for Mvskoke Verb Grades
In this dissertation I will attempt to provide a univocal account for each verb
grade and derive the apparent meaning dierences. This contrasts with a second,
viable approach that would treat the verb grade together with tense as a grammatical
construction. This univocal approach to the verb grades raises several puzzles when
it comes to the lgr and the fgr. First, as we saw above, although lgr most often
receives ongoing event interpretations, it can receive completed event interpretations
to describe an immediate past punctual event as in (13) or to describe a remote past
event with Past 5 as seen in (16). Secondly, fgr appears to have a current result state
inference similar to a perfect aspect with present tense, but is used as a perfective
with Pasts 2, 3, and 5. These puzzles are summarized below.
(18)

Puzzles for lgr and fgr
1.lgr appears to have both ongoing and completed event interpretations.
2.fgr appears to have components of meaning associated with both perfect and perfective aspect.

Smith (1991) proposes a separate aspectual category for aspects exhibiting properties characteristic of both imperfective and perfective - a category she calls neutral
aspect. The Russian imperfective is an example of the type of aspectual operator
this term was intended to cover. The Russian imperfective allows for both on-going
readings and completed readings (the so-called factual imperfective reading). As
reported by Grønn (2008), a verb in the imperfective can have ongoing, habitual, or
completed event interpretations, as illustrated in (19).
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(19)

Ja

obedal.

1.nom dine-impf.past
`I was having dinner.' (at some particular time)
`I used to have dinner.' (regularly)
`I have had dinner.' (today)

(Grønn 2008: 155)

In what follows I sketch an analysis of the lgr and fgr that draws on competition
accounts of the Russian imperfective and perfective developed by Grønn (2008) and
Altshuler (2014).
On Grønn's analysis, the Russian imperfective is an unmarked aspectual form
that is not assigned a specic meaning, but becomes associated with ongoing event
interpretations by standing in opposition to the perfective. The perfective aspectual
form, in contrast with the unspecied imperfective, does encode a temporal relation that enforces a complete event interpretation. In cases where this opposition
is neutralized, the Russian imperfective is pragmatically strengthened, so as to have
a completed event interpretation. One environment where the competition between
forms is neutralized is in contexts where the result state of the event is irrelevant.
The Russian perfective is associated with a result perfect interpretation. According
to Altshuler (2014), the sentence in (20) is only felicitous in a context where the
window is open. If the window is closed in the context of utterance, speaker would
not be able to use the perfective because of the conicting inference that the result of
opening the window still holds. In these contexts, speakers use the imperfective and
it receives a complete event interpretation.
(20)

Ja
I

otkry-l

okno.

pfv.open-pst window

`I (have) opened the window.'

(Altshuler 2014: 767)
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(21)

Ja
I

otkr-yva-l

okno.

open-ipfv-pst window

`I (have) opened the window.'

(Altshuler 2014: 767)

Turning to Mvskoke lgr and fgr, I propose we can think of these aspectual operators
as interacting along the same lines as the Russian imperfective and perfective. I sketch
my proposal by looking at the two aspectual operators when they combine with Past
5. The crucial Mvskoke data is repeated below. When P5 combines with the fgr, the
event is understood to have been completed in the recent past, from now up to a year
ago. When P5 combines with the lgr, the even is understood to have been complete
in the distant past, longer ago than one year from the utterance time. Although
a formal analysis of the recency eects of these aspects with Past 5 is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, I propose an explanation that draws on the analysis of the
Russian factual imperfective.
(22)

Pokkeccakvtēs.
pókkicc-a:k-atí:-s

lgr-p5-ind

play.ball-pl.

`They played stickball.' (long ago)
(23)

Pokkeccakvtēs.
pokkicc-â:k-ati:-s

fgr-p5-ind

play.ball-pl.

`They played stickball.' (recently)

(RH-Sem-07/2019)

I propose that the recency eect of the fgr with P5 it is likely due to its result state
inference. As we saw in (15), the fgr is associated with a relevant current result
inference when it combines with present tense. I suggest that, when it combines with
P5 which I will argue is a general past tense and compatible with all past time, it
becomes implausible for the result state to continue into the present if the event took
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place longer than a year ago. To avoid this implausible inference, speakers use the lgr
for remote past events. Furthermore, the culmination implicature associated with the
lgr when it combines with P5 could be explained as pragmatic strengthening of the
lgr when the fgr is ruled out as an alternative. An open empirical question is

whether similar recency eects are seen with Pasts 2 and 3. This approach predicts
that there would be recency eects.
In conclusion, in this dissertation I will gloss lgr as imperfective aspect and fgr
as perfective aspect. The semantics that I assume for these grades will gloss over the
culmination implicature of lgr and the result state inference of fgr. Their precise
semantics and interaction with each other are a subject for future research to make
precise.

2.3 Evidentiality
This dissertation deals in a large part with evidential inferences associated with
the past tenses. There are, however, other morphemes and constructions that are
associated with evientiality. As will become clear in Chapter 3, directness of evidence
is very important for the use of a sentence with Pasts 1-3. Relatedly, Mvskoke has
several strategies for signaling indirect evidence.
(24)

Strategies for signaling indirectness of evidence.
1. Embedding under a verb of saying
2. Using the inferential evidential, -vcok
3. Using the indirect evidential, -vttis
4. Using the auxiliary construction, -vt haketv
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2.3.1 Embedding under verbs of saying
The rst strategy is to embed the proposition in question under a verb of saying,
usually marked with the impersonal passive -ho-. This strategy is used by convention
in folktales and was employed quite frequently by my language consultants. The
examples below illustrate this strategy as used in contexts where the evidence source
is a newspaper article, although the strategy is also used to indicate a report or
hearsay evidence.
(25)

Newspaper Article Present Context: Imagine you read an article that said
On April 13, the President will be in Oklahoma, the next day he will travel
to Kansas. It is April 13th today, so he is in Oklahoma right now. You are
pleasantly surprised to learn this and tell your husband who just walked in.
Wvcenv

Mēkko Oklvhomvn

vlakes,

wacína

mí:kko oklahóma-n

alâ:k-is

washington chief

oklahoma-acc arrive.sg.pfv-ind

#(mahokes).
#(ma:<hô:>k-is)

pass.pfv>-ind)

#(say<

`The President is in Oklahoma, it was said.'
Speaker Comment: You need mahokes to indicate you read it or heard about
it in the news.

(RMM-Mus-04/13/2021)
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(26)

Newspaper Article P1 Context: Imagine that you read recently in the newspaper that the President was in Oklahoma yesterday. How would you tell
this to a friend?
Paksvnkē Wvcenv

Mēkko Oklvhomvn

vlakvceken,

paksankí: wacína

mí:kko oklahóma-n

ala:k-acík-in

yesterday washington chief

oklahoma-acc arrive.sg-infr-ds

kērkuehocis.

/

mahokis.

ki:ìkoy<ho:>c-êys-s

/

ma:<ho:>k-êys-s

announce<pass.ipfv>-p1-ind / say<pass.ipfv>-p1-ind
`Yesterday the President was in Oklahoma, they were announcing/ they were
saying (recently).'

(RMM-Mus-04/13/2021)

2.3.2 Inferential -vcok
The second strategy utilizes a sux that Martin (2011) categorizes as a deductive morpheme. This sux, -vcok/-vcek, is used when the speaker infers that the
prejacent proposition is true without directly witnessing it. Martin documents that

-vcok is compatible with a variety of evidence sources including olfactory and auditory evidence (Martin 2011: 309-310). It is also compatible with inference from visual
evidence, as in (27).
(27)

Visual Evidence Context: You drive up to your friend's house and see his car
parked outside.
Vnhesse

cuko tvklikvcoks.

an-híssi

cóko tak-lêyk-acok-s

1sg.dat-friend house loc-sit.sg.pfv-

`My friend is here (at the house).'
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infr-ind
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)

Although it is not clear that inference is involved, -vcok is compatible with evidence
from written reports, as in (28).
(28)

Newspaper Article Present Context: Imagine you read an article that said
On April 13, the President will be in Oklahoma, the next day he will travel
to Kansas. It is April 13th today, so he is in Oklahoma right now. You are
pleasantly surprised to learn this and tell your husband who just walked in.
Wvcenv

Mēkko Oklvhomvn

vlakvcoks.

wacína

mí:kko oklahóma-n

alâ:k-acok-s

washington chief

oklahoma-acc arrive.sg.pfv-

infr-ind

`The President must be in Oklahoma.'
Speaker Comment: Because we can't see [the President], we need -vcoks.
(RMM-Mus-04/13/2021)
When used with a rst person subject, -vcok communicates that the speaker somehow doesn't have knowledge of their actions through direct experience. In example
(29), the use of embedded form -vcek on the verb lvtketv `to fall' indicates that the
speaker only infered that they fell and don't remember experiencing the event.
(29)

Context: Imagine that you had a fall and remember it, and now you nd out
that Mary has learned about your fall from others' telling her.
a.

Tvklatkvyan

Milē

keriyes.

tak-lâ:tk-ay-â:n

Méyli: kiì<êyy>-is

loc-fall.pfv-1sg.ag-comp.ds Mary know<pfv.p1>-ind

`Mary learned that I fell down.'
b.

#Tvklvtikvyvceken

Milē

tak-lat<éy>k-ay-acík-in

Méyli: kiì<êyy>-is

infr-ds Mary

loc-fall<pfv>-1sg.ag-
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keriyes.

know<pfv.p1>-ind

`Mary learned that I must have fallen down.'
Speaker Comment: That makes me think that I got a concussion from
the fall and can't remember it happening.

(RMM-Mus-04/06/2021)

2.3.3 Indirect -vttis
A third strategy for indirect evidentce contexts is using the morpheme -vttis (often
preceded by the mediopassive -ip ). Martin (2011) presents a possible decomposition of
the construction as a combination of the happenstance sux -vt and the concessive

-tis (Martin 2011: 312). Another possibility is that the ending is a contracted form
of an auxiliary construction with Past 1 -vt hakis. Whether it can be decomposed is
an open question for future research that I do not attempt to answer here.
The construction, which Martin labels discovered change, is used when the
speaker realizes that something happened after it took place. For instance, speakers
use -vttis to say they forgot their phone, but only when some time has passed between
the moment of forgetting and their realization.
(30)

Forgotten Phone Context:

Imagine you leave to go to work, but when you

get in your car you realize you forgot your cell phone. When you go back
inside to get it, your spouse asks you why you're back.
a.

Setem ponahokv

cvhosētt

os.

is-iti-m- pona:hoká ca-ho:s-î:t-t
telephone

ó:-s

1sg.pat-forget-ip.pfv-ss be.ipfv-ind

`I have forgotten the phone.'
b.

#Setem ponahokv cvhosehpvttis.
is-iti-m- pona:hoká ca-hos-í<h>p-átteys
telephone

1sg.pat-forget-ip<pfv.p1>-

`I forgot the phone.'
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evid

Speaker Comment: I would say this if I got where I was going and then
realized I'd forgotten my phone.
(LSB-Mus-06/2017,LT-Mus-10/06/2021)
The ending is also used when the speaker discovers evidence of the results of an
event, such as a message on an answering machine (31) or hair trimmings on the oor
(32).
(31)

Answering Machine Context: Imagine you were gone from your house for
the day, but when you returned you saw two messages from Sam on your
answering machine.
Sam vhokkolan avnhuehikvttis.
sa:m ahókkola-n a:-an-hoyh<êy>k-átteys
Sam twice-acc dir-1sg.dat-call<pfv.p1>-

evid

`Sam (apparently) called me twice.'
(32)

(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)

Hair Cut Context: Imagine you are watching your grandson today. You leave
him in a room for a little while and when you come back you see scissors and
cut hair on the carpet. He cut his hair! Later you're telling a friend about
this.
Vm

ososwv

ekv-isse warehpvttis.

am-

osóswa

iké-yssi wa:ì-í<h>p-átteys

1sg.dat- grandchild hair

cut-ip<pfv.p1>-

`My grandson (apparently) cut his hair.'

evid
(RMM-Mus-06/18/2019)

There is much about this evidential morpheme that needs to be explored. There is
quite a bit of overlap between -vttis and -vcok in the types of indirect evidence they
is compatible with. What precisely is the semantic dierence between them is an
open question. One dierence, however, is that it is possible to express an inference
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about an ongoing event with -vcok, (33-a). But -vttis seems to involve past temporal
reference, (33-b).
(33)

Singing Context: A little boy playing detective hears the sound of a woman
singing in the next room. He concludes...
a.

Hoktē yvhikvcoks.
hoktí: yaheyk-acók-s
woman sing.ipfv-

infr-ind

`A woman is singing.'
Speaker Comment: That's saying, I'm hearing a woman singing.
(DLR-Mus-6/3/2019)
b.

#Hoktē yvhikēt
hoktí:

owvttis.

yahéyk-i:-t ô:w-átteys

woman sing-dur-ss be.pfv-

evid

`(Apparently) a woman was singing.'
Speaker Comment: That puts it in the past. She's not currently singing.
(LT-Mus-10/13/2021)

-Vttis does not seem to restrict the time of the event to a certain past temporal
interval. Example (30), (31), and (32) have events taking place in the P1-interval
(today to last night). However, speakers accept -vttis even when the event seems to
have taken place quite some time ago.
(34)

Campsite Context: Imagine you are hiking along and see the remains of what
looks like an old re pit. you conclude someone must have camped here.
Hvpo hayē

sasvttis.

hapó: ha:y-í:

sâ:s-áttis

evid

camp make-dur be.there.pfv-

48

`Someone was here making camp.'

(DLR-Mus-08/05/2019)

An open question is whether the -vttis ending places any requirements on the recency
of the evidence acquisition time. Can a Mvskoke speaker use -vttis when describing
the remains of a camp they discovered last year? Another open questions concerns the
curious co-occurrence restrictions with temporal adverbs. The evidential -vttis is reportedly unacceptable with the temporal adverb mucv nettv `today', but is acceptable
with paksvnkē `yesterday' and with the conjunction of the two.
(35)

a.

*Mucv-nettv Sam vnhuehkvttis.
moca-nítta

sa:m an-hôyhk-átteys

this-day

Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

evid

Intended: Sam (apparently) called me today.'
b.

Paksvnkē Sam vnhuehkvttis.
paksankí: sa:m an-hôyhk-átteys
yesterday Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

evid

`Yesterday Sam (apparently) called me.'
c.

Paksvnkē momen mucv-nettv Sam vnhuehkvttis.
paksankí: mo:mín moca-nítta sa:m an-hôyhk-átteys
yesterday and

this-day

Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

evid

`Sam (apparently) called me yesterday and today.'
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
Co-occurrence restrictions of this kind again suggest that there is some temporal or
aspectual information encoded in this evidential ending.
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2.3.4 Auxiliary Construction -vt

haketv

The nal strategy for indirect evidence contexts is a special auxiliary construction
involving an embedded shortened form of Past 5 -vt and the verb haketv `to become'
used as an auxiliary. This is a curious construction because the most frequently used
auxiliary in Mvskoke is the copular verb ometv `to be'. Until this data was elicited,
the -vt haketv construction had not been the subject of any linguistic inquiry. The
only mention of this construction to my knowledge is in Loughridge and Hodge's appendix to their 1890 dictionary of Mvskoke. They provide a way to think about this
auxiliary construction in terms of its temporal contribution as a pluperfect construction (Loughridge & Hodge 1890: 231-232). My own proposal, detailed in Chapter 3,
aligns with this characterization of the construction.
The -vt haketv construction appears to be falling out of use in the younger generation of speakers I work with. Not all of the speakers I consulted use this construction,
though they all recognize it. Many of them have re-analyzed the construction. In the
re-analysis, the vowel in the auxiliary is shortened (ha:k- becomes hak-) and the P5
form -at is replaced with the switch reference ending -it. In the following examples,
I do not transcribe the re-analysis but continue to gloss and transcribe the construction as involving Past 5. In the examples below, the English expression in parentheses
reects a common way that speakers translate the auxiliary construction.
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(36)

P1 Auxiliary Construction: Hair Cut Context: Imagine you are watching
your grandson today. You leave him in a room for a little while and when
you come back you see scissors and cut hair on the carpet. He cut his hair!
Later you're telling a friend about this.
ekv-isse tohnvt

Vm

ososwv

ēmēta

am-

osóswa

i:mi-i:tá: iké-yssi tó<h>n-át

1sg.dat- grandchild him-self hair

p5

cut<pfv>-

hakis.
ha:k-êys-s

become.ipfv-p1-ind
`My grandson (happened to) cut his hair himself.'
(37)

(IAH-Sem-06/07/2019)

P2 Auxiliary Construction: Hair Cut Context: Imagine yesterday you were
watching your grandson. You left him in a room for a littel while and when
you came back you saw scissors and hair on the carpet. He cut his own hair!
Today you're telling this to a friend.
Mv vm

ososwv

ekv-isse tahcvt

hakvnks.

ma am-

osóswa

iké-yssi tá<h>c-át

ha:k-ánk-s

dem 1sg.dat- grandchild hair

`My grandson (happened to) cut his hair.'
(38)

p5 become.ipfv-p2-ind

cut<pfv>-

(DLR-Mus-06/17/2019)

P3 Auxiliary Construction: Answering Machine Context: About two years
ago you were gone from your house. When you returned you saw on your
answering machine that Sam had called you.
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Ohrolopē hokkolvnkē

Sam vnhuehkvt

mahen,

Sam an-hôyhk-át

ohìolopí: hokkô:l=ankí: mâ:h-in
year

two=p2

very.pfv-ds Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p5

hakemvts.
ha:k-imát-s

become.ipfv-p3-ind
`About two years ago, Sam (happened to) called me.'
(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)
Evidence that this construction contains a shortened form of Past 5 and not a
dierent morpheme comes from the use of this construction in traditional Mvskoke
Hymns. In Hymns, the construction appears with a present tense auxiliary and is
used as a rhetorical question. The construction appears both with a shortened form
of Past 5 (at instead of atí: ) and with a shortened form of the future tense (aì
instead of aìí: ). These are illustrated below. In both examples the auxiliary bears
phonologically null present tense.
(39)

Aeha! Kut! Cv Hesayecv At The Cross
a.

Aeha! Kut! Cv

Hesayecv

eyhá: kót

hisa:yí:ca

ca-

excl excl 1sg.pat- savior

`Alas! My savior'
b.

Catv pvlatkvt

haks?

cá:ta palâ:tk-át

hâ:k-s

blood fall.tpl.pfv-

p5 become.pfv-ind

`Did his blood really spill?'
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(40)

Elkv-este Toyis And Must This Body Die?
a.

Ekvnv wikiyof
i:kaná weyk-ey-ô:f
land

let.go-1sg.ag-when

`When I leave this land'
b.

Estvmin

haks?

vyar

istamêy-n ay-á:ì

hâ:k-s

1sg.ag.fut become.pfv-ind

where-acc go.sg`Where will I go?'

Martin (2011) analyses haks as a question marker. It's use as a question and the
future form of this construction is a topic for future research. A deeper investigation
is needed to understand the meaning contributed by this construction beyond the
temporal-evidential component I argue for in Chapter 3.
The various indirect strategies in Mvskoke are important because, as mentioned
above, I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that Past 1-3 are associated with a direct evidence
inference. Specically, Mvskoke speakers have the intuition that using Pasts 1-3 on a
main verb commits them to having direct evidence for their assertion. As will become
clear in Chapter 3, using Past 5 for recent events is another strategy in Mvskoke for
describing events in indirect evidence contexts.

2.4 Nominals in Mvskoke
In Mvskoke a noun may appear in a bare form without an accompanying article
and may or may not be marked with case. There are no overt articles in Mvskoke,
instead a noun can be bare or preceded by one of three demonstratives. The most
commonly used demonstrative is the medial demonstrative mv. This demonstrative
is used in texts (to the exclusion of the other demonstratives) for discourse anaphora.
Together the demonstratives make a three-way distinction in distance.
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(41)

Demonstratives
a.

heyv /hiyá/ `this' - Proximal

b.

mv /ma/ `that' - Medial

c.

vsi /aséy/ `yonder' - Distal

Many of Mvskoke's nouns are deverbal. Nouns referring to humans (including kinship
terms), animals, food, plants, body parts, and some items of clothing are usually not
derived from verbs. However, Mvskoke makes extensive use of four nominalizers:
an agentive nominalizer -a, an experiencer/executor nominalizer -i:, and two event
nominalizers -ka and -ita. The agent nominalizer is of particular interest in Chapter 5
since its presence is important in distinguishing between a tensed deverbal noun and
a verb with a tensed relative clause ending. I return to this point when I introduce
the nominal tenses in Chapter 5.
Nouns describing roles or professions are often deverbal nouns with the agent nominalizer. According to Martin, the roots of these nouns are inected for imperfective
aspect (Martin 2011: 107). Below I illustrate the morphological make-up of three
deverbal nouns that feature prominently in this dissertation.
(42)

a.

mvhayv
(i)m-ahá:y-a
3.dat-teach.ipfv-nmlz

`teacher'
b.

ohhēcv
oh-hí:c-a
loc-see.ipfv-nmlz

`overseer/ principal'
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c.

fvccēcv
facc-í:c-a
right/true-caus.ipfv-nmlz
`judge' (lit. one who makes right)

A predominantly head-marking language, Mvskoke nevertheless has morphological
case on nouns. Case is largely optional and makes a binary distinction between subject
(-t, nominative) and nonsubject (-n, accusative). In a DP, demonstratives are the only
pre-nominal elements. Nominal modiers, such as adjectives and tense morphemes,
follow the noun and case, if present, is cliticized to the nal element in the DP.
(43)

mv esletketv

catē

vnkēn

ma is-litk-itá

cá:t-i:

=ankí:=n

dem inst-run-nmlz red-nmlz =p2=acc

`that red bicycle (from earlier)'

(RMM-Mus-09/24/2021 & 4/6/2021)

In the above example, the noun esletketv `bicycle' is a deverbal event nominalization
literally meaning `a thing to run with'. The noun is preceeded by the medial demonstrative and followed by an adjective catē `red' (itself a nominalization of a property
concept term), a nominal tense vnkē `Past 2', and nonsubject (or accusative) case -n.
In this section, I discuss the interpretation of bare NPs (which I consider to be
NPs without articles but which may have case) and demonstrative NPs, focusing
on deniteness and indeniteness. Mvskoke bare nouns are shown to be compatible
with contexts that license both denites and indenites. There is evidence from case
marking that suggests certain denite interpretations of bare nouns are associated
with additional structure, which will become important for the analysis in Chapter
6.

55

2.4.1 Background on Deniteness
In this dissertation, I adopt a view of denites proposed by Schwarz (2009) in
which languages may distinguish between weak and strong denites. Weak denites
cover non-anaphoric denites such as those refering to globally or situationally unique
entities as well as so-called bridging uses of denites for which uniqueness is entailed
by a relation between the denite and its antecedent. Strong denites are anaphoric
to a previously introduced discourse referent.
(44)

Weak Denites
a.

Globally unique

The sun rose at 6:15am.
b.

Situationally unique

The President is giving a speech.
c.

(Uttered in the U.S.)

Bridging
Mary took a community language class.

(45)

The teacher was Seminole.

Strong Denite
Susy met a teacher and a judge. She saw

the judge again the next day.

Whereas strong denites refer to familiar discourse referents, indenites are used to
introduce novel discourse referents. The two indenites in (45), a teacher and a judge
both introduce new discourse referents in to the conversation. Indenites are also
quanticational while denites are referential. Thus two instances of an indenite
NP of the same description introduce two discourse referents of the same description,
but two denite NPs with the same description both refer to the entity they describe.
This is illustrated in example (46) with the NPs a dog and the dog.
(46)

a.

A dog is barking and a dog is sleeping.

b. #The dog is barking and the dog is sleeping.
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In (46-a), each instance of the indenite NP a dog introduces a discourse referent. As
a result, the sentence is understood to be talking about two dogs - one who is barking
and another who is sleeping. Example (46-b) is a contradiction because the denite
NP the dog refers to a single, unique dog and asserts that the dog is both barking and
sleeping. Since the two predicates are incompatible with each other, the sentence is
anomalous.
Finally, denite NPs refer to a unique or maximal entity. Thus, in a context with
multiple possible referents for the NP, a plural denite must refer to the entire group
and a singular denite is infelicitous. An indenite, however, is felicitous in such a
context and the sentence is understood to be about just one of the possible referents.
(47)

Context: There are ve stray dogs on the side of the road. One runs out into
the road.
a.

Watch out! #The dog is running into the road.

b.

Watch out! #The dogs are running into the road. (unless all ve dogs
are running into the road)

c.

Watch out! A dog is running into the road.

In the next section I demonstrate that Mvskoke bare nouns are compatible both with
contexts that license denite NPs and with ones that license indenite NPs.

2.4.2 Bare NPs and Deniteness
Mvskoke bare nouns can introduce novel discourse referents and refer back to
familiar discourse referents, though speakers vary in their judgments on the last point.
In the example below, the rst sentence introduces two new discourse referents, a
group of raccoons and a snake. Each of these is introduced by a bare noun. The bare
noun wotkon `raccoon' is marked with case, but the bare noun cetto `snake' is not.
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(48)

a.

Wotkon

hecahkis

momen

cetto

mo

wótko-n

hic-á<h>k-ey-s

mo:mín

cítto

=mó

raccoon-acc see-pl<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind and

snake =also

hehcis.
hí<h>c-ey-s
see<perf.p1>-1sg.ag-ind
`I saw some raccoons and I also saw a snake.'
b.

(Mv)

cettot

solotket

ahyes.

(má)

cítto-t

solo:tk-ít

á:<h>y-is

snake-nom slide.ipfv-ss go.sg<pfv.p1>-ind
`The snake slid away.'
(dem)

Speaker #1's Comment: Without mv it sounds like there's more than
one snake.

(LSB-Mus-06/2017)

Speaker #2's Comment: With or without mv, it's the same snake.
(PF-Mus-7/6/2021)
In the second sentence we nd that either a bare noun cettot `snake' or a demonstrative
NP mv cettot `that snake' can refer back to the snake mentioned in the rst sentence.
The ability of a bare noun to function as a strong (anaphoric) denite is an area of
speaker variation. The rst speaker's comment indicates that bare nouns are unable
to receive a strong denite interpretation and be anaphoric to a previous mention.
However, the second speaker's comment demonstrates that some speakers do allow
bare nouns to be interpreted as strong denites.
In texts, demonstrative NPs are predominantly used for discourse anaphora, but
bare nouns regularly receive weak denite interpretations, referring to a globally or
contextually unique referent, such as `the sun' in (49) or `the owner of the spring' in
(50).
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(49)

hvset

raklvtkēpen,

hasí-t

ì-ak-látk-i:p-ín

sun-nom dir-loc-fall.sg-ip.ipfv-ds
`and the sun was going down...'
(50)

(Haas & Hill 2015: 341)

Context: A man who owned a spring wanted to catch the thing that was
muddying his spring, so he made a tar gure and when Rabbit came to the
spring, he got stuck in the tar gure.
Momof,

ueki-pucaset

vlahket

mo:m-ô:f

oykey-pocá:si-t

alá<h>k-it

be.so.impf-when

spring-owner-nom arrive.sg<pfv>-ss

eshēcvtēs.
ìs-hi:c-atí:-s
inst-see.ipfv-p5-ind

`Then

the owner of the spring came and found him.'
(Haas & Hill 2015: 619)

In Johnson (2019a), I nd that the presence or absence of case does not aect the
ability of a bare noun to have indenite or denite interpretations.
(51)

ē-mowis

kowet,

i:-mõweys kõw-it,

{hoktē(t)

/

mv hoktē(t)}

{hokti:(-t)

/

ma hokti:(-t)}

nom) / dem woman(-nom)}

refl-do.so think-ss, {woman(-

tak-lvtikes.
ta:k-latêy k-is
loc-fall.pfv-ind

`A/The

girl fell deliberately.'

(Johnson 2019a: 138)
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In the literature on the denotation of bare nouns cross-linguistically, there is some
debate on whether bare nouns can truly have indenite interpretations (Carlson 1977;
Chierchia 1998; Dayal 2004). Because indenite meanings can be derived without the
presence of an indenite article (e.g. Derived Kind Predication (Chierchia 1998) or
pseudo-noun incorporation (Dayal 2004)), it is important to show that a bare noun
has unrestricted indenite interpretations before one can be sure of the nature of the
indenite meaning. I will show that Mvskoke bare nouns do indeed have unrestricted
indenite interpretations. Specically, Mvskoke bare nouns are compatible with three
environments that only allow indenites.
First, in a context that establishes several entities that t the description dog, a
bare noun can be used to pick out one from among the group. This is seen in(52).
A denite NP would be incompatible with this context because it does not have a
unique referent for the NP efvt `dog'. Furthermore, since the NP is the agent of an
intransitive verb, pseudo-noun incorporation (which is only possible for an internal
argument) cannot explain the indenite reading we nd here.
(52)

Context: Imagine you are driving with a friend and there is a group of ve
stray dogs by the side of the road. Then one dog runs in front of the car and
you want to warn your friend.
I!

Efvt

puhomvn

lētkes!

éy

ifá-t

po-hóma-n

li:tk-ís

interj

dog-nom 1pl.pat-front-acc run.sg.ipfv-ind

`Ah! A dog is running in front of us!'

(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)

Secondly, in a sentence with two identical bare nouns, the bare nouns are not
understood to co-refer as we would expect if bare nouns were denite. Instead,
in (53) below, the bare nouns efvt `dog' both introduce a new discourse referent.
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The sentence is felicitous and interpreted as predicating barking and sleeping of two
dierent dogs.
(53)

Efvt

vwohken

cukofvn

efvt

nocēpē

ifá-t

awo:hk-ín

cóko-ofa-n

ifá-t

noc-i:p-í:

dog-nom bark.ipfv-ds house-in-acc dog-nom sleep-ip.ipfv-dur
monks.
mônk-s
be.still.pfv-ind
`A dog is barking, and in the house a dog is still sleeping.'
(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)
Again, the bare noun is the agent subject of an intransitive verb, ruling out pseudonoun incorporation.
A complicating factor with these kinds of sentences is the availability of the numeral hmvke `one' which forces a wide scope indenite interpretation of an NP. Some
speakers strongly prefer to use hvmke `one' to disambiguate in favor of a wide-scope
indenite interpretation of the bare noun. Thus in the following example, the speaker
interprets the bare noun as a denite and the NP wotko hvmket `one raccoon' as an
indenite.
(54)

Wotkot

eton

ohliken,

{

wotkot

/ wotko

wótko-t

itó-n

oh-leyk-ín,

{

wótko-t

/ wótko

raccoon-nom tree-acc loc-sit.sg.ipfv-ds { raccoon-nom / raccoon
hvmket

} fuswv enhompetvn

hâmk-it } fóswv ìn-hompitá-n
one-nom } bird

enhompet

owis.

in-homp-ít

o:w-êy-s

3.poss-food-acc 3.dat-eat.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-p1-ind

`A raccoon was sitting in a tree and a/another raccoon was eating birdseed.'
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Speaker Comment: Without hvmket `another/one' it's the same raccoon doing both.

(LSB-Mus-06/2017)

Gillon (2006) provides a way to think about this preference in terms of domain
restriction. For Gillon, two identical nouns are obligatorily co-referent when the
situation that serves to restrict the domain of the nouns is the same. In (54), there is
no information suggesting the situations are dierent. So without making it clear that
there is another x that is a raccoon in s, the default interpretation is co-reference.
We see the same pressure for co-reference working across sentence boundaries in
(48). However, as (53) demonstrates, when the sentence makes two distinct situations
salient (with the use of cukofvn `in the house'), an indenite reading is available for
the bare noun without the use of the numeral.
Lastly, unrestricted indenites are quanticational and thus able to scope above
or below negation, but indenites derived by other means (such as Derived Kind
Predication or pseudo-noun incorporation) take obligatory low scope. In Mvskoke, a
bare noun is able to scope above negation.
The context in (55) establishes a group of four pastors, one of whom did not laugh.
As such, the context only supports a wide-scope interpretation of the indenite - that
is, there is an x which is a pastor, such that it is not the case that x laughed. A
narrow-scope interpretation of the bare noun will not be felicitous in this context
because it will entail that none of the pastors laughed (i.e. it is not the case that
there is an x which is a pastor and x laughed). In (55), one speaker allows a widescope interpretation for a bare noun (without the numeral hvmke `one') and one does
not.
(55)

Context: There's a group of four pastors. Someone tells a joke and three
pastors laugh, but one doesn't.

62

a.

Erkenvkv hvmket

vpelekvnks.

iìkináka hâmki-t apil-ík-ánk-s
preacher one-nom laugh-neg-p2-ind
`One preacher didn't laugh.'
b.

?Erkenvkv vpelekvnks.

iìkináka

apil-ík-ánk-s

preacher

laugh-neg-p2-ind

Speaker #1 Comment: Yes, that can be one preacher, not necesarily all
of them.

(RMM-Mus-06/08/2021)

Speaker #2 Comment: No, that means none of them laughed.
(PF-Mus-05/26/2021)
I propose that bare nouns are indeed compatible with a wide scope indenite interpretation. The second speaker's judgment can be explained as the result of a preference
for using the numeral hvmke `one' to avoid ambiguity.
In both (55) and (54), the speakers prefer to use hvmke `one/another' for an
unambiguous wide scope reading. Because the numeral expression is available and
unambiguously communicates the wide scope reading, speakers will prefer to use
the simpler expression (the bare noun) to express narrow sope readings. This type of
division of labor between one ambiguous expression and a non-ambiguous expression is
the same kind of competition we saw above with the imperfective (ambiguous between
on-going and complete event interpretations) and the perfective (only compatible
with complete event interpretations). This explanation makes sense of Speaker #1's
intuition in (55) as well as the acceptability of bare nouns in the two other indenite
contexts discussed here. I conclude then, that a bare noun is indeed able to take
wide scope, but it is limited to narrow scope interpretations in certain contexts by
the availability of the numeral hvmke.

63

2.4.3 Proposal for the Structure of Bare Nouns
In summary, this section has demonstrated that Mvskoke bare nouns are ambiguous and able to receive denite and indenite interpretations. I present evidence from
case marking that supports viewing certain instances of bare nouns as projecting additional, although unpronounced, structure. For the purposes of this dissertation, I
will assume that bare nouns project an unpronounced DP-layer with null indenite
and denite determiners.
As argued in Johnson (2019a), Mvskoke case marking is not always optional. Case
marking is obligatory 1) on the second of two internal arguments and 2) on DP's larger
than a denite DP. The link between the size of a DP and case marking is not a novel
observation, but has been noted in other work on Dierential Case Marking languages
(e.g. Turkish (Enç 1991), Niuean (Massam 2001), and Nez Perce (Deal 2010)).
Mvskoke DPs that obligatorily bear morphological case are i) numeral DPs, ii)
quanticational DPs, iii) personal pronouns, iv) demonstrative pronouns, and v) deictic DPs. What all these DPs have in common is structure above the denite/indenite
DP-level. In Johnson (2019a), I propose that case marking is obligatory on DP's projecting additional structure. Since Mvskoke bare nouns can be case marked, it follows
that they are structurally ambiguous and project additional, unpronounced structure
when they are case-marked. There is suggestive evidence that the additional structure
is associated with specicity. However, case marking is falling out of use in younger
Mvskoke speakers, and consequently judgments are increasingly unstable regarding
the semantic correlate of case.
In light of the case-marking data, I propose that bare nouns are (at least) associated with unpronounced indenite and denite determiners. These null determiners
are responsible for the two interpretations available to bare nouns. I illustrate the
proposed structures below.
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(56)

Indenite DP

(57)

DP

Denite DP
DP

D

NP

D

NP

∅∃

N

∅ι

N

As a nal note, the reader may wonder if there is a dierence between the demonstrative mv and the null denite determiner. At this point in the description of
Mvskoke, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that this null element is not a null
version of the demonstrative. Certain speaker judgments, such as those of Speaker #1
in (48), suggest that the null denite determiner can only express weak deniteness
and the demonstrative mv is needed for discourse anaphora. However, this judgment
is not shared by all the speakers I consulted with.
A demonstrative NP and bare nouns are both acceptable in the same kinds of
contexts. They are acceptable for refering to globally unique entities like the sun.
(58)

(mv) hvse
(ma) hasí
(dem) sun
`the sun'
Speaker Comment: That's how I would talk about the sun. [With mv ] it
doesn't mean there's more than one sun.

(PF-Mus-05/18/2021)

They are both acceptable in a context establishing a group of ve dogs. The bare
noun, as we saw in (52), is interpreted as an indenite. Unlike the English denite
article the, which forces the NP to refer to a unique dog, the demonstrative mv does
not require the NP to refer to a unique or maximal entity.
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(59)

Context: Imagine you are driving with a friend and there is a group of ve
stray dogs by the side of the road. Then one dog runs in front of the car and
you want to warn your friend.
I!

(Mv) efvt

puhomvn

lētkes!

éy

(ma) ifá-t

po-hóma-n

li:tk-ís

interj

(dem) dog-nom 1pl.pat-front-acc run.sg.ipfv-ind

`Ah! That/#The/ a dog is running in front of us!'

(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)

Notice that in (58), the Mvskoke demonstrative pattern with an English denite
determiner and not with an English demonstrative. Notice also that the situation is
reversed in (59). I suggest that this, too, is due to the absence of a denite determiner
in the language.
Additionally, demonstrative NPs are not necessarily co-referential. Just as with
bare nouns, two identical demonstrative NPs can appear in a sentence with two
incompatible predicates.
(60)

(Mv) efvt

vwohken,

cukofvn

(mv) efvt

(ma) ifá-t

awo:hk-ín

cóko-ofa-n

(ma) ifá-t

nocēpē

monks.

noc-i:p-í:

mônk-s

(dem) dog-nom bark.ipfv-ds house-in-acc (dem) dog-nom

sleep-ip.ipfv-dur be.still.pfv-ind
`That/a dog is barking, and in the house that/a dog is still sleeping.'
(RMM-Mus-8/3/2021)
From the data seen so far, it is possible that bare nouns can combine with a null
version of the demonstrative. However, we will see data in Chapter 6 that supports
the existence of a null denite determiner in Mvskoke. Anticipating that data and
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argument, I adopt a Fregean semantics for the null denite determiner that encodes
a uniqueness presupposition.
(61)

J ∅ι K = [λPhe,ti : ∃!x.P (x).ιx.P (x)]

For the null indenite determiner, I adopt a basic quantication semantics illustrated
below.
(62)

J ∅∃ K = [λPhe,ti .[λQhe,ti .∃x.P (x)&Q(x)]]

In Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss the temporal interpretation of noun phrases and adjust
these denotations to combine with nouns having both an entity and a temporal argument (i.e. nouns of type he, iti). I leave the semantics of Mvskoke demonstratives
as a question for future research.

2.5 Theoretical Assumptions
2.5.1 Tense and Aspect
In this section, I briey lay out my theoretical assumptions regarding the semantics of tense and aspect. I adopt a Neo-Reichenbachian theory of tense and aspect as
spelled out in Klein (1994). In this framework, there are three temporal parameters
that are relevant for the interpretation of a sentence: the event time (ET), the utterance time (UT), and a third, more abstract time, the topic time (TT). The TT is the
time that the sentence is roughly about and it provides a time at which the truth of
the sentence is evaluated. The TT is overtly expressed with when -clauses in English.
These clauses provide the perspective of the speaker on the event. Klein motivates
sentences having a TT as distinct from the ET by considering English pluperfect
constructions. Consider the triplet of English sentences below.
(63)

a.

When I was in Oklahoma in August, Creek Nation was celebrating the
Green Corn Ceremony.

Past Imperfective
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b.

When I was in Oklahoma in August, Creek Nation celebrated the Green
Corn Ceremony.

c.

Past Perfective

When I was in Oklahoma in August, Creek Nation had (already) celebrated the Green Corn Ceremony.

Past Perfect

All three sentences describe two past intervals, a time when the speaker was in Oklahoma and the time when the Green Corn Ceremony was celebrated. However, only
in (63-c) are the two intervals temporally distinct.
According to Klein, viewpoint aspect serves to provide a relation between the
TT and the ET. In the three sentence above, the when-clause locates the TT of
the sentence and aspect on the main verb provides a relation between the interval
throughout which the event held and the TT interval. In (63-a), imperfective aspect
communicates that the Green Corn Ceremony extended beyond the TT interval and
was perhaps still ongoing by the end of the TT interval. In (63-b), perfective aspect
communicates tha the entire interval during which the Green Corn Ceremony was
celebrated is contained within the TT interval. This entails the ceremony was over
by the time the speaker left Oklahoma. For both these sentences, the TT and the
ET overlap; consequently, the only times that are strictly necessary for the temporal
interpretation of the sentence is the ET and the UT. However, in (63-c), perfect aspect
serves to place the ET (the interval for the Green Corn Ceremony) completely in the
past of the TT interval.
I adopt a formal implementation of tense as a restricted indenite. On this approach, tense existentially quanties over times which are restricted to a contextually
provided TT. This TT is represented as an index on the tense morpheme. I also
adopt relative tense theory in which tenses are evaluated relative to a reference time,
as opposed to being necessarily evaluated relative to the utterance time. For the
highest tense in the clause, this is the UT, represented syntactically as t∗ , following
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Kusumoto (2005). For a lower tense, the reference time is provided by the higher
tense.
In (64) I illustrate with the semantics I give to a general past tense. Formally,
times (t) are a basic semantic type whose domain is a set of intervals (type i). I take
propositions to be functions from situations/world to truth values; they are of type

hs, ti.
(64)

J Pasti Kw0 ,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ≺ t&t0 ⊆ g(i) & P(t0 , w)]]]

The semantics for past tense above accomplishes the role of tense on the Neo-Reichenbachian
perspective (i.e. relating the TT to the UT). It does so through the temporal precendence relation between a time included in the TT and the reference time, which
is saturated by the UT.
The role of aspect, in this framework, is to relate the TT to the ET. I implement this using Davidsonian event semantics. In a manner parallel to tense, aspect
is a function from properties of events to properties of time. Aspectual operators
introduce existential quantication over events and provide a relation between the
temporal trace of the event (τ (e)) and a reference time (which is provided by tense).
I illustrate a basic semantics for perfective and imperfective aspect in (65).
(65)

a.
b.

J ipfv Kw0 ,g = [λPh,sti .[λt0i .[λws0 .∃e.t0 ⊆ τ (e, w0 ) & P (e, w0 ) = T ]]]
J pfv Kw0 ,g = [λPh,sti .[λt0i .[λws0 .∃e.τ (e, w0 ) ⊆ t0 & P (e, w0 ) = T ]]]

Example (66) illustrates the Logical Form (LF) of the past perfective sentence Mary

spoke to Chief Leonard. Following Kratzer (1996), I represent a v P whose head
introduces the external argument.
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(66)

Logical Form for tense and aspect
TP

hsti
T0

t∗

hi, sti
T

AspP

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti

psti

Asp

vP

hh, sti, hi, stii

h, sti

pfv/ipfv

DP

v0

e

he, h, stii
v

VP

hh, sti, he, h, stiii

h, sti

Mary

DP

V

e

he, h, stii

Chief Leonard

speak to

The truth conditions of this sentences are predicted to be those in (67) below.
(66) will be true i there is a past time that is part of a salient interval g(i) and an
event that was temporally contained in that time which was an event of speaking by
Mary to Chief Leonard in the world of evaluation w0 .
(67)

J (66) Kw0 ,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ t∗ &t0 ⊆ g(i) & ∃e.t0 ⊆ τ (e, w0 ) & speak(e, w0 ) &
Ag(e, w0 )=Mary & Th(e, w0 )=Chief Leonard

This is the treatment of tense that I use in Chapters 3 and 4 for the Mvskoke graded
tenses. This particular implementation has the advantage of dealing seamlessly with
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complex tense constructions. These are constructions in which two tense morphemes
appear within a single clause. Arregi & Klecha (2015) have argued that English
perfect consists of a complex tense construction with a lower past tense. Present
perfect is schematized in (68-a) and past perfect as in (68-b).
(68)

a.

Present Perfect: [T P pres [T P past ]]

b.

Past Perfect: [T P past [T P past ]]

On the approach to tense detailed above, the lower past tense is interpreted relative
to the higher tense. An alternative deictic approach to tense (in which it is always
relative to the UT) cannot account for the backshifting in complex tense constructions.
In Chapter 3, I take this approach to a particular complex tense construction in
Mvskoke which involves a lower P5 and a higher tense which is either Past 1, Past 2,
or Past 3.
The semantics in (64) treats tense as existentially quantifying over times. This
quanticational approach to tense faces some challenges when it comes to Mvskoke.
In particular, it makes several inaccurate predictions when it comes to combinatorial possibilities for the Mvskoke tenses and with regard to how they compete with
each other. These are addressed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. An additional
shortcoming is discussed in Chapter 6, when I propose a structural asymmetry between the position of Pasts 1 and 2 in noun phrases and Past 5. These discussions
make reference to a theory of tense in which tenses are features modifying a temporal
pronoun. I therefore sketch this nal theory here.
Since the work of Partee (1973), it has been noted that tense seems to behave
like a pronoun. Partee's famous sentence in (69) demonstrates that a quanticational
theory of tense makes the wrong prediction with respect to the scope of tense with
negation.
(69)

I didn't turn o the oven!
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a.

Incorrect Reading #1: ¬∃t0 .t0 ≺ UT & I turned o the oven at t0

b.

Incorrect Reading #2: ∃t0 .t0 ≺ UT & ¬ I turned o the oven at t0

Neither scope possibility results in correct truth conditions for the sentence. If negation scopes above tense, the sentence should be true only if the speaker never turned
o the stove. If tense scopes over negation, the sentence should be trivially true if
the speaker ever wasn't turning o the stove. Intuitively, the sentence is true only if
the speaker did not turn o the over during a contextually salient past interval.
One way to implement this intuition is the way I have done with a restricted
indenite semantics for tense. Another possibility is to treat tense as a pronoun that
is anaphoric to that salient past interval (Partee 1973; Kratzer 1998; a.o.). On this
theory the tense node in a sentence is a pronoun that receives its value from the
contextual variable assignment function g . Past and present are tense features which
introduce presuppositions on the temporal location of the salient, topical interval. On
this approach, tense is given a structure as in (70) and lexical entries for the tense
node and tense features are given in (71).
(70)

Structure of past tense
T
Ti [pst]

(71)

Denotations for tense node and features
a.
b.
c.

J Ti Kg,t0 = g(i)

J [pst] Kg,t0 = [λt0 : t0 ≺ t0 .t0 ]

J [pres] Kg,t0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ t0 .t0 ]

A key dierence between a pronominal tense theory and the quantication tense
theory I have laid out is how it deals with complex tense constructions. Because
the presuppositions introduced by the tense features provide a relation between the
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pronominal tense node and the evaluation time of the proposition (t0 ), a sequence
of two past tenses will not derive the backshifted interpretation desired for a past
perfect construction. Rather each tense will only be dened if the salient TT interval
is past with respect to the evaluation time (in matrix clauses, this is identied with
the UT).

2.5.2 Evidentiality
In some languages, certain morphemes reference the source of the speaker's evidence for their assertion. These morphemes are called evidentials. Languages
vary greatly in the number of dierent evidence sources they encode grammatically.
According to Aikhenvald (2004), approximately a quarter of the world's languages
grammatically encode evidence source. Some languages make a two-way distinction
between some evidence type (e.g. rsthand, visual) and everything else (e.g. nonrsthand, non-visual) while others make as many as ve distinctions in evidence
source.
There are two traditional approaches to evidentials. Illocutionary approaches like
that of Faller (2002) and Murray (2010) view evidentials as illocutionary operators.
In Faller's theory, evidentials modify the speech act and sincerity conditions of the
assertion. According to Faller, the direct evidential -mi in Cuzco Quechua adds the
sincerity condition that the speaker has best possible grounds for their assertion, as
illustrated in (72).
(72)

-mi :

assert(p)
sinc={Bel(sp,p) }

→

assert(p)
sinc={Bel(sp,p), BPG(sp,Bel(sp,p)) }

(Faller 2002: 167)
What evidence counts as Best Possible Grounds depends on the sentence and the
context, but most often this requires the speaker to have visual evidence for the
proposition.
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A second family of approaches treat evidentials as a particular kind of epistemic
modal. Modal approaches encode the evidential source in various ways. Izvorski
(1997) encodes the evidence source as a presupposition. Matthewson et al. (2007),
building on Izvorski (1997), encode it as a presupposition restricting worlds in the
modal base to ones compatible with a certain kind of evidence. von Fintel & Gillies
(2010) make this last implementation more formal by dening direct and indirect evidence with a particular modal base they call the Kernel. The Kernel is a modal base
that contains all and only what is directly known given the context of utterance. A
speaker has direct evidence for a proposition if the truth of the proposition is directly
settled by the Kernel; they have indirect evidence if the truth of the proposition is
not directly settled by the Kernel. Applying this to English must, von Fintel & Gillies
propose the following lexical entry.
(73)

Fix a c -relevant kernel K:
a.
b.

J must ϕKc,w is dened only if K does not directly settle JϕKc

If dened, J must ϕKc,w = 1 i BK ⊆ JϕKc

(von Fintel & Gillies 2010: 372)
In essence, given a set of propositions describing what is direct evidence in the context
of utterance (K ), must will only be dened if K doesn't contain direct evidence that
tells us whether its prejacent is true or false. When this presupposition is met, a
T
proposition with must will be true if the intersection of K (BK = K ) entails its
prejacent.
A third variety of approaches to evidentials are so-called spatio-temporal approaches. This family of approaches were developed to account for morphemes that
appear to encode both reference to time and to evidential source for the assertion. A
peculiarity of these evidential-tense morphemes (as I call them) is that they are compatible with both direct and indirect evidence. Evidential-tenses are not amenable to
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illocutionary approaches to evidentiality because each evidential morpheme encodes
just one type of evidence source (e.g. direct or indirect). Instead, evidential-tense
morphemes have led authors to explore ways of deriving direct and indirect evidence
through relations between situations or events. These approaches introduce a new
situation which plays a crucial role in describing these systems: the situation in which
the speaker acquires evidence (through some means).
Nikolaeva (1999) is, to my knowledge, the rst to propose an analysis referring
to such an `evidence situation'. She dierentiates between three situations: 1) the
situation of the event itself (e.g. snow melting), 2) the resulting situation (the melted
snow), and 3) the situation of acquiring evidence (the speaker stepping outside to
see situation 2 - the melted snow). Speas (2010) and Kalsang et al. (2013) take
inspiration from Nikolaeva (1999) and propose that direct and indirect evidence can be
characterized by two relations between just two situations. The Evaluated Situation
(ES) is the situation which witnesses the truth of the proposition. For the proposition
`the snow melted', the ES is the situation consisting of the snow as it is melting. The
Information Situation (IS) is the situation in which the speaker encounters something
they take to be evidence for the proposition. When the ES is contained in the IS,
the speaker encounters or perceives the ES itself and evidence is direct. If the ES is
merely accessible from the IS (perhaps through a resulting situation or a report) then
evidence is indirect.
Davis & Hara (2014), following Waldie (2012), decompose evidentiality further
into relations between an agent a, a target proposition p, and an evidence source e.
The relations between these entities constitute dierent elements involved in evidentiality. Their conception of evidentiality is reproduced in Figure 2.1. At the bottom
of the gure is the agent who has the evidential support and makes the assertion.
The relation between the agent and the target proposition is an epistemic relation.
This relation gives us the level of the agent's commitment to the proposition. On a
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modal approach, this is encoded in by quanticational strength; on an illucutionary
approach, this is captured by a number of elements including the strength of the
speech act and the nature of the speech act (e.g. assertion versus presentation). The
relation between the target proposition and the evidence source identies how the
evidence supports the proposition. For example, an identity relation would be used
if evidence is direct.

p

evidential relation

epistemic relation

e

means of acquiring evidence

a

Figure 2.1.

Tripartite structure of evidentiality (Davis & Hara 2014: 181)

Of particular interest for spatio-temporal approaches is the relation between the
agent and the evidential source. This relation identies the means of accessing the
evidence, for instance through auditory or visual perception. Behind this idea of a
relation is a real world situation in which the agent encounters the situation that
constitutes evidence for the proposition. That is, the relation necessarily invokes an
evidence acquisition situation or event. This event has spatial and temporal coordinates that could be exploited by the grammar. Spatiotemporal approaches propose
that this is precisely what is encoded by evidential-tenses. In Chapter 3, I give
a detailed comparison of the two most prominent spatiotemporal approaches - one
which references the spatial and temporal coordinates of this event and another which
references only the temporal coordinates.
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CHAPTER 3
EVIDENTIALITY IN THE MVSKOKE TENSE SYSTEM
3.1 Introduction
The introductory chapters presented two puzzles from previous descriptions of
Mvskoke's past tense system. The rst puzzle has to do with the temporal intervals associated with each tense. Martin (2010) and Innes et al. (2004) provide very
dierent intervals for Pasts 2, 3 and 5. Additionally, several authors suggest that
Past 5 is not limited to remote times (Buckner & Herrod 1860; Loughridge & Hodge
1890; Martin 2010). The second puzzle is what role evidence plays in Mvskoke speakers' choice of tense. As I will show, evidence plays a central part in uncovering the
temporal interval covered by Past 5. Consequently I begin in this chapter with an
investigation of the evidential inferences associated with the past tenses. For the time
being, I adopt Martin's (2010) intervals for Pasts 1, 2, and 3. I chapter 4, I turn to
the precise temporal semantics of the intervals associated with each tense.

3.1.1 Evidential Inferences
Native speakers often characterize the dierence between Mvskoke's four past
tenses as a dierence in closeness to the speaker, or force of the statement - making

a declaration or stating it as fact. Similar observations are made by Martin (2010)
about the use of the tenses in narrative. Martin demonstrates that speakers shift to
more recent tenses in narration when speaking about events that are personal, closer,
or more vivid. More remote tenses, Past 5 in particular, are used to describe events
or states that they feel more removed from (Martin 2010: 67).
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Evidence is another notion that tracks subjective distance of an event. Consider
Willett's well-known taxonomy of evidence types, represented in Figure 3.1. When a
speaker has direct sensory evidence for an event, it will be more vivid and personal to
them. Their experience of the event is greater than if they only have sensory evidence
of the results of the event, or greater still than if they have only heard of it through
reports.

Indirect

Direct

Attested

Reported

Inferring

Visual
Second-Hand Results
Auditory
Third-Hand Reasoning
Other Sensory
Folklore

Figure 3.1.

Taxonomy of Evidence Types (Willett 1988)

Several early works on Mvskoke suggest that evidentiality does play a role in the
past tense system. In particular, these early works suggest that Past 5 is used in
indirect evidence contexts. They write that Past 5 refers to transactions of which
the subject of the verb has no personal knowledge, nor is directly connected with
(Brinton 1870: 307), or that it is used when the speaker did not witness, but has
heard about, the activity that the sentence refers to (Nathan 1977: 115). In this
chapter I demonstrate that Mvskoke tenses do distinguish between events based on
the evidence the speaker has for them. This nding is novel in that the existing major
documentary works make no mention of the evidential component of the tenses (Innes
et al. 2004, 2009; Martin 2011). Although the Muskogeanist literature suggests Past
5 is an indirect evidential, I propose instead that Pasts 1-3 are responsible for the
evidential inferences.
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This approach receives support from work on Proto-Muskogean by Booker (1980).
Booker writes that tense is so varied across Muskogean languages that the evidence
for reconstructing tense morphemes is so fragmentary that the existence of any temporal marking at all in the proto-language is questionable (1980: 112). There is,
however, evidence upon which to reconstruct direct evidentials. Booker nds Choctaw
morphemes in Byington's (1915) Dictionary of Choctaw which she argues are cognates of Mvskoke Past 2 and Past 3. Byington denes these as evidentials which
imply that the speaker has knowledge of what he speaks (Byington 1915: 222).
Based on this evidence, Booker reconstructs two rst-hand knowledge evidentials
in Proto-Muskogean. As we will see in this chapter, the empirical data leads me to a
semantics for Pasts 1-3 which comes extremely close to Byington's characterization of
the Choctaw cognates. I propose that Pasts 1-3 require the speaker to have come to
believe the proposition and in section 3.6.2.2 discuss whether it would not be more
accurate to say they have come to know.

3.1.2 Approaches to evidential-tense morphology
In recent years, much attention has been given to the puzzling relationship between tense and evidence type found in languages where a single morpheme appears
to encode both reference to time and to the evidential source for the assertion. This is
because in languages with evidential-tense morphology, these two categories of meaning are intertwined in ways that are unexpected given our understanding of both
phenomena. Specically, these evidential-tense morphemes appear to encode reference to a time that is linked to the situation in which the speaker gains evidence for
their assertion. In natural language, tense has long been understood as serving to locate the time at which the proposition expressed by the sentence holds. On a Kleinian
theory of tense (Klein 1994), there is a special semantic relationship between tense
and time the sentence is about, the topic time. Evidential-tenses appear to change
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this relationship and shift the role of tense to locating the time when evidence was
acquired. Similarly, these morphemes are unexpected given the two main theories
of evidentials. On approaches to evidentials that see them as illocutionary (Faller
2002) or as not-at-issue content (Murray 2010), the time at which the speaker gains
a particular kind of evidence is not relevant, only the type of evidence. Modal approaches to evidentials (Izvorski 1997; Matthewson et al. 2007; von Fintel & Gillies
2010), classify evidentials as epistemic modals. There is disagreement about whether
the epistemic modal base must be anchored to the utterance time (e.g. Condoravdi
2001) or can shift under tense to a past temporal anchor (e.g. von Fintel & Gillies
2008). Evidential-tenses appear to locate a body of evidence in time.
In addition to so-called experienced/non-experienced past systems like those in
Cherokee (Iroquoian, Pulte 1985) and Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2004), these types of
morphemes have been studied in Bulgarian (Izvorski 1997; Koev 2011, 2017; Smirnova
2013; Arregui et al. 2017), Korean (Chung 2007; Lee 2011, 2013), and Matses (Amazonian, Fleck 2007). In some of this literature it is proposed that evidential-tenses
do not refer to the Topic Time, but to the time (and place, in some approaches) at
which the speaker gains evidence for their assertion. The two leading approaches that
have emerged from this literature are what I label temporal approaches and spatial

approaches. Under a temporal approach, these evidential-tense morphemes are epistemic modals whose modal base is anchored to a new temporal index - the Evidence
Acquisition Time (EAT), the time at which the speaker gains the evidence for their
assertion (Lee 2011, 2013; Smirnova 2013). With these approaches, an evidentialtense morpheme has a direct evidence inference if the evidence is acquired at the

same time as the event unfolds. Evidential-tenses interact with aspect in the same
way tense does. Spatial approaches, on the other hand, claim that evidential-tense
morphemes reference the speaker's perceptual eld as well as the time and location
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of the event. Under an approach of this kind, a direct evidence inference arises when
the speaker perceives the event as it unfolds (Faller 2004; Chung 2007).
In this chapter, I present data demonstrating that Mvskoke tenses appear to reference evidence source in addition to time. Specically, in 3.2 I show that Mvskoke
speakers have the intuition that using Pasts 1-3 on a main verb commits them to having direct evidence for their assertion. Much like Korean evidential-tense morphemes
on Lee's (2013) account, Pasts 1-3 can be used in direct evidence contexts as well as
in certain indirect evidence contexts, which I label simultaneous learning and learning

after-the-fact contexts. Like Lee (2013), I argue that the acceptability of Pasts 1-3 in
these indirect contexts follows from the contribution of embedded temporal operators.
In 3.3, I review temporal and spatial approaches to evidential-tenses. I provide data
in 3.4 demonstrating that Mvskoke tenses support a temporal approach along the
lines of Lee (2013). In 3.5, I present a novel formalization of Evidence Acquisition
Time as the moment of coming to believe the proposition is true. This formalization
improves on Lee's (2013) semantics which proves too weak for the Mvskoke tenses.
The section concludes with a pragmatic account of the distribution of the tenses and
the infererences associated with Past 5. 3.6 discusses the predictions of my analysis,
and 3.7 concludes.

3.2 Evidentiality in the Past Tense System
Because much of the previous literature on Mvskoke is descriptive in nature, it
lacks negative data to support the hypothesis that evidence source aects the distribution of the past tenses. In this section I provide the needed negative data by
comparing the use of Mvskoke past tenses in direct witness and reportative contexts.
I nd that the distribution of the Mvskoke tenses depends not only on temporal interval but on evidential source as well. In reportative contexts, Pasts 1-3 are uniformly
rejected in favor of Past 5. This data, presented in section 3.2.1, demonstrates that
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Mvskoke past tenses distinguish between direct and indirect evidence and provides
new evidence that Past 5 is not restricted to a graded interval of time. I then discuss
whether Past 5 should be analyzed as an indirect evidential. Building on data from
Martin (2010), I conclude rather that Past 5 is unspecied for evidentiality.

3.2.1 Direct witness inference for Pasts 1-3
When asked to compare an assertion with Pasts 1, 2, and 3 to one with Past 5,
speakers report that using Pasts 1-3 invites the inference that the speaker directly
witnessed the event. Below I compare reportative and direct evidential contexts in
each of the P1, P2, and P3 intervals (according to Martin 2010) - Past 1 (today to
last night), Past 2 (yesterday to a year ago), and Past 3 (one year ago to 20 years
ago). These data reveal a sharp divide between Pasts 1-3 and Past 5.
Consider the following example for the Past 1 interval. As expected given Martin's
intervals for the tenses, speakers only accept Past 1 in a direct witness context compatible with the P1 interval. A minimally dierent sentence with Past 5 is rejected.
(1)

P1 Direct Witness Context: Imagine you saw Mary talking to the chief this
morning. Could you say (1-a)?
a.

#Mary Mēkko emponayvtēs.
Mary

mí:kko im-ponâ:y-ati:-s

Mary

chief

p5-ind

3.dat-talk.pfv-

`Mary talked to the chief.'
Speaker Comment: If you saw, you'd say [(1-b)].
b.

Mary Mēkko emponvyis.
Mary mí:kko ím-pona:y-êys-s
Mary chief

3.dat-talk.ipfv-

p1-ind

`Mary talked/was talking to the chief.
Speaker Comment: emponayis means that you saw.
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(IAH-Sem-06/07/2019)
However, in the following reportative evidence context, Past 1 is rejected even though
the temporal interval is appropriate for Past 1. Instead, speakers volunteer a sentence
marked with Past 5.
(2)

P1 Reportative Context: Your friend Mary tells you that she talked to the
chief today. How would you tell me Mary talked to the chief today?
a.

Mary mucv-nettv Mēkko emponayvtēs.
Mary moca-nítta mí:kko im-ponâ:y-ati:-s.
Mary this-day

chief

3.dat-talk.pfv-

p5-ind

`Mary talked to the chief today.'
Linguist: Could you say (2-b)?
b.

#Mary Mēkko emponayis.
Mary

mí:kko ím-pona:y-êys-s.

Mary

chief

3.dat-talk.ipfv-

p1-ind

`Mary talked/was talking to the chief.'
Speaker Comment: No, that would be if you saw her talking to him.
(DLR-Mus-06/17/2019)
The speaker comment above illustrates the pervasive intuition that Past 1 commits
the speaker to having witnessed the event.
The same pattern of judgments hold for Past 2. When the context supports direct
visual evidence at a topic time compatible with the P2 interval, speakers reject Past
5 (3-b) and accept Past 2 (3-a). Again these judgments are unsurprising given the
proposed intervals for each tense.
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(3)

P2 Direct Witness Context: Imagine you've been telling your brother there's a
girl who wants to see him in Seminole. Then last week you drove by the diner
and saw them together. How would you tell me that they saw each other?
a.

Etehecakvnks.
iti-hic-â:k-ánk-s
recip-see-pl.pfv-

p2-ind

`They saw each other.'
Linguist: Could you say (3-b)?
b.

#Etehecakvtēs.
iti-hic-â:k-ati:-s
recip-see-pl.pfv-

p5-ind

`They saw each other.'
Speaker Comment: Not if I saw them at the diner.
(LSB-Mus-06/21/2017)
Example (4) establishes a reportative context with a past topic time compatible
with the P2 interval (last year). In this context the speaker volunteered a sentence
marked with Past 5 (4-a). The corresponding sentence with Past 2 in (4-b) was
rejected.
(4)

P2 Reportative Context: Last year, a woman you know, Mary, spoke with
Chief Leonard Harjo and she told you about it. How would you tell me Mary
spoke with Chief Leonard last year?
a.

Mary ohrolopē hvnkvnkē1 Mēkko Leonard emponayvtēs.
Mary ohìolopí: hânk=ankí: mí:kko Leonard ím-pona:y-atí:-s
Mary year

one=p2

chief

Leonard 3.dat-speak.ipfv-

`Last year, Mary spoke with Chief Leonard.'
Linguist: Could you say (4-b)?
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p5-ind

b.

#Mary ohrolopē hvnkvnkē

Mēkko Leonard

Mary

ohìolopí: hânk=ankí: mí:kko Leonard

Mary

year

one=p2

chief

Leonard

emponayvnks.
ím-pona:y-ánk-s
3.dat-speak.ipfv-

p2-ind

`Last year, Mary was speaking with Chief Leonard.'
Speaker Comment: No, that's like I saw Mary talking to him.
(JWH-Sem-07/10/2018)
The same type of judgment holds in another reportative context. In the example
below, the target sentence includes an adverbial clause cokv-tvlvme 'svlikat `as it was
printed in the newspaper' which ensures that the sentence is judged with the indirect
evidence source. The verb marked with Past 5 is acceptable when paired with this
adverbial clause, but the corresponding sentence with Past 2 was judged unacceptable.
1 Certain

temporal adverbials in Mvskoke take nominal forms of Past 1 and Past 2. It is not
immediately clear whether the semantics for nominal tenses that I propose in Chapter 6 can be
extended to account for their appearance with temporal adverbials. This is a topic I must leave to
future research.
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(5)

P2 Alternate Reportative Context: Imagine that you read an article in the
newspaper that the President bought a dog yesterday. How would you tell me
this?
a.

Cokv-tvlvme 'svlikat,

Wvcenv

Mēkko efvn

co:ka-talamí (i)s-a-lêyk-a:t

wacína

mí:kko ifá-n

paper-daily

inst-loc-sit.sg.pfv-comp washington chief

dog-acc

vpohvtēs.
apô:h-ati:-s
buy.pfv-

p5-ind

`As it was printed in the newspaper, the President bought a dog.'
Linguist: Could you say (5-b)?
b.

#Cokv-tvlvme 'svlikat,

Wvcenv

Mēkko efvn

co:ka-talamí

(i)s-a-lêyk-a:t

wacína

mí:kko ifá-n

paper-daily

inst-loc-sit.sg.pfv-comp washington chief

dog-acc

vpohvnks.
apô:h-ánk-s
buy.pfv-

p2-ind

`As it was printed in the newspaper, the President bought a dog.'
Speaker Comment: No, that sounds like you were there when he bought
the dog.

(DLR-Mus-07/11/2018)

Past 3 shows the same pattern of judgments. In the example below, the context
establishes a past topic time which precedes the present by 30 or so years. Though
technically, according to Martin (2010)'s intervals, we might expect this to be incompatible with Past 3, speakers most naturally volunteer Past 3 when speaking of
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someone's childhood. We see this in (6) where the context locates an event within
the current chief's childhood, about 30-40 years ago.2
(6)

P3 Direct Witness Context : Imagine you knew the chief when he was young
and knew he attended a certain church. You saw him there on many occasions.
Now we are passing the church and you want to tell me this.
Mēkko mvnettof,

mv mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

mí:kko manítt-o:f

má mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

chief

young-when dem prayer-house

go.about.sg.ipfv-dur-ss

owemvts.
ô:w-imát-s
be.pfv-

p3-ind

`When the chief was young, he went to that church.'
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
Having established that Past 3 is acceptable for this interval of time, the following
example makes an indirect evidence context explicit through the use of the adverbial
clause cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat `as it was written in the newspaper.' The sentence with
Past 3 is judged unacceptable in the new context (7-a), and the speaker volunteered
Past 5 instead (7-b).
(7)

P3 Reportative Context: Now imagine you read a newspaper story about the
Chief in which you learned that he frequented a certain church when he was
young. Could you say the sentence in (7-a)?

2 The

chief of the Seminole Nation at the time of elicitation was Greg Chilcoat, who was approx.
50 years old at that time.
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a.

#Cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat,

Mēkko mv

coka-talamí

hoccéy<ho:>c-â:t

mí:kko má

paper-daily

write.ipfv-caus<pass>-comp chief

mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

owemvts.

mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

ô:w-imát-s

prayer-house

dem

p3-ind

go.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.pfv-

`As it was written in the newspaper, the chief went to that church.'
Speaker Comment: No, if it's according to the paper it would be [the
sentence in (7-b)]
b.

Cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat,

Mēkko mv

coka-talamí hoccéy<ho:>c-â:t

mí:kko má

paper-daily

write.ipfv-caus<pass>-comp chief

mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

owvtēs.

mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

o:w-atí:-s

prayer-house

go.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.ipfv-

dem

p5-ind

`As it was written in the newspaper, the chief went to that church.'
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
The examples presented in this section demonstrate that Pasts 1-3 are not compatible with reportative evidential sources, either hearsay or written reports. On the
other hand, we have seen that Past 5 is preferred in these contexts and is compatible
with temporal intervals previously described as being restricted to Past 1, Past 2, and
Past 3.3
3 At

this time, I do not have a negative judgment for Past 5 in a direct witness Past 3 context.

88

3.2.2 P5 indirect or P1-P3 direct?
The data in the previous section motivates a split between P1-P3 and P5 in terms
of both evidential inferences and graded intervals. This is summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1.
Tense
Past 1
Past 2
Past 3
Past 5

Evidential and Temporal Split

Time Span
just now - last night
yesterday - 1 year ago
1 year ago - 40 years ago
anytime

Direct Evidence
3
3
3
7

Indirect Evidence
7
7
7
3

There are three situations which could lead to the distribution in Table 3.1 (which
are illustrated below in Table 3.2). First, these inferences would be explained if the
tenses semantically encoded evidential requirements that restricted them to either
direct or indirect evidence sources. This option would have Pasts 1-3 semantically
encode a direct evidential requirement and Past 5 an indirect evidential requirement.
This predicts that Past 5 should never be used in direct evidence contexts and Pasts
1-3 should never be used in indirect evidence contexts. Due to the graded intervals
associated with Pasts 1-3, we might nd a dierent strategy used for witnessed events
at times more remote than the P3-interval.
The second and third alternatives would derive one of the evidential inferences
pragmatically. On these approaches, either Pasts 1-3 or Past 5 semantically encode
an evidential restriction; the other tense(s) would be unspecied for evidentiality.
The predictions of these options depend on whether a P5 sentence is a structural
alternative to a P1-P3 sentence. For example, the English sentence with must and
the non-modal English sentence in (8) are not structural alternatives.
(8)

a.

It must be raining.

b.

It's raining.
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The modal sentence involves another syntactic projection hosting the modal must ; the
non-modal sentence lacks this structure. As a result, the sentence with the indirect,
epistemic necessity modal must does not compete pragmatically with a sentence that
lacks the indirect, epistemic information that must carries. The distribution we nd
is that the non-modal sentence is not restricted in the contexts it can appear in. The
non-modal sentence is compatible with both indirect and direct evidence contexts in
(9) and (10). Rather it is the must -sentence that is restricted to contexts compatible
with its semantic requirements.
(9)

Indirect Evidence Context: Imagine you have been indoors all day in a room
without windows. Then you see people coming into the building with wet
umbrellas.

(10)

a.

It must be raining.

b.

It's raining.

Direct Evidence Context: You step outside into the rain.
a. #It must be raining.
b.

It's raining.

On the other hand, consider two English words that are structural alternatives for
each other: and and or. These are both conjunctions. Consequently a sentence with

and will not contain more or less structure than a sentence with or. An and -sentence
diers from an or -sentence in that the latter is true for a superset of the situations
that make the former true. I illustrate this below in (11) and (12).
(11)

It is raining and it is cold.
a.

(12)

s1 = {it is raining in s1 , it is cold in s1 }

It is raining or it is cold.
a.

s1 = {it is raining in s1 , it is cold in s1 }
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b.

s2 = {it is raining in s2 }

c.

s3 = {it is cold in s3 }

Because the sentences in (11) and (12) are structural alternatives, they compete with
each other pragmatically. To put it very succinctly, and and or form a scale of informativity. The use of or (the less informative alternative) results in a scalar implicature
that the and -sentence is false. The result is that or -sentences are interpreted exclusively; that is, they are limited to situations where only one of the conjuncts is true.
Because they compete in this way, unless the competition is neutralized by reversing
the scale in a downward entailing environment, and and or are in complementary
distribution. I refer the reader to Gazdar (1979) for the details of the competition
between words like and and or.
To draw a comparison with Mvskoke, if P5 and P1-P3 are structural alternatives,
then we would expect to see the unspecied form only in contexts where the specied
form is not possible. Table 3.2 illustrates the predictions of this possibility. If however
P5 and P1-P3 are not structural alternatives, then we would expect the unspecied
form to be acceptable in both direct and indirect evidence contexts. I have represented
this possibility in parentheses in Table 3.2.
On the approach to P1-P3 and P5 in which they are structural alternatives, sentences with the unspecied form will be pragmatically restricted to contexts incompatible with the evidential restriction of the other tense(s). If Pasts 1-3 semantically
encode a direct evidential requirement and Past 5 is unspecied for evidentiality (Option 2), then Past 5 would be limited to indirect evidence contexts at times covered
by Pasts 1-3. This would not be because of a semantic clash with direct evidence,
but because of competition with the direct evidential past tenses. Similarly, if Past 5
semantically encodes indirect evidence and Pasts 1-3 are unspecied for evidentiality
(Option 3), then Pasts 1-3 would be limited to direct evidence contexts. This would
not be because of a semantic clash with indirect evidence, but because of competition
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Table 3.2.

Three options for evidential inferences of Mvskoke tenses

Semantic Entailment
1.
Dir.
Indir.

P1-P3 Direct
P5 Indirect

Pragmatic Implicature
2.

P1-P3 Direct
P5 unspecied

3.

P1-P3 unspecied
P5 Indirect

|P1|P2|P3|///

|P1|P2|P3|P5|
(|P5|)

|P1|P2|P3|///

|P5|

|P5|

|P5|
(|P1|P2|P3|//)

with the indirect evidential Past 5. This most closely resembles the distribution found
in the examples above (and represented in Table 3.1).
As can be seen in Table 3.2, Options 1 and 3 make nearly identical predictions
about the distribution of the tenses. If the tenses are not structural alternatives,
then indirect evidence uses of Pasts 1-3 should be possible. However, regardless of
the view we take on the nature of the competition between tenses, neither option
predicts the possibility of using Past 5 in direct evidence contexts. Option 3 is the
view implicitly taken in earlier Muskogeanist literature (Brinton 1870; Nathan 1977).
Option 2 stands out in predicting that Past 5 should be possible in direct evidence
contexts. On the structural alternative hypothesis, what makes this possible is that
the P3-interval does not extend indenitely into the past. If a speaker is old enough,
it is plausible that they have direct evidence for very remote events outside the P3interval. This prediction is represented by the bolding of P5 in Table 3.2. (If the
tenses aren't structural alternatives, we predict Past 5 should be possible in any
number of direct evidence contexts.)
A strong argument against Options 1 and 3 comes from Martin (2010). Martin
provides elicited evidence that Past 5 can be used for a directly experienced event

provided it is more remote than Past 3. The elicited example below demonstrates
that at very remote past times, speakers accept Past 5 on a sentence describing their
own actions - necessary witnessed and experienced by the speaker.
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(13)

hofonof

mēcvyvtēs.

hofon n-o:f

mi:c-ay-áti:-s.

p5-ind

long.ago.int-when do.ipfv-1sg.ag-

(Martin 2010: 53, glossing adapted )

`I did it long ago [P5].'

This judgment is replicated in (14) with another type of direct evidence. This example
demonstrates that an elderly speaker (over 60 years of age) can use Past 5 to talk
about a childhood event they have direct evidence for. (This option is not available
to a younger speaker who is approx. 20 years old.)
(14)

Direct Evidence Context : Imagine you and your friends are talking about a
certain Mvskoke Hymn. You haven't heard the hymn since you were very
young, but you want to tell me that you have heard it.
a.

Cvmvnettof,

mv yvhiketv pohvyvtēs.

ca-manítt-o:f

ma yaheykitá po:h-ay-áti:-s

1sg.pat-young-when dem song

p5-ind

hear.ipfv-1sg.ag-

`When I was young, I heard that song.'
Speaker Comment: I could say that. But [a younger speaker] would have
to [use P3].

(RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)

These two examples show that at past times more remote than those covered by the
P3 interval, Past 5 can be used for events the speaker has direct evidence for.
One might imagine that Past 5 can be used for rst person experiences at remote
times to indicate that the speaker's memory of the event isn't as vivid as for more
recent events. But with certain verbs, Past 5 is also compatible with rst person
actions at more recent times, including today. With the verb lvtketv `to fall', Past
5 can describe the speaker's fall that occured an hour ago. In this situation, Past 1
would be used to describe the speaker's fall that happened more recently.
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(15)

a.

Cvlatkvtēs.
ca-lâ:tk-ati:-s

p5-ind

1sg.pat-fall.pfv-

`I fell.'
Speaker comment: That means I fell, maybe an hour ago.
b.

Cvlvtikes.
ca-lat<êy>k-is
1sg.pat-fall<pfv.p1>-ind

`I fell.'

(PF-Mus-04/19/2021)

The speaker comments on these examples suggests that for some speakers there
is a gap between the immediate past communicated by perfect aspect (which covers
completed events in the P1 interval) and the beginning of the P2 interval. This
explanation ts with the view of the tense system illustrated by Option 2 in which
P5 is available for use in direct evidence contexts at times not covered by the P1, P2,
or P3 intervals.
In fact only Option 2 predicts the use of Past 5 in the direct witness contexts
presented above. The other options would have an indirectness requirement encoded
in the semantics of Past 5 which would preclude its use in direct evidence contexts.
As such, the evidence presented here is a strong argument in favor of viewing Past 5
as unspecied for evidentiality.
As previewed above, something more needs to be said in order to account for the
infelicity of Past 5 in direct witness contexts where Pasts 1-3 are acceptable. If Past
5 is unspecied for evidentiality, then it is in principle compatible with the direct
evidence contexts in (1) and (3). I propose that pragmatic implicatures account for
the infelicity of Past 5 in direct evidence contexts in the P1, P2, and P3 intervals.
Specically, I will argue that pragmatic reasoning is responsible for the indirect evidence inference associated with Past 5. After laying out a formal semantics for the
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tenses in Section 3.5, I formalize the pragmatic reasoning which leads to the evidential
inferences of the Mvskoke tenses.
In summary, the examples seen in this section have demonstrated that Pasts 1-3
are incompatible with reportative contexts. On the other hand, Past 5 was shown
to be infelicitous in direct evidence contexts in the Past 1, 2, and 3 intervals, but
felicitous with direct evidence outside those intervals. Taking these data into account,
the following interim hypothesis is proposed.
(16)

Evidentiality of Past Tense Morphemes - Interim Hypothesis:
Pasts 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the speaker has direct evidence for the event
asserted in the utterance.
Past 5 is unspecied for evidentiality.

There are puzzles for this hypothesis though. There are two situations in which a
speaker may use Pasts 1-3 without having witnessed the event in question. First,
a speaker may use an evidential tense when they receive a report about the event

as it is taking place. Second, a speaker may use an evidential tense on an auxiliary
verb if they learn about the event through a report or by perceiving its results af-

ter the fact. In Willett's taxonomy of evidence types, the evidence in both of these
situations are considered indirect. Both reports and inferences based on results are
overwhelmingly marked with indirect evidentials in languages with grammatical evidential morphemes. Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 thus appear to be acceptable in both direct
evidence contexts and the indirect evidence contexts described above. This distribution proves to be problematic for traditional accounts of evidentiality but crucial in
adjudicating between two prominent approaches to morphemes which seem to bundle
tense and evidential information.
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3.3 Direct Evidence and Approaches to Evidential-Tense
Aikhenvald (2004), in her cross-linguistic survey of evidentiality, demonstrates
that the most basic distinction made in evidential systems is between direct and
indirect evidence. As Chung (2007) and Lee (2013) point out for Korean evidentialtenses, it is unexpected under a traditional approach to evidentiality that one in the
same evidential morpheme cover both direct perceptual evidence and some kinds of
indirect evidence. However, this is the pattern I have just described for Mvskoke
Pasts 1-3 and is one that we see in languages with evidential-tenses like Bulgarian,
Korean, and Cuzco Quechua. There are two main approaches to evidential-tenses
build on the spatiotemporal approaches discussed in Chapter 2, section 5.
I will rst discuss a type of approach I call a spatial approach. Spatial approaches
capture the intuition that direct evidence involves the speaker's perceptual eld overlaping with the spatio-temporal trace of the event. Such a situation is usual one where
the speaker is in proximity to the event while it is taking place and peceives it through
one of their senses. Faller (2004) and Chung (2007) take this approach for evidentialtenses in Cuzco Quechua and Korean, languages whose tense systems show evidential
distinctions. For these authors both the time and place of the event with respect to
the speaker are central to characterizing direct evidence for evidential-tenses. For the
event, Faller (2004) and Chung (2007) refer to the spatio-temporal trace of the event;
that is, the extension of the event in space and time. More specically, the trace of
the event is the set of all time-location pairs for which the times t are contained in the
temporal trace of the event and the event takes place at those times and locations.
(17)

e-trace (e) = {ht, li : t ⊆ τ (e)∧AT(e, t, l)}
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(Faller 2004: 70)

To capture the intuition that the speaker perceives the event, these authors formalize
the perceptual eld of the speaker - the locations that the speaker perceives over time.4
(18)

The Speaker's Perceptual Field
P-trace(sp) = {ht, li : t ⊆ τ (sp)∧perceive(sp, t, l)}

(Faller 2004: 70)

When the speaker's perceptual eld and the spatio-temporal trace of the event overlap,
what results is a situation where the speaker perceives the event directly. When they
do not overlap, the speaker's evidence cannot be direct.
(19)

The Spatial approach to evidentiality

a.

Direct Evidence = e − trace(e) ∩ P − trace(sp) 6= ∅

b.

Indirect Evidence = e − trace(e) ∩ P − trace(sp) = ∅
(adapted from Chung 2007: 207)

According to Faller (2004), an evidential-tense can make use of three possible relations
between the P − trace and the e − trace: 1) partial direct evidence - the P − trace
overlaps with part of the e − trace, 2) total direct evidence - the e − trace is contained
in the P − trace, and 3) indirect evidence - there is no overlap between the two traces.
The Cuzco Quechua evidential-tense -sqa is compatible with both direct and indirect
evidence because it simply requires that the P − trace does not entirely contain the

e − trace.
The formulation of direct evidence in (19) requires that the intersection of the two
traces not be empty. If an evidential-tense has direct evidence inferences, it could in
theory be used in situations where the speaker perceives only part of the event. This
denition raises two questions: what counts as perception of an event? and what
4 Although

Faller (2004) makes use of locations in her proposals, it is not clear that there is
empirical evidence that motivates the use of locations in addition to times.
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counts as a part of an event? I address these two questions in section 3.2.2 when I
present evidence from Mvskoke that proves problematic for a spatial approach.
A second type of approach derives the use of evidential-tenses in direct and indirect evidence contexts entirely through temporal relations. They key intuition this
approach captures is that direct evidence contexts involve learning of the event at the

same time as it unfolds. I call these temporal approaches. Lee (2013) and, following
her, Smirnova (2013) claim that evidential-tense morphemes make crucial reference to

Evidence Acquisition Time (EAT). The EAT is the time at which the speaker encounters some situation that they consider to be evidence for the event in question. This
can be thought of as the temporal trace of the evidence situation discussed earlier.
First proposed by Lee (2011), EAT is a new temporal index intended to enrich
a neo-Reichenbachian system of times so that there are four times that a sentence's
temporal operators can refer to: event time (ET), evidence acquisition time (EAT),
topic time (TT) and utterance time (UT). Temporal approaches claim that evidentialtenses encode a relation between times only and that the evidential avor of a sentence
with an evidential-tense morpheme is derived compositionally through interactions
with lower tense/aspect morphology. This is seen most clearly with Korean.
According to Lee (2013), Korean -te locates the EAT in the past of the UT. -te
co-occurs with lower tense morphemes which relate the EAT to the ET. In (20-a)
when -te co-occurs with present tense, the sentence communicates that the speaker
has direct evidence for the event. In (20-b) and (20-c) when -te co-occurs with past or
future tense, the sentence communicates that the speaker has only indirect, inferential
evidence for the event.
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(20)

Korean -te: interactions with lower tense
a.

Context: Yenghi saw it raining yesterday. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-∅-te-la.

te-decl

rain-nom fall-pres-

`[I make a sensory observation that] it was raining.
b.

Context: Yenghi saw yesterday that the ground was wet. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-ass-te-la.

te-decl

rain-nom fall-past-

`[I inferred (from the acquired sensory evidence) that] it had rained.'
c.

Context: Yenghi saw the overcast sky yesterday. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-kyess-te-la.

rain-nom fall-fut-

te-decl

`[I inferred (from the acquired sensory evidence) that] it would rain.'
(Lee 2013: 2)
For these approaches, the temporal relations are responsible for the dierence between
direct and indirect evidence. When ET overlaps (∞) with the EAT, evidence is
considered to be direct. When there is no overlap, evidence is indirect. Thus the
same evidential-tense may be used in both direct and indirect contexts; lower tense
or aspect is responsible for distinguishing between the two.
(21)

The Temporal approach to evidentiality
a.

Direct Evidence = ET ∞ EAT

b.

Indirect Evidence = ET 6 ∞ EAT

Additionally, temporal approaches involve modal semantics. Lee (2013) gives -te
modal semantics and characterizes EAT as the temporal anchor for a modal base
consisting of all the propositions that count as sensory observations. The worlds
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compatible with the sensory observations are ordered by a stereotypical or doxastic
order source. Finally, the prejacent proposition is said to follow from the best (most
highly ranked) of these worlds. I give Lee's (2013) semantics below. In her semantics,
Lee intends for t00 to be a free reference time variable which receives its value from
context. As such, it is not bound in the formula below.
(22)

Denotation of -te :

J−teK = [λp.[λw.[λt. t00 < t&∀w0 .[w0 ∈ BEST(SO,ST/DX,w, t00 ) → p(w0 )(t00 )]]
(Lee 2013: 29)

Although temporal approaches rely heavily on the relations between times, they do
include evidential restrictions as part of identifying the temporal index as the evidence acquisition time. The evidential restriction is quite broad - external evidence
according to Smirnova (2013) and sensory observation according to Lee (2013) so as to capture the evidential-tenses' compatibility with direct and indirect evidential sources. In what follows, I demonstrate that Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 provide strong
support for a temporal approach to evidential tenses.

3.4 Adjudicating Between Approaches
These two approaches make dierent predictions for the situations in which a direct evidential-tense will be acceptable. In this section I address the predictions for
the two kinds of indirect evidence context in which Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 are acceptable:

simultaneous learning contexts and learning after-the-fact contexts. Simultaneous
learning contexts are contexts in which the time of evidence acquisition overlaps with
the event time, but the two are spatially distant (i.e. the speaker learns about the
event as it is happening ). Assessing the predictions for these contexts involves making precise the notion of distance and perception that count for spatial approaches.
Learning after-the-fact contexts are contexts where the speaker acquires evidence of
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the event after it has taken place. In Mvskoke, learning after-the-fact contexts involve a complex tense construction that spatial approaches have diculty accounting
for. For each context, I address the predictions of the approaches and the facts for
Mvskoke.

3.4.1 Simultaneous Learning Contexts
3.4.1.1 Predictions
A spatiotemporal approach predicts that direct evidential-tenses require that the
event described by the main predicate and the event of acquiring evidence (or the
speaker's perceptual eld) must overlap in both time and space. A temporal approach
predicts that they only need to overlap in time. Until modern inventions such as the
telephone, the radio, and the television, all situations in which the speaker acquires
evidence at the same time as the event unfolds were also situation in which the
speaker was in the same place as the event. In other words, all situations of temporal
overlap were also situations of spatial overlap. Communication technology allows one
to acquire evidence of an event without begin in the same physical space as the event.
I call the type of context aorded by this technology simultaneous learning contexts.
Simultaneous learning contexts involve non-overlap between the location of the
event and the locations that lie in the speaker's perceptual eld. However, the question that must be addressed in order to evaluate the predictions of the spatial approach
is whether the speaker can be said to perceive the event and thus put it within the
speaker's perceptual eld. In her denition of the P-trace function, Faller explains
that the perceptual eld contains part of the physical space surrounding, and including, the speaker (Faller 2004: 70). Earlier she writes that the P-trace contains
all the locations that the speaker has perceptual access to... where perception may
involve any of the senses, not just sight (Faller 2004: 69).
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This denition has interesting implications for simultaneous learning contexts. On
this denition, being at the beach and seeing the waves clearly makes the beach a
location within one's perceptual eld. The beach will also be in one's perceptual eld
if the speaker smells the salty air or hears the waves crashing from a distance which
prevents them from seeing the beach. These cases involve extending the speaker's
perceptual eld beyond the locations visible to the speaker and thereby increasing
the distance between the speaker and the event. However, it is unclear that the beach
should be in your perceptual eld if you hear the waves crashing over the phone with
someone at the beach or receive a picture on your phone of your friend at the beach
or see live news footage of the beach. It is even less clear whether these various types
of perceptual evidence can give a speaker access to the location of an event. Seeing
a ball game denitely gives one perceptual access to the location of the game event,
perhaps even seeing the game on TV. However, it is harder to say that hearing sounds
associated with a ball game counts as perceiving the any part of the park where the
game is taking place.
Faller includes some brief discussion of visual and auditory images of events
which may be perceptually accessible through technological means (Faller 2004: 74,
fn41). On Faller's approach, perceptual access to a spatio-temporal image counts as
perceptual access to the event itself. In her semantics an evidential-tense encodes
overlap (or non-overlap) in space and time at the topic time. Thus if the access to
the image occurs at the topic time/event time then evidence is considered direct.
However, if access to the image occurs at a time other than the topic time, this would
count as indirect evidence. If we take this approach, then the notion of the location of an event becomes so weak that a spatial approach is reduced to a temporal
approach. To illustrate consider the two scenarios below.
(23)

Scenario #1: The Chickasaw stickball team played in Mississippi on Friday.
The speaker watched the game on television in Oklahoma on Sunday.
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Figure 3.2.
(24)

Scenario #1 - Perceptual access to e-image, dierent time

Scenario #2: The Chickasaw stickball team played in Mississippi on Friday.
The speaker watched the game on live television in Oklahoma on Friday

In Scenario #1 there is no overlap in physical space between the event of the game (the
e-trace) and the speaker's perceptual eld (the P-trace). There is also no temporal
overlap between the time of the game (ET) and the time when the speaker watched
it on television (EAT). In Scenario #2 there is no overlap in physical space between
the event (e-trace) and the speaker's perceptual eld (P-trace). However, there is
temporal overlap between the time of the game (ET) and the time when the speaker
watched it on television (EAT). This is graphically illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
A proponent of the spatial approach might argue that in order to adjudicate
between the spatial and temporal approach we need to nd a scenario where the
evidence acquired does not involve an image of the event. But it is unclear what
counts as an image of the event. Does visual access to a picture and article in the
newspaper count as a visual image of the event? Does auditory access to a report
of the event count as an auditory image of the event? Intuitively the line should be
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Figure 3.3.

Scenario #2 - Perceptual access to e-image, same time

drawn at these types of evidence, but the reasoning behind including the previous
cases but excluding these seems quite arbitrary.
I have discussed three cases where there is perceptual access to the event but
where the speaker is increasingly distant from the location of the event. The rst is a
scenario in which the speaker receives non-visual scensory evidence of an event which
is out of sight: hearing the crashing waves of the nearby beach or the sounds of ball
game down the road. The second is a scenario in which the speaker has perceptual
access to an audio-visual image of the event: watching a game on live TV. The third
is a scenario where the speaker receives visual or auditory input from a secondary
source about the event: a news article or phone call report about the event. Although
the rst and second might be considered direct on a spatio-temporal approach with
a weak notion of location, the third certainly should not. If we take a strict view
of location, the rst is questionably direct on a spatio-temporal approach, but the
second and third are completely ruled out.
Temporal approaches, as mentioned earlier, are unconcerned with physical distance. As a result they predict that simultaneous learning contexts should be treated
like direct evidence contexts with a few potential caveats. First, evidential-tenses in
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Table 3.3.

Predictions of Spatial and Temporal Approaches for Simultaneous Learning Contexts

1
2
3

Scenario
Non-visual sensory
Audio/visual image
Secondary source

Strict Spatial
?
7
7

Weak Spatial
3
3
7

Temporal
3
3
3(with possible variation)

both Bulgarian and Korean appeared to have a broad constraint on type of evidence,
either external evidence or sensory observation. Thus on a temporal approach we
might expect to see an eect of evidence type, but this shouldn't necessarily be tied
to physical distance. Second, since the temporal approaches sketched above are both
modal, we might expect to see some eects related to speaker certainty or reliability of evidence sources. Both of these eects are more likely to arise with evidence
types from secondary sources, the third scenario. These predictions are summarized
in Table 3.3.

3.4.1.2 Mvskoke Supports a Temporal Approach
In Mvskoke we nd clear support for the temporal approach and nd eects of
sensitivity to evidence source as well as speaker certainty. Past 2 is acceptable in
all three types of simultaneous learning scenario. First, consider the example in (25)
where the speaker receives olfactory evidence of a cooking event though she does not
see the cooking event. In this scenario Past 2 is acceptable and we see an eect of
evidence type. Specically, P2 must be accompanied by the inferential evidential

-vcok.5
5 How

precisely the inferential evidential composes semantically with the evidential-tenses is a
problem that must be left to future research.
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(25)

P2 Simultaneous Olfactory Evidence : Imagine that yesterday you stopped by
your church and could smell food coming from the fellowship hall. You didn't
have time to go into the fellowship hall but you thought there must be some
event going on. Today you tell me:
a.

Mēkusvpkv-cuko arin,

hompetv

mi:kosapka-cokó a:ì-éy-n

hompitá

go.about.sg.ipfv-1sg.ag-ds food

prayer-house

noricakvcokvnks.
noìéyc-a:k-acók-ánk-s
cook-pl.ipfv-infr-

p2-ind

`When I was at church, they were cooking food.'
Speaker Comment: I know they were doing it without seeing it.
b.

#Mēkusvpkv-cuko arin,

hompetv

mi:kosápka-cokó

a:ì-éy-n

hompitá

prayer-house

go.about.sg.ipfv-1sg.ag-ds food

noricakvnks.
noìéyc-a:k-ánk-s

p2-ind

cook-pl.ipfv-

`When I was at church, they were cooking food.'
Speaker Comment: This points out the fact that I saw it. There's more
experience of the cooking.

(RMM-Mus-12/03/2020)
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(26)

P2 Simultaneous Auditory Evidence : Imagine yesterday you were going by
the church and heard the sound of people singing.
Paksvnkē mēkusvpkv-cuko ahoyanvyan,
paksankí: mi:kosapka-cokó á:-hoya:n-ay-â:n
yesterday prayer-house

dir-pass.byipfv-1sg.ag-comp.ds

yvhihokvcokvnks.
yahéy<ho:>k-acók-ánk-s
sing.ipfv<pass>-infr-

p2-ind

`Yesterday as I was coming by the church, someone was singing.'
(IAH-Sem-06/07/2019)
The speaker comment suggests that the sentence without -vcok is infelicitous because
it implies the speaker has visual evidence of the event. I propose that this eect is
not due to the semantics of Past 2, but rather to the availability of the non-visual
sensory evidential in the Mvskoke language. The inference that Past 2 on its own
indicates visual evidence should be understood as an implicature due to competition
between the utterance with -vcok.
The next example replicates Scenario #2 (24), where the speaker watches a game
on live TV.
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(27)

P2 TV Simultaneous Context: Yesterday (in Oklahoma) you watched the
Chickasaw stickball game (in Mississippi) live on TV.
Empokkēckv

Cekvsalke

Mississippi vpehyet

im-pokkí:cka

Cikas-âlki

M.

3.dat-ball.game Chickasaw-gpl M.

apí<h>y-it
go.tpl<pfv>-ss

pokkeccakvnks.
pokkicc-â:k-ánk-s

p2-ind

play.ball-pl.pfv-

`The Chickasaw went to Mississippi and played their ball game.'
(RH-Sem-07/13/2019)
In example (27), the speaker has perceptual access to an audio-visual image of the
event at the same time the actual event is taking place. In Mvskoke, Past 2 is perfectly
acceptable in this context.
Finally, we turn to simultaneous scenarios with evidence from secondary sources.
In Mvskoke simultaneous reports over the phone are sucient to license the use of
Past 2. In (28), the speaker receives a simultaneous report over the phone about
a hair cutting event from someone visually witnessing the event. In this contexts,
speakers accepted Past 2.6
6 For

the reader who may be confused by the accusative case marking on both friend's wife and
hair I provide some indications as to the syntactic complexity of this example. First, the verb
has the impersonal passive -ho- inx, which is a non-promotional passive. As a result, no nominal

argument is promoted to subject position, rather the verb has two objects a benefactee and a direct
object. Secondly, this is an external possessive construction involving the possessor my friend's wife
raising out of the direct object. For discussion of the syntax of similar constructions in Mississippi
Choctaw, see Tyler (2021).
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(28)

P2 Simultaneous Phone Context - Same Location: Imagine that yesterday,
your friend called you and said, I'm over here at the hair salon. My wife is
getting her hair cut. Then today I ask how your friend's wife is doing and
you want to tell me that she got her hair cut.
Vnhesse

ehiywvn

ekv-essen entonhowvnks.

An-híssi

ihéywa-n

iké-yssi-n in-ton<hô:>w-ánk-s.

1sg.dat-friend 3.pat.wife-acc hair-acc 3.dat-cut.pfv<pass>-

p2-ind

`My friend's wife got her hair cut.'
(PF-Mus-11/28/2018,RMM-Mus-06/25/2019)
Although there is no overlap between the speaker's location and the event, a
proponent of the spatial approach might argue that the interlocutor's location makes
a dierence in these contexts. In particular one could argue that the context location
involves both the location of the speaker and her interlocutor on the other end of the
phone. As a result, the interlocutor's being at the hair salon could give the speaker
access to the location of the event. As discussed above, this is quite a stretch of
the denition of location but it is possible. We can set this possibility to rest because
Mvskoke evidential-tenses are acceptable with simultaneous reports regardless of the
location of the reporter. Past 2 is still acceptable with a simultaneous report over
the phone even when the interlocutor is not in the same location as the event. In
(29), the speaker calls her friend's husband, who is at home but knows his wife is at
the hair salon getting her hair cut. Presumably he knows this because he knows her
schedule and either took her or saw her leave the house.
(29)

P2 Simultaneous Phone Context - Dierent Location: Imagine that yesterday
your friend Lillian was supposed to join our conversation class. But she wasn't
there, so you called her home phone. Her husband answered and, when you
asked to speak with your friend, he said, she's at the hair salon getting her
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hair cut. Today, I ask you, Why wasn't Lillian at our conversation class
yesterday?
Lillian ekv-isse enwarhoyvnks.
Lillian iké-yssi in-wa:ì<hô:>y-ánk-s
Lillian hair

3.dat-cut<pass>pfv-

`Lillian got her hair cut.'

p2-ind
(RMM-Mus-05/11/2021)

In conclusion, I take these data to support a temporal approach as opposed to a
spatial approach. The crucial data are scenarios that involve an audio-visual image of
an event as well as scenarios that involve simultaneous reports. All of these scenarios
are problematic for a spatial approach because they involve substantial physical distance between the speaker and the event or state described. Mvskoke evidential tenses
are acceptable in these scenarios, providing support for a purely temporal approach.
After setting up the components of my formal analysis, I return to the predictions
my approach makes for simultaneous learning contexts in section 3.6.1.

3.4.2 Learning After-the-Fact Contexts
The second type of context in which Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 are compatible with
indirect evidence are what I call learning after-the-fact contexts. These contexts
involve the speaker learning about the event at a time entirely following the run-time
of the event. In learning after-the-fact contexts, Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 are acceptable,
but only when they appear on a special auxiliary verb. The auxiliary construction,
introduced in detail in Chapter 2 section 2.3, crucially involves an embedded shortened
form of Past 5 on the participle and an evidential-tense on the auxiliary haketv `to
become'.
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3.4.2.1 Auxiliary Constructions
In the examples below, the speaker's evidence comes from indirect sources: rsthand reports (for P1) and messages left on the speaker's answering machine (for P2
and P3). Sentences with Pasts 1-3 on the main verb are unacceptable in these learning
after-the-fact scenarios, and auxiliary constructions with Pasts 1-3 are unacceptable
in simultaneous learning contexts.
In the following context for Past 1, the person uttering the sentence learns about
the event after it has taken place through a rst-hand report over the phone. In
this context, a main verb inected for Past 1 is unacceptable. Instead the speaker
volunteered a sentence with an auxiliary construction in which Past 1 appears suxed
to the auxiliary.
(30)

Past 1 Learning After-the-Fact : Imagine your friend Bill called you on the
phone just now and told you he just cut his hair.
a.

Vnhesset

vnhuehiket

ekv-esse

an-híssi-t

an-hoyh<êy>k-it

iké-yssi

1sg.dat-friend-nom 1sg.dat-call.<pfv>-ss head-hair

warehpvt

hakis.

wa:ì-í<h>p-át

ha:k-éys-s

p5 become.ipfv-p1-ind

cut-ip<pfv>-

`My friend called, he cut his hair.'
b.

#Vnhesset

vnhuehiket

ekv-esse

an-híssi-t

an-hoyh<êy>k-it

iké-yssi

1sg.dat-friend-nom 1sg.dat-call<pfv>-ss head-hair

wahres.
wá<h>ì-is
cut

<pfv.p1>-ind

Speaker Comment: No, you'd say (30-a).
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(IAH-Mus-11/2018)

Conversly, the auxiliary construction with Past 1 is unacceptable in a direct witness
context.
(31)

P1 Direct Witness Context : Imagine that today you saw your friend Mary
talking to the Mēkko. Now, you want to tell me this.
a.

Mary Mēkko emponayis.
Mary mí:kko ím-pona:y-êys-s.
Mary chief

3.dat-talk.ipfv-

p1-ind

`Mary talked/was talking to the chief.'
b.

#Maret

Mēkko emponahyvt

hakis.

Mary-t

mí:kko im-poná<h>y-át

ha:k-êys-s

Mary-nom chief

p5 become.ipfv-p1-ind

3.dat-speak<pfv>-

`Mary had talked to the Chief.'
Speaker Comment: No, You'd have to say (31-a). That would be if Mary
told me she had talked to the Mēkko.

(DLR-Mus-06/17/2019)

The dierence between a past tense on the main verb and the special auxiliary
construction is also seen with Pasts 2 and 3. In the next two examples, the speaker
compared the two sentences in question in two types of contexts. Context A for each
example is a Simultaneous/ Direct Witness Context. In both cases (which dier only
in the temporal interval for the topic time) the Direct Witness Context is one in
which the speaker was home when the phone rang, but did not answer. Context B
for each example is the Learning After-the-Fact Context. In both cases, this involved
the speaker being gone from home when the phone rang and only later seeing the call
on their answering machine. In Context A, only the sentence in which Past 2 or Past
3 is axed to the main verb are acceptable. In Context B, only the sentence with
Past 2 or Past 3 axed to the auxiliary verb are acceptable.
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(32)

a.

P2 Direct Witness Context - Context A: A month ago, Sam called you
twice on the phone. You were in the room when the phone rang, but
you didn't answer.

b.

P2 Learning After-the-Fact Context - Context B: You weren't home one
day last month, but when you returned to the house you saw on your
answering machine that Sam had called you twice.
(i)

Sam vhokkolvn vnhuehkvnks.

Hvse

hvnkvnkē

hasí

hânk=ankí: Sam ahókkola-n an-hôyhk-ánk-s

month one=p2

Sam twice-acc 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p2-ind

`Sam called me twice, one month ago.'

X Context A, # Context B
(ii)

Sam vhokkolvn vnhuehkvt

Hvse

hvnkvnkē

hasí

hânk=ankí: Sam ahókkola-n an-hôyhk-át

month one=p2

Sam twice-acc 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p5

hakvnks.
ha:k-ánk-s

become.ipfv-p2-ind
`Sam called me twice, one month ago.'
# Context A, X Context B
(33)

a.

(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)

P3 Direct Witness Context - Context A: About two years ago, Sam called
you on the phone. You were in your house when he called, but you didn't
answer the phone.

b.

P3 Learning After-the-Fact Context - Context B: About two years ago
you were gone from your house. When you returned you saw on your
answering machine that Sam had called you.
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(i)

Ohrolopē hokkolvnkē

mahen,

Sam

ohìolopí: hokkô:l=ankí: mâ:h-in

Sam

year

two=p2

very.pfv-ds Sam

vnhuehkemvts.
an-hôyhk-imát-s
1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p3-ind

`About two years ago, Sam called me.'

X Context A, # Context B
(ii)

Ohrolopē hokkolvnkē

mahen,

ohìolopí: hokkô:l=ankí: mâ:h-in
year

two=p2

Sam vnhuehkvt
Sam an-hôyhk-át

very.pfv-ds Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p5

hakemvts.
ha:k-imát-s

become.ipfv-p3-ind
`About two years ago, Sam called me.'
# Context A, X Context B

(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)

These examples have demonstrated that in learning after-the-fact contexts, Mvskoke
Pasts 1-3 are acceptable only when they appear in this auxiliary construction which
embeds Past 5. The auxiliary construction is unacceptable in simultaneous learning
contexts. In section 3.5, I provide an account of the auxiliary construction as a
complex tense construction.

3.4.2.2 Predictions of Temporal and Spatial Approaches
Similarly to Mvskoke, Korean evidential-tenses are acceptable in learning afterthe-fact contexts, but only when they appear in complex tense constructions. These
constructions crucially involve a lower past tense operator scoping below the evidentialtense. An example from Korean is given in (34).
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(34)

Context: Yenghi saw yesterday that the ground was wet. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-ass-te-la.

rain-nom fall-past-

te-decl

`[I inferred (from the acquired sensory evidence) that] it had rained.'
(Lee 2013: 2)
Constructions like that in (34) are analyzed very dierently by temporal and spatial
approaches. In this section, I review the temporal analysis of (34) as spelled out in
Lee (2013) and the spatial analysis as spelled out by Chung (2007). As Lee argues,
Chung's spatial analysis is deeply awed because it has to posit lexical ambiguity in
the embedded tenses. Consequently, complex constructions like the Mvskoke auxiliary
construction are best analyzed with a temporal approach.
As discussed in section 3.3, Lee (2013) provides a temporal account of the Korean
evidential-tense -te. On her account and other temporal accounts, evidential-tenses
do not lexically encode indirect or direct evidence. Rather the evidential inferences
follow from the the temporal relation between the ET and the EAT that is conveyed
by the sentence. For Lee, the evidential-tense provides a temporal relation between
the EAT and the UT; lower tense (or aspect) provides a temporal relation between
ET and EAT. In Lee's semantics for -te (repeated below in (35)), -te asserts that t00 (a
contextually provided reference time) temporally precedes t which will be saturated
by the UT. The free temporal variable t00 provides the EAT because it is the time at
which the sensory observations (SO) of the speaker hold. Thus, -te indicates that the
speaker acquired evidence before the time of speech.
(35)

Denotation of -te :

J−teK = [λp.[λw.[λt. t00 < t&∀w0 .[w0 ∈ BEST(SO,ST/DX,w, t00 ) → p(w0 )(t00 )]]
(Lee 2013: 29)
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For Lee, -te interacts with lower, relative tenses to give rise to both direct and indirect evidence inferences. When -te combines with lower present tense as in (36-a)
(repeated from (20-a)), the speaker's sensory observation is at the same time as the
event. This is the Korean equivalent to my simultaneous learning contexts. In (36-b)
and (36-c), -te combines with lower past and future tense. When it combines with
lower past tense, the speaker acquired evidence of the event after the event time.
When it combines with lower future tense, the speaker acquired evidence before the
event time.
(36)

Korean -te: interactions with lower tense
a.

Context: Yenghi saw it raining yesterday. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-∅-te-la.

te-decl

rain-nom fall-pres-

`[I make a sensory observation that] it was raining.
b.

Context: Yenghi saw yesterday that the ground was wet. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-ass-te-la.

te-decl

rain-nom fall-past-

`[I inferred (from the acquired sensory evidence) that] it had rained.'
c.

Context: Yenghi saw the overcast sky yesterday. Now she says:
Pi-ka

o-kyess-te-la.

rain-nom fall-fut-

te-decl

`[I inferred (from the acquired sensory evidence) that] it would rain.'
(Lee 2013: 2)
For example (36-b), Lee gives the following truth conditions. Crucially, the sensory
observations are anchored to the EAT t00 which becomes the reference time for the
lower past tense. As a result, the sentence asserts that the rain took place at a time

t0 which is in the past of the EAT t00 .
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(37)

J (36-b) K = [λw.[λt. t00 ≺ t ∧ ∀w0 .[w0 ∈ best(so,st/dx,w, t00 ) → [t0 ≺ t00 ∧

at(t0 , w 0

rain0 )]]]]

(Lee 2013: 29)

Lee's analysis thus provides a straightforward way to understand the constructions
in (36) and the evidential inferences associated with them. The semantics for -te
remains constant and the direct vs. indirect evidence inferences are derived through
temporal relations due to a lower tense.
Chung (2007) provides a spatial analysis of the very same facts in Korean. Consequently, no speculation is needed to evaluate the predictions of a spatial approach for
constructions like the Korean one in (36-b) and the Mvskoke auxiliary construction.
Recall from discussion in section 3.3 that on spatial approaches direct and indirect evidence are derived through relations between the speaker's perceptual eld (P −trace)
and the spatio-temporal trace of the event (e−trace). Faller's (2004) spatial approach
identied three relations between these traces: non-overlap, partial overlap, and the
nal case where the P − trace entirely contains the e − trace (e − trace ⊂ P − trace).
Chung claims that -te cannot be an evidential because it is compatible with all
three relations. Instead, Chung re-analyzes the relative tenses from (36) as evidentials.
In (36-a), -te co-occurs with a direct evidential, -∅. And in (36-b) and (36-c), -te
co-occurs with indirect evidentials -ess and -kyess. However, as Lee (2013) points
out, because these morphemes lack evidential semantics in the absence of -te, Chung
is forced to take the view that they are ambiguous between lower tense-aspect and
evidentials.
Lee (2013) argues that her temporal approach is superior to Chung's (2007) spatial
approach in several ways. For one, on Lee's analysis there is no need to depart from
the independently motivated and well-accepted relative tense analysis of -∅, -ess, and

-kyess. A temporal approach also does a better job of capturing the generalization
that sentences without -te lack evidential inferences. Finally, Lee demonstrates that
constructions which involve the morpheme Chung analyses as a direct evidential (-∅)
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are in fact compatible with indirect evidence. This is readily accounted for on a temporal approach through the temporal contribution of −∅ and Lee's broad denition
of sensory observation. As Lee (2013) makes quite clear, complex tense constructions in Korean and in the Mvskoke auxiliary constructions receive a straightforward
account on a temporal approach, but prove problematic for a spatial approach.
In conclusion, this section has provided evidence from Mvskoke strongly in support of a temporal approach. Examples from the two contexts discussed here (Simultaneous Learning and Learning After-the-Fact) allow us to make the following
generalizations about the evidential contributions of the past tenses.
(38)

a.

Generalization #1: When Pasts 1, 2 and 3 are axed to the main verb,
the speaker has learned of the event as it happened.

b.

Generalization #2: When Pasts 1, 2 and 3 are axed to an auxiliary
verb, the speaker has learned of the event after the fact.

The characterization of Pasts 1-3 above are very dierent from characterizations of
either tense or evidentials. Notice that there is no mention of any source of evidence.
Notice also that these morphemes do not directly restrict the topic time of a sentence,
rather they restrict the time of learning to a particular past interval.7 If the time of

learning and the time of the event are simultaneous, the morpheme must be axed
to the main verb. If the time of learning occurred after the time of the event, then the
morpheme must appear on an auxiliary verb. In the next section I provide a formal
analysis of the Mvskoke evidential-tenses.
7 Certain

examples of auxiliary constructions in Mvskoke call this claim into question. In particular if the ET and the EAT are in dierent temporal intervals, the evidential-tense (P1, P2, or P3)
appears to track the ET and not the EAT. For example, if the speaker sees an old stump of a tree
at a P1-time, they must use an auxiliary construction with Past 2 to say he cut down the tree.
Using Past 1 would indicate that what they saw was a fresh stump.
(i)

P2 Learning After-the-Fact Context Imagine that at your uncle's house there was a tree that

you and your friends used to love to play in. You haven't been to your uncle's house in a
long time, but you went to see him this morning. When you got there, you saw an old stump
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3.5 Formal Analysis: Moment of Belief-State Change
In the previous section, I presented data which motivated viewing Mvskoke Pasts
1-3 as having an evidential component to their meaning. While this seemed at rst
blush to be a direct witness inference, the compatibility of Pasts 1-3 in Simultaneous
Learning Contexts and Learning After-the-Fact Contexts demonstrated that what is
at stake with Past 1-3 is not whether evidence is direct visual evidence, but that
evidence is acquired either simultaneously to the event or shortly following the event.
This was taken to support a temporal approach to evidential-tense morphemes which
makes crucial reference to the Evidence Acquisition Time or EAT. First proposed by
Lee (2011), EAT is a new temporal index intended to enrich a neo-Reichenbachian
system of times so that there are four times that a sentence's temporal operators
can refer to: event time (ET), evidence acquisition time (EAT), topic time (TT) and
utterance time (UT).
where that tree used to be. In the afternoon you call up your friends and want to tell them
that your uncle cut the tree down.
tvcēpvt
eto oh-ahkopanēma,
encuko
a.
Cvpvwv
tac-î:p-át
itó ohh-ahkopâ:n-i:-má-:
in-cóko
ca-páwa
1sg.pat-uncle 3.dat-house tree loc-play.pfv-1pl.ag-p3-dur cut-ip.pfv-p5
hakvnks.
ha:k-ánk-s
become.ipfv-p2-ind
`The tree we used to play on at my uncle's house, he cut it down.'
How would it sound to say (i-b)?
b.
#Cvpvwv
encuko
eto ohhahkopanēma,
tvcēpvt
ca-páwa
in-cóko
itó ohh-ahkopâ:n-i:-má-:
tac-î:p-át
1sg.pat-uncle 3.dat-house tree loc-play.pfv-1pl.ag-p3-dur cut-ip.pfv-p5
hakis.
ha:k-êys-s
become.ipfv-p1-ind
`The tree we used to play on at my uncle's house, he cut it down.'
Speaker Comment: That'd be it happened more recently, like that stump was new.
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)
Additional data seems to suggest that the auxiliary construction has a requirement that the result
state of the event continue up to the interval indicated by the evidential-tense. This inference and
whether examples like these can be accounted for on the analysis I propose is a question in need of
much more research.
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With these temporal indices, the generalizations for Mvskoke's evidential-tenses
can be reworded. The dierence between monoverbal and auxiliary constructions with
Pasts 1-3 can reframed as a dierence in the temporal relation between the Evidence
Acquisition Time and the Event Time. In what follows, I will characterize Evidence
Acquisition Time as a moment of changing one's belief state and derive the relation
between EAT and ET through the contribution of viewpoint aspect.
In monoverbal constructions, EAT and ET overlap. This is achieved through
commonly assumed semantics for perfective and imperfective aspect.

In a Neo-

Reichenbachian or Kleinian view of tense and aspect, aspect relates properties of
events to properties of times, giving us the relation between the run time of the event
and the TT. I propose that Pasts 1-3 restrict TT in two ways. First, they place it
within an interval of time at a certain distance from the UT. Second, they restrict
it to the time the speaker learned of the prejacent, the EAT. Thus in monoverbal
constructions EAT and TT refer to the same time and overlap with ET. This derives
the use of Pasts 1-3 the direct witness contexts as well as the simultaneous learning
contexts. Monoverbal constructions with Past 5, on the other hand, quite simply
locate an event in the past of the utterance. Thus under this approach, Past 5 is an
unrestricted past tense similar to English past tense.

Table 3.4.

Temporal Relations in Monoverbal and Auxiliary Constructions.

Construction
Monoverbal P1-P3
Monoverbal P5
Auxiliary

Aspect
ET ∞ EAT/TT
ET ∞ TT
ET ∞ t0

Lower Tense


0
t ≺ EAT/TT

Higher Tense
EAT/TT ≺ UT
TT ≺ UT
EAT/TT ≺ UT

In auxiliary constructions, ET precedes EAT. I take the auxiliary construction
itself to be a past perfect construction consisting of two past tenses: a lower instance of
Past 5 and a higher tense which is either Past 1, 2, or 3. This is not without precedent.
In their dictionary of Mvskoke, Loughridge & Hodge list these auxiliary constructions
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in their appendix of verb conjugations and label the construction the `pluperfect'
(Loughridge & Hodge 1890: 231-2). In auxiliary constructions (im)perfective aspect
on the main verb relates ET to another temporal index as usual, but then the relative
Past 5 tense contributes a precedence relation which places that temporal index into
the past of a temporal index that is idenitied as the EAT by the matrix past tense. In
essence, auxiliary constructions communicate that the speaker learned of a past event.
Since the learning came after the event took place, these constructions are compatible
with indirect evidence contexts. The evidential-tenses in both clause types have the
same semantics and relate EAT to the UT through the intervals that they refer to.
Past 1 locates the EAT in the past within the day of utterance. Past 2 locates the
EAT in the interval preceding the day of utterance up to a year ago. Past 3 locates
the EAT in the interval preceding a year from the day of utterance to 20 years ago.

3.5.1 EAT as Belief-State Change
Drawing on the informal language used here, I take EAT (or learning time) to
represent the time at which the speaker came to believe a proposition. I depart from
Lee's (2013) formalization because, as I will demonstrate in section 3.6.2, Mvskoke
Pasts 1-3 require the speaker to not have already believed p before the EAT. I formalize EAT as the time at which one's belief state changes from not believing p to
believing p. More specically, for an individual x to come to believe a proposition p
at a time t means that for all times preceding t, p was not true in all of x's belief
worlds at those past times. Similarly, for all times equal to and following t, p is true
in all x's belief worlds at those future times. I formalize this below by dening a
meta-language predicate come-to-believe.
(39)

λxe [λti [λws [λPhsti : come-to-believe(x,t,w,P) ]]] = λxe [λti [λws [λPhsti .∀t0 :
t0 ≺ t.¬∀w0 ∈ bel(x,w,t'). P(w0 ) = T & ∀t00 : t  t00 .∀w00 ∈ bel(x,w,t00 ).
P(w00 ) = T ]]]
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With universal quantication in both directions, this denition makes some very
strong claims about the speaker's beliefs regarding the proposition both before and
after the moment of coming to believe. I return to these issues in section 3.6.2.
For a world to be in the belief worlds of x it must be consistent with x's beliefs
at a certain world and time.
(40)

w0 ∈ bel(x,w,t) i w0 is consistent with the beliefs of x in w at t.

This denition formalizes evidence acquisition time as the time at which the speaker
comes to believe p. In other words, EAT is the time the speaker's belief state changes when they go from being agnostic about the proposition to believing the proposition.
What - if any - evidence initiates this change in belief state is not explicit in this
semantics. This does not however make the semantics of Pasts 1-3 too weak, because
in the proposed semantics for Pasts 1-3 require that the time of coming to believe p
is identical to the time at which p holds, deriving the intuition that Pasts 1-3 require
learning to take place simultaneously with the event in monoverbal sentences. The
desired truth conditions for a sentence like (41-a) are given in (41-b).
(41)

a.

Wvcenv Mēkko efvn

vpohvnks.

wacína mí:kko ifá-n

apô:h-ánk-s

white

chief

dog-acc buy.pfv-p2-ind

`The President bought a dog.'
b.

J The President bought-P2 a dog K = T i there is a past time t0 included

in the P2-Interval (yesterday to a year ago), and the speaker came to
believe at t0 that the President bought a dog at t0 .
I assume that tenses are restricted indenite quantiers over times and introduce a
temporal index i. I propose that P1-P3 are relative tense operators of type hhi, sti, hi, stii.
They introduce existential quantication over times and a contextually salient inter-
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val g(i). The tense restricts the times quantied over to both the contextually salient
interval and the appropriate interval associated with P1-P3. Finally, this time is fed
to the Come-to-Believe predicate. I adopt Martin (2010)'s interval for Pasts 1-3 and
abstract away from their precise semantics here. Instead, in the formulae that follow,
I refer to them as the P1-interval, P2-interval, and P3-interval. These intervals are
revised and formalized in Chapter 4. Example (42) illustrates the proposed semantics
for Past 2, which I abbreviate hereafter as in (43).
(42)

J Past 2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t)
& ∀t00 : t00 ≺ t0 .¬∀w0 ∈ bel(sp(c), w, t00 ) : P (w0 ) = T

& ∀t000 : t0  t000 .∀w00 ∈ bel(sp(c), w, t000 ) : P (w00 ) = T ]]]
(43)

J Past 2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t)
& come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w ]]]

Past 2 is evaluated relative to a context c and a variable assignment function g . I
represent the evaluation time as a temporal argument present in the syntax and label
it t∗ , following Kusumoto (2005). Past 2 relates an interval (introduced by existential
quantication) to the topic time (g(i)) and to the P2-Interval. The P2-interval is
relative to the evaluation time. Furthermore, the interval quantied over by the tense
node is identied as the time at which the speaker comes to believe P . Crucially, the

coming to believe -time is also the time which is applied to the proposition, so that
the speaker comes to believe the proposition at the time that it takes place.
Given the proposed semantics for P1-P3, their acceptability in simultaneous and
after-the-fact contexts follows from their interaction with viewpoint aspect. As laid
out in Chapter 2 section 2.2, I give imperfective and perfective aspect traditional
semantics associated with these aspects.
(44)

a.
b.

J ipfv K = [λPh,sti .[λt0i .[λws0 .∃e.t0 ⊆ τ (e, w0 ) & P (e, w0 ) = T ]]]

J pfv K = [λPh,sti .[λt0i .[λws0 .∃e.τ (e, w0 ) ⊆ t0 & P (e, w0 ) = T ]]]
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I do not encode the result state inference of perfective aspect or address the culmination implicature of imperfective aspect, though the subset relation in (44-a) allows
for a complete event interpretation. Instead I refer the reader to Altshuler's (2014)
analysis of Russian partitive aspects which share these properties with Mvskoke's
aspectual operators.

3.5.2 Monoverbal Sentences
In monoverbal sentences, Past 1, 2 or 3 combine with a verb inected for either
imperfective or perfective aspect. In either case, aspect will require the TT to overlap
with the ET, and the evidential-tense will identify the TT as the time of coming-to-

believe. Thus the coming-to-believe -time will overlap with ET.
Example (45) shows the LF and truth conditions for the monoverbal sentence
(41-a), using Davidsonian event semantics.
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(45)

LF for (41-a): Wvcenv Mekko efvn vpohvnks. `The President bought-P2 a
dog.'
TP4

st
DP

TP3

hhe, sti, sti

he, sti

efvn

1

TP2

dog

st
t∗

TP1

hi, sti
T

AspP

hhi, sti, hi, sti

hi, sti

P2i

Asp

vP

-vnk

hh, sti, hi, stii

h, sti

[pfv]

DP

v0

e

he, h, stii

Wvcenv Mekko

v

VP

President

h, sti, he, h, stiii

h, sti
DP

V

e

he, h, stii

t1

vpohbuy

(46)

J The President bought-P2i a dog Kc,g = T in w i

∃x. dog(x) in w & ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-to-bel(sp(c),
t0 ,w,
[λw0 .∃e. τ (e, w0 ) ⊆ t0 & buy(e, w0 ) & Ag(e, w0 )=The President & Th(e, w0 )=x)]
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Applying the meaning of the come-to-believe predicate yields the following expanded truth conditions.
(47)

J The President bought-P2i a dog Kc,g = T in w i

∃x. dog(x) in w & ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) &
a.

∀t00 .t00 ≺ t0 : ¬∀w0 ∈ bel(sp(c),w,t00 ) . [∃e.τ (e, w0 ) ⊆ t0 & buy(e, w0 ) &
Ag(e, w0 )=The President & Th(e, w0 )=x] &

b.

∀t000 .t0  t000 : ∀w00 ∈ bel(sp(c),w,t000 ) . [∃e.τ (e, w00 ) ⊆ t0 & buy(e, w00 ) &
Ag(e, w00 )=The President & Th(e, w00 )=x]

These truth conditions will be satised only if the time that the speaker came to
believe the proposition is also the topic time of the proposition. Since the proposition
bears perfective aspect, the time of the event ends up overlapping with the learning
time. In most contexts this will mean the speaker directly witnessed the event, but
it will also hold in simultaneous contexts where evidence is indirect.
The only way in which Past 2 diers from the other evidential tenses is in the
intervals that the times are related to.
(48)

a.

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti : λti : λws : ∃t0 . t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t) & t0 ⊆ g(i)
& come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w ]

b.

J P2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti : λti : λws : ∃t0 . t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t) & t0 ⊆ g(i)
& come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w ]

c.

J P3i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti : λti : λws : ∃t0 . t0 ⊆ P3-interval(t) & t0 ⊆ g(i)

& come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w ]

The intervals themselves are what requires the time t0 to be in the past of the evaluation time t.
An evidential tense sentence in imperfective aspect will receive similar truth conditions and will also enforce an overlap between the event time and the time the
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speaker came to believe P . Thus the truth conditions for an imperfective sentence
with Past 1-3 will require that the speaker come to believe P at a time which is entirely contained in the run time of the event. Linking the learning time to the event
time through the semantics of viewpoint aspect makes some ne-grained predictions
about how much of the event was witnessed. With imperfective aspect, a direct witness use should be compatible with the speaker witnessing only part of the event.
It may or may not continue after that time. Given the semantics of the perfective
aspect, a direct witness use should require that the speaker witness the entire event
or learn of the event as it is completed.
Kalsang et al. (2013) show that direct evidentials in Tibetan vary along exactly
these lines. They show that the evidential shag is felicitous in contexts where the
speaker witnessed part or all of the event, and the evidentials dug and song are
felicitous only in contexts where the speaker witnessed the entire event. They link
this to the contribution of aspect, as I sketched in the previous paragraph. In their
situation semantics they characterize the dierence between them as a dierence in
the type of relation between the Event Situation (ES) and the Information Situation
(IS).
(49)

a.

dug, song: ES ⊂ IS

b.

shag: IS ⊂ ES

(Kalsang et al. 2013: 557)

Testing these predictions for Mvskoke imperfective and perfective aspect is left for
future work. I do, however, provide here an account of auxiliary constructions which
also appeals to aspect.

3.5.3 Auxiliary Constructions
As mentioned earlier, I follow Loughridge & Hodge (1890) in viewing this auxiliary
construction to be a type of past perfect construction. More precisely, I view the
auxiliary construction as a complex tense construction with a sequence of two past
127

tenses - Past 5 on the main verb and an evidential tense on the auxiliary. I hold
that it is the precedence relation introduced by the lower Past 5 that leads to the
indirect evidential avor of auxiliary constructions. The desired truth conditions for
a sentence with an auxiliary construction like (50-a) is given in (50-b).
(50)

a.

Sam avnhuehkvt

hakvnks.

Sam a:-an-hôyhk-át

ha:k-ánk-s

Sam dir-1.sg.dat-call.pfv-p5 become.ipfv-p2-ind
`Sam called me.'
b.

J Sam called-P5 aux-P2 me K = T i there is a past time t0 included

in the P2-Interval (yesterday to a year ago), and the speaker came to
believe at t0 that Sam had called at a time t00 prior to t0 .
I assume a non-evidential, relative past tense semantics for Past 5 in (51). The
evidence in previous sections illustrated that a sentence with Past 5 is acceptable in
both direct and indirect evidence contexts. It was further shown through speaker
comments and in discussion of Martin (2010) that Past 5 is compatible with all past
times. Here I depart from Martin (2010)'s intervals and give Past 5 a semantics which
does not reference any graded interval of time or encode any evidential requirement.
(51)

J P5i Kg = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ≺ t & t0 ⊆ g(i) & P(t0 , w) = T]

I assume that, as in English, the auxiliary that appears in perfect constructions is
inserted to host the tense features of the higher T head and that the features of
the lower T head are realized on the main verb (see Arregi & Klecha (2015) and
references therein). The reason behind the choice of the auxiliary hak-, instead of the
more general copular auxiliary om-, is unclear. A possible reason for the choice may
be the semantic overlap between coming to believe and the change of state meaning of
the verb hak- `become'. The choice of imperfective aspect on an auxiliary following a
verb inected for perfective aspect is in keeping with the wider pattern in the Mvskoke
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language (see Martin 2011: 244). Although there is no empirical data at present as
to its meaning contribution, I propose that one can think of the imperfective aspect
on the auxiliary as contributing that the result state (contributed by the perfective
aspect) surrounds the topic time contributed by the tense on the auxiliary verb. To
make my proposed semantics more transparent and to highlight how the evidential
meaning results from relations between times, I gloss over the semantic contribution
of the auxiliary and the aspect it is inected for.
The LF and truth conditions for the sentence in (50-a) are given below.
(52)

LF for Sam avnhuehkvt hakvnks. `Sam called me.'
TP3

st
t∗

TP2

hi, sti
T2

TP1

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti

P2i

T1

AspP

-vnk

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti

P5j

Asp

vP

-vt

hh, sti, hi, stii

h, sti

pfv

DP

v0

e

he, h, stii

Sam

v

VP

hh, sti, he, h, stiii

h, sti
DP

V

e

he, h, stii

pro1.sg.obj

huehkcall
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(53)

J Sam called-P5j Aux-P2i me Kc,g = T in w i

∃t0 . t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-to-believe(sp(c), t0 ,w,
[λw0 .∃t00 . t00 ≺ t0 & t00 ⊆ g(j) & ∃e.τ (e, w0 ) ⊆ t00 & call(e, w0 ) & Ag(e,w0 )=Sam
& Th(e,w0 )=sp(c)])
To achieve the order of morphemes, I assume a head-nal syntax for Mvskoke and that
the verb undergoes total head-movement - that is V moves through each functional
head until it reaches the highest functional projection. To account for the auxiliary
construction, I propose that head-movement stops if it would result in a feature con-

ict. I follow Arregi & Klecha (2015) in dening feature conict as a situation that
arises when adjacent heads bear a feature of the same type. I reword their denition
of feature conict in (54).
(54)

Feature Conict : Two heads X and Y conict in features if X and Y both
bear features of type F.

Crucially, auxiliary constructions involve two tense features. As a result the verb
moves only as high as T2 and the auxiliary hak- is inserted to host P2's tense features
and the indicative mood morpheme.
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(55)

Morphosyntax of (50).
CP
C

TP
DPi

T

T0

[T:P2] [ind]
-s
T -vnk
; hak-

Sam
TP2
T2

AspP

ti

T2

Asp

Asp1

vP

C

v

v0

Asp

[T:pst]
-vt

[pfv]
VP

v

V

v

huehkDP

V

vn=
In summary, we have seen that the semantics of both monoverbal and auxiliary
constructions can be captured using the same semantics for Past 2 (and for Past 1 and
3). The dierence between monoverbal and auxiliary constructions comes down to
the aspect of the clausal complement of the evidential tense. In a monoverbal clause,
P2 takes an AspP in the perfective or imperfective aspect, the temporal relation
introduced by either aspect results in an overlap between the event time and the time
of the speaker's coming to believe. In an auxiliary construction, P2 takes a clause
with additional tense features. Past 5 contributes a precedence relation between the
time of the event and the time the speaker comes to believe that event took place.
Past 5 aects the construction in two ways. Semantically, the precedence relation is
131

responsible for the indirect evidential meaning. Morphosyntactically, the presence of
additional tense features is responsible for auxiliary support.
To conclude, I will briey describe how a monoverbal Past 5 sentence is composed.
When Past 5 is the highest tense, its time argument will be saturated by the evaluation
time t∗ . This will yield a proposition of type hs, ti which, when evaluated in the actual
world, yields the following truth conditions:
(56)

P5i [AspP

a.

[T P a dog 1 [T P t∗

pfv [vP President t1 buy ]]]]

b.

J The President bought-P5i a dog Kc,g = T in w i

∃x. dog(x) in w & ∃t0 .t0 ≺ t∗ & t0 ⊆ g(i) & ∃e.τ (e, w) ⊆ t0 & buy(e, w)
& Ag(e, w)=The President & Th(e, w)=x
The semantics in (56) correctly predict that a monoverbal sentence with P5 will be
true in any past tense context regardless of the remoteness of the time or the type of
evidence the speaker has for the assertion. It is the pragmatic competition between
tenses that leads to the restricted distribution of P5 sentences. I turn to this in section
3.5.4.
The analysis presented here makes two predictions about the behavior of tenses in
embedded environments.First, I have given all the Mvskoke past tenses denotations
of the same semantic type: hhi, sti, hi, stii. They introduce a time and shift that
time into the past of an evaluation time, which is either the utterance time t∗ or a
time provided by a higher tense. In the matrix clauses and the auxiliary construction
data we have seen, Pasts 1-3 are always the highest tenses. They are interpreted
relative to the utterance time and the speaker of the utterance context is always the
individual coming to believe the proposition. However, this analysis makes predictions
which call these two generalizations into question. First, it predicts that it should be
possible for Pasts 1-3 to 1) embed under another tense operator either in auxiliary
constructions or in embedded clauses and 2) to locate a time within an interval that is
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evaluated relative to a time other than the utterance time. Secondly, it predicts that
the individual argument of the come-to-believe predicate should not be able to
shift from the speaker of the utterance context to the subject of an embedded clause.
The empirical data on the embeddability of Pasts 1-3 is incomplete at this time,
however relevant data would come from embedding Pasts 1-3 in intensional environments such as under verbs of saying or thinking. One major challenge to testing this
is that direct quotation appears to be the primary strategy for reporting speech acts.
Not every consultant I worked with produces or allows indirect quotation. An exception to this is embedding under kometv `to think/believe'. I return to some examples
of P1-P3 embedding under kometv in Chapter 7.
Data from auxiliary constructions in particular reveals a structural asymmetry
between Past 5 and Pasts 1-3. Specically, auxiliary constructions demonstrate that
Past 5 can appear as either the lower tense in a complex tense construction or as the
highest tense in a monoverbal construction. Pasts 1-3 are unable to appear as the
lower tense in the -vt haketv auxiliary construction.
(57)

Sam vnhuehk{vt/*is/*vnk/*emvt}
Sam an-hôyhk-{át/*éys/*ánk/*imát}
Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-{p5/*p1/*p2/*p3}
hak{∅pres /is/vnk/emvt}-s.
ha:k-{∅pres /éys/ánk/imát}-s
become.ipfv-{pres/p1/p2/p3}-ind
`Sam had called me.'

(RMM-Mus-03/30/2022)

This data points to a crucial dierence between Past 5 and Pasts 1-3. Past 5 can
genuinely be shown to be a relative tense, whereas I cannot show that for Pasts 1-3 at
present. Additionally, Past 5 can appear in a lower position than Pasts 1-3. Finally,
as we saw in this chapter, Past 5 makes a dierent semantic contribution from Pasts
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1-3 - it lacks the come-to-believe predicate. As such, it competes pragmatically
with Past 1-3 but only in monoverbal sentences. I address the nature of this competition in section 3.5.4, demonstrating that the implicatures associated with P5 because
of competition are conversational implicatures. I return to the competition between
Pasts 1-3 in Chapter 4 where I show that they can be modeled as competing via

Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991; a.m.o.). These dierences certainly allow for
monoverbal sentences with Past 5 to be structurally dierent (though not substantially more complex) than monoverbal sentences with Pasts 1-3. This is a structural
asymmetry that we nd again in the nominal domain (discussed in Chapters 5 & 6).

3.5.4 Competition between tenses
In the preceding discussion, the empirical data lead me to propose a semantics
for a Past 5 sentence that is both non-evidential and non-graded. Sentences with
Past 1, 2 or 3, however, have semantics that are both evidential and graded. Given
these semantics, Past 5 is true in direct evidence contexts compatible with any past
time. It is therefore puzzling that speakers reject Past 5 in direct evidence contexts
in the P1, P2, of P3 intervals. I propose that they reject Past 5 in these contexts
because there is a stronger form that can and should be used, namely Pasts 1, 2,
or 3. Because Pasts 1-3 are stronger (which I will dene in terms of assertability),
pragmatic reasoning similar to Scalar Implicatures accounts for the indirect evidence
and temporal remoteness inferences associated with the use of Past 5.
Scalar Implicatures arise when two or more lexical items form a scale of informativity and the less informative item is used. If the speaker is being cooperative, then
Grice's rst maxim of Quantity (Make your contribution as informative as required)
will result in reasoning to the eect that the more informative item is false. Usually,
informativity is dened in terms of logical entailment. Utterances with the more informative item asymmetrically entail utterances with the less informative item. Given

134

the semantics of the come-to-believe predicate introduced above, a P2-sentence
(58-a) does not logically entail a P5-sentence (58-b). Informativity dened in terms of
logical entailment will not be able to account for the pragmatic competition between
Pasts 1-3 and Past 5.
(58)

a.

J ϕ-P2i K = T i ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-tobel(sp(c),t0 ,ϕ(t0 ))

b.

J ϕ-P5i K = T i ∃t0 .t0 ≺ t∗ & t0 ⊆ g(i) & ϕ(t0 )

If however we dene informativity in terms of assertability as in (59), then we can
explain the Scalar Implicature-like reasoning associated with the use of Past 5.8
(59)

Informativity (redened in terms of assertability)
A sentence p is more informative than another sentence q if i) in every context
in which p can be asserted q can be asserted, and ii) the reverse does not hold.

In every situation where ϕ-P2 can be asserted, ϕ-P5 can also be asserted. There
are two components of meaning that make this so. First, since the P2-interval is an
interval of past time, both sentences assert the existence of a past time at which ϕ
holds. Second, the come-to-believe predicate asserts that ϕ(t0 ) follows from the
speaker's beliefs; given the nature of assertion and sincerity conditions, a speaker
would not assert a P5 sentence if ϕ(t0 ) didn't follow from their beliefs. Indeed, if
speakers want to convey a lack of commitment to the truth of a P5 sentence, they
must explicitly do so through the use of epistemic modals or an outright denial.
A P5 sentence is thus less informative than a sentence with P1, P2, or P3 in that
it doesn't narrow down the temporal interval and it does not add the information
about coming to believe ϕ as it took place. When a speaker uses the less-informative
P5, one infers either that the speaker did not nd out as the event took place or
8I

thank Seth Cable for suggesting this approach to the competition between P1-P3 and P5.
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that the event did not take place in the P1, P2, or P3 interval. This disjunction of
implicatures is due to the two ways to make the P1, P2, or P3 sentence false. To see
this let us consider what the scale strength would need to be for the tenses. Consider
the scale in (60):
(60)

h P5, P2, {P3, P1} i

Previewing the data that we will see in Chapter 4, I propose a nested interval analysis
for P1-P3 in which P2 covers the widest span of time and P1 and P3 are more
specic intervals - P1 adding a restriction to the day of utterance and P3 adding
a restriction to subjectively distant times. The assertion of a P5 sentence will be
pragmatically strengthened by conjoining the negation of all stronger alternatives.
Thus the semantics of a P5 sentence (61-a) will be conjoined with the negation of
the P2 alternative (61-b), and the negation of the disjunction of the P3 and P1
alternatives (61-c).
(61)

a.

∃t0 .t0 ≺ t∗ & t0 ⊆ g(i) & ϕ(t0 )

b.

∧ ¬∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,ϕ(t0 )

c.

∧ ¬ [∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P3-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,ϕ(t0 ))
∨ ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ g(i) & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,ϕ(t0 ))]

Simplifying (61-c) by De Morgan's Law will result in the negation of each of the
disjuncts. The resulting pragmatically strengthened utterance can be paraphrased as
in (62).
(62)

There is a past time at which ϕ holds,
and there is not a time in the P2 interval at which the speaker learned of ϕ
as it took place,
and there is not a time in the P3 interval at which the speaker learned of ϕ
as it took place,
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and there is not a time in the P1 interval at which the speaker learned of ϕ
as it took place.
For the alternatives to be false, it is sucient for either i) the time the eventuality
held (t0 ) to not fall within either the P2, P3, or P1 interval, or ii) for the speaker to
not have learned of the eventuality at the same time as the eventuality held. When
reasoning about the utterance, if the speaker has made it clear (perhaps through the
use of a rst person pronoun as in (13)) that they did learn of ϕ as it took place,
then the interlocutor will draw a temporal remoteness inference - they will conclude
that ϕ must have fallen outside the P1-P3 intervals. If however, the speaker makes it
clear (perhaps through the use of a temporal adverbial) that ϕ took place in one of
the graded intervals, then the interlocutor will draw an indirect evidence inference they will conclude that the speaker must not have learned of ϕ as it was taking place.
Accounting for the distribution of P5 with Gricean quantity implicatures predicts
that when neither evidence type nor temporal interval is relevant to the conversation,
P5 should be felicitous in direct witness contexts in the P1, P2, or P3 intervals.
While I have not yet conrmed this in elicitation, textual examples suggest that this
prediction is on the right track. The following example is drawn from an 1883 letter
to A.E.W. Robertson. The author of the letter describes his experience in a Baptist
church and discusses the teaching he heard there. He uses Past 5 to describe his
visit to the Baptist church even though it is clear that he has rst-hand evidence for
his visit and locates it in the Past 2 interval with the phrase nettv-cako vnkēn `last
Sunday'.
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(63)

a.

Momen

nettv-cako vnkēn

likiyat

mo:m-ín

nitta-cá:ko =ankí:-n

lêyk-ay-a:t

be.so.ipfv-ds

Sunday

=last-

acc sit.sg.pfv-1sg.ag-comp

en

hvsvklatkv-fvccvn vkerkv hokkolen ayit

in-

hasakla:tka-fácca-n akí:ìka hokkô:li-n â:y-ey-t

3.dat- west-direction-acc mile

two-acc go.sg.pfv-1sg.ag-ss

`And now, last Sunday I traveled two miles west of my home,'
b.

Este-lvste

tvlofvn

ce

isti-lasti-

taló:fa-n ci-

hocefkēn
hocífk-i:-n

person-black- town-acc 2.pat- be.called-dur-ds
erorit
iì-ô:ì-ey-t
dir-arrive.sg.pfv-1sg.ag-ss

`and arrived at a black town which bears your name,'
c.

mēkusvpov-cukon ecēyvyvtēs.
mi:kosapka-cóko-n i-ci:y-ay-áti:-s

p5-ind

prayer-house-acc 3-enter.ipfv-1sg.ag`and entered a church house....'
d.

Momof

erkenvkv hvmket

Este-cate liken

mo:m-ô:f

iìkináka hámki-t isti-cá:ti

lêyk-in

be.so.ipfv-when preacher one-nom person-red sit.sg.pfv-ds
heciyvtēs.
hi:c-ay-áti:-s

p5-ind

see.ipfv-1sg.ag-

`And seated inside I saw an Indian man, a preacher.'
(Tanyan 1883: glossing added )
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The (a) and (b) examples establish the temporal location in the P2-interval and
the evidence source as direct rst-hand perception. In spite of this being a context
in which P2 is the most informative tense, the author uses Past 5 in both (63-c)
and (63-d). I argue that since the content of the teaching at the church is the main
topic of conversation, the temporal interval and evidence source are conversationally
irrelevant. I suggest that this is the reason that Past 5 is felicitous.

3.6 Predictions of the Account
3.6.1 Comparison with other Temporal Approaches
In this chapter I have motivated a temporal account of the evidential inferences
associated with Mvskoke's graded tenses, Pasts 1-3. Although they are accompanied
most often by a direct witness inference, I have argued that Pasts 1-3 do not encode
evidential source at all but rather encode reference to a moment of coming to believe.
The type of evidence implied by a sentence marked with Pasts 1, 2, or 3 is partly
derived through temporal relations between the event time and the moment of coming
to believe and partly implicated by presence or absence of the inferential evidential

-vcok (see (25) for example). The Belief-State Change approach is consequently not
evidential per se. As such, it predicts that Pasts 1-3 should be compatible with any
evidence type so long as i) the evidence is acquired simultaneously to the event (for
monoverbal constructions) and ii) the evidence justies a change in belief. At this
point in my research, given the empirical data at hand, it is unclear whether this
prediction is completely borne out. In lacking any semantically encoded evidential
restriction, my approach diers from the two prominent temporal approaches of Lee
(2013) and Smirnova (2013). In this section I discuss some challenging Mvskoke data
and the reasons that lead Lee and Smirnova to encode an evidential restriction.
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In the very rst examples, we saw that Pasts 1-3 were infelicitous with reports
and evidence from written sources such as the newspaper. I illustrate with Past 2 in
the examples below, repeated from (4) and (5).
(64)

P2 Reportative Context: Last year, a woman you know, Mary, spoke with
Chief Leonard Harjo and she told you about it. How would you tell me Mary
spoke with Chief Leonard last year?
a.

Mary ohrolopē hvnkvnkē

Mēkko Leonard emponayvtēs.

Mary ohìolopí: hânk=ankí: mí:kko Leonard ím-pona:y-atí:-s
Mary year

one=p2

chief

Leonard 3.dat-speak.ipfv-

p5-ind

`Last year, Mary spoke with Chief Leonard.'
Linguist: Could you say (64-b)?
b.

#Mary ohrolopē hvnkvnkē

Mēkko Leonard

Mary

ohìolopí: hânk=ankí: mí:kko Leonard

Mary

year

one=p2

chief

Leonard

emponayvnks.
ím-pona:y-ánk-s
3.dat-speak.ipfv-

p2-ind

`Last year, Mary was speaking with Chief Leonard.'
Speaker Comment: No, that's like I saw Mary talking to him.
(JWH-Sem-07/10/2018)
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(65)

P2 Newspaper Context: Imagine that you read an article in the newspaper
that the President bought a dog yesterday. How would you tell me this?
a.

Cokv-tvlvme 'svlikat,

Wvcenv

Mēkko efvn

co:ka-talamí (i)s-a-lêyk-a:t

wacína

mí:kko ifá-n

paper-daily

inst-loc-sit.sg.pfv-comp washington chief

dog-acc

vpohvtēs.
apô:h-ati:-s
buy.pfv-

p5-ind

`As it was printed in the newspaper, the President bought a dog.'
Linguist: Could you say (65-b)?
b.

#Cokv-tvlvme 'svlikat,

Wvcenv

Mēkko

co:ka-talamí

(i)s-a-lêyk-a:t

wacína

mí:kko

paper-daily

inst-loc-sit.sg.pfv-comp washington chief

efvn

vpohvnks.

ifá-n

apô:h-ánk-s

dog-acc buy.pfv-

p2-ind

`As it was printed in the newspaper, the President bought a dog.'
Speaker Comment: No, that sounds like you were there when he bought
the dog.

(DLR-Mus-07/11/2018)

In light of the analysis, one reason for the infelicity of Past 2 in these examples
is that the speaker is hearing the report and reading the newspaper article after the
relevant event. The evidence is not acquired simultaneously to the event. Simultaneous versions of these evidence types, however, also fail to license Past 2. Consider
the simultaneous report heard over the radio in (66) and the newspaper that reports
on an ongoing state in (67).
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(66)

P2 Radio Simultaneous Context: Imagine that last week you were listening to
the radio and heard a live broadcast of a re in Wewoka. You were listening
attentively as the newscaster described the eorts to save the building. At
one point the newsman said there was a reman entering the building. Later
that reman emerged helping a man out of the burning building. He asked
the reman's name and he said he was Paul. You know Paul, he's your friend!
#Tvcak hvnkēvnkē

vnhesse,

Paul, orēn

fekhvmkēt

Paul oìí:-n

khámk-i:-t

taca:k

hânk-i:=ankí: an-híssi

weak

one-nmlz=p2 1sg.dat-friend Paul really-ds brave-dur-ss

arvnks.
a:ì-ánk-s
go.about.sg.ipfv-

p2-ind

`Last week, my friend Paul was being brave.'
Speaker Comment: You would need to add a disclaimer and say that you
heard it from someone else.
(67)

(RMM-Mus-06/22/2021)

P2 Newspaper Simultaneous Context: Imagine that in July you were reading
in the news that Florida was having a big heat wave with temperatures up
in the 100's F. Now it's September and we are talking about how we had a
mild summer in Oklahoma.
#Kvn-fvsket orēn

hiyēt

omvnks.

kan-fáski-t

héyy-i:-t

ô:m-ánk-s

oìí:-n

Florida-nom really-ds be.hot-dur-ss be.pfv-p2-ind
`It was really hot in Florida.'
Speaker Comment: This means you experienced the heat in Florida, like you
were there. You can't have just read about it.
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(RMM-Mus-9/21/2021)

There are a few reasons why these evidence sources and contexts might fail to
license Past 2. For (66), the context might not actually establish enough simultaneity.
While Paul is in the building performing the brave act, the speaker doesn't actually
know it's Paul. Consequently, this context may in fact qualify as a Learning After-theFact context. For (67), the reason for infelicity might be the notorious unreliability
of weather reports or the inherent non-simultaneity associated with the newspaper
(the reported becomes aware of the fact, writes about it, the story is printed, then
distributed, and then comes to the speaker). A nal confound for this sentence could
be that direct predication with an experiencer verb like hot independently requires
direct evidence. Other attempts to elicit judgments in simultaneous learning contexts
with evidence from a newspaper or a text message over the phone proved unsuccessful.
Further exploration of this topic is left for future research.
A nal evidence source that I will discuss here is evidence from inference based
on reasoning. As mentioned above, both Lee (2013) and Smirnova (2013) provide an
account of evidential-tenses which encodes an evidential restriction. For Lee, Korean

-te is restricted to evidence that counts as a sensory observation; Smirnova encodes
a restriction to external evidence for the Bulgarian evidential participle. A central
reason for encoding an evidential restriction is the Korean -te and the Bulgarian
evidential participle are unacceptable with inference based on reasoning. One type of
pure-reasoning context that Lee (2013) and Smirnova (2013) use is reasoning based on
previous experience. These examples often involve a report as a secondary evidence
source supporting the reasoning as well as direct evidence of prior situations. However,
since the speaker has no evidence for the asserted proposition (other than their own
reasoning), their assertion is at best a guess.
(68)

Korean Reasoning-Based Inference Context : Yenghi was Chelswu's homeroom teacher last year, but she has not seen him recently. Yenghi heard from
Chelswu's current teacher that he did not show up in class yesterday. She
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remembered that he was a hardworking student and never missed a class
except for one time when his old car broke down. Now, Yenghi says:
#Chelswu cha-ka
Chelswu

tto

kocangna-ss-te-la.

car-nom again break.down-past-te-decl

Intended: [I inferred (from reasoning based on previous experience) that]
Chelswu's car had broken down again.
(69)

(Lee 2013: 6)

Bulgarian Reasoning-Based Inference Context : You and your sister have been
out of touch for a couple of years. You know that your sister always wanted
her daughter Maria to play the piano. When someone asks you whether your
niece Maria plays any musical instrument, you say:
a.

#Maria svirela
Maria

na piano.

play.ipfv.pres.evp on piano

`Maria plays the piano, [I inferred].'
b.

Maria trjabva

da

sviri

na piano.

Maria must.pres sbjv play.ipfv.3sg.pres on piano
`(For all I know), Maria must be playing the piano.'
(Smirnova 2013: 491, glossing adapted )
Testing Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 in contexts where the speaker has evidence from reasoning met with limited success. AnderBois (2017) discusses the diculty of constructing
or nding naturally occuring scenarios that exemplify so-called pure reasoning or
mind-internal reasoning.'. As seen in the scenarios above, most often multiple evidence sources are involved and speaker certainty is unclear. Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 are
predicted to be infelicitous in scenarios like (68) and (69) because the available evidence does not justify the level of certainty needed to believe the proposition. I do,
however, predict that Pasts 1-3 should be felicitous with inference based on reasoning
if the reasoning involved supports a much stronger conclusion. Such a context would
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involve logical reasoning based on (for instance) natural laws, mathematical truths,
or metaphysical necessities. It would also need to avoid having problematic secondary
evidence sources and would need to be simultaneous to the eventuality.
The strength of the assertion is another dierence between the Korean and Bulgarian evidential-tenses and Mvskoke Pasts 1-3. The modal semantics that Lee and
Smirnova propose are also designed to capture the fact that anassertions with an
evidential-tense is weaker than a non-modal assertion. Consequently, in Korean and
Bulgarian evidential-tenses cannot be used to assert introspectively known facts about
one's self (e.g. I was happy/hungry/crying). These are perfectly acceptable with
Mvskoke Pasts 1-3. In the next section, I address the level of certainty required for
a P1-P3 assertion and the predictions of the semantics I propose for the come-tobelieve predicate.

3.6.2 Predictions of the Belief-State Change Approach
This chapter has motivated a semantics for Pasts 1-3 which is not evidential, but
which gives rise to evidential inferences because these tenses encode a moment of
coming to believe. I dened this moment with the predicate repeated below as (70).
As mentioned in previous section, this denition is quite strong and denes a rst
moment of coming to believe the proposition p. The universal quantication over
times prior to the moment of coming to believe, enforces a requirement that there
is no past time at which the speaker believed p. The universal quantication over
times following the moment of coming to believe requires that the speaker keeps that
believe forever.
(70)

λxe [λti [λws [λPhsti : come-to-believe(x,t,w,P) ]]] = λxe [λti [λws [λPhsti .∀t0 :
t0 ≺ t.¬∀w0 ∈ bel(x,w,t'): P(w0 ) = T & ∀t00 : t  t00 .∀w00 ∈ bel(x,w,t00 ):
P(w00 ) = T ]]]
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These requirements are too strong if P1-P3 really do encode a belief predicate. However in describing the contribution of P1-P3, speakers often invoke a factive predicate
like know. The key contexts were also characterized with the predicate learn, also
factive (e.g. Simultaneous Learning and Learning After-the-Fact). In what follows,
I address the two key elements of this denition and the predictions they make for
moments before and after coming to believe. I also discuss a possible renement of
the denition and whether P1-P3 encode belief or a stronger factive predicate.

3.6.2.1 Moments Prior to Coming to Believe
The rst part of this denition that I would like to address is the requirement
that for every time prior to the coming-to-believe time, p did not follow from the
speaker's beliefs at that time. There are four situations that could hold at moments
prior to coming-to-believe. 1) The speaker could be agnostic about the truth of the
proposition p. 2) The speaker could believe p to be false. 3) The speaker could
believe p to be true. And 4) the speaker could have believed p to be true and then
changed their mind (believed it to be false). The rst two are situations which my
come-to-believe predicate predicts to be compatible with the use of P1-P3. The

last two are situations the predicate rules out. In my discussion of these situations, I
will draw mostly on data with P1-P3 in an auxiliary construction. To understand the
reason for this, consider again the semantics for P1-P3, illustrated with P2 in (71)
(repeated from (43)).
(71)

J Past 2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t)
& come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w ]]]

This denition requires the speaker to come to believe at t0 that P holds at t0 . The
denition in (70) then would require that the speaker not have believed P(t0 ) at times
prior to t0 . When one considers events, believing P (t0 ) before t0 is rather implausible.
Two events of the same description that take place at dierent times are two distinct
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events. If P describes a perfective or imperfective event, then believing P (t0 ) before

t0 would amount to believing a future event to be true.9 Given the unsettled nature
of the future, controlling this variable in elicitation would be quite complicated. If
however, P describes a past event (as it does in auxiliary constructions), it is perfectly
reasonable for someone to believe P (t0 ) (at t0 there is a past event of P ) before t0 . This
follows from believing P ; if you believe an event took place, then you will believe that
at future times there will still be this past event that is true (modulo new evidence
that would force one to revise their beliefs). As such, auxiliary constructions allow
us to probe the predictions of the approach for the second and third cases, which
I discuss in detail below. Given the unsettled nature of the future, I assume that
the most natural situation in which to use P1-P3 will be one in which the speaker is
agnostic about the truth of p until the moment she nds out about it. Most of my
key data exemplify the evidential-tenses in this type of situation. I will not discuss
the rst situation further here. However, after discussing the second and third cases,
I will return to the predictions regarding the fourth situation - in which the speaker
changes their mind about P .
There is a particular kind of Learning After-the-Fact scenario that allows us to
probe the predictions for the second and third cases. Following Koev (2017), I call
these scenarios Late Realization contexts. These are scenarios where the speaker perceives an eventuality but draws the wrong conclusion, only later to discover the true
nature of the eventuality. Consider the following naturally occuring Late Realization
context in Mvskoke. In (72), the speaker is recounting her rst time in an airplane.
She looked out the window and mistakenly thought she was seeing clouds. Later
9 The

situation is somewhat more complicated with states, but this would still amount to believing
that a state will hold (or continue to hold) at a future time.
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though she realized that what she had seen was the ocean. In these types of contexts,
Mvskoke speakers use the auxiliary construction.10
(72)

P3 Late Realization Context: The interviewee is describing her rst ride in
an airplane. She looked out the window and thought she saw clouds, but
afterwards she realized it was the ocean.
Vholucēt

owet

aholocí:-t ô:w-it

kowimvc.

Eu-hvtkvt

kô:w-ey-mát-s

oy-hátka-t

cloud-nom be.pfv-ss think.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind water-white-nom
ohwvt

hakemvc.

ó<h>w-at

ha:k-imát-s

be<pfv>-

p5 become.ipfv-p3-ind

`I thought it was clouds. It happened to be the ocean.'
(Harris Interview, 0:13:14-0:13:18)
In late realization scenarios, the speaker directly perceives the eventuality (such as
the state of the view being of the ocean). However, they draw an incorrect conclusion
(she believes that at that moment there was a state of the view being of clouds).
At times after their perception of the eventuality up to the moment they realize the
truth, they would judge the proposition describing the actual situation (there was a
past state of the view being the ocean) as false. This satises the denition of cometo-believe since the proposition is not true in any of their belief worlds. Thus my
come-to-believe analysis correctly predicts that an auxiliary construction with

Pasts 1-3 will be acceptable in late realization scenarios.
10 The

reader will notice that native speakers prefer to translate the auxiliary construction with
the English expression it happened to be/ it happened that. This expressions appears to be very
similar to the expression it turns/turned out that. Whether this translation signals an additional
meaning component carried by the auxiliary construction is a topic in need of further investigation
and is not accounted for with my come-to-believe semantics.
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Let us now consider one of the situations that the come-to-believe predicate
rules out: the situation in which the speaker already believes the proposition before
the come-to-believe time. In the following late realization scenario for P1, the speaker
sees something on the oor and comes to believe (mistakenly) that it is a leaf. As
with the previous scenario, none of their belief worlds are worlds in which the thing
on the oor is a bug until the moment of coming to believe, when they realize it
is a bug. In the following scenario the speaker can use an auxiliary construction to
indicate that they realized there was a past situation of a bug on the oor, or they
can use a monoverbal P1 sentence to indicate that they came to believe that there
was an ongoing state of a bug being on the oor.
(73)

P1 Late Realization Context: Imagine this morning you saw something on
the oor and assumed it was a leaf. But when you looked closer, you realized
it was a bug.
a.

Eto-esset

os

kowvyisan,

ito-íssi-t

ô:-s

ko:w-ay-êys-a:n

tree-hair-nom be.pfv-ind think.ipfv-1sg.ag-p1-comp.ds
soksot

ohwvt

hakis.

sókso-t

ó<h>w-át

ha:k-êys-s

p5 become.ipfv-p1-ind

betsy.bug-nom be<pfv>-

`I thought it was a leaf, however it happened to be a bug.'
b.

Eto-esset

os

kowvyisan,

ito-íssi-t

ô:-s

ko:w-ay-êys-a:n

tree-hair-nom be.pfv-ind think.ipfv-1sg.ag-p1-comp.ds
soksot

owis.

sókso-t

o:w-êys-s

betsy.bug-nom be.ipfv-

p1-ind

`I thought it was a leaf, however it was a bug.' (IAH-Sem-07/27/2019)
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Consider however an immediate realization context. If the speaker immediately
realizes that it is a bug on the oor, the auxiliary construction is unacceptable and
only the monoverbal P1 sentence can be used. I propose that the auxiliary construction is unacceptable because at every moment after the realization, the speaker
believes there was a past time at which the proposition was true. This is precisely
the case that my semantics for come-to-believe rules out.
(74)

P1 Immediate Realization Context: Imagine this morning you saw something
on the oor and immediately recognized it as a bug.
a.

#Soksot

ohwvt

hakis.

sókso-t

ó<h>w-át

ha:k-êys-s

p5 become.ipfv-p1-ind

betsy.bug-nom be<pfv>-

Intended: It happened to be a bug.'
b.

Soksot

owis.

sókso-t

o:w-êys-s

betsy.bug-nom be.ipfv-

p1-ind

`It was a bug.'

(IAH-Sem-07/27/2019)

Let us imagine for the sake of the argument that the speaker realized that being a
bug holds at 9:00AM. There are two possible referents for the coming to believe time
that I would like to consider. First consider that the time of coming to believe (that
is, g(i)) is a time following 9:00AM, let's say 10:00AM. The auxiliary construction
(uttered sometime later that day) asserts the existence of a moment in the P1-interval
(g(i)=10:00AM) of coming to believe that there was a prior time (g(j)=9:00AM) at
which the state of a bug on the oor held. The monoverbal sentence asserts the
existence of a moment in the P1-interval (g(i)=10:00AM) of coming to believe that a
state of the bug on the oor held at that time (10:00AM). These semantics are given
below.
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(75)

Come-to-believe time is 10:00AM
a.

Auxiliary Construction: ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ 10:00AM &
come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,w ,[λw 0 .∃t00 . t00 ≺ t0 & t00 ⊆ 9:00AM & ∃s.t00 ⊆

τ (s, w0 ) & ∃x. bug(x, w0 ) & being.on.the.oor(s, w0 ) & Th(s, w0 )=x ])
b.

Monoverbal Construction: ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ 10:00AM &
come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,w ,[λw 0 .∃s.t0 ⊆ τ (s, w 0 ) & ∃x. bug(x, w 0 ) &

being.on.the.oor(s, w0 ) & Th(s, w0 )=x ])
The truth conditions of the auxiliary construction (taking into account the semantics
of the come-to-believe predicate) requires that for each time prior to 10:00AM,
not all of the speaker's belief worlds at that time are worlds in which the state of
the bug being on the oor at 9:00AM is true. This is precisely where the auxiliary
construction goes wrong. At the moments after 9:00AM and prior to 10:00AM the
speaker held exactly that belief about the particular past time of 9:00AM. To say it
slightly dierently, there are times prior to 10:00AM when the proposition followed
from the speaker's beliefs.
The previous discussion has demonstrated that the predictions of the semantics
for the come-to-believe predicate are born out for situations where the speaker
believes P prior to the moment of coming-to-believe. There is another possible referent for the coming to believe time in (74). Why can't the speaker use the auxiliary
construction to indicate that the moment of coming to believe is the moment she realized there was a bug on the oor? If the speaker sees a bug on the oor at 9:00AM,
does it not follow that the bug was on the oor at some moment prior to 9:00AM?
Consider the following semantics for the two sentences if the come-to-believe time is
9:00AM.
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(76)

Come-to-believe time is 9:00AM
a.

Auxiliary Construction: ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ 9:00AM &
come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,w ,[λw 0 .∃t00 . t00 ≺ t0 & t00 ⊆ g(j) & ∃s.t00 ⊆ τ (s, w 0 )

& ∃x. bug(x, w0 ) & being.on.the.oor(s, w0 ) & Th(s, w0 )=x ])
b.

Monoverbal Construction: ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ ) & t0 ⊆ 9:00AM &
come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,w ,[λw 0 .∃s.t0 ⊆ τ (s, w 0 ) & ∃x. bug(x, w 0 ) &

being.on.the.oor(s, w0 ) & Th(s, w0 )=x ])
Consider also the following hypothesis about stative clauses proposed by Altshuler &
Schwarzschild (2013).
(77)

The Temporal Prole of Statives:
For any tenseless stative clause ϕ, if ϕ is true at moment m, then there is
a moment m0 preceding m at which ϕ is true and there is a moment m0
following m at which ϕ is true.
(Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013: 45)

If we adopt this ontology of states in which they are open intervals, then the auxiliary
construction would technically be true of 9:00AM as the come-to-believe time. This
is because if there is a state of a bug on the oor at 9:00AM, it also true that the
state held at a moment immediately preceding 9:00AM. According to this hypothesis,
the truth conditions of both sentences are satised. Neither sentence will run afoul
of the come-to-believe predicate, since at all times prior to 9:00AM the speaker
did not believe either a) that the state would hold at 9:00AM or b) that the state
held prior to 9:00AM. I propose that (74-a) is infelicitous because the Immediate
Realization context does not support a referent for g(j) - that prior moment at which
the state held. The immediate realization context in (74) doesn't provide a past
moment or interval about which the speaker is realizing that the state held. In the
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later realization example, (73), g(j) was the interval surrounding 9:00AM and the
auxiliary construction asserts that the speaker is coming to believe that the state
held then regardless of whether continued to hold later.
Since I've appealed to the Open Interval Hypothesis, one might wonder whether
the auxiliary construction and the monoverbal construction stand in an entailment
relation with each other. If they did, one could attempt to account for the infelicity of
the auxiliary construction in terms of Gricean cessation implicatures. Both sentences
are true in the context and if the monoverbal sentence asymmetrically entailed the
auxiliary construction by the open interval hypothesis, then we might expect the two
utterances to form a scale of informativity.
If the use of the auxiliary construction generated a scalar implicature that the
monoverbal sentence was false, then we could have an explanation for the infelicity
of the auxiliary construction in (74). The monoverbal sentence would be more informative than the auxiliary construction and since both are true in the context, Grice's
maxim of quantity would require the speaker to use the monoverbal sentence. Her
choice of the less-informative auxiliary construction would cause her interlocutor to
reason that she must know the monoverbal sentence is false. This implicature would
contradict the context, explaining the infelicity of the auxiliary construction. If the
two constructions competed in this way, we would predict that the auxiliary sentence
in (73) would also give rise to an implicature that the monoverbal construction is
false. However, contrary to what is predicted, the monoverbal sentence is perfectly
acceptable in (73). This type of competition, then, is not responsible for the infelicity
of the auxiliary construction in the context in (73).
The pragmatic competition just described is the same competition and reasoning
that gives rise to cessation implicatures with English simple past tense sentences. A
cessation implicature very naturally arises in a present tense context like (78).
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(78)

Context: You are looking at a bug on the oor. Your friend asks, What are
you looking at?
a.

There is a bug on the oor.

b. #There was a bug on the oor.

There is not a bug on the oor now.

In a context where there is a bug on the oor at the present, it is unacceptable
to use a past tense sentence even though, per the Open Interval Hypothesis, it is
true in that context. It's unacceptability is due to the competition between the
two sentence generating an implicature that contradicts the context. What (73) and
the above discussion shows is that the auxiliary construction and the monoverbal
construction in Mvskoke don't compete in the same way that English simple past
and present tense sentences do. Rather, I propose that the real logical relationship
between the auxiliary and monoverbal constructions is like the relationship between
the two English sentence in (79).
(79)

Context: Imagine this morning you saw something on the oor and assumed
it was a leaf. But when you looked closer, you realized it was a bug. Later
today, you tell me:
a.

I realized there

was a bug on the oor.

b.

I realized there

had been a bug on the oor.

In our theory of pragmatic implicatures, the sentences in (79) don't compete in the
same way the two sentences in (78) do because they are too structurally dissimilar.
There is a similar lack of competition between the Mvskoke sentences in (73).
Finally, I would like to consider a fourth situation that the come-to-believe
predicate predicts to be ruled out: the situation in which the speaker believed p and
then afterwards changed their mind prior to coming to believe p again. This situation
is ruled out by the come-to-believe predicate because there is a time prior to the
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moment of coming-to-believe at which the speaker believed p to be true. Using the
bug example, we could characterize this situation as follows.
(80)

Change of Belief Context: At 9:00AM, Ann sees something on the oor and
forms the belief there is a bug on the oor at 9:00AM. Later on, at 10:00AM,
Ann reconsiders and thinks, No, that was not a bug on the oor at 9:00AM.
It was a leaf. Later on at 11:00AM, Ann reconsiders yet again and thinks,
Yes, that WAS a bug on the oor at 9:00AM.

Although I do not have empirical evidence regarding this type of context, intuitively
it seems too strong to predict that evidential tenses should not be acceptable here. A
possible reformulation of the come-to-believe predicate would require a moment
immediately prior to the coming-to-believe moment at which the speaker didn't believe p. In essence, the predicate would not dene the rst moment of coming to
believe p, but simply a moment of belief-state change. To give an informal paraphrase: there is a time t0 immediately preceding the come-to-believe time at which
not all of the speaker's belief worlds at t0 entail p.
Another possibility is that the relevant predicate for Mvskoke evidential-tenses is
come-to-know instead of come-to-believe. Pasts 1-3 seem to require a much

stronger certainty than is associated with weak belief. In (80), it is conceivable that
at 9AM Ann may have believed there was a bug on the oor, but she didn't actually
know it because she lacked sucient evidence and certainty. In a scenario like (80),
it's plausible that Ann acquired the necessary certainty and evidence at 11AM. This
would then count as the rst moment at which Ann came to know there was a bug
on the oor. I return to this idea below.

3.6.2.2 Moments After Coming to Believe
The second part of the denition of the come-to-believe predicate that I want
to address is the requirement that the speaker believe the proposition at all times
155

following the moment of belief-state change. This amounts to a requirement that the
speaker adhere to this belief forever without changing their opinion. To paraphrase,
the concern is that the come-to-believe predicate requires the speaker to be asserting that they came to believe p and will always believe it. This requirement is too
strong for a belief predicate. With belief there is always the possibility of later belief
revision if the speaker nds themselves forced to give up a belief (Hansson 2017).
This part of the come-to-believe predicate aimed to capture three commitments on the part of a speaker using P1-P3. First, when a speaker asserts a P1-P3
sentence, they are committed to having come to believe the proposition at the P1, P2,
or P3 time. Secondly, they are committed to still believing that proposition at the
time of utterance. And thirdly, the speaker asserting a sentence with P1, P2, or P3
has a high degree of certainty with regards to the proposition. Recall that speakers
have the intuition that a sentence with P1-P3 is making a declaration and stating
[the proposition] as fact (RH-Sem-07/10/2018). Additionally, as was seen in section
3.6.1, not every evidence source is sucient to justify using P1-P3.
These commitments are better explained if the predicate encoded by P1-P3 is a
factive predicate - come-to-know. The rst commitment is arguably the only one
that needs to be semantically encoded by the come-to-know predicate. The second
and third commitments can be explained by appealing to the nature of knowledge.
On a standard philosophical analysis, knowledge is justied true belief.
(81)

Knowledge as Justied True Belief

S knows that p i
a.

p is true,

b.

S believes p, and

c.

S is justied in believing p.

(Ichikawa & Steup 2018: sect. 1)
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The second commitment - that the speaker still believes p at the time of assertion - is
explained by the factivity of know. If a speaker asserts that they came to know p, it
follows that p was true at that past time. Consequently, p is still true at the time of
the assertion. If the speaker now knows that p is false, they would not use P1-P3 to
avoid being committed to the truth of p. This accounts for the second commitment.
For an attitude holder to consider that they have acquired knowledge, they must have
a very high level of certainty that p is true. This certainty is intimately linked to the
type of evidence they have and how reliable they consider the evidence to be. This
accounts for the third commitment of a speaker using P1-P3. Given the issues raised
in this section, it may be more accurate to think of the attitude predicate encoded
by Pasts 1-3 as knowledge rather than belief.

3.7 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter began with two new empirical discoveries - 1) that Pasts 1-3 are
accompanied by direct evidential inferences and 2) that Past 5 is possible at quite
recent times in indirect evidence contexts. I also provided more documentation of
Mvskoke's (still rather mysterious) auxiliary construction than previous works on the
language. These data and my subsequent analysis motivates splitting the Mvskoke
past tenses into two sets. In one set are Pasts 1-3 which encode graded intervals
of past time as well as a moment of coming-to-believe (or coming-to-know). In the
other is Past 5, a non-graded, non-evidential past tense. The data suggests that there
are additional asymmetries between these two sets. There is a possible structural
asymmetry between Past 5, which can be the lower tense in auxiliary constructions,
and Pasts 1-3, which cannot. There is also an asymmetry in how these two sets
compete with one another. As we saw in section 3.6.2 monoverbal and auxiliary
constructions do not compete pragmatically, but it was shown that Past 5 is associated
with two conversational implicatures in monoverbal constructions due to pragmatic
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competition with Pasts 1-3. As we will see in Chapter 4, the competition between
Pasts 1, 2, and 3 can be modeled as an eect of Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991:
a.o.). Finally, although Past 5 was given a simple past tense semantics, I proposed a
semantics for P1-P3 that is very dierent from the semantics we traditionally associate
with tense.
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CHAPTER 4
GRADED TENSE AND TEMPORAL INTERVALS
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are some discrepancies between the
intervals that Martin (2010) proposes for the past tenses and my data. Specically,
we saw evidence that motivated making a cut between Pasts 1-3 and Past 5 in terms
of gradedness. We saw that Past 5 is compatible with any past time and can be used
in the P1, P2, and P3 intervals for unwitnessed events. With respect to the graded
tenses, we also saw that Past 3 is compatible with times more remote than 20 years
ago (the remote boundary that Martin (2010) gives this tense). These data suggest
that the intervals associated with each tense warrant closer investigation. Having
established the role that evidence plays in the tense system, in this chapter I turn to
the precise temporal semantics of the intervals associated with each tense.
As introduced in Chapter 2, there are two quite dierent descriptions of the past
tense intervals in Martin (2010) and Innes et al. (2004). Whereas Martin (2010)
(building on earlier Muskogean scholarship) describes each tense as covering adjacent
intervals of time, Innes and her co-authors describe Pasts 2, 3, and 5 as covering large
overlapping intervals. The two descriptions are represented in (1) and (2), repeated
from Chapter 2.
(1)

Martin (2010)'s Intervals
P1

today to last night

P2

yesterday to one year ago

P3

one year ago to 20 years ago

P5

20 years ago to ancient times
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(2)

Innes et al. (2004)'s Intervals
Recent Past

(P1)

a short time has passed

Middle Past

(P2)

yesterday to one year ago

Distant Past

(P3)

yesterday to a long time ago

Remote Past

(P5)

yesterday to mythic past

In the rst part of this chapter, I test the compatibility of the graded tenses with
temporal adverbials and contexts establishing dierent past times. This evidence
supports slightly rening Martin's (2010) intervals for Pasts 2 and 3. Martin (2010)
very clearly demonstrates that the Mvskoke tense system has changed substantially
since it was rst documented in the 1800's. Not only has Past 4 dropped out of
use, but the intervals of the remaining tenses have shifted. My contribution can be
thought of as the most recent update to the description of the Mvskoke system.
The second part of this chapter makes an original contribution to our knowledge
of the Mvskoke tense system. Although my data overall supports Martin's (2010)
intervals, there are two underlying systems that could result in the adjacent intervals
he describes. 1) The tenses may encode restrictions to adjacent, disjointed intervals of
time, or 2) they may cover overlapping intervals but competition between forms results
in their restriction to adjacent intervals. To address this question, I investigate the
use of Pasts 1-3 in contexts where the time of the event is unknown. This diagnostic is
integral to analyses of the semantics of graded past tense systems cross-linguistically
and has successfully diagnosed adjacent intervals in the past tense system of Medumba
(Mucha 2017) and overlapping intervals in South Ban Inuktitut (Hayashi 2011;
Hayashi & Oshima 2015), Gk
uy
u (Cable 2013), and Luganda (Klecha & Bochnak
2016). Applying this diagnostic to the Mvskoke past tenses reveals an underlying
system of overlapping intervals, though not exactly as Innes et al. (2004) describe. I
conclude this section with an analysis of competition between the tenses that results
in their surface distribution.
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4.1 Rening Interval Boundaries
Mvskoke's graded (and evidential) tenses - Pasts 1, 2, and 3 - are used to indicate
how far in the past an event took place. Past 1 is used for recent events that took
place today, Past 2 covers events taking place from yesterday to a year (or so) ago,
and Past 3 is used for events that took place more than a year ago including very
distant events within the speaker's childhood. As I will show, the temporal intervals
associated Pasts 3 and 5 are much broader than the intervals described by Martin
(2010) and Innes et al. (2004). Furthermore, I demonstrate that there is a non-trivial
amount of overlap between the P2-interval and the P3-interval. Table 4.1 summarizes
the distribution of the tenses according to the data in this section. I illustrate the
graded nature of the rst three past tenses using temporal adverbs and contexts
specifying temporal reference. Chapter 3 contains the key data showing Past 5 is
compatible with all past times, as such I only address Past 5 briey here.

Table 4.1.

Summary of Temporal Intervals/Adverbials Compatible with Tenses
Time

P1

P2

P3

P5

today
yesterday
1 year ago
when I was young

3
*
*
*

*
3
3
*

*
*
3
3

3
3
3
3

4.1.1 The day of utterance: Past 1 & Past 5
The time span covered by Past 1 is relatively undisputed and covers times just
preceding the moment of utterance up to the evening of the day before. In the
following example the temporal adverb mucv nettv `today' is compatable with Past
1, but not with Pasts 2 or 3.
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(3)

Today Context: Imagine we are talking about a certain hymn. You want to
tell me that you heard it today.
Mucv-nettv mv yvhiketvn

pohhis.

/

moca-nítta má yaheykitá-n pó<h>h-ey-s
this-day

dem song-acc

hear

/

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind /

#pohvyvnks.

/ #pohimvts.

pôh-ay-ánk-s

/ pôh-ey-mát-s

p2-ind / hear.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind

hear.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I heard that song today.'

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018,RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)

Past 5 is also acceptable with the temporal adverb `today' as seen in the two examples
below.
(4)

a.

Mucv-nettv Mary Mēkkot

emponayvtēs.

moca-nítta Mary Mí:kko-t

im-ponâ:y-ati:-s

this-day

Mary chief-nom 3.dat-speak.pfv-

p5-ind

`Today, the chief spoke with Mary.'
b.

(RH-Sem-6/17/2019)

Mary mucv-nettv Mēkko emponayvtēs.
Mary moca-nítta mí:kko im-ponâ:y-ati:-s
Mary this-day

chief

p5-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-

`Today, Mary spoke with the chief.'

(DLR-Mus-6/17/2019)

Some Mvskoke speakers nd the combination of Past 5 and `today' unacceptable.
However, without the temporal adverb, Past 5 is more readily accepted in recent
past contexts. The speaker comment in (5) (repeated from Chapter 3, example (15))
shows that although there is a dierence between how far from the UT the falling
happened, both tenses are appropriate for a fall that happened today.
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(5)

a.

Cvlatkvtēs.
ca-lâ:tk-ati:-s
1sg.pat-fall.pfv-

p5-ind

`I fell.'
Speaker comment: That means I fell, maybe an hour ago.
b.

Cvlvtikes.
ca-lat<êy>k-is
1sg.pat-fall

<pfv.p1>-ind

`I fell.'

(PF-Mus-04/19/2021)

Past 2, however, is incompatible with a context that makes it clear the event happened

today.
(6)

Today Context: Imagine I want to learn to make Sofkey. You tell me your
cousin is planning to make Sofkey today and he can show me how. When I
arrive at his house, I nd he already made it this morning. Your cousin tells
me...
#Kvpe-cvfke hayēpvyvnks.
kapi-cáfki

ha:y-î:p-ay-ánk-s

sofkey

make-ip.pfv-1sg.ag-

p2-ind

Speaker Comment: That would be saying, `I already made it yesterday, or
even weeks ago.'

(LSB-Mus-06/2017)

The cut-o between Past 1 and Past 2 is around dusk on the day preceding
the utterance. For Mvskoke the day of utterance begins as the sun goes down and
continues up to the present. The following example demonstrates that Past 1 is
compatible with the temporal adverbs nerē-isē `last night', paksvnkē yakfen `yesterday
evening', but not paksvnkē hvse ennvrkvpēcen `yesterday noon.'
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(7)

Nerē-isē

/ paksvnkē yafken

/ (# paksvnkē hvse

niìí:yeysí: / paksankí: yâ:fki-n

/

paksankí: hasí

last.night / yesterday evening-acc /

yesterday sun

ennvrkvpēcen)

pohhis.

in-naìkapî:c-in

pó<h>h-ey-s

3.dat-reach.mid.point-ds hear

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`Last night / yesterday evening / (#yesterday noon) I heard it.'
(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)
Accordingly, I dene the P1-interval as begining with sunset on the day before
the utterance. As such, this denition correctly predicts that P1 is compatible with
the temporal adverb paksvnkē `yesterday' since part of the P1 interval is technically
included in yesterday. This demonstrates that there is a mis-match between the
interval of time identied by the temporal adverbs mucv-nettv `today' and paksvnkē
`yesterday' and the intervals associated with Pasts 1 and 2.
(8)

Paksvnkē mv yvhiketvn

pohhis.

paksankí: má yaheykitá-n pó<h>h-ey-s
yesterday dem song-acc

hear

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`I heard that song yesterday.'

(RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)

The examples presented here support the generalizations represented in the rst
line of Table 4.1. These data have shown that both Past 1 and Past 5 are compatible
with temporal reference included in the day of utterance. Past 2 and Past 3 are
incompatible with this temporal interval. Mvskoke joins the majority of graded tense
languages in using today as a dening unit of time (Botne 2012). Botne demonstrates
that the time unit `day' is usually delineated by sunset or sunrise or by a 24 hour
cycle. The cross-linguistic variation highlights the subjective nature of what counts as
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the `day of utterance.' Other studies of graded tenses systems have given considerable
thought to dening this salient unit of time (e.g. Comrie 1985; Hayashi 2011; Botne
2012). In section 4.3.1, I formalize what I take to be the denition of `day' relevant
for Mvskoke's P1-interval.

4.1.2 Yesterday and before: Past 2 & Past 5
Past 2 is the tense used for times before the day of utterance. As we saw above,
some times included in `yesterday' may be compatible with Past 1, specically yesterday evening and night. However, `yesterday noon' is considered to be outside the
P1-interval. In the example below (partially repeated from (7)), the temporal adverb

paksvnkē hvse ennvrkvpēcen `yesterday noon' is compatible with Past 2, but not with
Past 1.
(9)

Yesterday Noon Context: Yesterday, I attended Cold Springs church and
around noon I heard a nice hymn. Now you mention the hymn and I want to
tell you when I heard it.
Paksvnkē hvse ennvrkvpēcen

pohayvnks.

/

paksankí: hasí in-naìkapî:c-in

pô:h-ay-ánk-s

/

p2-ind /

yesterday sun 3.dat-reach.mid.point-ds hear.pfv-1sg.ag#pohhis.
pó<h>h-ey-s
hear

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`Yesterday at noon, I heard it.'

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)

In example (10) below, Past 2 but not Past 3 is compatible with the temporal adverb

paksvnkē `yesterday'. This judgment contradicts Innes et al. (2004)'s description of
the Past 3 interval.
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(10)

Yesterday Context: Yesterday, you saw Mary fall. Now you want to tell me
that she fell.
Paksvnkē Maret

latkvnks.

/ # latkemvc.

paksankí: Mary-t

lâ:tk-ánk-s

/

p2-ind /

yesterday Mary-nom fall.pfv-

lâ:tk-imát-s
fall.pfv-

p3-ind

`Yesterday, Mary fell.'
Speaker Comment: [P3] doesn't work. You're saying she fell once upon a
time, not yesterday.

(PF-Mus-07/09/2018)

Past 5 is also acceptable with the temporal adverb paksvnkē `yesterday.'1
(11)

Paskvnkē Maret

latkvtēs.

paksankí: Mary-t

lâ:tk-ati:-s

p5-ind

yesterday Mary-nom fall.pfv`Yesterday, Mary had fallen.'

(PF-Mus-07/09/2018)

Although the interval boundaries in graded tense systems are uid and variable, in
general neither Past 1 nor Past 3 can locate an event within yesterday. This data
supports Martin's (2010) interval for Past 1 and the near boundary of the Past 2
interval. Martin (2010) gives Past 2 an interval that extends from yesterday to about
a year ago. But speaker intuitions suggest that the remote boundary can extend
further back in time, with some saying as far back as 5 years ago.
1 In

(11) as well as (5), the translation provided by the speaker for a Past 5 sentence suggests
that Past 5 goes along with a past perfect aspectual meaning. This intuition is a subject for future
eldwork to make precise.
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(12)

Vsi

mēkko arat,

Mary kerrēt

owvnks.

asêy

mí:kko a:ì-â:t

Mary kíìì-i:-t

ô:w-ánk-s

yonder chief

go.about.sg.ipfv-comp Mary know-dur-ss be.pfv-

p2-ind

`Mary met that chief going about over there.'
Speaker Comment: It could be that she met him a couple days ago or 5 years

ago.

But I know because I saw her shaking hands with him, for instance.
(RH-Sem-07/10/2018)

These intuitions point to Past 2 covering a larger span of time than yesterday to a
year ago. Past 2's interval extends at least as far back as 5 years ago, but the remote
boundary of this interval remains undetermined. I return to this issue in section 4.4.2.
What is clear, is that there is a substantial amount of overlap between times at which
one could theoretically use both Past 2 and Past 3.

4.1.3 Talking about childhood memories: Past 3 & Past 5
I nd that Past 3 covers a much wider interval than Martin describes, but a
smaller interval than Innes and her co-authors describe. We saw above that Past 3 is
incompatible with time included in yesterday contra Innes et al. (2004). According
to Martin, speakers begin using Past 3 around a year ago. Example (13) conrms
that P3 is compatible with times 1 year from the utterance.
(13)

Ohrolopē hvnkevnkē

mv yvhiketvn

pohimvts.

ohìolopí: hânki=ankí: má yaheykitá-n pôh-ey-mát-s
year

one=p2

dem song-acc

`I heard that song one year ago.'

p3-ind

hear.pfv-1sg.ag-

(RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)

However, I nd that the remote boundary of Past 3 extends much further back in
time than Martin (2010)'s intervals suggest. One context in which speakers reliably
volunteer a sentence in Past 3, is when speaking about someone's childhood. In the
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data presented below the adverbial phrase cvmvnettof(a) `when I was young' could
refer to times from 30 years ago to 60 years ago, depending on the age of the relevant
individual. Data from Chapter 3 provided evidence that Past 3 could be used to
speak about an event that took place 30-40 years ago during someone's childhood.
(6) is repeated here as (14).
(14)

P3 Direct Witness Context : Imagine you knew the current chief when he was
young (about 30-40 years ago) and knew he attended a certain church. You
saw him there on many occasions. Now we are passing the church and you
want to tell me this.
Mēkko mvnettof,

mv mēkusvpkv-cuko arēt

mí:kko manítt-o:f

má mi:kosapka-cóko a:ì-í:-t

chief

young-when dem prayer-house

go.about.sg.ipfv-dur-ss

owemvts.
ô:w-imát-s

p3-ind

be.pfv-

`When the chief was young, he went to that church.'

(MAE-Sem-07/2018)

Furthermore, speakers who are 60 to 80 years old also use Past 3 to describe their
childhood. Past 2, however, is unacceptable with the adverbial phrase cvmvnettof(a)
`when I was young'.
(15)

Childhood Context: Imagine you heard a nice hymn when you were young
(50-60 years ago). We are talking about that hymn today and you want to
tell me when you heard it before.
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Cvmvnettofv

yvhiketv pohimvc.

/

ca-manítt-o:fa

yahéykita pô:h-ey-mát-s

/

1sg.pat-young-when song

p3-ind /

hear.pfv-1sg.ag-

#pohvyvnks.
pô:h-ay-ánk-s

p2-ind

hear.pfv-1sg.ag-

`When I was young, I heard that song.'

(RH-Sem-06/27/2018)

Another consultant conrmed these judgments. What is more, speakers feel that Past
2 is still unacceptable in (15) even if they imagine that the speaker is only 20 years
old (RMM-Mus-12/17/2020).
Data from Chapter 3 also demonstrated that Past 5 is acceptable for referring to
someone's childhood, as shown in (16) (repeated from Chapter 3, example (7)).
(16)

P3 Reportative Context: Now imagine you read a newspaper story about the
Chief in which you learned that he frequented a certain church when he was
young.
Cokv-tvlvme hoccihocat,

Mēkko mv mēkusvpkv-cuko

coka-talamí hoccéy<ho:>c-â:t

mí:kko má mi:kosapka-cóko

paper-daily write.ipfv-caus<pass>-comp chief
arēt

owvtēs.

a:ì-í:-t

o:w-atí:-s

go.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.ipfv-

dem prayer-house

p5-ind

`As it was written in the newspaper, the chief went to that church.'
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
In conclusion, we have seen that the intervals compatible with Pasts 2 and 3 need
to be rened. My data conrmed Martin's (2010) and Innes et al.'s (2004) Past 1
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interval, as well as Martin's near boundaries for Past 2 and Past 3. The remote
boundaries of Pasts 2 and 3 intervals are somewhat vague and may extend further
back in time. Because of this, there is substantial overlap between times at which one
could theoretically use both Past 2 and Past 3. Section 4.3.2 addresses this puzzle and
provides some initial thoughts on how to distinguish between Past 2 and 3 when both
are possible. In addition to evidence presented in Chapter 3, this chapter presented
further evidence that Past 5 is not in fact a graded tense. This data, missing in
previous documentary and analytical works, supports the hypothesis that Past 5 is
compatible with all past times.

Table 4.2.
Tense
Past 1
Past 2
Past 3
Past 5

Interim Hypothesis: Rened Intervals

Near Boundary Remote boundary
Evidential
just now
sunset yesterday
yesterday
approx. 5 years ago
1 year ago
60(+) years ago
Non-evidential
today
(no boundary)

A speaker's choice between Pasts 1-3 and Past 5 was shown to be dependent on the
evidence they have for the utterance. But the overlap between Past 2 and 3 begs the
question as to how speakers choose between Pasts 1, 2 and 3. The distribution of Past
2 and 3 demonstrates that their choice is not dependent on temporal intervals alone.
A question that has proved most illuminating in the study of graded tense systems
is which tense do speakers use when they are unsure of when an event happened? I
turn to this question now.

4.2 Choosing between Pasts 1, 2 and 3
The two descriptions of the Mvskoke tenses make the same prediction about the
use of tenses in contexts where the speaker knows when the event took place, but
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70 yrs 20 yrs
Past 5

Figure 4.1.

1 yr
Past 3

Yest.
Past 2

Now

Past 1

Adjacent Intervals - Martin (2010)'s Description

70 yrs 20 yrs

1 yr

Yest.
Past 2

Now

Past 1

Past 3
Past 5

Figure 4.2.

Overlapping Intervals - Innes et al. (2004)'s Description

dierent predictions about the use of tenses in contexts where the speaker doesn't
know what past time the event took place at. To illustrate these predictions, consider
the following graphic representations of Martin's description (Figure 4.1) and Innes
et al.'s description (Figure 4.2) of the Mvskoke tenses.
Martin (2010), following early literature on the Mvskoke tense system, describes
the tenses as covering disjointed intervals of time. Each interval is adjacent to the
other and covers a specic span of past time: Past 1 covers from just now to last
night, Past 2 from last night to 1 year ago, P3 from 1 year ago to 20 years ago, Past
5 any time before 20 years ago. On this view, the tenses have distinct intervals they
cover and there is no overlap in meaning among them. Since each tense is specic
to an interval of time, if the speaker isn't sure whether the event happened in one
interval or in another, none of the tenses should be licensed. Martin's description
predicts that speakers would have to make an educated guess about the appropriate
tense or use circumlocution to speak about an event for which the time is unknown.
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Innes et al (2004)'s description is more complex, yet it makes the same prediction
as Martin's description regarding which tense is used to describe an event whose time
is known. For example, since Past 2 and Past 3 both cover times from yesterday to
a year ago, but Past 3 also covers time from 1 year ago to 20 years ago, a sentence
marked with Past 2 asymmetrically entails the same sentence marked with Past 3.
Because Pasts 2 and 3 bear this entailment relationship with each other, we expect
them to compete pragmatically with each other and to result in scalar implicatures.
Thus, if a speaker knows that an event takes place in the P2 interval, they will use
Past 2 instead of Past 3 (even though the event could also be described with Past
3) because the Cooperative Principle Grice (1975) will require them to use the most
informative morpheme. The use of Past 3 instead of Past 2 will result in the scalar
implicature that the event did not take place in the P2 interval. The competition
with Past 5 would proceed as I have laid out in Chapter 3, section 3.5.4. In sum, this
description of the tenses predicts that their distribution when used by a well-informed
speaker will in fact be identical to the distribution described by Martin (2010).
However, Innes et al.(2004)'s description makes a dierent prediction concerning
which tense will be used in contexts where the speaker is ignorant of the specic interval in which the event took place. In these contexts, speakers will use the strongest
tense compatible with their knowledge. If the speaker doesn't know whether the event
took place in the Past 2 or in the Past 3 interval, they will use Past 3 since it covers
the broader interval of time. They will not be able to use Past 2, since according to
Innes et al. (2004) Past 2 covers the narrower interval and the speaker's knowledge
doesn't support using it. Similarly if the speaker is unsure as to whether the event
took place in the Past 2, Past 3, or Past 5 interval, they will use Past 5 as it covers
the broadest interval. However, if a speaker doesn't know if the event took place in
the Past 1 or Past 2 interval, neither description predicts that one of these two tenses
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will be licensed. In both descriptions, Past 1 and Past 2 cover disjoint intervals of
time. The predictions of the two descriptions are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3.

Predictions of Martin (2010) and Innes et al. (2004)

P1 or P2
P2 or P3
P3 or P5

Martin (2010)
-none-none-none-

Innes et al. (2004)
-noneP3
P5

To test these predictions, I apply a diagnostic that has successfully distinguished
between disjoint or overlapping semantics in graded tenses discussed in the semantic
literature (Hayashi 2011; Cable 2013; Klecha & Bochnak 2016; Mucha 2017). First
applied by Hayashi (2011) and Hayashi & Oshima (2015) to South Ban Inuktitut,
this diagnostic involves testing each tense in what Hayashi calls a remoteness indeterminacy context. These are contexts where the speaker is ignorant of the temporal
remoteness of an event. The logic behind this test - as explained for the Mvskoke
tense descriptions - is that if one tense morpheme is logically weaker than another
(i.e. covers a larger time span which encompasses the span covered by another tense),
it will be used in contexts which do not license the more restricted interval.

4.2.1 Remoteness Indeterminacy: Declaratives
Using remoteness indeterminacy contexts to test the Mvskoke tenses is complicated by the evidential requirement of Pasts 1-3. If the speaker doesn't know when
an event occurred, they most likely did not witness it. Thus the declarative responses
were confounded and speakers used several of the strategies predicted by the disjoint
interval hypothesis: they used evidential endings, Past 5 and circumlocution. For
example (17), a single context was presented to three dierent speakers. Their responses to this context are presented below and illustrate the various strategies they
employed.
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(17)

Declarative Context (Today or This Week - P1 or P2): You've been out of
town for a week. Today when you get home, you see that you've missed a call
from Sam. You're not sure when he called though; it could have been last
week or it could have been this morning before you got back to your house.
How would you tell me that Sam called?
a.

Sam vmvhuekvtē

hehcis.

Sam am-ahôyhk-ati:

hí<h>c-ey-s

Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

p5 see<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`I just saw that Sam had called me.'
b.

(PF-Mus-7/9/2018)

O, Sam avnhuehikvttes.

Naken

yacet.

ó: Sam a:-an-hoyh<êy>k-áttis.

nâ:ki-n

ya:c-ít

oh, Sam dir-1sg.dat-call<pfv>-

evid what-acc want.ipfv-ss

`Oh, Sam called me. (I wonder) what he wants.' (JWH-Sem-6/27/2018)
c.

Sam vnhuehkvttis.

Stofvnkēn

Sam an-hôyhk-átteys.

(e)stó:f=ankí:-n hoyhk-î:p-ati:-s

Sam 1sg.dat-call.pfv-

evid when=p2-acc

`Sam called me. (I wonder) when he called.'

huehkēpvtēs?

call-pfv.ip-p5-ind
(MAE-Sem-7/13/2018)

In examples (17-b) and (17-c), the speaker used the indirect evidential ending

-vttis in place of a tense morpheme (see Chapter 2 for discussion of this ending).
Example (17-a) is an example of using circumlocution as a strategy. This speaker
embeds the clause [Sam called me] (marked with P5) under the verb hecetv `to see'
with Past 1. Since the speaker certainly has direct evidence for his perception, he is
able to use the evidential-tense here. The speaker of example (17-c) also uses Past 5
in the second clause, a rhetorical question.
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A similar strategy was observed in declarative remoteness indeterminacy contexts
where the event could have happened in either P1, P2 or P3 intervals. In (18), the
speaker uses Past 5 to talk about the event of coin-buying that he did not witness.
(18)

Declarative Context (Today or 30 years ago - P1, P2 or P3): Your friend
has been collecting ancient coins for thirty years. You know he just bought
another one this morning. He shows you his collection and you notice a
certain coin. It could be one of the rst ones he bought or it could be the
one he bought this morning. You're not sure. How would you tell me, John
bought this coin?
John yv toknawuce nēsvtēs.
John yá tokna:w-ocí ni:s-atí:-s
John this money-dim buy.ipfv-

p5-ind

`John bought this coin.'

(PF-Mus-07/2018)

To determine which of the evidential pasts are used for declarative sentences in these
contexts requires more careful control of the evidential variable. In interrogatives,
evidentials ip the burden of evidence to the addressee. Because of this evidential
ip, Pasts 1-3 are acceptable in questions responding to a remoteness indeterminacy
context. Thus we are able to see which tense a speaker chooses when they ask when
an event happened.

4.2.2 Remoteness Indeterminacy: Interrogatives
Although both descriptions of the Mvskoke tenses predict that no tense should
be licensed when an event may have happened in the P1 or the P2 interval, the data
supports an overlapping semantics for these tenses. When the speaker doesn't know
whether the event happened the day of the utterance or a few days earlier (P1 or
P2 interval), they can ask a question marked with Past 2. Example (19) shows three
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speakers' responses to the elicitation task. These questions vary slightly in the form
and pronunciation of the verb and whether the interrogative pronoun estof- `when'
bears optional nominal tense, however they all use Past 2 on the main verb.
(19)

Interrogative Context (Today or This Week - P1 or P2): You've been out of
town for a week. Today when you get home, you see that you've missed a call
from Sam. You're not sure when he called though; it could have been last
week or it could have been this morning before you got back to your house.
How would you ask Sam when he called?
a.

Estofvnkēn

vmvhuehkeccvnka?

istó:f=ankí:-n am-ahóyhk-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

when=p2-acc 1sg.dat-call.pfv-2sg.ag`When did you call me?'
b.

'Stofvnkēn

(PF-Mus-07/2018)

vnhuehkeccvnka?

(i)stó:f=ankí:-n an-hóyhk-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

when=p2-acc 1sg.dat-call.pfv-2sg.ag`When did you call me?'
c.

Sam, 'stofvn

(JWH-Sem-07/2018)

vnhuehkeccvnka?

Sam (i)stó:fa-n an-hóyhk-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

Sam when-acc 1sg.dat-call.pfv-2sg.ag`Sam, when did you call me?'

(DLR-Mus-07/2018)

The questions in (19) demonstrate that when the event could have fallen in either
the P1 interval or the P2 interval, Past 2 is used. If the speaker has any evidence o
of which to base a guess about when the event occurred, they can use that evidence
to choose an appropriate past tense. This is seen in the following context. Here the
speaker bases their choice on whether the owers look fresh or wilted.

176

(20)

Interrogative Context (today or yesterday - Past 1 or 2): Imagine you were
at your sister's house on Friday and she invited you to dinner on Sunday.
You come over on Sunday and see some owers on her table. You know she
must have bought them yesterday or today, you want to ask her when she
got them.
a.

Estofvnkēn

nēsetskvnka?

istó:f=ankí:-n nî:s-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

when=p2-acc buy.pfv-2sg.ag`When did you buy those?'

Speaker Comment: I might say this if they didn't look fresh, or if I was
unsure.
b.

Estosēn

nehsetska?

istó:f=eysí:-n ní<h>s-íck-a:
when=p1-acc buy

<pfv.p1>-2sg.ag-q

`When did you buy those?'
Speaker Comment: This would be if I think they look fresh.
(LSB-Mus-06/2017)
The speaker comment for (20-a) strongly suggests that Past 2 is the appropriate tense
to use if unsure of whether the event happened in the Past 1 or Past 2 interval. These
two examples lead to the following hypothesis:
(21)

Past 2 Hypothesis - Version #1 : the P2-interval is larger than and subsumes
the P1-interval.

Turning to contexts where the speaker is unsure of whether the event took place in
the P2 or P3 interval, the descriptions make dierent predictions. Martin (2010) and
the disjoint interval hypothesis predict that neither P2 or P3 should be used. Innes
et al. (2004)'s proposed intervals involve overlap between P2 and P3 and predict that
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P3 should be used as it has the largest interval. What we nd, however, is that there
is a clear preference to use P2 in contexts of speaker ignorance, and using P3 invites
the inference that the speaker has evidence to suspect the event took place longer
ago. In a remoteness indeterminacy context spanning all three intervals, speakers
volunteered questions marked with P2.
(22)

Interrogative Context (Today or 30 years ago - P1, 2 or 3): Your friend Sam
has been collecting antique cars for the past 30 years. Today he shows you his
collection and says he was just at a show this morning and bought another
car. You want to ask him when he bought a particular car. It might be the
one he bought this morning, or even the rst car he acquired 30 years ago.
'Stofvnkēn

mv ato nēseccvnka?

(i)stó:f=ankí:-n má á:to nî:s-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

when=p2-acc dem car buy.pfv-2sg.ag`When did you buy that car?'
(23)

(JWH-Sem-07/2018)

Interrogative Context (Today or 30 years ago - P1, 2 or 3): Your friend
has been collecting ancient coins for thirty years. You know he just bought
another one this morning. He shows you his collection and you want to ask
him when he bought a certain coin. It could be one of the rst ones he bought
or it could be the one he bought this morning. You're not sure.
Estofvnkēn

yv toknawuce nēseccvnka?

istó:f=ankí:-n yá tokna:w-ocí nî:s-íck-ánk-a:

p2-q

when=p2-acc this money-dim buy.pfv-2sg.ag`When did you buy this coin?'

(PF-Mus-07/2018)

If the context provides the speaker with visual evidence upon which to base a guess
about the time the event took place, then P3 is also acceptable and is accompanied
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by an inference. The following pair of questions demonstrates that Past 3 is chosen
if the speaker has evidence that the event took place long ago.
(24)

Interrogative Context (today or many years ago - P1, P2, or P3): You haven't
seen your cousins in a many years. When you see them again, they have a
dierent car from the one you remember them having. How would you ask
when they bought their car?
a.

Atvme estofvnkēn

nēsetskvnka?

a:tamí istó:f=ankí:-n nî:s-íck-ánk-a:
car

p2-q

when=p2-acc buy.pfv-2sg.ag-

`When did you buy the car?'
Linguist: Could you say (24-b)?
b.

Atvme estofvnkēn

nēsetskemvtē?

a:tamí istó:f-ánk-i:-n nî:s-íck-imát-i:
car

p3-q

when=p2-acc buy.pfv-2sg.ag-

`When did you buy the car?'
Speaker Comment: Yes, I would say that if the car looked older.
(LSB-Mus-06/2017)
These examples have demonstrated that Pasts 2 is the default tense used in contexts
where an event could have happened recently or as much as 30 years ago and thus
compatible with times as far back as 30 years ago. Using Past 3 in these contexts
leads to the inference that there is evidence leading the speaker to suppose a more
distant time for the event. Thus it appears that the Past 2 interval encompasses both
the Past 1 interval as well as much (if not all) of the Past 3 interval. As such, Past 2 is
compatible with the largest span of time and is used when the information provided
by the context does not call for the more specic Pasts 1 and 3. This leads to the
revised hypothesis in (25)
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(25)

Past 2 Hypothesis - Revised Version : the P2-interval is larger than and subsumes both the P1 and P3 intervals.

The data presented in this section from interrogative remoteness indeterminacy contexts supports a nested interval hypothesis for Mvskoke Pasts 1-3 in which Past 2
covers the largest time span. In the next section, I propose a formal analysis for the
temporal intervals encoded by Pasts 1-3.

4.3 Formal Analysis
4.3.1 Nested Intervals
To account for the generalization in (25), I propose a semantics for the graded
intervals in which the P2-interval is a general past interval and the P1- and P3intervals are more restricted past intervals. The P1 and P3-intervals are thus nested
within the P2-interval and the semantics of Pasts 1 and 3 asymmetrically entail Past
2.
The P1-interval is restricted to past times within the day of utterance. As was
mentioned, the vast majority of graded tense systems are sensitive to the day of
utterance as an integral time unit. To encode this salient unit of time, I follow
Cable (2013) in using a meta-language functions from temporal intervals to temporal
intervals. I dene day(t) as a function which maps a temporal interval t to the larger
temporal interval which makes up the day surrounding it. In Mvskoke the cycle of the
sun appears to delineate a day ; the function would thus map a time t to the interval
between sunset preceding t and sunset following t.
(26)

a.

[λt.day(t)]
maps interval t to an interval [ts ...tf ] such that ts ≺ t ≺ tf and ts is the
start of sunset prior to t and tf is the start of sunset following t.

b.

J day (2:15PM,7/18/2020) K = [8:45PM,7/17/2020 ... 8:45PM,7/18/2020]
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Th truth conditions for Past 1 and Past 2 are given below. These truth conditions
substitute the abstract P1-interval and P2-interval from the last section for more
precise intervals. Past 2 restricts the TT of a sentence to the come-to-believe time
and to past times. Past 1 restricts the TT to the come-to-believe time and to past
times within the day surrounding the evaluation time.
(27)

a.

J P2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t &

come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w]]]

b.

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t & t0 ∞ day(t) &
come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w]]]

Past 2 has weaker truth conditions than Past 1, capturing the nesting of the P1interval in the P2-interval. Any past time which is also the come-to-believe time will
satisfy the denition in (27-a).

4.3.2 Subjective vs Vague Remoteness
Dening the P3-interval is not as straightforward. We saw in previous sections that
the P3-interval is more restricted than the P2-interval. However, there is substantial
overlap in the times compatible with Pasts 2 and 3. In this way, the P3-interval
appears to be rather exible in where the near boundary is situated in time. Below
I show that the P3-interval cannot be dened by an objective xed point in time.
Then I demonstrate that Past 3 patterns with Bantu graded tenses that are dened
by vague, context dependent intervals such as those proposed for Luganda by Klecha
& Bochnak (2016). Finally, I compare Mvsoke to South Ban Inuktitut and propose
that Past 3 additionally must encode subjectivity in dening the contextually salient
standard of distance.
To begin with, let us take as a default hypothesis that the P3-interval is dened,
as the P1-interval is, by an objective point in time.
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(28)

(Ultimately Wrong) Hypothesis #1: Objective Interval
The P3-interval is an interval of past time beginning one year from the utterance time and extending indenitely into the past.

Although most speakers begin using Past 3 at one year ago, dening the P3-interval
beginning at that time would not make the right predictions. If the P3-interval had
an objective near boundary, this would predict a strict cut-o between Pasts 2 and
3 similar to the strict cut-o point between Pasts 1 and 2. With Past 1 and Past 2,
as soon as the more restricted P1-interval is appropriate, the less restricted Past 2 is
blocked. Past is no longer possible at times within the day of utterance. We see this
in (29), repeated from (3).
(29)

Today Context: Imagine we are talking about a certain hymn. You want to
tell me that you heard it today.
Mucv-nettv mv yvhiketvn

pohhis.

moca-nítta má yaheykitá-n pó<h>h-ey-s
this-day

dem song-acc

hear

/
/

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind /

#pohvyvnks.
pôh-ay-ánk-s

p2-ind

hear.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I heard that song today.'
(RH-Sem-06/27/2018,RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)
Similarly, given Hypothesis #1, we would expect Past 2 to no longer be possible as
soon as Past 3 becomes appropriate. Thus for events that happened one year ago,
we do not expect Past 2 to be acceptable. Contrary to what we expect, in example
(30) the speaker alternately used Past 2 or Past 3 for an event temporally situated
one year from the utterance time. This speaker generally starts using Past 3 at one
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year ago, however when eliciting this sentence, the speaker produced it several times
using either tense.
(30)

a.

Ohrolopē hvnkevnkē,

vnhessē

vlēkcv vnkē

ohìolopí: hânki=ankí:

an-híssi

alí:kca =ankí:

year

1sg.dat-friend doctor =p2

one=p2

hēcan

vcakkayi(mvts/vnks).

hi:c-â:n

acakk-â:y-ey-(mát-s/ánk-s)

p3-ind/p2-ind)

see.ipfv-comp.ds comm-go.pfv-1sg.ag-(
`One
b.

year ago, when my friend was seeing the doctor, I went with her.'

Cvfeknicemvts.

/ Cvfeknicvnks.

cakn-êyc-imát-s

/ cakn-êyc-ánk-s

p3-ind / be.well-caus.pfv-p2-ind

be.well-caus.pfv`He healed her.'

(RMM-Mus-9/21/2020)

To reiterate, if the P3-interval had an objective near boundary at one year ago, then
it should block the use of the more general Past 2. Instead, speakers variably use
Past 2 and Past 3 at times compatible with both.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.1, other graded tense systems also show a
certain amount of exibility in how intervals are dened. In particular, graded tenses
in Bantu languages cover intervals that can vary depending on the context and the
type of event they modify. To illustrate this, consider graded tenses in the Bantu
language Gk
uy
u (Cable 2013). Gk
uy
u has three graded tenses which Cable labels
`current past', `near past' and `remote past'. In contexts where the speaker knows
when something took place the tenses have the following distribution.
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(31)

Temporal remoteness distinctions in Gk
uy
u past perfectives
a.

Mwangi nainire.
Mwangi n-a-∅-in-ire

cur-dance-pst.pfv

Mwangi asrt-3sg.subj-

`Mwangi danced (within the day).'
b.

Mwangi narainire.
Mwangi n-a-ra-in-ire
Mwangi asrt-3.sg.subj-

nrp-dance-pst.pfv

`Mwangi danced (before today, but recently).'
c.

Current Past

Near Past

Mwangi naainire.
Mwangi n-a-a-in-ire
Mwangi asrt-3.sg.subj-

remp-dance-pst.pfv

`Mwangi danced (some time ago; not recently).'

Remote Past
(Cable 2013: 226)

Remoteness indeterminacy diagnostics like those applied to Mvskoke in the last
section motivate a nested interval analysis for Gk
uy
u tenses. `Remote past' is analyzed as a general past marker and `near past' covers past times up to (roughly)
yesterday. Cable shows, however, that the tenses are more exible and their acceptability depends on complex pragmatic considerations (Cable 2013: 224). For
example, in the general case the near past is not possible with events taking place
before yesterday, (32-a). However, with certain verbs like kua `die', several days ago
is considered near enough to use the near past, (32-b).
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(32)

Gk
uy
u Near Past
a.

Mwangi narainaga

(*iyo).

Mwangi n-a-ra-in-aga

(*iyo)

nrp-dance-pst.ipfv day.before.yesterday

Mwangi asrt-3sg.subj`Mwangi was dancing.'

Speaker judgment: Not correct is Mwangi was dancing two days ago.
b.

Guuka

narakwire

(iyo).

Guuka

n-a-ra-ku-ire

(iyo)

nrp-die-pst.pfv day.before.yesterday

grandfather asrt-3sg.subj`Grandfather died.'

Speaker judgment: With or without iyo, could be said if he died several
days ago.
(Cable 2013: 224)
The exibility of Gk
uy
u near and current past depends on the type of event and with
what frequency this type of event usually occurs. Luganda (also Bantu) displays the
same pattern of exibility (Bochnak & Klecha 2015). Bochnak & Klecha (2015)
propose that graded tenses in Luganda are vague in the sense that degree predicates
and gradable adjectives are vague. This captures the context dependency of the
intervals and their variability depending on the type of event they combine with. For
example, just as the adjective skilled is interpreted dierently depending on the noun
(e.g. violinist versus 9 year old ), the interval dened by near varies depending on
the verb (e.g. near for dancing versus near for dying).
Drawing on Kennedy (2007), they dene two measure functions on intervals of
time as in (33).
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(33)

Measure Function on Time Intervals

close(t, t0 ) assigns to a time t0 a degree on a scale of closeness from t
far(t, t0 ) assigns to a time t0 a degree on a scale of distance from t
(Bochnak & Klecha 2015: 23)
On Bochnak & Klecha's account, the near past2 and distant/remote past have denitions along the lines in (34).3
(34)

Vague Interval Analysis for Bantu Graded Tenses
a.

J near.pasti K = [λP.[λt.∃t0 .

far(t, t0 ) ≺ s(far)

& t0 ≺ t & t0 ⊆ g(i) &

P(t0 )]]
b.

J remote.pasti K = [λP.[λt.∃t0 . t0 ≺ t & t0 ⊆ g(i) & P(t0 )]]
(adapted from Bochnak & Klecha 2015: 23)

The near past in Luganda asserts that there is a time t0 which is has a degree of
distance from t that exceeds the contextual standard. In these formulae,

s

is a

function that chooses from context a salient standard of comparison. As expected, this
contextual standard varies depending on the type of event as well as other contextual
factors.
The second (nearly correct) hypothesis, then, is that the P3-interval is vague like
Bantu near past intervals.
(35)

(Nearly Correct) Hypothesis #2
The P3-interval is a vague interval of past time assigning the TT a degree of
distance greater than a contextually salient standard of distance.

2 In

Bochnak & Klecha (2015), they label the Luganda tense intermediate past, however it corresponds to what Cable (2013) calls the near past in Gk
uy
u.
3 To

facilitate comparison with my semantics for Mvskoke tenses, I have adapted Bochnak &
Klecha's denitions to t my theoretical assumptions about tense as restricted indenites.
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This hypothesis predicts that the P3-interval should vary depending on the type
of verb that it combines with since the type of event will inuence the contextual
standard. For instance, if an event is performed on a regular basis (like doing laundry)
then a relatively distant event could feasibly still take place in the more recent past.
This prediction appears to be borne out in Mvskoke for Past 3 in (36).4
(36)

P3 Relatively Distant Context: Imagine that your son just got home from
college on a semester break. You ask him when the last time he washed
his clothes was. He hasn't washed them since the beginning of the semester
(about 3 months ago). How would he tell you this in the language?
mahen, okkosimvts.

Hvse

tuccenv vnkē

hasí

toccî:na =ankí: má:hin okkô:s-ey-mát-s

month three

=p2

p3-ind

about wash.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I washed them about three months ago.'
Speaker Comment: He could use [Past 2] or [Past 3].
(RMM-Mus-12/17/2020)
Although this example seems to point to Past 3 encoding a vague interval of time,
there is a limit to what can count as distant or far enough in the past. As we saw in
(10), Past 3 is generally incompatible with the temporal adverbial paksvnkē `yesterday'
and most of my consultants agreed that one-year-ago is when they would start using
Past 3. Consequently, it is possible that this particular implementation of vagueness
overpredicts the use of Past 3 at times more recent than one-year-ago. Testing this
4I

hesitate to take a strong stance on whether this prediction is actually borne out in Mvskoke.
The reason is that this judgment comes from just one speaker and it was unclear how condent the
speaker was about their judgment. I would like to replicate the example with a larger number of
speakers to be quite sure that the P3-interval can vary depending on the verb.
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prediction with a wider range of speakers and rening the vagueness analysis is a
topic that must be left to future work.
This analysis still doesn't quite capture the exibility of Mvskoke Past 3. When
applied to the Bantu languages discussed above, the analysis still predicts a sharp cuto between tenses. Although it allows for exibility with dierent verbs that alter the
contextually salient standard, if the contextual standard remains constant, the vague
tense should behave as though it covers an objective interval of time. Consider the
following example from Luganda. In Luganda, as in Gk
uy
u, the near past covers the
more restricted interval than the remote past. For the verb nazina `dance', at times
compatible with the restricted interval, the unrestricted remote past is unacceptable.
(37)

Cut-o between Luganda Near Past and Remote Past
a.

Nazinye
1sg.dance.

saawa

{satu/nnya/tano} emabega.

nrp {three/four/ve} behind

`I danced {three/four/ve} hours ago.'
b.

#Nazina
1sg.dance.

saawa

{satu/nnya/tano} emabega.

remp {three/four/ve} behind

`I danced {three/four/ve} hours ago.'
(Bochnak & Klecha 2015: 383-4, glossing adapted )
A similar sharp boundary between near and remote pasts can be seen in the Gk
uy
u
example below.
(38)

Cut-o between Gk
uy
u Near Past and Remote Past
a.

Mwangi narainaga

(*iyo).

nrp-dance-pst.ipfv day.before.yesterday

Mwangi asrt-3sg.subj`Mwangi was dancing.'

Near Past

Speaker judgment: Not correct if Mwangi was dancing two days ago.
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b.

Mwangi nãinaga

(iyo).

remp-dance-pst.ipfv day.before.yesterday

Mwangi asrt-3sg.subj`Mwangi was dancing.'

Remote Past

Speaker judgment: With or without iyo, could be said if he danced two
days ago.

(Cable 2013: 224)

This prediction is inaccurate for Mvskoke Pasts 2 and 3, as we saw in (30).
South Ban Inuktitut's two distant past tenses lauq and lauqsima display a exibility similar to Mvskoke Pasts 2 and 3. These two tenses have considerable overlap
in the past times where they can be used. According to Hayashi (2011) and Hayashi
& Oshima (2015), lauqsima covers a more restricted interval of distant past and lauq
is a general past tense. Yet even at remote times like 20 years ago, the availability of

lauqsima doesn't block the use of lauq (39).
(39)

Comparison between South Ban Inuktitut -lauqsima and -lauq.
a.

jaan aulla-lauqsima-juq

iqalu-nnit

20arraagulauqsimajunit

John leave-lauqsima-part.3s Iqaluit-acc.pl 20.years.ago
`John left Iqaluit 20 years ago.'
b.

jaan aulla-lauq-juq

iqalu-nnit

20arraagulauqsimajunit

John leave-lauq-part.3s Iqaluit-acc.pl 20.years.ago
`John left Iqaluit 20 years ago.'

(Hayashi & Oshima 2015: 799)

To account for the exible boundary between the two tenses, Hayashi & Oshima
(2015) propose that the distant past lauqsima is used to make more ne-grained and
subjective temporal specications (Hayashi & Oshima 2015: 795).
Similarly to South Ban Inuktitut, the Mvskoke data suggests that the P3-interval
is also subjective. For a given verb and past time roughly 1 year ago or earlier,
speakers accept and use both Past 2 and Past 3. For example, to describe a memorable
falling event that took place ve years ago, both Past 2 and Past 3 are possible.
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(40)

P2 and P3 Context: Imagine that your friend Susan fell ve years ago. It
was a really memorable occasion because you were with her when she fell and
she had hip problems for a long time.
Hofonvnkē

Susan latkvnks

/ latkemvc.

hofó:n=ankí: Susan lâ:tk-ánk-s
long=p2

/ lâ:tk-imát-s

p2-ind / fall.pfv-p3-ind

Susan fall.pfv-

`It was long ago, Susan fell.'

(PF-Mus-11/28/2018)

Like Inuktitut -lauqsima, example (40) shows that the P3-interval is sensitive to a
subjective notion of remoteness.5 I would argue that the vague analysis presented
above can account for these examples, but that more needs to be said about the
context dependency of the standard of temporal distance. In particular, I propose
that it is possible to use both Past 2 and Past 3 in examples (40) and (30) because
the contextually salient standard (s(far)) in examples (30) and (40) is subject to the
speaker's perception of what counts as far for that particular event.
There are three reasons to think that for a single event (such as dancing or falling)
a speaker may conceive of two dierent standards of comparison. First, we are dealing
with time and not another vague notion like tall or long. Whereas height or length is
something we can visually perceive, time is only perceived indirectly through unfolding of events and change over time (Le Poidevin 2019). Consequently, a contextual
standard of height is more concrete than a contextual standard of temporal distance.
A contextual standard of temporal distance is thus more likely to be inuenced by
the speaker's memory and their perception of the passage of time. Secondly, we are
dealing with time long past and not recent past. Thus the speaker's memory of how
5 The

term subjective remoteness has also been employed by Botne (2012). For Botne subjective
remoteness is synonymous with epistemic remoteness, or speaker uncertainty. Systems sensitive to
epistemic remotenes may allow the remote past in intervals of time close to the day of utterance,
but which the speaker considers less certain. This is clearly not the case with Past 3, which is used
for remote events which the speaker has direct evidence for, and hence is certain of.
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long ago the event occured is weaker and less accurate than their memory of a recent
event. Finally, since we are dealing with events, there is greater exibility in choosing
a contextual standard. For instance, someone uttering the sentence Mike is tall is
probably using the average height of men as the standard of comparison. However,
a speaker uttering (40) may choose to compare Susan's fall to other major accidents
Susan has had or to the frequency at which people the speaker knows fall and are
seriously injured, etc. In this way, the standard of comparison for an event is much
more subjective than the standard of comparison for height.
With this caveat regarding the subjectivity inherent in the standard of comparison, I formalize the P3-interval adopting Bochnak & Klecha (2015)'s vague measure
function
(41)

far.

I give Past 3 the following semantics.

J P3i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t &

far(t, t0 ) > s(far) &

come-to-believe(sp(c),t0 ,P(t0 )) in w]]]

According to this formula, Past 3 restricts the topic time t0 to times in the past of
the evaluation time t, assigns t0 a degree of distance from t that is greater than their
(subjective) contextual standard of distance (s(far)), and applies t0 to the come-tobelieve predicate.

This semantics for Past 3 explains some of the puzzling distributional facts discussed earlier.
(42)

Puzzles for Past 3
1.

Past 3 is used when the speaker has evidence suggesting the event happened longer ago.

2.

Past 3 and Past 2 have substantial temporal overlap.

3.

Past 3 is most reliably volunteered when speaking about childhood experiences.
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Since Past 3 has an additional subjective component which is context dependent
we expect contexts which provide a physical, salient standard of comparison to more
readily accommodate Past 3. We saw that this was so in remoteness indeterminacy
contexts such as (22). In this example, if the standard is a car in good shape and the
car looks old, then the event of buying a car is more likely to be considered distant
from the utterance time. Additionally, since what counts as long ago depends on the
speaker and varies from context to context, the substantial temporal overlap between
Past 2 and Past 3 is expected. Finally, this characterization of subjective remoteness
explains why Past 3 is most reliably used to speak about childhood experiences.
For adults, childhood experiences nearly always qualify as more distant than some
contextual standard.

4.4 Predictions and Implications
4.4.1 Competition Between Pasts 1-3
This analysis correctly predicts the general distribution of the past tenses. In
direct witness contexts, Pasts 1-3 will be used to pick out (somewhat) disjoint temporal intervals, which accord with Martin (2010)'s intervals. This will arise due to
Quantity Implicatures associated with the use of one tense versus another, and will
arise in spite of the actual temporal intervals compatible with each tense's semantics.
The following diagram illustrates the intervals compatible with each tense according
to the proposed semantics.
The distribution we see on the surface arises due to competition and blocking
between the forms. I formalize this competition as a Scalar Implicature, as I did for
the competition between P5 and the evidential tenses. With the semantics developed
above, Pasts 1, 2, and 3 form a scale of informativity. Since the P2 interval subsumes
both the P1 and P3 intervals, Past 2 is less informative than the other tenses and is
entailed by each of them. The scale is reproduced below without P5.
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Past 5
60 yrs 10 yrs

1 yr

Yest.

Past 3

Now

Past 1
Past 2

Figure 4.3.
(43)

Times Covered by Past Tenses

h P2, {P3,P1} i

In contexts where the speaker has sucient evidence to use P1, Grice's rst maxim of
Quantity (Make your contribution as informative as required.) will mitigate against
the use of the less-informative P2. The same maxim will require the speaker to use
P3 if she judges the event to be suciently remote.
In contexts where the speaker is not assumed to be knowledgeable about when
exactly the event took place, the use of P2 will result in an ignorance implicature.
That is, a speaker will be able to use P2 if they know the event took place within
the broader P2-interval, but just don't know if it took place within the more specic
P1 or P3 intervals. In contexts which allow for it, the addressee will assume that
the speaker is knowledgeable about when the event took place; this is called the
Opinionated Speaker assumption (Sauerland 2004) but also follows from the belief
predicate encoded by P1-P3. In these contexts, the use of P2 will result in a Scalar
Implicature which restricts the P2 interval to times not included in either the P1 or
P3 intervals. The reasoning is as follows.
(44)

a.

The speaker s uttered a sentence with P2.

b.

s did not use the more informative alternatives with P3 or P1.

c.

If they knew the event e happened in the P1 or P3 intervals, they would
have used P3 or P1.

Maxim of Quantity 1
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d.

s is knowledgeable about when e happened.

e.

Therefore, s must know that e did not happen in the P3 or P1 intervals.

Opinionated Speaker

Maxim of Quality

An utterance with P2 will be pragmatically strengthened by conjoining the negation
of the two stronger alternatives. Thus a P2 sentence will be conjoined with the
negation of the disjunction of the P3 and P1 alternatives.
(45)

a.

∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,φ(t0 )

b.

∧ ¬ [∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t & far(t, t0 ) > s(far) & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,φ(t0 ))
∨ ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(i) & t0 ≺ t & t0 ∞ day(t) & come-to-bel(sp(c),t0 ,φ(t0 ))]

Simplifying (45-b) by De Morgan's Law, a P2 sentence will be accompanied by a
Scalar Implicature consisting of the negation of both the P3 and P1 alternatives. The
pragmatically strengthened utterance is paraphrased below.
(46)

There is a past time at which the speaker learned of φ as it took place,
and there is not a past time which the speaker considers more distant than
the contextual standard at which she learned of φ as it took place,
and there is not a past time in the day of utterance at which the speaker
learned of φ as it took place.

Cable (2013) argues that the competition between Gk
uy
u graded tenses cannot
be due to Conversational Implicatures. He has two reasons for this. First, pragmatic
reasoning about informativity relies on truth conditional entailment and therefore
cannot be what is driving the competition between tenses in questions. Secondly,
Conversational Implicatures cannot explain the sharp infelicity of weaker tenses in
contexts compatible with stronger tenses. Cable shows that even when the time of
an event is not conversationally relevant, the weaker tenses still cannot be used if
the event took place at a time compatible with a stronger tense. Since whether the
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interval is conversationally relevant does not aect the competition between graded
tenses, Cable concludes that a stronger grammatical pressure must be at work, namely

Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991; Singh 2011; Schlenker 2012; a.m.o.).
I do not have empirical data that bears on the second argument. However, since
P1-P3 do compete in questions, the data presented here is compatible with the competition between Pasts 1-3 being a matter of presuppositions. If the competition
between tenses is indeed a Maximize Presupposition!

eect, this would motivate

giving the tenses presuppositional semantics as in (47).
(47)

a.

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t & g(i) ∞ day(t).

[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]
b.

J P2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t.

[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]
c.

J P3i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t &

far(t,g(i)) > s(far).

[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]
(48)

J P5i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t.[λws . P(g(i)) in w ]]]

I adopt an informal denition of Maximize Presupposition! as spelled out for
Gk
uy
u graded tenses in Cable (2013).
(49)

Maximize Presupposition! If all the following conditions hold,
a.

LF1 and LF2 are identical, except that LF1 contains lexical item α where
LF2 contains lexical item β .

b.

The domain of JαK is a strict subset of the domain of JβK. (i.e. The
presuppositions of α are stronger than the presuppositions of β .)

c.

A speech act (declarative or interrogative) using either LF1 or LF2 would
be licit in context. then the speech act must be made with LF1 and not
LF2 .
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(adapted from Cable 2013: 259)
On these semantics P1-P3 count as presuppositional alternatives because they have
the same assertive content. Since P1 and P3 have stronger presuppositions than
P2, using P2 in a context that satises the presuppositions of P1 or P3 will violate

Maximize Presupposition! This presuppositional approach straightforwardly accounts
for the competition between Pasts 1-3 in declarative and interrogative sentences. Since
on both accounts P5 has dierent assertive content from P1-P3, the competition with
P5 would still be due to Scalar Implicatures.
In order to take the temporal presuppositions into account when calculating the
Scalar Implicature, we would need to adopt a theory for how presuppositions are
treated when the alternatives are negated. Spector & Sudo (2017) discuss two ways
this could be modeled: i) Strong Negation: the alternatives are false, therefore dened, therefore their presuppositions project, and ii) Weak Negation: the alternatives
are not true, that is, either false or undened. The second theory gives us approximately the same inferences that were derived with the non-presuppositional Scalar
Implicature account in Chapter 3.
(50)

Weakly Negated Alternatives to φ-P5
a.

φ-P2 = 0 or φ-P2 is undened
¬come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),φ(g(i))) & g(i) ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ )
∨ it is not the case that g(i) ⊆ P2-interval(t∗ )

b.

φ-P1 = 0 or φ-P1 is undened
¬come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),φ(g(i))) & g(i) ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ )
∨ it is not the case that g(i) ⊆ P1-interval(t∗ )

c.

φ-P3 = 0 or φ-P3 is undened
¬come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),φ(g(i))) & g(i) ⊆ P3-interval(t∗ )
∨ it is not the case that g(i) ⊆ P3-interval(t∗ )
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Thus when we calculate the Scalar Implicature for a P5 sentence, the weakly negated
alternatives will be true if either i) the speaker did not come to believe φ as it took
place, but g(i) may be in a P1, P2, or P3 interval, or ii) g(i) is not a subset of any of
the intervals, but the speaker may have come to believe φ as it took place. The rst
implicature will give us the indirect evidence inference of P5, and the second will give
us the temporal remoteness inference of P5.

4.4.2 Remote Boundaries for Pasts 2 and 3
An astute reader will notice that, on either competition account, deriving the temporal remoteness inference of P5 requires that P2 and P3 have remote boundaries.
This is so that g(i) can fall outside both intervals at a remote past time, allowing P5
to be used for directly experienced events. Recalling data presented in the previous
chapter, it appears that Past 3 (and consequently Past 2) might have a remote boundary that is a xed point in time. Consider (51) (repeated from Chapter 3, example
(14)).
(51)

Context: Imagine you and your friends are talking about a certain Mvskoke
Hymn. You haven't heard the hymn since you were very young, but want to
tell me that you have heard it.
Cvmvnettof,

mv yvhiketv pohvyvtēs.

ca-manítt-o:f

ma yaheykitá po:h-ay-áti:-s

1sg.pat-young-when dem song

p5-ind

hear.ipfv-1sg.ag-

`When I was young, I heard that song.'
Speaker Comment: I could say that. But [a younger speaker] would have to
[use Past 3].

(RMM-Mus-12/17/2021)

The speaker comment on this example demonstrates that while the Past 3 interval is
dened by subjective distance, the interval isn't so subjective that it shrinks in size
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for younger individuals. It is possible for part of the childhood of a 65 year old to fall
outside the Past 3 interval, but the entire childhood of a 25 year old must fall within
the Past 3 interval. If Past 3 (and consequently Past 2) has a remote boundary it is
somewhere between 25 years ago and approximately 60 years ago.
This hypothesis leaves open the possibility that the Past 3 interval might extend
beyond the lifetime of a person younger than 60 years old. Example (52) shows that
this is not possible.
(52)

Before-I-was-born Context: Imagine your mother went to this one church
before you were born. How would you say that in the language?
Cvhēckeko

monkof,

cvcke

yv mēkusvpkv-cuko

ca-hí:ck-ikó-:

mônk-o:f

cácki

ya mi:kosapka-cóko

1sg.pat-seen-neg-dur still-when my.mother this prayer-house

ayvtēs.

/ #ayemvts.

a:y-atí:-s

/ â:y-imát-s

go.sg.ipfv-

p5-ind / go.sg.pfv-p3-ind

`Before I was born, my mother went to this church.'
Speaker Comment: No, you couldn't say [the verb with P3] because you're
not born yet. You have to be present to use that one.
(MAE-Sem-07/13/2018)
This eect may not be so much a reection of the interval Past 3 refers to, but the
result of its evidential component. If an event happened before a person's lifetime,
they cannot have learned about it as it happened. The examples and discussion here
point to two main factors that eect the remote boundary: the evidential component
of Pasts 2 and 3 (in the form of the come-to-believe predicate) and the age of the
speaker.
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Botne's (2012) characterization of Mvskoke's Past 3 potentially unies these two
factors. Botne (2012) characterizes the graded tenses in Mvskoke as being sensitive
to cycles relevant to the human experience. Specically, he hypothesizes that the
remote boundary of Past 3 is the limit of the speaker's memory (Botne 2012: 545).
This would account for the remote boundary seen in (51) and the lifetime boundary
in (52). In (51), the older speaker may shift to using Past 5 for events so long ago
in their childhood that they have no memory of them. The judgment in (52) is
completely expected; if Past 3 is limited by the speaker's memory, it follows that
it is limited by their lifetime. The judgment in (51) for a younger speaker remains
unexplained by Botne's hypothesis. The memory hypothesis predicts that no matter
the age of the speaker, there will be childhood events that fall outside their memory.
The hypothesis might be conrmed by an example with a richer context such as
rst memories or looking through a family photo-album for very early events outside
the speaker's memory. Testing this hypothesis for Past 3 as well as determining the
remote boundary for Past 2 is an issue I set aside for future elicitation and further
research to resolve.

4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the precise semantics of the temporal intervals associated with Pasts 1-3. In addition to rening the intervals convered by the tenses
in declarative sentences, I also provided new empirical evidence from questions that
Pasts 1-3 cover overlapping intervals. In direct witness contexts, I demonstrated that
the P1-interval covers the day of utterance, beginning with sunset on the day before.
The P2 and P3-intervals were shown to overlap substantially, though the P3-interval
is typically restricted to times one year ago to the speaker's childhood. As discussed
in section 4.4.2, the remote boundary of the P3-interval is dicult to ascertain, however it appears to be somewhere around 60 years from the utterance time. In addition
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to the evidence presented in Chapter 3, Past 5 was shown to be compatible with all
past time. Table 4.4 (repeated from 4.2) summarizes the rened intervals that the
tenses cover in the general case.

Table 4.4.
Tense
Past 1
Past 2
Past 3
Past 5

Rened Interval Boundaries

Near Boundary Remote boundary
Evidential
just now
sunset yesterday
yesterday
approx. 5 years ago
1 year ago
60(+) years ago
Non-evidential
today
(no boundary)

Using remoteness indeterminacy contexts (Hayashi 2011) - i.e. contexts where
the speaker doesn't know when the event took place - I provided evidence that the P2interval is, in fact, the broadest of the P1, P2, and P3 intervals. The P1-interval and
P3-interval were shown to cover more restricted intervals of past time that are subsumed by the P2-interval. Since at times more remote that the P3-interval (approx.
60 years ago), P5 becomes available an not P2, I conclude that the P2-interval does
not extend beyond the P3-interval. The structure of the tense system is illustrated
in Figure 4.4 (repeated from Figure 4.3).
Past 5
60 yrs 10 yrs

1 yr

Past 3

Yest.

Now

Past 1
Past 2

Figure 4.4.

Times Covered by Past Tenses

Finally, I demonstrated how the tenses, having the intervals represented in Figure
4.4, come to cover the time spans in Table 4.4. I demonstrated how the appearance
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of disjointness could result from Scalar Implicature-like pragmatic reasoning, but
concluded based on the presence of competition in questions that Pasts 1-3 are best
analyzed as presuppositional alternatives. Their competition is thus governed by a
stronger pragmatic principle, Maximize Presupposition!
In light of the discussion of competition and remote boundaries, I adopt the following nal denotations for Mvskoke's past tenses.
(53)

a.

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t & g(i) ∞ day(t).

[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]
b.

J P2i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : 60.years.ago(t) ≺ g(i) ≺ t.
[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]

c.

J P3i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : 60.years.ago(t) ≺ g(i) ≺ t &

far(t,g(i)) > s(far).

[λws . come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) in w ]]]
(54)

J P5i Kc,g = [λPhi,sti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t.[λws . P(g(i)) in w ]]]

Because of the dierence in truth-conditional content, I argued that the competition between Past 1-3 and Past 5 must still be due to pragmatic reasoning resulting in
Conversational Implicatures. This asymmetry in how the tenses compete is another
indication that Pasts 1-3 and Past 5 might also occupy dierent structural positions,
as discussed in Chapter 3. I return to the notion of a structural asymmetry between
Pasts 1-3 and Past 5 in Chapter 6 when I address the nominal use of these tenses.
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CHAPTER 5
TEMPORAL MEANING IN THE NOMINAL DOMAIN
In the preceding chapters we saw that Mvskoke's past tenses fall into two distinct
categories both in terms of evidentiality and in terms of gradedness. Pasts 1-3 were
shown to restrict the topic time both to a particular interval of past time and to
a moment of coming-to-believe. Past 5 was shown to do neither, but to be a nonevidential, relative past tense. This distinction between tenses is reected in the
nominal domain as well. Mvskoke is one of few languages in which tense morphology
axes to nouns as well as verbs. Pasts 1 and 2 can ax to nouns where the basic
interpretation they receive indicates the interlocutors have a shared past experience of
the individual the noun is predicated of. Past 5 can also ax to nouns, but its basic
interpretation indicates that the individual is deceased. Nominal uses of all three
tenses are also able to receive a change of state meaning similar to the interpretation
of English former or ex-.
This chapter and the next provide the rst formal investigation of Mvskoke past
tenses when they appear in the nominal domain. In Section 1, I review previous
literature on the temporal interpretation of nominals and demonstrate that Mvskoke
bare nouns are temporally independent. In Section 2, I introduce the cross-linguistic
category of nominal temporal morphemes (NTMs) and propose two categories of
meaning that NTMs fall into: discourse related meanings (like the shared past experience meaning) and change of state meanings.
With this background in place, I turn to a descriptive presentation of Mvskoke
NTMs in Section 3. After introducing the discourse related interpretations of P1
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and P2, I take a closer look at the change of state interpretations of P1, P2, and
P5. I show that P1 and P2 are ambiguous between their discourse related and their
change of state interpretations. I then provide a description of the change of state
and decessive interpretations of P5. Section 4 examines the change of state inferences
further and nds that the change of state inferences of all three NTMs, when they
are accessed, are not cancellable. Section 5 concludes.

5.1 Temporal Interpretation of Nominals
We typically think of tense as a category that has a special semantic relationship
to predicates of eventualities rather than predicates of individuals. However, both
verbal and nominal predicates are true at some times and false at others. Enç (1981)
demonstrates that the time at which nominal predicates are true can be independent
of the verbal tense. In her dissertation, Enç considers a theory of tense as a sentential
operator introducing quantication over times. She famously considers the sentence
in example (1).
(1)

Every fugitive is now in jail.

(Enç 1981: 38)

The most natural interpretation of (1) is one in which all the individuals who were
fugitives in the past are now in jail. The noun receives a past interpretation and
the main predicate is interpreted at the present. (1) would be contradictory if the
nominal predication time and the time of the main predicate were both constrained
by a present tense operator. In her dissertation, Enç demonstrates that noun phrases
have a greater range of temporal interpretations than is predicted if they interact
with a sentential tense operator. She concludes that the nominal predication time
is provided by context and all nouns are therefore temporally independent of verbal
tense.
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However, Musan (1995) argues that there are certain types of nominals that appear
to be temporally dependent. Consider the following pair of sentences.
(2)

a.

Many fugitives are now in jail.

b.

There are now many fugitives in jail.

(Musan 1995: 11)

The (a) example has a similar interpretation to Enç' original example in (1). However
the (b) example is contradictory because it requires the individuals to be fugitives
and in jail at the same time. Musan (1995) argues that this is because the noun
phrase many fugitives is not temporally independent in the (b) example.
For Musan, the dierence between (2-a) and (2-b) comes down to a distinction
between presuppositional noun phrases and non-presuppositional noun phrases. In
Milsark's (1974) thesis on the existential there -construction in English, he classies
noun phrases depending on whether they can appear in there -constructions. Specifically noun phrases with what he calls strong determiners are incompatible with

there -constructions. This construction only allows noun phrases with weak determiners (such as one or a ).
Musan renes this classication in terms of whether or not the determiner introduces a presupposition. Many determiners are ambiguous between a presuppositional interpretation and a cardinal, non-presuppositional interpretation. Appearing in an existential-there sentence forces a cardinal interpretation. Thus the noun
phrase many fugitives is presuppositonal and temporally independent in (2-a), but
non-presuppositonal and temporally dependent in (2-b).
For Musan, whether a noun phrase is temporally dependent or independent comes
down to the determiner and whether or not it iintroduces a presupposition. Kusumoto
(2005) implemented the basics of Musan's proposal in her formal theory of quanticational tense. Presuppositional determiners introduce existential quantication over
times binding the noun's temporal argument and thereby making it independent of
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the main clause tense. Non-presuppositional determiners do not existentially bind
the temporal argument of the noun, but pass up the temporal variable which ends
up being bound by the matrix clause tense operator. As a consequence, the temporal
argument of the noun and verb are interpreted at the same time.
(3)

J every Kg = λP ∈ Dhe,hi,stii [λQ ∈ Dhe,hi,stii [λt ∈ Di [λw ∈ Ds .[ for every

individual x such that there is a time t0 such that P(x)(t0 )(w)=1, Q(x)(t)(w)=1
(Kusumoto 2005: 343)

]]]
(4)

J a Kg = λP ∈ Dhe,hi,stii [λQ ∈ Dhe,hi,stii [λt ∈ Di [λw ∈ Ds .[ there is an individual

x such that P(x)(t)(w)=1 and Q(x)(t)(w)=1 ]]]

(Kusumoto 2005: 343)

Kusumoto's implementation of Musan's determiner theory of the temporal interpretation of noun phrases is illustrated above for a strong, presuppositional determiner
(3) and for a cardinal, non-presuppositional determiner (4).
Tonhauser (2002, et seq.) challenges Musan's conclusion that certain noun phrases
must be temporally dependent. Tonhauser shows that even noun phrases in existential-

there constructions can receive temporally independent readings if the context is rich
enough to provide another salient nominal predication time. Consider the following
example.
(5)

Context: At a reunion of the survivors of the Titanic disaster.
Look, there are even some crew members.

(Tonhauser 2002: 294)

Even though example (5) contains a noun phrase with a weak determiner in an
existential-there construction, the noun phrase some crew members is able to be
interpreted independently of the verbal topic time. The individuals in question were
crew members at a time prior to the reunion. They are no longer crew members of
the Titanic at the time of the reunion.
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Tonhauser demonstrates that a suciently rich context can license temporally
independent readings in each of the syntactic environemnts that Musan proposed
were limited to temporally dependent noun phrases. She proposes that the time
at which any noun phrase is interpreted - the NP evaluation time - is a temporal
anaphor that is resolved to the topic time unless the context provides another referent.
She thus concludes that all noun phrases are able to have temporally independent
interpretations.
In Mvskoke, all types of noun phrases seem to have temporally independent interpretations. From the literature reviewed above, it is no surprise that strong DPs like
quanticational DPs or Demonstrative NPs receive temporally independent interpretations. Mvskoke bare nouns are also able to be interpreted at times other than the
verbal TT. Recall from the introduction to Mvskoke nominals in Chapter 2 that a
bare noun in Mvskoke can receive indenite and denite interpretations.
The rst example below demonstrates that a bare noun can be interpreted at a
time later than verbal TT. The bare noun (mékko `chief') is true at the UT; the
main predicate (cēpanēt ow- `be a boy') is interpreted at a P2 time. World knowledge
ensures that the bare noun cannot be true at the same time as the main predicate.1
(6)

Context: We are talking about Chief David Hill of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation.
Pale-cahkēpvnkē

mēkko cēpanēt

owvnks.

pa:li-cahkî:p=ankí: mí:kko ci:pa:ní:-t ô:w-ánk-s
ten-ve=p2

chief

boy-nom be.pfv-p2-ind

`Fifty years ago, the chief was a boy.'
1 An

(RMM-Mus-10/1/2020)

astute reader will notice that the TT of this sentence is located by the temporal adverb at
50 years ago, but the speaker uses a Past 2 on the copula ometv/owetv `to be' instead of a Past 3 or
5. I do not currently have an explanation for this. However, the temporal semantics proposed for
Past 2 are compatible with this temporal interval.
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In the sentence below, we nd that a bare noun can be interpreted at a time prior
to the verbal TT. In this example, the bare noun enokkv `sick person' is necessarily
true before the UT, when the verbal predicate cvfeknēs `be well' holds.
(7)

Enokkv

cvfeknēs.

inó:kka

cafíkn-i:-s

sick.person be.well-dur-ind
`The sick person is well.'

(RMM-Mus-10/1/2020)

Thus, a bare noun is temporally independent and can be interpeted before or after the
verbal TT. However, the NP evaluation time is limited to non-future times. Just as
with English NPs, a bare noun in Mvskoke cannot be evaluated at a future time.2 In
the example below, the bare noun vlēkcv `doctor' cannot be used to refer to someone
who will be a doctor in the future.
(8)

Context: Imagine that last week you went and visited your granddaughter and
met a friend of hers who is in medical school. She is going to be a doctor in a
few years.
#Tvcvk hvnkevnkē

vlēkcv hēcvyvnks.

taca:k

hânki=ankí:

alí:kca

week

one=p2

doctor see.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

hî:c-ay-ánk-s

`One week ago, I saw a doctor.'
Speaker Comment: That means I saw someone who was already a doctor.
(PF-Mus-8/31/2021)
2 Though

see O'Leary (2021) for data showing that English temporally independent NPs can be
interpreted at future TT.
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These examples do not show denitively that bare nouns are never forced to be temporally dependent; they just provide evidence that bare nouns can be temporally
independent. Since Mvskoke syntax is understudied, there may be constructions like
the English there-construction which strongly favor a temporally dependent interpretation of the NP. Since this is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, for
the purposes of this chapter, I assume that all nominals in Mvskoke are temporally
independent and, following Tonhauser, I assume they have a free temporal anaphor
which provides the contextually determined NP evaluation time. Since future times
are not yet realized, they are unacceptable referents for the temporal anaphor.

5.2 Nominal Temporal Morphemes
In some languages, tense morphology can ax to nouns. One of the rst major
works outlining nominal tense across languages is Nordlinger & Sadler (2004). In
their crosslinguistic survey, the authors dene parameters for what they consider to
be true nominal tense morphology. The tense marking must appear on dependent
nouns - nouns functioning as arguments or adjuncts in a clause headed by a verb as opposed to tense marking on nouns that serve as the main predicate for a verbless
clause. The tense marking cannot be merely phonologically cliticized to a noun such
as the English future clitic 'll as in John'll be home tomorrow (Nordlinger & Sadler
2004: 777). The category of tense on nouns must be dened as it is for verbs;
that is, nominal tense must introduce a temporal relation between two indices that
are relevant for the temporal interpretation of nouns. Finally, the tense marking
cannot be limited to a small number of nouns, but should combine with nouns across
many semantic classes. With this last condition they exclude English ex- from their
discussion, as it is largely limited to kinship terms and professions.
Since the status of these markers as tense in a theoretical sense is disputed (see
Tonhauser 2006, 2007; Thomas 2014), some authors (e.g. Ivan & Özyldz 2016) have
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used the theory-neutral term nominal temporal markers (NTMs). Nordlinger & Sadler
(2004) identify two major types of NTMs: Independent NTMs, which modify the
temporal properties of the noun itself independently of verbal tense, and Propositional
NTMs, which provide temporal information for the whole proposition but are marked
on the noun and can be absent from the verb. Examples of Propositional NTMs
are languages where case morphology takes a dierent form in past vs future tensed
clauses. Since Propositional NTMs do not contribute temporal information relevant to
the temporal interpretation of the noun, I do not discuss it further in this dissertation.
Most NTMs discussed in formal literature are Independent NTMs. Of the two kinds
Nordlinger & Sadler identify, Independent NTMs have potential to shed light on
theories of the temporal interpretation of nominals and their interaction with verbal
tense.

5.2.1 Change of State NTMs
Two broad types of interpretation for NTMs emerge from this literature. The
rst type of interpretation is what I will call a Change of State interpretation. On a
Change of State meaning, the NTM indicates that the nominal property has ceased to
hold of the entity (for past NTMs) or that the nominal property does not yet hold of
the entity (for future NTMs).3 With temporary properties such as professions, roles,
or alienable possesion a past NTM will have an interpretation like English former or

ex-. With permanent properties such as natural kinds, proper names, or inalienable
kinship terms, a past NTM may have a decessive interpretation like English late. The
intuition behind this meaning is that permanent properties only cease to hold of an
individual if the individual ceases to exist. One language with a past NTM that illustrates the two meanings of a change of state interpretation is Halkomelem (Wiltschko
2003). With Halkomelem possessive DPs, the past NTM -elh indicates the possessive
3I

will focus almost exclusively on past NTMs since Mvskoke does not have a future NTM.
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relation has ceased. For a temporary or alienable possession relation such as my pen-

cil, the change of possession doesn't eect the interpretation of the possessed noun
(9-a); the pencil can still be a pencil. However, for permanent possessive relations
such as my father, the past NTM necessarily indicates the possessed noun no longer
exists (9-b).

Halkomelem Past NTM

(9)

a.

(Wiltschko 2003: 665)

má:l-elh

te-l

pst

det-1sg.poss father-

`my
b.

late father'

xéltel-elh

te-l

det-1sg.poss pencil-

`my

former pencil'

pst
(attributed to Burton 1997: 67)

Not all NTMs with a change of state interpretation may combine with nouns
denoting permanent properties. Paraguayan Guaraní -kue is one such NTM; -kue
cannot receive a decessive interpretation. In (10), the combination of a possessive DP
like my father and -kue is ungrammatical.
(10)

*O-heja che-ve

ko óga

che-ru-kue.

a3-leave b1sg-ve this house b1sg-father-kue

Intended: My (late) father left me this house.
(Tonhauser 2006: 194)
Tonhauser (2007) proposes that -kue requires the change of state to occur during the
individual's lifetime (not at the individual's time of death). -Kue is ungrammatical
with permanent properties because the change of state cannot occur during the individual's lifetime. Tonhauser calls this the Existence Property of -kue. I discuss this
property briey in Section 3 where I show that Mvskoke P1 and P2 most likely have
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this property, but P5 does not. However, I am not able to investigate the property
further at this time.
In her analysis of Guaraní -kue, Tonhauser proposes two other properties that -kue
has as a nominal temporal marker: the Precedence Property and the Change of State
Property. To discuss these meaning components of -kue, Tonhauser proposes that
nouns have three key times that are relevant for their temporal interpretation. The
rst ows out of Musan's (1995) work on the temporal interpretation of nominals: the
nominal predication time (for which Tonhauser uses the symbol tnom ). In possessive
DPs the time of the possessive relation (tposs ) is important for the interpretation of

-kue. The third temporal index, which was already introduced, is the NP evaluation
time (tnp ).
With tenseless DPs, the nominal predication time and the NP evaluation time
are indistinguishable. But with the introduction of an NTM, the two come apart.
Tonhauser argues that, in Paraguayan Guaraní, -kue contributes a precedence relation
between tnom (or tposs ) and tnp .
In (11), the nominal predication time is the time that mbo'ehara `teacher' is true
of Juan. The NP evaluation time is the time at which mbo'ehara-kue `teacher-past'
is true of Juan. The temporal contribution of kue is placing the nominal predication
time (the time Juan is a teacher) in the past of the NP evaluation time.
(11)

a.

Juan pete mbo'e-ha-ra-kue.

kue

Juan one teach-nom-ag`Juan is a
b.

former teacher.'

(Tonhauser 2007: 838)

tnom ≺ tnp

Similarly, with possessive DPs, -kue contributes that the time of the possessive relation (the time the speaker owned the house) is past with respect to the NP evaluation
time.

211

(12)

a.

Ko'agã a-hecha che-róga-kue.
now

a1sg-see b1sg-house-

`I am seeing my
b.

kue

former house.'

(Tonhauser 2007: 838)

tposs ≺ tnp

The Change of State Property of -kue builds on the Precedence Property; where
the Precedence property requires tnom to precede tnp , the Change of State property requires the nominal predicate to have stopped holding by tnp . Altshuler &
Schwarzschild (2013) make a careful distinction between a change of state inference
and a cessation inference. Whereas a change of state inference simply requires the
state to have ended, a cessation inference requires that no state of the kind currently
holds (Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013: 48). A change of state inference is incompatible with the state still holding at the present; a cessation inference is incompatible
both with the state still holding and with the state holding again. In Tonhauser's
original argument, she presented example (13) as evidence that -kue was accompanied
by a change of state inference. In other words, -kue in (13) means Juan must have
stopped being a teacher at some past time even though he may be a teacher again.
(13)

Juan pete mbo'e-ha-ra-kue...

kue

Juan one teach-nom-ag`Juan is a
a.

former teacher...'

# ha mbo'e-ha-ra

gueteri.

and teach-nom-ag still
`and he's still a teacher.'
b.

ha ko'agã mbo'e-ha-ra
and now

jey.

teach-nom-ag again

`and now he's a teacher again.'
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(Tonhauser 2007: 838)

The above example was later shown to be awed by Thomas (2014) for reasons which
will be reviewed in section 5.4.2.
In summary, Tonhauser (2007) proposes that NTMs like -kue are a kind of nominal terminative aspect. Like aspect, they provide a relation between a predication/situation time and an evaluation time. They also semantically encode a change
of state; something tenses do not do. I return to the question of whether Mvskoke
NTMs are nominal tense or nominal aspect in Chapter 7.

5.2.2 Discourse Related NTMs
The second type of interpretation that an NTM can have is what I will call Discourse Related interpretations. NTMs with discourse related interpretations may
give rise to several dierent meanings depending on their context of use. This type of
interpretation is possibly similar to English `that NP from this morning/ yesterday/
before'. These demonstrative constructions have been called recognitional uses of the
demonstrative (Diessel 1999). According to Partee (2006), these demonstrative constructions come with a presumption of familiarity  the speaker conveys condence
that the hearer will recognize the intended referent. Prince (1981) and Grundel et
al. (1993) also indicate that these constructions convey the idea of private shared
knowledge of the referent.
Discourse Related NTMs and English that NP from this morning expressions
indicate that there is a previous situation from which the entity is known. One way
this manifests itself is with discourse anaphoric interpetations of past NTMs. On this
interpretation the NTM is understood to refer back to a previous time in discourse
that the individual was mentioned. Another inference associated with past discourse
related NTMs are invisibility inferences. With this interpretation, the past NTM
is taken to imply that the individual is not present in the utterance context, but was
present in some previous context.
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What unies these meanings is that the NTM does not limit the temporal extendedness of the interval during which the nominal property holds of the individual. In
other words, there is no change of state entailment. Thus a noun with a discourse
related NTM may well refer to an individual who still bears the nominal property at
the utterance time. The NTM instead provides some other time-related information
relevant for the identication of the referent.
Somali [Cushtic: Somalia] (Lecarme 1996, 1999, 2008) is perhaps the best known
example of a language with discourse related NTMs. In Somali temporal information
is fused with denite determiners for which there is a present tense and past tense
form. The Somali past tense determiner -kii (feminine form -dii ) can have several
discourse related meanings. Lecarme (1999) describes three such readings which she
paraphrases with the English expressions in parentheses in (14).
(14)

a.

ardyáy-dii

pst

wáy

joogaan

Somali

students-det.f.
foc.3pl be.present.nonpst
`The students (e.g. students I told you about) are present.'
b.

wl-kii

pst

áawey?

boy-det.m.
where-is-he
`Where is the boy (I told you about / I have in mind / not in sight )?'
(Lecarme 1999: 335,337)
The rst meaning - the students/boy I told you about - is a discourse ananphoric
interpretation. The past NTM is indicating that the individuals are familiar from an
earlier mention in discourse. Lecarme describes the second meaning as a specic or
referential interpretation. However, there is little information about the specics of
this interpretation.
The third meaning Lecarme identies is a deictic/locative meaning that often
implies the referent is not visible to the interlocutors. In (15) below, the past denite
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determiner -kii (here -gii ) must be used to ask about the location of the speaker's
pen. The present tense -ku/gu is unacceptable.
(15)

Qálinkay-gii/*gu
pen.m.poss.1sg-

méeyey?

det.m.pst/*det.m.pres is.m.q

`Where is my pen?

(Lecarme 2008: 212)

For Lecarme, the present form is unacceptable because it implies the pen is visible to
the speaker. The visibility of the pen would make the question unnecessary and, as
a result, infelicitous. Lecarme shows that the inference of invisibility is defeasible. In
(16), in a sentence which specically indicates the referent is in the utterance context,
past tense -kii implies the referent is distant.
(16)

búug-gii

wáa kan

pst foc det.m.dem

book-det.m.

`Here is the book (distant but in sight ...).'

(Lecarme 1999: 337)

Notice that Somali -kii in these examples does not imply that the nominal property
no longer holds of the entity, as it would if it had a change of state meaning. Instead,
Lecarme proposes that past tense functions with the determiner at the referential
level to temporally locate the entity in the utterance context. In essence, the tensed
determiners provide a topical time for the interpretation of the nominal.
Temporal adjectives within the nominal locate either the nominal predication time
(bound by the tense operator) or the NP evaluation time. When a temporal adjective
modies the nominal predication time, a Somali NP with -kii can have a change of
state meaning. In (17), hore `former/before' indicates that the nominal predication
time is past, generating the inference that the nominal predicate no longer holds.
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(17)

ardáy-dii

hore

students-det.f.poss1sg.

dhammáan-t-ood

pst before entirety-det.f-poss3pl

(waa ilá soo xariiran).
(are in contact with me)
`All my ex-students (are in contact with me).'

(Lecarme 1999: 341)

Other kinds of temporal adjectives modify the NP evaluation time. In (18), the adjective yesterday locates the evaluation time of the noun arrests, but is not accompanied
by any change of state inference.
(18)

qabqabashá-dii
arrests-det.f.

shálay

pst yesterday

`yesterday's arrests'

(Lecarme 1999: 341)

According to Lecarme, nominal tense in Somali functions much like a tense operator in the verbal domain. It binds the temporal argument of the noun and contributes
a syntactic feature that contributes to tense concord within the DP. Additional modiers make certain interpretations of -kii explicit by modifying dierent temporal
variables bound by -kii. But in essence the nominal past simply encodes a temporal relation and receives various interpretations when it interacts with the context of
discourse. My own account, presented in the next chapter, builds on Lecarme (1999)
and her intuitions about the function of discourse related NTMs. In the next section
I describe the meanings associated with Mvskoke's past NTMs and discuss several
features of tensed nominals.

5.3 NTMs in Mvskoke: A Descriptive Presentation
As introduced in previous chapters, Mvskoke has four (previously ve) verbal
tenses. Of these, three are used by modern speakers to mark nouns: Past 1, Past 2,
and Past 5, as rst noted in Martin (2010, 2011). No modern Mvskoke speaker I have
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consulted recognizes a nominal use of Past 3. There are also no textual examples of a
nominal Past 3. This stands in contrast to Mvskoke's now defunct Past 4, which was
able to ax to nouns. A textual example of a nominal use of Past 4 can be found in
Ernest Gouge's Tug-of-war between the tie-snakes (Gouge 2004).
(19)

Context: Rabbit (or Pasokolaya) went to another town for a long time, and
the people from his original town thought he was dead. After a long time,
when they were sitting in a meeting, Rabbit came up in plain sight and they
all saw him.
Mont okakat,

 Pasokolvyv

vnna

mónt ok-a:k-â:t

pa:soko:layá =anná:

and

Pasokolaya =

say-pl.ipfv-comp.ss

p4

arēt

omētatet

ervlaket

a:ì-í:-t

o:m-í:-t-a:ti-t

iì-alâ:k-it

go.about.sg-ipfv-dur-ss be.ipfv-dur-ss-comp-ss dir-arrive.pfv-ss
os.
ó:-s
be.ipfv-ind
`And they said, Pasokolaya from long ago has returned. '
(Gouge 2004: 75, glosses adapted )
Since Past 4 is no longer used (and, in some cases, no longer recognized) by Mvskoke
speakers, I will not discuss it further in this chapter. The tenses take a slighly dierent
form and tonal pattern when they appear on nouns. They end in a long vowel and
for Pasts 1, 2, and 4, there is high pitch across the morpheme. Past 5's nominal
counterpart has an initial t-. Martin (2011: 419) analyzes -tá:ti: as a shortened form
of a copular relative clause construction inected for Past 5, -t om-atí: meaning `one
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who was...'. The initial t (originally a case ending on the noun) and lengthening of
the rst vowel are remnants of this shortening. While this is most likely the origin of

-tá:ti:, I do not treat it as a relative clause construction here. Instead I assume this
shortened form has been grammaticalized as a nominal use of Past 5. The tenses and
their nominal forms are illustrated in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1.

Mvskoke Verbal and Nominal Tenses.

Appearing on Verbs
Past 1
-ey
Past 2
-ánk
Past 3
-imát
Past 4
-ant(a)
Past 5
-atí:

Appearing on Nouns
-eysí:
-ankí:

anná:
-tá:ti:

Because so many Mvskoke nouns are deverbal, headless relative clauses with one
of these tenses are often nearly identical to a noun bearing a nominal tense. Consider
for example the headless relative clause and the tensed NP in (20) and (21).
(20)

Relative Clause
honnv hayvnkē
hónna hâ:y-ánk-i:
dress make.pfv-p2-dur
`one who made dresses'

(21)

Tensed Noun
honnv-hayv

vnkē

honna-há:y-a

=ankí:

dress-make-nmlz =p2
`that (former) seamstress'
The headless relative clause with Past 2 lacks the agent nominalizer -a on the deverbal
noun. The tensed noun, on the other hand, has two vowels in hiatus, which speakers
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will often resolve with a glottal stop or by inserting a glide. The headless relative
clause also retains pitch accent on the rst vowel of the tense and pitch falls over
the nal long -i:. A tensed noun has level high pitch over the nominal tense. With
deverbal nouns, I only consider a use of P1 and P2 to be nominal if the noun's
nominalizer is pronounced and the tense has level high pitch as in (21).
Nominal uses of P1, P2, and P5 are not instances of tense agreement. There
is no requirement that the nominal and verbal tenses match. The examples below
demonstrate a few of the intepretations of the nominal tenses and in each case the
nominal tense mis-matches with the past verbal tense. Example (22) contains a
nominal P1 and a verbal P2.
(22)

Nominal P1 - Verbal P2 Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get approval
for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and language
teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving each other
updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You ask me:
Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

p2-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

`Yes, I spoke with the judge.' (i.e. that we just saw)
(RMM-8/27/2020)
Example (23) demonstrates that the tenses can mis-match in the other direction as
well. The sentence below contains a nominal P2 and a verbal P1/present perfect.
(23)

Nominal P2 - Verbal P1 Context : Imagine we both know a judge. You were
invited to his retirement reception yesterday. Then today after that reception,
you run into him again taking his things out of the oce.
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Fvccēcv

vnkē

emponahyis.

faccí:ca =ankí: im-poná<h>y-ey-s
judge

p2

=

3.dat-speak

<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`I spoke to the (retired) judge (recently).'

(RMM-Mus-9/3/2020)

Nominal P5 can also co-occur with one of the verbal graded tenses. In (24), nominal
Past 5 co-occurs with a verbal P3.
(24)

Nominal P5 - Verbal P3 Context : You spoke to the late judge while he was
living, perhaps 3-5 years ago.
Fvccēcv

tatē

emponayimvts.

faccí:ca =tá:ti: im-ponâ:y-ey-mát-s
judge

p5

=

p3-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I spoke with the

late judge (long ago).'

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

Finally, nominal P1 and P2 can appear in a future tense sentence. In (25), P1 and
P2 mark the noun esletketv `bike', identifying which bike the speaker intends to buy.
If nominal tense were tense agreement with the verbal tense, we would not expect a
past nominal tense to co-occur with a future verbal tense.
(25)

Nominal P1 - Verbal Future Context: Your family is getting ready to celebrate
your younger sister's birthday. You and your older sister went to a store this
morning and saw a nice bike. You plan to go back the day after tomorrow
to buy the bike for your younger sister. Now, your older sister asks you if
you've decided what to get for your younger sister. Which is the best way to
tell her your plans?
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a.

Nettv hokkolē hoyanofvn,

pucuse

esletketv

nítta hokkô:li: hoya:n-ô:fa-n

po-cósi

islitkitá

day

two

isēn

pass.ipfv-when-ds 1pl.pat-younger.sibling bicycle
ennesarēs.

=eysí:-n in-nis-á:ìi:-s

p1-acc 3.dat-buy-1sg.ag.fut-ind

=

`In two days, I will buy that bike (we

saw this morning) for our little

sister.'
b.

Nettv hokkolē hoyanofvn,

pucuse

esletketv

nítta hokkô:li: hoya:n-ô:fa-n

po-cósi

islitkitá

day

two

vnkēn

pass.ipfv-when-ds 1pl.pat-younger.sibling bicycle
ennesarēs.

=ankí:-n in-nis-á:ìi:-s

p2-acc 3.dat-buy-1sg.ag.fut-ind

=

`In two days, I will buy that bike (we
sister.'

saw yesterday)

for our little

(RMM-Mus-9/24/2020)

Although I currently lack evidence for a nominal P5 co-occuring with future tense, I
predict that it, too, should be acceptable.
These examples demonstrate that Mvskoke NTMs are independent of verbal tense
and provide temporal information relevant to the noun only. In other words, Mvskoke
NTMs qualify as Independent NTMs according to Nordlinger & Sadler's criteria. As
became evident in the above examples, Mvskoke NTMs are associated with several
kinds of interpretations. I propose that the interpretations fall into the two broad
categories introduced in section 5.2: discourse related interpetations and change of
state interpretations.
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5.3.1 Discourse Related Interpretations
When asked about a nominal with P1 or P2, the meaning that comes most readily
to mind for speakers is what I label a Shared Past Experience (SPE) meaning, following Martin (2011: 271-272). This meaning is often paraphrased by speakers with the
bolded English expression in the examples below. According to my own intuitions,
it would also be felicitous to translate the SPE meaning of P1 and P2 with the English expressions from a moment ago, from this morning , or from yesterday. The
SPE meaning appears to be discourse related in that it identies an entity (discourse
referent) that both interlocutors are familiar with. As seen in the translations oered
by the consultants in examples (26) and (27), the SPE meaning of P1 and P2 implies
that the interlocutors were visually aquainted with the entity at a time within the
appropriate interval.
(26)

P1 Shared Past Experience Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get
approval for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and
language teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving
each other updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You
ask me: Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yes, I spoke with the judge.' (i.e. that we just saw)
(RMM-8/27/2020)
(27)

P2 Shared Past Experience Context : One year ago I visited that current
teacher of mine that we saw at the grocery store the other day.
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Ohrolopē hvnkevnkē, (mv) vmvhayv

vnkē

ohìolopí: hânki=ankí: (má) am-ahá:ya

=ankí:

year

one=p2

p2

(dem) 1sg.dat-teacher =

encukopericvyvnks.
in-cokopiìêyc-ey-ánk-s
3.dat-house.visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`One year ago I visited my teacher (that

we saw before).'

(RMM-Mus-11/19/2020, PF-Mus-3/22/2021)
In both examples above, the referent of the tensed NP is understood to still satisfy
the nominal property (i.e. judge and teacher ) at the time of utterance.
Nominal P1 is often accompanied by an invisibility inference like the Somali past
tensed determiner. When asked about the meaning of a nominal marked with P1,
speakers comment that the P1 means the individual was present but is now gone.
(28)

mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

isē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:c-a

=eysí:

p1

school-house loc-see.ipfv-nmlz =
`this school principal (who

was just here)'
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)

(29)

Judge Moore

isē

hvte punponayisē.

Judge Moore =eysí: hatí pon-pona:y-êys-i:

p1

Judge Moore =

just 1pl.dat-speak.ipfv-p1-dur

`Judge Moore (is) the one who just talked to us.'
Speaker Comment: He was just here and then left. (RMM-Mus-8/20/2020)
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Speakers do not give such clear comments about invisibility inferences with P2, they
nonetheless occur. The most natural interpretation of (27) is that the teacher is not
in the context of utterance.
A nal Discourse Related meaning that P1 and P2 can have is a Discourse

Anaphoric or Previous Mention meaning. Speakers can use P1 and P2 to refer back
to an entity that was previously talked about in the conversation.
(30)

P1 and P2 Discourse Anaphoric Context : Imagine we are talking about the
two young men that you are teaching Muskogee to. First you told me about
one young man who is really good at speaking and picking up ways of saying
things. Then you were talking about the second young man who has a more
analytical approach, and he tries to understand the grammar. Now you want
to mention something about the rst young man, that he often goes around
and speaks with elders. The second young man, you say, lives somewhere
else.
a.

Honvnwv mvnette

vnkē

este

honánwa manítti =ankí: ísti
man

p2

young

=

vculvke emponayet
acol-akí ím-pona:y-ít

person old-gpl 3.dat-speak.ipfv-ss

arēt

omēs.

a:ì-í:-t

ô:m-i:-s

go.about.sg.ipfv-dur-ss be.pfv-dur-ind
`The young man (that

I was talking about earlier)

goes around

talking with elders.'
b.

Este

mvnette isē

ísti

manítti =eysí: í:ta-n

person young

p1

=

`The young person (I

ētvn

likēt

os.

lêyk-i:-t

ô:-s

elsewhere-acc sit.sg.pfv-dur-ss be.pfv-ind

was just talking about) lives somewhere else.'
(RMM-Mus-10/26/2020)
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It is unclear at this time how widespread this use of P1 and P2 is. However,
when they do receive Discourse Anaphoric interpretations, they function similarly to
English the former and the latter. Speakers comment that having talked about the
individual is sucient to make them known to the addressee. They also note that
the conversation doesn't have to have taken place before today to license a Discourse
Anaphoric use of P2.
Past 5 does not allow for Discourse Related interpretations. It is infelicitous in a
context where the referent of the NP does not cease to bear the nominal property. In
the following example, the P5 marked noun school principal is felicitous as long as
the individual is no longer a principal. It is infelicitous in context (31-b) in which the
individual is still a principal. Context (31-b) attempts to establish a remote shared
past experience of the school principal and license an SPE use of P5 if it were possible.
(31)

Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

tatē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:ca

=tá:ti: ato:tk-í:

p5

school-house loc-see.nmlz =
`The

vtotkē

monkvt os.
mónka-t ô:-s

work.ipfv-dur still-ss

be.pfv-ind

former principal/ #That principal (that we knew long ago) is still

working.'
a.

3Change of State Context: The principal retired, but he is still working
in his retirement.

b.

7Shared Past Experience Context: A and B met the principal of a certain
school a long time ago. It's been many years and they haven't kept
in touch with him. A recently learned that he is still the principal. B
doesn't know this and asks about the school, Who's the principal now?
(RMM,LT-Mus-10/26/2021 & 12/14/2021)

In conclusion, P1 and P2 are the only NTMs used by Mvskoke speakers today
that receive Discourse Related interpretations. P5 is not able to refer to a past time
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in discourse that is relevant for identifying the referent of the NP. P1 and P2 were
shown to give rise to three discourse related interpretations: shared past experience,
invisibility, and discourse anaphoric or previous mention readings.

5.3.2 Change of State Interpretations
All three Mvskoke NTMs are able to receive Change of State interpretations.
Recall from section 5.2.1 that, in my classication, Change of State interpretations
included both a change of state meaning indicating the nominal property has ceased
to hold, as well as a decessive meaning indicating the entity has ceased to exist.
In addition to their Discourse Related meanings, P1 and P2 can be interpreted as
indicating a change of state. Judgments regarding this interpretation are much easier
to obtain for P2 than for P1. My discussion, therefore, focuses on P2, and I provide
some discussion on why the change of state meaning is harder to obtain for nominal
P1. P1 and P2 are unable to receive a decessive interpretation, but P5 can have both
change of state and decessive meanings. In what follows, I rst discuss the Change
of State meanings of P1 and P2 and then turn to P5.

5.3.2.1 Change of State Interpretations of P1 and P2
P2 Change of State

In certain contexts (to be claried in the next chapter), P2

can be interpreted as indicating that the nominal property ceased to hold of the
individual. This is illustrated in example (32). In this example, the verb makes it
clear that the individual is no longer a preacher; he has stepped down from the role.
(32)

Mv erkenvkv mvyvnkē4 ahvtvpkēpvtēs.
ma iìkináka ma=ankí: a:-hatapk-î:p-ati:-s

p2

dem preacher dem=

loc-step.down.sg-ip.pfv-p5-ind

`That former preacher stepped/has stepped down.'
Speaker Comment: mvyvnkē means he used to be a preacher.

226

(PF-Mus-07/06/2021)
Just as discussed above for Paraguayan Guaraní (in section 5.2.1), the change of
state meaning can indicate that the nominal predication has ceased to hold or, for
relational nouns, that the possessive relation has ceased to hold.5 In many cases with
a change of state P2, implicit contextual restriction of the noun makes a relational
interpretation available creating ambiguity in the interpretation of the nominal P2.
In (33) for example, the NP vlēkcv `doctor' is implicitly restricted to `the doctor
of our town'. Because of this, nominal P2 can be interpeted as indicating that the
possessive relation between the doctor and the town has ceased, or as indicating that
the nominal property `doctor' has ceased.
4 In

nearly all of my examples from Mvskoke speaker PF, the nominal P1 or P2 is axed to a
demonstrative pronoun mv instead of directly on the noun. This construction, which appears to be
unique to this speaker, seems to reect the status of NTMs as clitics. There is a parallel with the
Mvskoke clitic -u `too'. This clitic ax to overt personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns,
but not to nouns. In order to use -u with a noun, the noun must be followed by a demonstrative
pronoun to host the clitic. (Thanks to Jack Martin for bringing this to my attention.)
(i)

a.

b.

c.

Vneu
ani=w

me=too
`me, too'
*kafeu
ká:=w

coee=too
Intended: coee, too
kafe mvu
ká: ma=w

coee dem=too
`coee, too'

(Jack Martin, pers. comm.)

This speaker seems to be using the same strategy for NTMs, and, although he allows P1, P2, and
P5 to ax to nouns, he prefers to use the demonstrative pronoun construction.
5 Interestingly

the same is true for English former. See Partee & Borschev (2003) for discussion
of how these two meanings might arise.
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(33)

Ohrolopē hvnkēvnkē, vnhessē

vlēkcv vnkē

hēcan

ohìolopí: hânki:-ankí:, an-híssi

alí:kca =ankí:

hi:c-â:n

year

one-p2

1sg.dat-friend

doctor =p2

vcakkayimvts.

Cvfeknicēmvts.

acakk-â:y-ey-mát-s

cakn-êyc-imát-s

see.ipfv-comp.ds

comm-go.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind be.well-caus.pfv-p3-ind

`One year ago, when my friend was seeing the (past) doctor, I went with her.
He healed her.'
a. #Current Doctor Scenario: Imagine your town has always had one doctor.
The current doctor has been there for 10 years. Your friend was very
sick a year ago, but you went with her to the doctor and he cured her.
You are telling this to a friend from your town.
Speaker Comment: This would be specifying it's the past doctor, not
the present doctor, the previous doctor (who transferred maybe).
b.

X Transferred Doctor Scenario: Imagine your town has always had one
doctor, until he transferred to another hospital a few months ago. A year
ago before he left you went with your friend to see him and he cured your
friend. You are telling this to a friend from your town.

c.

X Retired Doctor Scenario: Imagine your town has always had one doctor, until he retired 5 years ago. Your friend, who was very sick a year
ago, went to see him anyway and he cured her. You went with her. You
are telling this to a friend from your town.
(RMM-Mus-9/21/2020)

Ambiguity of P2

The Change of State interpretations of P2 are demonstrably

distinct from its Discourse Related interpretations. In the example below, the context
explicitly denies any shared past experience of the referent of the NP. In this context,
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a shared past experience reading of P2 would be infelicitous. However, a change of
state reading of P2 is perfectly acceptable.6
(34)

P2 Change of State Context: The position of district court judge is always
held by someone until he steps down and another judge takes his place. You
know both the current and the previous judges quite well, but I don't know
anything about them and haven't met them. You and I go to see the current
judge about a language project of ours. We have to wait to see him, which
is something the previous judge never did. While we are waiting to see him
you want to tell me this.
a.

Mehakt

owēyan,

(i)m-íha:k-ít

o:w-iy-â:n

wait.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1pl.ag-comp.ds
pumvlvkekot

os.

pom-alak-íko-:-t

ô:-s

1pl.dat-arrive.sg-neg-dur-ss be.pfv-ind

`We are waiting and he has not come.'
b.

Fvccēcv vnkē

tat

mehakēsekot

faccí:ca

=ankí: =ta:t (i)m-iha:k-í:-siko-:-t

judge

=

p2

=foc 3.dat-wait.ipfv-1pl.ag-neg-dur-ss

owvnks.
ô:w-ánk-s
be.pfv-p2-ind
`We never waited for the previous judge.'
6I

(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)

do not have empirical evidence that the speaker's acquaintance with the individual in question
is necessary to license a Change of State interpretation of P1 or P2. It is possible that a P2 Change
of State interpretation may be available even if the speaker only knows the judge by reputation.
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Additionally, a change of state interpretation of P2 would be infelicitous in SPE
contexts which make it clear that the nominal property (and any implicit relation)
still holds of the individual. These examples motivate viewing P2 as being ambiguous
between Change of State and Discourse Related meanings. An alternative hypothesis
would be that P2's meaning is vague. A P2 sentence would then have a single set
of truth conditions that are weak enough to include both meanings. If this were so,
then we would not expect P2 to be felicitous in both contexts that make the SPE
meaning false and in contexts that make the Change of State meaning false.

P1 Change of State

P1, when it receives a change of state meaning, indicates that

the change of state took place within the P1-interval (i.e. last night at the earliest).
In (35), the scenario establishes that the addressee knows of the deacon and the plans
to ordain him, but there is no recent shared past experience of the deacon. In this
scenario, the speaker accepted the constructed sentence with nominal P1.
(35)

P1 Change of State Context : Last night, a deacon was given the authority
to preach as a pastor. This morning he taught the church for the rst time
as pastor. I knew they were giving this deacon (that we both know) the
authority to be a preacher, but I was not at church or at the ordination.
Later that day I ask you, Who preached this morning?
Hvthvyvtke -isē,

(isē)

cuko-vfastv

(=eysí:) iìkináka

hathayátki =eysí: coko-afá:sta
morning

=p1

erkenvkv

p1)

house-caretaker (=

hahoyan

erkenahkes.

há:<ho:>y-â:n

iìkiná<h>k-is

preacher

make.ipfv<pass>-comp.ds preach<pfv.p1>-ind
`This morning the former deacon who was made a preacher, preached.'
(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)
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The Change of State meaning of P1 is much harder to elicit than that of P2. All
the speakers I consulted with prefer an SPE reading for P1. Additionally contexts
where speakers feel condent that P1 has a change of state meaning are quite hard
to identify and replicate. There are several reasons that this is dicult to test.
The change of state reading of P1 and P2 is only acceptable on nouns denoting temporary properties (such as professions or roles) or on temporary relations in
possessive DPs (e.g. alienable possession). Additionally, for a subset of Mvskoke
speakers, change of state readings are also limited to nouns denoting humans and
temporary human relations. For example, speakers vary in whether they accept P1
or P2 on possessed inanimate nouns with the intended reading that the possession
has ceased. (A shared past experience reading is acceptable, however.)
(36)

Prompt: Can cenhonnv isē and cenhonnv vnkē be used to refer to dresses like
the one's described in (36-a) and (36-b)?
cenhonnv

isē/vnkē

cin-hónna

=eysí:/=ankí:

2.dat-dress =p1/=p2

Intended: your former dress/ your dress that we saw
a.

Shared Past Experience : one of my dresses that you and I saw a little
while ago/ yesterday

b.

Change of State : a dress that I used to own
Speaker Comment: Yes, both.
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(RMM-Mus-8/12/2021)

(37)

Prompt: How would you talk about a shirt that used to be yours? (For
example, perhaps you gave it away.)
a.

Mv yokkofketv cvnaket

{owemvc

/

ma yokkofkitá ca-nâ:ki-t

{ô:w-imát-s

/

dem shirt

1sg.pat-thing-nom {be.pfv-p3-ind /

owvtēs}.
ô:w-ati:-s}
be.pfv-p5-ind}
`That shirt used to be mine.'
Could you say (37-b)?
b.

#vnyokkofketv mvyvnkē
an-yokkofkitá ma=ankí:
1sg.dat-shirt dem=p2

Intended: my former shirt

(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)

For the speakers who accept P1 with a change of state meaning on a possessed inanimate noun, eliciting the P1 tensed nominal in a sentence and context supporting a
change of state meaning was unsuccessful.
Additionally, all the speakers I have consulted reject Past 2 on non-human nouns
with an intended change of state meaning.
(38)

Esletketv (#mvyvnkē) hopvnkēs.
islitkitá

(#ma=ankí:) hopánk-i:-s

bicycle

(dem=

p2)

break-dur-ind

`The bicycle is broken.'

(PF-Mus-08/31/2021)

232

(39)

Ohliketv (#vnkē)

hiyomat

hopvnkēt

ohleykitá =(#ankí:) heyyô:ma:t hopánk-i:-t
chair

=(#

p2)

now

os.
ô:-s

broken-dur-ss be.ipfv-ind

`The chair is now broken.'

(RMM-Mus-6/25/2019)

It is therefore extremely unlikely that speakers will accept P1 on non-human denoting
nouns with a change of state meaning.
For this reason the nouns for which a change of state readings for Past 1 can be
tested are largely limited to nouns denoting professions or societal roles. The temporal
interval associated with Past 1 additionally complicates the situation with this type
of noun. A change of state reading with P1 requires that the property have ceased to
hold of the individual sometime between last night and the moments preceding the
utterance. With professions and societal roles, it is dicult to create a pragmatically
natural situation in which one would want to refer to someone as a recently former
N. One speaker commented that it is hard to say whether someone who just retired
or changed roles would still be refered to with the noun describing their profession or
role. [P1] would be like [saying]: Seconds ago he was a deacon. Is he still a deacon?
(RMM-Mus-8/5/2021).
To summarize, I have demonstrated that both P1 and P2 allow change of state
readings, but that those of P1 are quite dicult to elicit.

Decessive Interpretations and Existence Properties

The change of state read-

ings of these NTMs are also limited to temporary properties and temporary human
relations. The reason for these restrictions is most likely that P1 and P2 encode an
Existence Property (Tonhauser 2007). As mentioned in previous sections, discussing
and anlyzing the Existence Property of Mvskoke NTMs is outside the scope of this
dissertation. However this property is encoded or derived, the Existence Property
of P1 and P2 essentially requires the entity to exist at the time of the state change.
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This is impossible for permanent properties such as chair and young man.7 For these
properties to cease to hold of the entity, the entity must cease to exist.8
The Existence Property is also likely the reason why P1 and P2 do not in general allow decessive interpretations. In a limited number of environments, Mvskoke
speakers do recognize a euphemistic use of P2 as a decessive. With proper names, P2
can be used to politely indicate the person is deceased.
(40)

Kizzie Bender vnkē
Kizzie Bender =ankí:
Kizzie Bender =p2
`the late Kizzie Bender'

(Nero Interview, 0:02:50-0:02:54)

`that Kizzie Bender (do you remember her?)'
7 This

is a source of variation between Paraguayan Guaraní -kue and Mvskoke P1 and P2. Tonhauser (2007) demonstrates that -kue, although it has the Existence Property, can co-occur with
permanent properties such as non-food artifacts like chair, wall, and house to indicate that these
artifacts have lost their functionality (i.e. they are broken). This is not something that P1 or P2
can be used to indicate; and it is questionable whether P5 can. Although some speakers accept
P5 on a noun like chair to indicate that it is broken (e.g. RMM-Mus-06/25/2019), others nd P5
anomalous on any noun that does not denote a human or animate. This dierence suggests that the
formulation of the Existence Property for Mvskoke NTMs may be slightly dierent from Tonhauser's
formulation. This is a topic for future research to ellucidate.
8 The

NP young man can technically cease to hold of an individual without the individual ceasing
to exist. An old man, for example, used to be a young man. The NP young man behaves linguistically
like a natural kind and not like a temporary property. It is infelicitous (or at least odd) to say in
English My father is a former young man. Likewise, Mvskoke speakers reject NTMs on young man
in similar sentences.
(i)

Context: Imagine you are making a joke about your husband not being a young man anymore.
Could you say this?
#Vmpvlse
honvnwv mvnette
am-pálsi
honánwa manítti
1sg.dat-spouse man
young

vnkēt

=ankí:-t
=p2-ss

os.
ô:-s
be.pfv-ind

Intended: My husband is a former young man.

(RMM-Mus-5/7/2021)

Natural kinds like child are similarly infelicitous with Paraguayan Guaraní -kue (Tonhauser 2006:
192-193). Tonhauser proposes that lexical blocking (of child by adult ) is responsible for the infelicity
of -kue and former with this type of natural kind.
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Speaker Comment: that could be saying she's passed on or it could saying,
`do you remember her?'
(41)

(PF-Mus-3/22/2021)

honvnwv mvnette vnkē
honánwa manítti =ankí:
man

young

=p2

`the young man (that we know from some past time)'
Speaker Comment: This can also be a delicate way of talking about a deceased young man. I would use it to be respectful of others' emotions. It's
understood, unspoken that he has passed away.

(RMM-Mus-5/7/2021)

Speakers comment that the use of P2 in examples like (41) are much more delicate
than using P5/tatē. Using P2 is more sensitive, speakers say, especially when the
death is unexpected or happened recently. I suggest that the reason P2 receives a
euphemistic decessive use is precisely because it has an existence property. I propose
that these euphemistic decessive uses are, in fact, SPE uses with invisibility inferences.
The speaker is indicating that the young man is known to the interlocutors from a
past time and is implicating that he is not in the current utterance context. The
existence property gives P2 the eect of implying the individual is still alive. As
such, I assume that P2 does not have a real decessive meaning. I do not at present
have parallel data for P1, but I predict that the restriction to the P1 interval would
make it unlikely that P1 has a euphemistic decessive use.

5.3.2.2 Change of State Interpretations of P5
The nal nominal tense I discuss in this chapter is P5/tatē. P5 has two interpretations - decessive and change of state. The Change of State meaning is only available
with nouns denoting temporary properties or temporary human relations (e.g. my
spouse vs. my father). The Decessive meaning, however, is available with nouns

235

denotating both temporary and permanent properties and with nouns denoting both
temporary and permanent human relations.
(42)

Temporary Property
Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

tatē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:ca

=tá:ti:

p5

school-house loc-see.nmlz =

Decessive: `the late school principal'
Change of State: `the former school principal'
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)
(43)

Permanent Property
honvnwv mvnette

tatē

honánwa manítti =tá:ti:
man

young

p5

=

Decessive: `the deceased young man'

7Change of State
Speaker Comment: This can only mean he's passed away.
(RMM-Mus-5/7/2021)
(44)

Temporary Human Relation
ehiwv

tatē

ihéywa

=tá:ti:

p5

3.poss.wife =

Decessive: `his late wife'
Change of State: `his ex-wife'

(RMM-Mus-6/25/2019)
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(45)

Permanent Human Relation
cvrke

tatē

cá-ìki

=tá:ti:

p5

1sg.pat-father =

Decessive: `my late father'

(RMM-Mus-6/25/2019, a.o.)

7Change of State
Speaker Comment: This cannot be someone who stopped being my father,
like a step-father that moved on.

(RMM-Mus-6/25/2019)

The decessive meaning is generally restricted to animates, and for some speakers,
to humans. However, every speaker of Mvskoke recognizes the decessive meaning
of P5. Not every speaker allows for the change of state meaning of P5. For a few
speakers who do allow P5 to have a change of state meaning, that meaning is available
so long as the context makes it clear the individual is alive, as in (46) and (47).
(46)

Change of State Context: Imagine that you want to point out to someone
the man who was the chief of your tribe at one time, but has stepped down
from the position.
Vsi

este

arat,

vnmēkko

tatē

asêy

ísti

a:ì-â:t

an-mí:kko

=tá:ti: á:ì-t

p5

yonder person go.sg.ipfv-comp.ss, 1sg.dat-chief =

art

go.sg.ipfv-ss

os.
ó:-s
be.ipfv-ind
`That person going about over there, that's my former chief going about.'
(RH-Sem-6/24/2019)
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(47)

Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

tatē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:ca

=tá:ti: ísti

p5

school-house loc-see.nmlz =

este

hērēt

os.

hn ìi:-t

ô:-s

person good.int-ss be.pfv-ind

`The former school principal is a good man.'

(RMM-Mus-10/26/2021)

Martin (2011) notes that the change of state use of P5 is attested in older written
works, such as a 1887 letter written by Mvskoke speaker J.R. Postoak, addressing his
former teacher.
(48)

tate

Vm

vnokeckv vm

vhayv

am-

anokícka am-

ahá:ya =tá:ti: tô:y-íck-a:t

1sg.dat- love

p5

1sg.dat- teacher =

toyetskat,

be.pfv-2.sg.ag-comp
(Postoak, 1887, glossing added )

`My beloved former teacher,'

To summarize, nominal P5 can have both a change of state and a decessive interpretation. The change of state is the more restricted meaning as it is only available for
temporary properties and relations. The availabiity of the decessive meaning demonstrates that P5 lacks an Existence Property like the one encoded by Guaraní -kue. As
was demonstrated in the previous section, P5 is not able to receive discourse related
meanings.

5.3.3 Predictions and Distribution of Readings
The data in this section has shown that each NTM has a slightly dierent range
of interpretations that speakers allow. While P1 and P2 have Discourse Related and
Change of State meanings, the change of state meaning of P1 is much more ellusive
than that of P2. Additionally, P1 and P2 do not allow decessive interpretations,
though P2 is often used as a delicate way of indicating the person is deceased. P5,
on the other hand, is most widely used as a decessive NTM and its change of state
meanings are not recognized by every speaker. P5 cannot receive discourse related in-
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terpretations. Table 5.2 illustrates the distribution of readings for each of the Mvskoke
NTMs.

Table 5.2.
P1
P2
P5 (tatē)

Interpretations of each NTM

Discourse Related
3
3
7

Change of State
3
3
3

Decessive
7
7
3

An alternate generalization that emerges from this data is a inverse correlation
between the remoteness of an NTM and the availability of discourse related readings.
P1, the NTM covering the most recent temporal interval, is almost exclusively used
by speakers for discourse related meanings. The change of state reading is more
dicult to obtain, and the decessive interpretation is impossible. P2, the NTM
covering roughly the middle past, is the most versatile in that it has both readily
available discourse related and change of state interpretations. It additionally allows
euphemistic decessive readings. P5, the most remote of the NTMs, disallows discourse
related meanings and has limited change of state meanings. It is used most often as
a decessive. The descriptive generalization is that the more remote an NTM, the less
likely it is to allow discourse related interpertations. One reason to think that this
generalization is not capturing a meaningful correlation comes from textual data on
the now defunct P4. Remoteness alone cannot be the reason for the infelicity of P5
with discourse related meanings (as seen in (31-b)). This is because a nominal use
of P4 is able to indicate a very remote shared past experience of the NP's referent.
This was seen in the textual example of a nominal P4 in (19), repeated below.
(49)

Context: Rabbit (or Pasokolaya) went to another town for a long time, and
the people from his original town thought he was dead. After a long time,
when they were sitting in a meeting, Rabbit came up in plain sight and they
all saw him.
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Mont okakat,

 Pasokolvyv

vnna

mónt ok-a:k-â:t

pa:soko:layá =anná:

and

Pasokolaya =

say-pl.ipfv-comp.ss

p4

arēt

omēta:tit

ervlaket

a:ì-í:-t

o:m-í:-t-a:ti-t

iì-alâ:k-it

go.about.sg-ipfv-dur-ss be.ipfv-dur-ss-comp-ss dir-arrive.pfv-ss
os.
ó:-s
be.ipfv-ind
`And they said, Pasokolaya from long ago has returned. '
(Gouge 2004: 75, glosses adapted )
Speakers who recognize the vnna ending comment that it seems to place the referent
of the NP in another time. One of my consultants constructed the following example
of how she had heard the P4 ending used by her elders.
(50)

Coleman Bird

vnna

ohliketv-ohlikv

omemvts.

Coleman Bird =anná: ohleykita-ohléyka ô:m-imát-s

p4

Coleman Bird =

`Coleman Bird (from

pastor

be.pfv-p3-ind

former times) was our pastor.'

Speaker Comment: That's like saying, back when Coleman Bird was our
pastor.

(RMM-Mus-12/14/2021)

These examples demonstrate that remoteness of an interval cannot predict the absence
of an SPE meaning. While this casts doubt on the viability of this as a synchronic
explanation of the distribution of NTM meanings, it might provide a diachronic explanation for the pattern observed in Table 5.2.
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This descriptive characterization of the Mvskoke NTMs P1, P2 and P5 makes
a prediction about when an NTM should be possible and which interpretation it
receives. When nominal P1 and P2 are present, if the context makes it clear that the
nominal property still holds of the individual, I predict that only discourse related
interpretations of P1 and P2 should be possible. If, on the other hand, the context
makes it clear that there is no previous experience of the individual or previous
mention, then I predict that only a change of state reading should be possible.
Consequently, an P1 or P2 NTM should be impossible in contexts where i) the
entity never ceased to bear the nominal property and ii) there is no previous experience
or mention of the entity. This prediction is borne out. Consider the context in
(51). This context makes it clear that there is no shared past experience of the
policeman. There is also no previous mention of a policeman. Finally, it is clear that
the individual is a current policeman and not retired. In this context, using P1 on
the noun policeman is unacceptable. As the speaker comment makes clear, a change
of state reading does emerge in this general kind of context.
(51)

P1: no Shared Past Experience, no Change of State : Imagine that this morning you attended a ceremony in which the Governor of Oklahoma honored
Mary, a retired doctor, and a current policeman for their work. I was not at
the ceremony, but I heard that the Governor honored Mary. I don't know
the policeman. I ask you, Who else did the Governor honor?
Este-wvnayv (#isē)

mo

isti-waná:ya (#=eysí:) ma-w

policeman

p1)

(#=

vrakkueckv
aìakkóycka

dem-too appreciation

enhahyes.
in-há<h>y-is
3.dat-make<pfv.p1>-ind
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`He also honored a policeman.'
Speaker Comment: No, [with P1] that would mean he was no longer a policeman at the ceremony.

(RMM-Mus-9/3/2020)

The same is true for nominal P2. Consider the doctor example from (33). In the
context, there is no previous mention of the doctor to the addressee and no shared past
experience of the doctor, even though it is understood that the addressee knows (of)
the doctor. In this context, nominal P2 is infelicitous. The speaker comments that
a change of state reading for P2 would make the sentence acceptable in a minimally
dierent context.
(52)

P2: no Shared Past Experience, no Change of State : Imagine your town has
always had one doctor. The current doctor has been there for 10 years. Your
friend was very sick a year ago, but you went with her to the doctor and he
cured her. You are telling this to a friend from your town.
Ohrolopē hvnkēvnkē, vnhessē

vlēkcv (#vnkē)

ohìolopí: hânki:-ankí:, an-híssi

alí:kca (#=ankí:)

year

one-p2

p2)

1sg.dat-friend doctor (#=

hēcan

vcakkayimvts.

hi:c-â:n

acakk-â:y-ey-mát-s

see.ipfv-comp.ds comm-go.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind
Cvfeknicēmvts.
cakn-êyc-imát-s
be.well-caus.pfv-p3-ind
`One year ago, when my friend was seeing the (past) doctor, I went with her.
He healed her.'
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Speaker Comment: This would be specifying it's the past doctor, not the
present doctor.

(RMM-Mus-9/21/2020)

The above contexts are ones in which a P1 or P2 NTM is impossible, precisely because
the context does not support either of the interpretations that P1/P2 can have. I similarly predict that if the context makes it clear that the nominal property never ceased
to hold of the entity in question, P5 should be impossible. This was demonstrated to
be true in (31-b).
In Mvskoke NTMs are entirely optional. Although a P2 NTM is strongly preferred
in contexts that support a change of state interpretation, it is not necessary.
(53)

P2 Change of State Context: Last year you went to visit your elementary
school teacher. She wasn't your teacher when you visited her and she isn't
your teacher now.
Ohrolope hvnkēvnkē,

vmvhayv

(vnkē)

ohìolopí: hânki:-ankí:

am-ahá:ya

(=ankí:)

year

one-p2

1sg.dat-teacher (=p2)

encukopericvyvnks.
in-cokopiìêyc-ey-ánk-s
3.dat-visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Last year I visited my (former) teacher.'
Speaker Comment: I would say vmvhayv vnkē, but it's also true without vnkē.
(RMM-Mus-11/19/2020)
Furthermore, while it is culturally expected that a speaker will use P5/tatē or P2
when talking about a deceased person, this is not always the case. In James Hill's
autobiography (written around 1940) talks about his deceased father without using
either NTM.
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(54)

Monkv

cvrke

kerrvko

monkēn

môNka

cá-ìki

kíìì-ako-:

mônki:-n

therefore 1sg.pat-father know-1sg.ag.neg-dur be.still-ds
elēpvtēt

omēs.

il-i:p-atí:-t

ô:m-i:-s

die.sg-ip.ipfv-p5-ss be.pfv-dur-ind
`So my father died before I knew him.' (lit. So while I still did not know my
father, he died.)
(Haas & Hill 2015: J. Hill Autobiography, 5, glossing added )
In summary, I have demonstrated with novel data from eldwork and textual data
the various interpretations that are available to Mvskoke NTMs P1, P2, and P5. This
description also made predictions about when the dierent interpretations should be
possible as well as situations where NTMs should be impossible. Finally, we saw that
Mvskoke NTMs are completely optional, a fact that in part explains their rarity in
documentation materials. There are 13 instances of NTMs in approx. 990 minutes
of interviews resulting from the Muskogee (Seminole/Creek) Documentation Project
(Vpoket 'punahoyvkēts!, 2015-2018). There is 1 instance of an NTM across two text
collections (Gouge 2004; Haas & Hill 2015). I suggest that the Discourse Related
meanings of P1 and P2 are also responsible for their being largely restricted to casual
conversation. These discoure related meanings function to help an addressee identify
the referent of an NP from the interlocutors' shared past (experience or discourse).
In the next section I provide an detailed analysis of the Change of State interpretations, focusing on P2 and P5. I compare these NTMs to other NTMs that give
rise to change of state meanings: -kue in Paraguayan and Mbyá Guaraní (Tonhauser
2007; Thomas 2014) and -kii in Somali (Lecarme 1999; Ivan & Özyldz 2016).
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5.4 Investigating the Change of State Meaning
Much of the literature on NTMs has focused on the Change of State interpretation. The central question here is whether the change of state meaning component
is semantic or pragmatic. As a result, there is a great deal of focus on whether the
change of state meaning is a semantic entailment or a pragmatic implicature. This
is a delicate issue as (non)cancellability is only a partial clue as to the nature of the
inference. Tonhauser (2007) nds that the change of state meaning of Paraguayan
Guaraní -kue cannot be cancelled; this and other factors lead her to propose that

-kue semantically encodes change of state. However, Thomas (2014) and Ivan &
Özyldz (2016) have proposed that the change of state meaning of NTMs can be
derived pragmatically in much the same way that cessation implicatures are derived
for verbal past tenses (Musan 1997; Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013). Whereas Ivan
& Özyldz' account derives the inference in Somali as a cancellable pragmatic implicature, Thomas (2014) proposes that it is an obligatory grammatical implicature in
Myá Guaraní. In light of these pragmatic accounts, this section investigates whether
the change of state inferences of Mvskoke NTMs can be cancelled.
Determining whether the change of state inference of P2 is cancellable requires
distinguishing between two questions. The rst question is whether a Mvskoke speaker
use P2 in a context that makes the change of state reading false. The answer to this,
as we have seen, is yes. But this does not necessarily mean that the change of state
meaning is pragmatic. As I demonstrated in previous sections, P2 is ambiguous
between a change of state and discourse related meaning. It is thus possible for P2 to
have discourse related meanings in contexts that make the change of state meaning
false. Since P2 is ambiguous, this does not tell us anything about the change of state
inference when it does arise. The second question - and the more informative one - is
whether P2 entails change of state when the change of state reading is accessed. In
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the Mvskoke examples below, the context are crafted so that only the change of state
reading of P2 is possible.

5.4.1 Cancellation of Change of State
In this section, I compare the behavior of various NTMs' change of state inferences
with verbal cessation implicatures. Cessation implicatures are cancellable inferences
associated with the use of past tense in certain sentences and contexts. For instance,
English stative past tense sentences in present tensed contexts lead to the inference
that the state has ceased to hold by the UT. Consider the following example from
Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013).
(55)

Context: A little boy named Scotty has just been brought into the hospital.
Dr. Spock is talking to him, when the head nurse walks.
a.

Nurse: How is our patient doing?

b.

Dr. Spock: He

was anxious.

The doctor's response in (55-b) is past tensed and the nurse infers from it that Scotty
is no longer anxious - a cessation inference. According to seminal work by Musan
(1997), the use of past tense in this context gives rise to a cessation implicature
because the past tense sentence is less informative than the present tense sentence.
In (55), the nurse's question is in the present tense and the doctor can reasonably
be assumed to understand that she wants information on the boy's current state. By
telling the nurse about the boy's past state, the doctor is giving her a less informative
response than if he told her about the boy's current state. The nurse can infer that
he intends to communicate that the present tense alternative could not be uttered
because it is false.
A central dierence between semantic entailments and pragmatic implicatures is
that the latter can be cancelled but the former cannot. In the literature on verbal
cessation inferences, there are three means by which a cessation or change of state
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inference could be cancelled (Klein 1994; Musan 1997; Altshuler & Schwarzschild
2013; Cable 2017). 1) The inference can be explicitly denied following the original
utterance. 2) The inference can be defeated by placing the utterance in a context
with a salient past topic time. And 3) the inference can be cancelled with an explicit
statement of ignorance.
Consider the cessation implicature arising from the utterance of the English example (55-b). This inference can be cancelled with a statement denying the cessation.
(56)

Scotty was anxious.

And he still is.

In Somali the change of state inference associated with the past NTM -kii can be
cancelled with an outright denial. Consider the sentence in (57), where -kii leads to
an inference that Maxamed is no longer a student.
(57)

Context: We are talking about several students. Maxamed is the one who
dropped out of college/ graduated.
Maxamed waa

arday-dii

hore.

det.f.pst.pl before

Maxamed decl students-

`Maxamed is one of the former students.'

(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 632)

This inference can be cancelled by stating that Maxamed is still a student.
(58)

Maxamed waa

arday-dii

hore

ee

wali

pst.pl before which still

Maxamed decl students-det.m.
ardayga
student-det.m.

ah.

pres is

`Maxamed is one of the previous students who is still a student.'
(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 632)
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However, neither the change of state inferences of Guaraní -kue nor of Mvskoke P2
or P5 can be cancelled in this way. Thomas (2014) demonstrates with the following
example that a statement with -kue cannot be followed up with a phrase to the eect
that the nominal property still holds.
(59)

Juan mburuvicha-kue haēag
y mburuvicha #teri.
Juan leader-

pst

coord now

leader again/ #still

`Juan is an ex-leader and now he is a leader again/ #now he is still a leader.'
(Thomas 2014: 18)
Tonhauser (2007) showed exactly these judgments hold for Paraguayan Guaraní -kue.
Her example is below (repeated from (13)).
(60)

Juan pete mbo'e-ha-ra-kue...

kue

Juan one teach-nom-ag`Juan is a
a.

former teacher...'

# ha mbo'e-ha-ra

gueteri.

and teach-nom-ag still
`and he's still a teacher.'
b.

ha ko'agã mbo'e-ha-ra
and now

jey.

teach-nom-ag again

`and now he's a teacher again.'

(Tonhauser 2007: 838)

The change of state inferences of Mvskoke P2 and P5 are similarly incompatible with
continuations denying the change of state. Consider the examples in (61) and (62).
For each example, the speaker is pointing out an individual to the addressee. There
is no previous mention or shared past experience of the individual, thus a discourse
related meaning is not available. Each example begins with an initial sentence with
an argument DP bearing the NTM. For P2 and P5, Mvskoke speakers can follow up
with the (a) sentences which state that a similar state holds again at the UT. But
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Mvskoke speakers reject the (b) sentences as follow-ups; the (b) sentences assert that
the state is still ongoing at the UT.
(61)

Sam em

pvlse

mvyvnkē ares.

Sam im-

pálsi

ma=ankí: a:ì-ís

p2

Sam 3.dat- spouse dem=

go.about.sg.ipfv-ind

`Sam's ex-wife is here.'
a.

Hiyowat

hvtvm em

pvlse

mvt

os.

heyyô:wa:t hatâm im-

pálsi

má-t

ô:-s

now

again 1.dat- spouse dem-nom be.pfv-ind

`Now she is his wife again.'
b.

# Em

pvlse

emonkes.

im-

pálsi

imônk-is

3.dat- spouse be.still.pfv-ind

# `She is still his wife.'
(62)

(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)

Vsi

este

arat,

vnmēkko

tatē

asêy

ísti

a:ì-â:t

an-mí:kko

=tá:ti: á:ì-t

p5

yonder person go.sg.ipfv-comp.ss, 1sg.dat-chief =

art

go.sg.ipfv-ss

os.
ó:-s
be.ipfv-ind
`That person going about over there, that's my former chief going about.'
a.

Hvtvm vnmēkkot

os.

hatâm an-mí:kko-t

ô:-s

again

1sg.dat-chief-nom be.pfv-ind

`He's my chief again.'
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b.

# Vnmēkko
an-mí:kko

monkēt

os.

mônk-i:-t

ô:-s

1sg.dat-chief be.still-dur-ss be.pfv-ind

# `He's still my chief.'

(RH-Sem-06/24/2019)

These examples show that the change of state inference cannot be defeated by an
overt denial of the change of state. One explanation for this judgment might be
that cancelling an implicature with an overt denial is an odd thing to do in natural
speech. It is more likely that a non-linguistically trained consultant will judge such a
continuation to be unacceptable because of this. This is especially so if we consider
an English verbal parallel to (61).
(63)

That lady was my wife. ??And she's still my wife.

Although English verbal cessation inferences are quite easily cancelled, doing so explicitly after uttering a sentence that most naturally leads to a cessation inference is
not acceptable in this type of context.
In the literature on verbal cessation inferences, a contextually salient past topic
time is a more natural way to block the pragmatic reasoning leading to a cessation
inference (Klein 1994; Musan 1997; Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013). This is because a
salient past topic time has the eect of making a present tensed alternative irrelevant.
Consider this famous example from Klein (1994).
(64)

a.

A: What did you see when you looked in the room?

b.

B: There was a book on the table. It was in Russian.

(Klein 1994: 4)

In (64), A's question establishes a past topic time: when B looked into the room. This
salient past topic time restricts the time that B's answers are relevant to. Because of
this, it is irrelevant whether the book is still in Russian (as it most likely is). Because
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the present tense alternative is irrelevant, the past tense in B's response does not lead
to a cessation inference (i.e. that the book is no longer in Russian).
In her investigation of Paraguayan Guaraní -kue, Tonhauser (2007) demonstrated
that the change of state inference of -kue cannot be cancelled by providing a salient
past time for the nominal. In the following context, Tonhauser attempts to establish
a past time in the discourse from which the bike was salient. In (65), -kue is still
accompanied by a change of state inference, here indicating that the bike is broken.
(65)

Context: I want to buy my sister a bike.
a.

Kuehe

a-ha

bisikleta-ñe-vende-há-pe ha enterove bisikleta

yesterday a1sg-go bike-je-sell-nom-pe
o--va-gui

ai-poravo

and all

bike

pete che-hermana-pe-guã-rã.

a3-exist-rc-abl a1sg-choose one

b1sg-sister-pe-for-ra

`Yesterday I went to a bike shop and of all the bikes they had there I
chose one for my sister.'
b.

#Ko'e-ramo a-ha-jevy-ta

o-jogua-ha-guã

pe

dawn-cond a1sg-go-return-fut a1sg-buy-nom-purp that
bisikleta-kue.
bike-kue
Intended: `Tomorrow I'll go back to buy that bike.'
Consultants' comments: `Sounds like you're going to buy a bike that
doesn't work anymore, a broken bike.'

(Tonhauser 2007: 855)

In Somali the situation is dierent. The change of state inference of -kii can be
cancelled by introducing a salient past topic time for the nominal property. In the
following example (modeled after Tonhauser's example above), -kii 's change of state
inference is easily defeated. Thus baskiil-kii `bike-kii' does not mean the bike is
broken.
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(66)

Context: Yesterday I went to a bike shop and out of all of the bikes they had
I chose one for my sister. I didn't have enough money yesterday. Tomorrow
I'll go back to the shop and buy the bike I chose.
Baskiil-ka

/ Baskiil-kii

bari

baan

gadanaya.

det.m.pres / bike-det.m.pst tomorrow foc.1s buy.fut

bike-

`I will buy the bike tomorrow.'

(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 631)

In the next set of examples I test whether the change of state inference for Mvskoke
NTMs can be cancelled with a salient past topic time. In the examples, I establish
a salient past topic time during which the state held and which is relevant for the
speaker's answer to the question introduced in the context. The reasoning is that if
NP evaluation time can be resolved to a contextually salient past time, this might
defeat the change of state inference. To test whether the change of state inference
was defeated, I asked speakers about a continuation that makes it clear that the state
has not ended. Crucially, this salient past time is not a time when the interlocutors
had a shared past experience of the NP's referent or had mentioned the referent in
conversation.
Consider rst the example in (67). The context in (67) introduces a past time in
the (nominal) P2-interval9 during which the individual in question was the school's
principal - the time up until May of the previous school year when he announced his
possible retirement. Although the speaker knows he did not retire, her interlocutor
is unaware of the fact and believes he is no longer the principal. The interlocutor's
question asks about this salient past time for which both interlocutors know that he
was the principal. Without a salient previous mention or shared past experience, the
NTM cannot have a discourse related interpretation. Since Change of State is the
9 Since there is no nominal P3,

the P2 NTM covers times from yesterday to the speaker's childhood
(i.e. both the P2- and the P3-interval).
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only possible interpretation for the NTM, this example correctly tests whether, on
the change of state meaning, change of state is entailed.
(67)

Context: Imagine that Sue's kids go to a certain school. The principal of the
school is a really good man and Sue knows him and likes him. In May he
mentioned that he might be stepping down over the summer. Sue has just
heard that the principal is going to continue in his role at the school and she
is happy about that. Sue's friend still thinks he may have stepped down; she
doesn't know the news. When her friend asks her, Was the principal good
at what he did? Sue says (a) then (b).
a.

Ehe! Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

(#vnkē

h

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:c-a

(#=ankí: / #=tá:ti:) ísti

yes

school-house loc-see.ipfv-nmlz (=

hērēt

os.

hı̌n ìi:-t

ô:-s

p2

/ #tatē)

p5)

/=

este

person

good.int-ss be.pfv-ind
`Yes! The (#former) school principal is a really good man.'
b.

Ohhēcv

emonkat

svcafvckēs.

oh-hí:c-a

imonk-â:t

s-ac-a:fáck-i:-s

loc-see.ipfv-nmlz be.still-comp.ss inst-1sg.pat-be.happy-dur-ind

`I'm happy that he is continuing as principal.'
Speaker Comment: Both these sentences [with vnkē and with tatē] assume the principal stepped down and then got reinstated. If he never
stopped being the principal, then you should leave out vnkē or tatē.
(RMM-Mus-10/26/2021)
Even with the salient past topic time in (67), if the speaker uses P2 or P5 they
cannot cancel the change of state inference. As the speaker comment indicates, hav-

253

ing either NTM is not ungrammatical (the sentences are perfectly ne provided the
principal stepped down and is now continuing the work after a hiatus), but they are
unacceptable if the state of being a principal did not end prior to the UT.
In the literature on verbal cessation inferences, Cable (2017) has argued that there
is cross-linguistic variation in how easily these inferences can be cancelled. Specically, Cable shows that a language can allow one strategy for cancellation without
allowing other strategies. Cessation inferences associated with past tense in Tlingit,
for example, cannot be cancelled by an overt denial or a salient past topic time, but
can be cancelled if the speaker makes it clear that they do not know whether the
state extends into the present.
The Gricean pragmatic reasoning involved in generating cessation implicatures
relies on an Opinionated Speaker assumption. That is, in order for someone to conclude that a speaker using a less informative utterance means to implicate that the
more informative utterance is false, that person must assume that the speaker knows
whether the more informative utterance is false. Because of this, a speaker can defeat a cessation implicature by providing the information that they do not know if
the more informative utterance is true or false. In (68), we see that a statement of
ignorance is a very natural way to defeat a cessation implicature in English.
(68)

Sam was the school principal, but I don't know if he still is.

Cable presents an analysis of this variation in which the dierence between English
and Tlingit lies in their inventory of tense features. In English, cessation implicatures
can be modeled as Scalar Implicatures because of the Open Interval Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, a present tense stative will entail that there is a past time
at which the state also held. In certain cases, this will mean there is an asymmetric
entailment relationship between a past and present tensed stative sentence. In Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013)'s formalization of this, a past tensed sentence will be
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entailed by the present tense alternative only if the context doesn't provide a past
TT. Consider the following semantics for the rst conjunct in (68) and it's present
tensed counterpart. As in previous chapters, I assume a quanticational semantics
for tense which includes a pronominal TT variable.10
(69)

a.

J Sam wasi the school principal Kw,t,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ t∧t0 ∈g(i) & be(s)(ιx.school-

principal(x)) at t0
b.

J Sam isi the school principal Kw,t,g = ∃t0 .t0 = t∧t0 ∈g(i) & be(s)(ιx.school-

principal(x)) at t0

With the above semantics, it is possible for g(i) to refer to an interval that will make
both of the sentences true, such as an interval surrounding the utterance time, but
including some past times. In this case, the present tense sentence will entail the
past tense sentence and pragmatic reasoning will result in a cessation implicature.
Consider, however, a context which provides a salient past TT, that is, a referent for
g(i) that excludes the utterance time t. In this case, the present tense alternative is
not stronger than the past tense sentence; it is false. For this reason, a salient past
TT is able to cancel a cessation implicature for a language like English which has
past and present tense.
Tlingit, however, is a language with optional past tense and non-future tense.
Non-future tense has the interesting property of allowing for three kinds of temporal
reference; it can have 1) past temporal reference, 2) present temporal reference, or 3)
it can refer to an interval of time including both past and present. Because of this,
both a past tensed sentence and a sentence with non-future tense are both true in a
context with a salient past TT. It was crucial to the pragmatic reasoning between the
English sentences in (69) that a salient past TT had the eect of making the present
10 I

would like to note that Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) introduce a Reference Time Concept
to do the work that I have attributed to the pronominal TT. The result and the reasoning, however,
are the same as these authors'.
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tense alternative false. Since a non-future sentence in Tlingit is not false in a context
with a salient past TT, the same mechanisms cannot be responsible for generating
and defeating the change of state implicature.
The key dierence, Cable argues, between English and Tlingit is that Tlingit, as a
language with non-future tense, allows for the possibility that the topic time is a large
interval that contains both past and present times. Cable proposes a grammatical
principle that requires a speaker to use an utterance that allows for the broadest
interval compatible with their knowledge. He formulates this principle as in (70)
below.
(70)

Include UT inside the TT, whenever possible

If all the following conditions hold, then the speaker must use sentence S1,
and not S2:
a.

Sentences S1 and S2 are identical except for their T-heads (T1 and T2).

b.

J T1 Kw,t,g contains both t0 and t, while J T2 Kw,t,g = t0 .

c.

Both S1 and S2 are `assertable' (i.e., the speaker's knowledge entails

them).
(Cable 2017: 659)
This principle will require a speaker of Tlingit to use a tenseless sentence instead of
a past tense sentence whenever they know that the state extends into the present.
As a result, unless they don't know, using a past tense sentence will implicate that
the state has ended. For this reason, the cessation implicature of Tlingit past tensed
sentences can be cancelled in contexts where it is made explicit that the speaker is
ignorant about whether the state continues into the present.
The Tlingit verbal tense system has some striking similarities to the Mvskoke
nominal tense system. As we saw in section 5.1, a bare NP in Mvskoke can be
interpreted in the past or at the UT, but not at a future time. Consequently, a
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tenseless noun could be understood to have a phonologicall unexpressed non-future
tense feature.11 Furthermore, section 5.3.3 demonstrated that Mvskoke NTMs are
optional and a bare noun is acceptable in all the contexts that a tensed nominal is.
Because of the similarities between Mvskoke nominal tense and Tlingit clausal tense,
we might expect that one could cancel the change of state inference associated with
Pasts 2 and 5 through explicit statements of ignorance. The empirical facts, however,
are not straightforward.
To test whether the change of state inferences of P2 and P5 can be cancelled
with a statement of ignorance, a context must control for several variables. First,
the context in (71) rules out a discourse related interpretation of the NTM. The
speaker, Sue, and her addressee do not have a shared past experience of the principal
and there is no previous mention of the principal in their conversation. Second, (71)
establishes a salient past topic time for the speaker when the state held. Finally, the
addressee's question makes it relevant whether he is a principal now. As a result,
given the speaker's knowledge, the most informative answer she can give is that he
was a principal during that past time. The follow up in (71-b) makes it clear that
the speaker does not know if the state currently holds.
(71)

Context: Imagine that Sue's kids go to a certain school. The principal of the
school is a really good man and Sue knows him and likes him. In May he
mentioned that he might be stepping down over the summer. Sue hasn't had
a chance to talk with him again since then and she hasn't heard if he did step
down or not, but she hopes he will continue to be the principal. Sue's friend
asks, Does this school have a good principal? Sue says (a) then (b).

11 This

is not strictly necessary for either tenseless clauses or tenseless nouns. Given that the
future is unsettled and future times do not yet exist, they may be unsuitable referents for a temporal
pronoun. Since the exclusion of future temporal reference can be accounted for pragmatically, it
may not be necessary to encode it semantically.
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a.

Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

(vnkē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:c-a

(=ankí: / # =tá:ti:) ísti

p2

school-house loc-see.ipfv-nmlz (=
hēret

owvnks.

hı̌n ìi:-t

ô:w-ánk-s

/#

tatē)

p5)

/#=

este

person

good.int-ss be.pfv-p2-ind
`The former school principal was a good man.'
b.

Mowis

mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

mô:weys maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:c-a

vtotkē
ato:tk-í:

however school-house loc-see.ipfv-nmlz work.ipfv-dur
monkat

owat

kerrvkot

mônk-a:t

o:w-â:t

kíìì-áko-:-t

be.stillpfv-comp.ss be.ipfv-comp.ss know-1sg.ag.neg-dur-ss
os.
ô:-s
be.pfv-ind
`However, I don't know if he is still working as the school principal.'
Speaker Comment: With tatē (P5), (a) is a good sentence, but the logic
breaks down when you say (b) because the rst sentence says he's a
former principal.
Linguist: Does the logic break down in the same way when you use vnkē
(P2)?
Speaker Comment: No, it doesn't.
(RMM-Mus-10/26/2021, also LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021 for P2)
In the above example, we see a clear negative judgment concerning the cancellation
of P5's change of state inference. The speaker reports that there is a break-down in
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the logic of the sentence with nominal P5 when they reach the (b) sentence. It is
thus, quite clear that the change of state inference of P5 cannot be cancelled by an
explicit statement of ignorance.
The situation with P2 is somewhat less clear. The continuation in (71-b) seems to
be ne following a P2-marked noun for all three of the speakers consulted on this example. While this seems to indicate that the change of state inference associated with
P2 is cancellable, I argue that this judgment may have a couple dierent explanations.
First, the judgment for nominal P2 reected in (71) might be due to the explicit
comparison with P5. Since P5 cannot receive discourse related interpretations, there
is no way to rescue the sequence in (71-a) and (71-b). Nominal P2, however, does
allow for a discourse related interpretation. As a result, if the sentences were considered in isolation, it is possible to interpret P2 in a way that makes the sequence
felicitous. Thus, the judgment might reect that the speaker was not considering the
two sentences in the context provided in (71).
One reason to think this explanation is on the right track is that two of the
three speakers consulted for (71) reported conicting judgments for P2 in similar
contexts. The judgments reported in (72) and (73) would seem to indicate that an
explicit statement of ignorance is not sucient to cancel the change of state inference
associated with P2. The contexts for (72) and (73) control for the same variables
discussed for (71) above.
(72)

Context: Imagine that your friend Judy needs to nd a pastor that speaks
Mvskoke uently so that he can come preach at her church for a special
service. She asks you if you know anyone. You know that the man who was
the pastor of Cedar Creek church is a uent Mvskoke speaker, but it's been
so long since you spoke to him, you aren't sure he's still their pastor.
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a.

Vcenv Hvcce emerkenvkv

(#vnkē)

acína hácci im-iìkináka

(#=ankí:) ma:skó:ki hn ìi-n

Maskoke hē ren

p2

cedar creek 3.dat-preacher =
punayet

omvnks.

pona:y-ít

ô:m-ánk-s

Mvskoke good.int-acc

speak.ipfv-ss be.pfv-p2-ind
`The (former) pastor of Cedar Creek spoke Mvskoke very well.
b.

Momis

emerkenvkv

emonkv

ont

omat

mô:meys im-iìkináka

imônka

ó:n-t

o:m-â:t

however 3.dat-preacher be.still.pfv be.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-comp
kerrvkot

os.

kiìì-áko-t

ô:-s

know-1sg.ag.neg-ss be.pfv-ind
`However, I don't know if he's still their pastor.'
Speaker Comment: If you use vnkē [P2], then you know he's not their
preacher anymore.
(73)

(RMM-Mus-08/12/2021)

Context: Imagine that you used to know a deacon from Tallahassee. You
remember that he wanted to be a pastor eventually, but you don't know if
he ever did become one. You and I meet each other at a hymn singing event
and you see this man on the other side of the room. You get distracted from
our conversation so you want to tell me why.
a.

Vnhesse

cuko-vfastv

(#mvyvnkē) alikat,

an-híssi

coko-afá:sta

(#ma=ankí:) a:-lêyk-a:t,

p2

1sg.dat-friend house-caretaker dem=

dir-sit.sg.pfv-comp

`My friend the former deacon is sitting over there,
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b.

mowis

hiyowat

cuko-vfastv

mô:weys heyyô:wa:t coko-afá:sta
however now

mvt

owat

má-t

o:w-â:t

house-caretaker dem-nom be.ipfv-comp

kerrvks.
kíìì-ák-s
know-1sg.ag-neg-ind
`however, if he's a deacon now, I don't know.'
Speaker Comment: You said mvyvnkē, so you know he's not a deacon
anymore.

(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)

In both contexts, Mvskoke speakers feel that using P2 means they know the nominal
property ceased to hold. As a result, the continuation stating their ignorance is
infelicitous.12
There is a second explanation for the conicting judgments for nominal P2. Recall
from the doctor example in (33) that when P2 receives a change of state interpretation
it was able to modify either the nominal property (indicating that the doctor is
retired) or the NP implicitly restricted by the context (inidcating that the doctor was
no longer the town's doctor). It is possible that in (71), the speaker is aware of the
possibility that the individual is no longer the school's principal though he may still
be working as a principal elsewhere. The same ambiguity is not present in either (72)
or (73). In (72), the noun phrase is explicitly restricted by the possessive relation
between the pastor and the church. In (73), the context does not provide any implicit
restriction for deacon.
12 It

is worth noting that the continuation in (73-b) does not have the word meaning still in it. As
a result, the continuation is technically compatible with the individual having ceased to be a deacon
at some point in the past though the speaker doesn't know if they are a deacon again at the UT.
This type of situation would be very unusual; I conclude that the speaker is assuming that there is
an implicit still in (73-b).
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I conclude that the change of state inferences of P2 and P5, when they arise, are
entailments. These examples demonstrate that the change of state inferences of P2
and P5 cannot be cancelled either with an outright denial of the change of state, with
a salient past TT, or with an explicit statement of ignorance. The change of state
inferences of these NTMs stand in stark contrast with verbal cessation inferences in
languages like English as well as Tlingit (Cable 2017). The change of state inferences
of Mvskoke NTMs are consequently unlike that of Somali -kii (Ivan & Özyldz 2016)
but rather like the change of state inference of Guaraní -kue (Tonhauser 2007; Thomas
2014).
The non-cancellability of the inference strongly suggests that the change of state
inferences of P2 and P5 are lexically encoded semantic entailments rather than pragmatic implicatures. These data are consequently incompatible with a pragmatic
Scalar Implicature account of change of state inferences like that proposed for Somali by Ivan & Özyldz (2016). Likewise a pragmatic account along the lines of
Cable (2017) for Tlingit will not be sucient to derive the change of state inference
associated with P2 and P5. Encoding the change of state in the lexical semantics of
these NTMs would pose no problem in accounting for P5. However, this type of approach would necessitate positing two lexical entries for P2 - one that entails change
of state and one (responsible for the discourse related meanings) that does not.
Thomas (2014) considers a similar problem for the semantics of Mbyá Guaraní

-kue. In Mbyá Guaraní, -kue has both verbal uses and nominal uses. The former do
not entail change of state, but the latter do. In order to present a unied account
of -kue, Thomas proposes that the change of state inference associated with nominal

-kue is a pragmatic implicature, just as it is in the verbal domain. However, he argues
that the pragmatic mechanisms by which the implicature is generated are obligatory
in the nominal domain. In the next chapter, I review the pragmatic proposals of
Ivan & Özyldz (2016) for Somali NTMs and Thomas (2014) for Guaraní -kue. I
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then evaluate how well Thomas' analysis can account for Mvskoke P2 and P5 while
maintaining a univocal account of P2.

5.4.2 Change of State or Cessation
In the preceding section, I drew comparisons between the change of state inferences
of P2 and P5 and cessation implicatures that are associated with verbal past tense.
The distinction between cessation and change of state is a subtle one. The two
inferences can be characterized formally in (74), follwing Altshuler & Schwarzschild
(2013).
(74)

Given a reference time RT and a state s that held prior to RT,
a.

a change of state inference means that s ended prior to RT, but another
state s0 with the same description may hold at RT.

b.

a cessation inference means that s ended prior to RT and that there is
no state s0 with the same description that holds at RT.

Thomas (2014) is very careful about the correct characterization of the inference
associated with -kue. Tonhauser (2007) argues based on the following example that
Paraguayan Guaraní -kue is associated with a change of state, and not a cessation
inference.
(75)

Juan pete mbo'e-ha-ra-kue...

kue

Juan one teach-nom-ag`Juan is a
a.

former teacher...'

# ha mbo'e-ha-ra

gueteri.

and teach-nom-ag still
`and he's still a teacher.'
b.

ha ko'agã mbo'e-ha-ra
and now

jey.

teach-nom-ag again

263

`and now he's a teacher again.'

(Tonhauser 2007: 838)

Either a change of state or a cessation inference would make the continuation with

gueteri `still' infelicitious. They both require that the state described by the NP have
ended prior to the relevant RT - here, RT is the verbal topic time. According to
Tonhauser's original argument, the continuation with jey `again' is felicitous because

-kue allows a similar state to hold again at the RT. In other words, -kue encodes
change of state and not cessation.
The fact that these are nominal predication constructions is crucial for identifying
the RT of the nominal predicate. According to Tonhauser (2006, et seq.), the reference
time of a noun is the NP evaluation time. With argument DPs, which are temporally
independent, the NP evaluation time is free. Although it is usually resolved to the
verbal TT, this isn't obligatory. Fixing the RT of an argument DP is key to evaluating
whether a similar state can hold at that RT. According to Thomas (2014), when the
NTM is axed to a nominal predicate, the NP evaluation time is bound by the
verbal TT. In nominal predication sentences, therefore, the NP evluation time can
be determined by xing the verbal TT with verbal tense or a temporal adverbial.
In (75), Tonhauser has apparently attempted to x the NP evaluation time to the
UT. Thomas (2014), however, argues that Tonhauser's example is awed and that the
inference associated with -kue is, in fact, a cessation inference. In Guaraní, a tenseless
clause can receive present or past temporal reference. As a result, it is possible for
the rst conjunct in (75) to have a past TT. The TT for the second conjunct must be
present because of the presence of the temporal adverb ko'agã `now.' If the RT for
both conjuncts is the UT, then cessation would indeed rule out the continuation with

again, which states that a similar state holds at the RT. However, if RT for the rst
conjunct is a past time, then -kue may be accompanied by a cessation inference and
still allow a similar state s0 to hold at the utterance time after the rst conjunct's RT.
Thomas argues that Tonhauser's example does not rule out this second possibility and
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therefore the acceptability of the (b) continuation with again does not demonstrate
that -kue has a change of state inference.
In order to address this confound, Thomas preposes the adverb now and consequently ensures that the RT of the rst conjunct is the present. Having done so in
(76), he nds that the continuation with again is no longer acceptable.
(76)

#Ag
y, Juan mburuvicha-kue haēmburuvicha ju.
Now

Juan leader-

pst

coord

leader again

`Now, Juan is an ex-leader and he is a leader again.'

(Thomas 2014: 18)

Since Guaraní verbs are unmarked for tense and can receive past or present temporal
reference, without the preposed temporal adverb, Thomas argues that there is no way
to ensure the rst conjunct is not interpreted at a past reference time. Thomas (2014)
thus demonstrates that Mbyá Guaraní -kue is accompanied by a cessation inference.
The Mvskoke examples in the previous section all involved a tensed nominal functioning as an argument. As a result, the nominal RT in these examples is free and the
examples cannot show us whether Mvskoke NTMs have change of state or cessation inferences. The account I develop in the next chapter does predict that Mvskoke NTMs
have a cessation inference like Guaraní -kue. However, the semantics of Mvskoke
NTMs on nominal predicates are in need of further research. It appears that using
an NTM in a nominal predication sentence is rather uncommon. However, there does
appear to be a crucial dierence between P1-P2 and P5 in sentences without a verbal
predicate. Consider the two examples below.
(77)

Ricky mvhayv

tatē

tos.

Ricky mahá:ya =tá:ti: -t=ô:-s

p5

Ricky teacher =

-ss=be.pfv-ind

`Ricky is a former teacher.'
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Speaker comment: This sentence is like making a statement: Ricky is a
former teacher.
(78)

Ricky mvhayv

(LT-Mus-12/14/2021)

vnkē

tos.

Ricky mahá:ya =ankí: -t=ô:-s

p2

Ricky teacher =

-nom=be.pfv-ind

`That's Ricky, that former teacher.'
Speaker comment: This sentence sounds like you're pointing him out.
(LT-Mus-12/14/2021)
The sentence with nominal P5 receives an interpetation like a nominal predication
sentence. The nominal mvhayv tatē `former teacher' is a property that is asserted
to hold of Ricky. A minimally dierent sentence with nominal P2 interestingly does
not have the same interpretation. Instead, this sentence appears to be more like
an equative copular construction with two referential NPs. A question for future
research is whether a P2-marked nominal can ever function as a nominal predicate.
If, as these examples suggest, nominal P2 cannot mark a nominal predicate, it will
not be possible to determine whether it has a change of state or a cessation inference.
However, it should be possible with P5/tatē.

5.4.3 (In)deniteness of Mvskoke tensed DPs
Another reason to believe that a P1 and P2 cannot appear on a noun functioning
as a nominal predicate is that nouns with nominal P1 and P2 cannot be interpreted as
indenites. Nominal P5, on the other hand, is perfectly compatible with indenites.
We see this dierence best in a comparison of nominal P2 and P5 in the change
of state context below. Crucially, the context does not support the existence of an
individual who bears the nominal property.
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(79)

P5/P2 Indenite Change of State Context : Imagine that you and I are at the
Senior Center where we are organizing a hymn singing event. We know that
all these people have stepped down from their roles in the community and in
the churches. You think it would be right to see if anyone present is a former
women's leader so that you can ask them to lead us in a song. I notice you
going around and talking to the ladies one after another. I ask Who are you

looking for?
a.

tatē

Hoktvke

enhomahtv

hokt-akí

in-homáhta =tá:ti: hopó:-t

p5

woman-pl dat-leader =

hopot

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for a former women's leader.'
Speaker Comment: You may or may not know who I'm looking for.
b.

#Hoktvke enhomahtv
hokt-akí

vnkē

hopot

in-homáhta =ankí: hopó:-t

p2

woman-pl dat-leader =

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

I'm looking for that former women's leader.
Speaker Comment: This is the one women's leader that you and I know.
(RMM-Mus-6/1/2021)
P5 is perfectly acceptable in the target sentence with the indenite interpretation of
the DP. However, nominal P2 is incompatible with the context in (79). The speaker's
comment for (79-b) suggests that the way to x the context is for there to be exactly
one women's leader in the common ground (i.e. known to speaker and hearer). As
such, this example supports the hypothesis that a noun phrase with nominal P2 (and
presumably also P1) must be denite.
P1 and P2-tensed nominals are also necessarily denite on their SPE meanings.
They cannot, for example, appear in partitive NPs to indicate a shared past experience
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of the larger group. Consider the context in (80). In this context, the interlocutors
have a shared past experience of a group of ve elders from the night before (a
P1 time). Although the SPE meaning of the nominal tense is supported in the
context, a P1 tensed nominal is nevertheless anomalous and cannot mean one of
those elders (from last night). Although a bare NP in (80-b) can receive an indenite
interpretation, a tensed bare NP in (80-a) must refer to a unique elder from the Past
1 interval that both interlocutors are able to identify.
(80)

Group Shared Past Experience P1 Context: Last night you and I went and
sat in a waiting room hoping to be cast in a TV show. There were ve
elders there. We had to leave early. When we went back this morning, you
started looking for any one of the ve elders from last night to ask them what
happened after we left. I don't know which one you are looking for and you
don't have any particular one in mind. I ask, `Who are you looking for?' Can
you answer with (a)?
a.

#Este vcule
ísti

isē(n)

hopot

owis

acóli =eysí:-(n) hopó:-t

person old

.

o:w-éy-s

p1-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

=

# `I'm looking for that elder (from last night).'
Speaker Comments: That's one certain elder...the one you and I knew
specically.
b.

Este

vcule(n)

hopot

ísti

acóli-(n) hopó:-t

owis.
o:w-éy-s

person old-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind
`I'm looking for an elder (any elder).'
(RMM-Mus-5/25/2021 & PF-Mus-5/18/2021)
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Similarly, P2 cannot mark an indenite, cardinal DP even in a context which
supports the interlocutors having a shared past experience of the larger group. In
(81), the interlocutors both saw all ten students at a time in the P2-interval. However,
using P2 on the DP `two students' is infelicitous. As the speaker comment suggests,
the interlocutors have to be able to identify a unique pair of two students refered to
by the DP.
(81)

Group Shared Past Experience P2 Context : Imagine I'm teaching a class with
10 students and you come in to give an announcement in the rst portion
of the class. You see the ten students. Then you leave. The next day, I am
talking to you about the class and mention that I asked a question that I
didn't expect anyone to be able to answer, but when I asked the question,
two students answered me back.
a.

Vpohkv enhayin,

cokv-hēcv hokkolvtēket

apóhka in-hâ:y-ey-n

coka-hí:ca hokkô:l-atî:k-it

question 3.dat-make.pfv-1sg.ag-ds student

two-up.to-ss

vmvyoposkakvnks.
am-áyoposk-â:k-ánk-s
1sg.dat-answer-pl.pfv-p2-ind

`When I asked the question, (up to) two students answered me back.'
b.

#Vpohkv enhayin,

cokv-hēcv hokkolvnkē

apóhka

coka-hí:ca hokkô:l=ankí:

in-hâ:y-ey-n

question 3.dat-make.pfv-1sg.ag-ds
vmvyoposkakvnks.
am-áyoposk-â:k-ánk-s
1sg.dat-answer-pl.pfv-p2-ind
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student

two=p2

`When I asked the question,

those two students answered me back.'

Speaker Comment: I would have to know who these two persons are;
perhaps the two that you pointed out to me among the ten.
(RMM-Mus-02/18/2021 & JWH-Sem-10/13/2020)
These three examples demonstrate that P1 and P2-tensed nominals are necessarily
denite, but that a P5-tensed nominal can be an indenite.
A possible explanation of the judgment in (79-b) could be that a P2-tensed nominal is necessarily accompanied by a null demonstrative mv. In a similar sentence
and context, a bare noun is acceptable but a demonstrative NP is infelicitous. The
speaker comment is similar to that in (79-b).
(82)

Context: Imagine I don't know anyone at your church. There are several
elders at your church and you are looking for one of them. I see you looking
around and ask, Who are you looking for ?
a.

Este

vculē(n)

ísti

acóli:-(n) hopó:-t

hopot

owis.
o:w-éy-s

person old-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind
`I'm looking for an elder.'
b.

#Mv este

vculē(n)

ma

acóli:-(n) hopó:-t

ísti

hopot

owis.
o:w-éy-s

dem person old-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for that elder.'
Speaker comment: No, that's a specic elder that you know, too.
(PF-Mus-07/06/2021)
However, a P2-tensed nominal behaves dierently from a demonstrative NP. In
Mvskoke, a bare noun with P2 is able to receive co-varying interpretations in generic
sentences like the one below.
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(83)

Prompt: In every church, it is standard practice or tradition that the previous
preacher (when he steps down) prays for the new preacher.
(#Mv) Erkenvkv vnkē

erkenvkv mucvsē em

(#ma) iìkináka =ankí: iìkináka mocási im(dem) pastor

=p2

pastor

new

mēkosapet
mí:osa:p-í:-t

3.dat- pray.ipfv-dur-ss

omēs.
ô:m-i:-s
be.pfv-dur-ind
`The former pastor (always) prays for the new pastor.'
Speaker Comment: [With mv ] the tradition is that one former pastor prays
for the new pastors.

(RMM-Mus-8/5/2021)

Example (83) describes a tradition where whenever there is a change in pastoral
leadership in a church, the previous pastor in that situation prays for the new pastor
in that situation. On the view of generic sentences where a covert generic operator
quanties over situations, this example demonstrates that a P2-tensed nominal can
pick out a dierent former pastor in each situation. The same is not possible for
a demonstrative NP. With the demonstrative, the P2-tensed nominal must refer to
one specic former pastor who is involved in every situation quantied over. If a
P2-tensed nominal was accompanied by a null demonstrative, we would not expect
to see this dierence. A P2-tensed nominal is not a covert Demonstrative NP.
A P2-tensed nominal also stands apart from bare nouns in tests for referentiality
and uniqueness. A common test for referentiality of a DP places two identical DPs in
a coordinate construction with two incompatible properties. If the DPs are referential
and encode uniqueness, they necessarily co-refer and the sentence is a contradiction.
If however, the DPs are not referential or do not encode uniqueness, co-reference is
not obligatory and the sentence can receive a plausible interpretation. For example,
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consider (84). If the two NPs fvccēcv `judge' co-referred, this would lead to the
strange interpretation that the unique judge in the context is in two places at once.
However, Mvskoke bare nouns are able to introduce new discourse referents, making
it so these sentences describe the positions of two judges.
(84)

a.

Fvccēcv homvn

ohhueres.

faccí:ca hóma-n

oh-hôyì-is

judge

in.front-acc loc-stand.sg.pfv-ind

`A judge is standing up there in front.'
b.

Hvtvm fvccēcv eyopvn

ohlikes.

hatâm faccí:ca iyópa-n

oh-lêyk-is

again

judge

3.pat.behind-acc loc-sit.sg.pfv-ind

`And a judge is sitting up there behind him.'

(RMM-Mus-2/2/2022)

The bare noun fvccēcv `judge' is licit in (84) because bare nouns are able to have
indenite readings. Consequently, the sentence can be understood as talking about
two judges.
Unlike bare nouns, P2 tensed nominals with change of state readings pattern with
English denite DPs. We see this in the two sentences in (85) which together receive
the implausible meaning that the same former chief is in two locations at once.
(85)

P2 Change of State
a.

Mēkko

vnkē

homvn

mí:kko =ankí: hóma-n
chief

p2

=

ohhueres.
oh-hôyì-is

in.front-acc loc-stand.sg.pfv-ind

`The former chief is standing up there in front. '
b.

#Hvtvm mēkko

vnkē

yopvn

hatâm

mí:kko =ankí: yópa-n

again

chief

p2

=

ohlikes.
oh-lêyk-is

behind-acc loc-sit.sg.pfv-ind
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`#And the former chief is sitting up there behind/in the back.'
(RMM-Mus-8/3/2021)
This example provides strong evidence that the tensed DP mēkko vnkē `former chief'
receives a denite interpretation and, consequently, two instances of the same DP
must co-refer. I conclude that a P2 tensed nominal must co-occur with a covert
denite determiner. Furthermore, this denite determiner has semantics that are
distinct from the semantics of the demonstrative mv.13

5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that in addition to having multiple past tenses in
the verbal domain, Mvskoke has multiple tense morphemes that are also able to sux
to nouns. Mvskoke P1 and P2 were shown to dier quite dramatically from P5 and
from the NTMs described in two Guaraní languages (Tonhauser 2007; Thomas 2014)
and the NTMs in Somali (Lecarme 1996, 1999, 2008). I motivated dividing NTMs
into two broad categories based on their interpretations: Change of State NTMs
13 A

puzzling peice of data that has come to my attention is that noun phrases with P5/tatē also
behave like denites in these sentences.
(i)

#Hvtvm fvccēcv tatē
ohhueres.
homvn
Fvccēcv tatē
hatâm faccí:ca =tá:ti:
oh-hôyì-is
faccí:ca =tá:ti: hóma-n
judge =p5
in.front-acc loc-stand.sg.pfv-ind again
judge =p5
eyopvn
ohlikes.
iyópa-n
oh-lêyk-is
3.patbehind-acc loc-sit.sg.pfv-ind
`The former judge is standing up there in front. #And the former judge is sitting up there
behind him.'
Speaker Comment: It is hard to say this without making it sound like one judge in two
places. To clarify, I would say ētv fvccēcv tatē, another judge.
(RMM-Mus-2/2/2022)

One explanation for the judgment in (i) is that there is a preference to interpret even bare nouns
as being co-referential across clauses and in a coordinate construction. In Chapter 2, I suggested
that this preference was due to the availability of words that force an indenite construal such as
hvmke `one' or ētv `(an)other'. This being my view of examples like (i), I hold that example (30)
still demonstrates that there is a deniteness contrast between nominal P2 and nominal P5.
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being represented by Guaraní -kue and Discourse Related NTMs being represented
by Somali -kii. Mvskoke P1 and P2 are ambiguous between the two interpretations,
but P5 can only have Change of State interpretations (being most commonly used
for a sub-category of Change of State - Decessive). Additionally, as we just saw just
above, nouns marked with P1 and P2 are necessarily denite, but nouns marked with
P5 can be indenite. I summarize these dierences below.

Table 5.3.
P1 & P2
P5

Dierences between P1/P2 and P5

Discourse Related & Change of State
Change of State only

Denites only
Denite & Indenites

The dierences between Mvskoke P1/P2 and other languages with NTMs are
also quite interesting. First of all, as mentioned above, Mvskoke P1 and P2 are
ambiguous between Discourse Related and Change of State NTMs. Guaraní -kue
lacks a Discourse Related meaning, but Somali -kii does appear to allow both. In
this way Mvskoke P1 and P2 appear to be more like Somali -kii. However, Mvskoke
P2 was shown to have a non-cancellable change of state inference like Guaraní -kue
but unlike Somali -kii which only implicates change of state. In this way Mvskoke
P2 appears to be more like Guaraní -kue. Finally, like Somali -kii, nominals with
Mvskoke P1 and P2 are necessarily denite, but Guaraní -kue is compatible with
denites and indenites. These dierences are summarized in the table below.

Table 5.4.

Dierences between Mvskoke, Guaraní, and Somali NTMs

Discourse Related
Change of State (C-of-S)
C-of-S Inference
Deniteness

Mvskoke P1 & P2
3
3
Non-cancellable
Denites only

Guaraní -kue
7
3
Non-cancellable
Both

Somali -kii
3
3
Cancellable
Denites only

Because of these dierences, Mvskoke NTMs cannot be given a unied account
using any existing analyses (as I show in the next chapter). As such, we will see that
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accounting for Mvskoke NTMs expands both our understanding of nominal temporal
morphology and the typology (which I will discuss in Chapter 7). In the next chapter,
I develop a formal analysis of the Mvskoke tenses which accounts for the dierence
between Mvskoke NTMs and provides a way to think about the cross-linguistic differences.
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CHAPTER 6
NOMINAL TENSES AS RESOURCE SITUATIONS
The previous chapter provided a descriptive presentation of Mvskoke NTMs.
Mvskoke NTMs were shown to be quite dierent from NTMs that have received
attention in the formal semantic literature. Additionally, the description revealed
that nominal P1 and P2 exhibit readings and properties that nomimal P5 lacks. In
this chapter, I develop a formal semantic analysis that explains the dierent properties and interpretations of these NTMs. In particular, I propose that Mvskoke NTMs
appear in two locations in a DP. NTMs in both positions can have Change of State
meanings but they are derived in dierent ways. Furthermore, only NTMs in the
higher position can give rise to Discourse Related meanings. I begin this chapter by
discussing the change of state interpretations of Mvskoke NTMs and two prominent
approaches that seek to derive change of state in NTMs pragmatically. In Section
2, I evaluate the most promising of these accounts - Thomas (2014) - for Mvskoke
NTMs. I show that Thomas' system can account for P5, but that extending the
system to P1/P2 encounters a number of challenges. Section 3 presents my analysis
of P1 and P2. I argue that they serve to temporally restrict the resouce domain of
the DPs they appear in. I demonstrate how this proposal can derive the change of
state meanings and, in Section 4, how it accounts for the various discourse related
meanings associated with P1 and P2. Section 5 investigates the predictions of this
account for the relationship between resource domains and nominal predication times.
Section 6 summarizes the main proposals and concludes.
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6.1 Approaches deriving change of state pragmatically
Since much of the literature on NTMs has focused on the change of state interpretation, I begin with this interpretation of the Mvskoke NTMs. A central question
to determining the nature of the change of state inference is whether it is a semantic
entailment or a pragmatic implicature. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that
the change of state inference associated with P2 and P5 could not be cancelled. This
suggested that change of state is a semantic entailment, but there are some considerations that push against this analysis. First, nominal P2, when it receives discourse
related interpretations, doesn't entail change of state. As a result, a univocal analysis
of P2 would need to derive the change of state entailment in some way other than
encoding it in the lexical semantics of P2. A second consideration is that, as in Mbyá
Guaraní, the Mvskoke P1, P2, and P5 also appear on verbs where they do not entail
change of state (or cessation).
The verbal tenses in Mvskoke, like English past tense, have defeasable cessation
implicatures. As in other languages, a salient past topic time introduced by the
context easily cancels cessation implicatures. Consequently, past stative sentences
with P1 or P2 in examples (1) and (2) do not entail a change of state. In neither
sentence does the past tense on the sentence `he was a tall man' invite the outlandish
inference that the man is no longer tall.1
(1)

Cekvsike

honvnwv lopicēn

hvthitke-isē

cikaséyki honánwa lopéyc-i:-n
Chickasaw man

hathéytki=eysí:

be.nice-nmlz-acc morning=p1

kērriyis.

Honvnwv mahēt

omis.

ki:ìì-ey-êys-s

honánwa ma:h-í:-t

o:m-êys-s

p1-ind man

know.ipfv-1sg.ag-

1I

be.tall-dur-ss be.ipfv-

currently am lacking an example demonstrating the same for verbal P5.
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p1-ind

`I met a nice Chickasaw man this morning. He was a tall man.'
(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)
(2)

Cekvsike

paksvnkē kērrvyvnks.

honvnwv lopicēn

paksankí: kî:ìì-ay-ánk-s

cikaséyki honánwa lopéyc-i:-n
Chickasaw man
Honvnwv mahēt

omvnks.

honánwa ma:h-í:-t

ô:m-ánk-s

man

p2-ind

be.nice-nmlz-acc yesterday know.pfv-1sg.ag-

be.tall-dur-ss be.pfv-

p2-ind

`I met a nice Chickasaw man yesterday. He was a tall man.'
(MAE-Sem-08/04/2018)
There are two analyses that derive change of state readings of past NTMs as
pragmatic implicatures: Ivan & Özyldz (2016) for Somali -kii and Thomas (2014)
for Mbyá Guaraní -kue. The main proposal of these accounts is that the temporal
information in NTMs functions essentially the same as verbal tenses. Just as certain
uses of past tense in matrix clauses lead to cessation implicatures, past NTMs also
give rise to cessation implicatures. In both these accounts the inference is technically
a cessation implicature. In what follows I will call the relevant reading and the type
of NTM change of state and refer to the inference/implicature as cessation.
Ivan & Özyldz (2016) provide a straightforward Gricean pragmatic account of
the change of state and invisibility readings of Somali -kii. They begin with the
background assumption, put forward by Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013), that states
are open intervals. Cable (2017) provides the following formalization.
(3)

The Open Interval Hypothesis
The run-time of a state is an open interval. That is, if e is a stative eventuality
and t0 is a temporal instant contained within τ (e) (t0 ∈ τ (e)), then there is
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a temporal instant t00 such that t00 ≺ t0 and t00 is also contained within τ (e)
(t00 ∈ τ (e)).
In Altshuler and Schwarzschild's (2013) words, there is no rst moment of a state.
In an ontology of times in which time is dense (that is for any two moments, there
is always another moment between the two), if a state holds at a particular moment,
there is always a moment, no matter how small, just before when the state also held.
With this assumption in place, present tense stative sentences and past tense stative sentences stand in an asymmetrical entailment relationship with each other. A
present tense stative sentence asserts that a state holds at the moment of utterance.
According to the Open Interval Hypothesis, this means that there is always a moment
prior to the moment of utterance where the state holds. This is precisely what is
asserted by a past tense stative sentence. A present tense stative thus entails a past
tense stative, and, by standard Gricean reasoning, a present tense stative is more
informative than a past tense stative. Having established this strength relation, implicatures associated with past tense can now be accounted for as Scalar Implicatures.
Ivan & Özyldz (2016) give the Somali denite determiners lifted (quanticational) Fregean semantics for a denite determiner which introduce existential quantication over times. These are given below.
(4)

a.
b.

J -ka Kw,t,g = λPhe,iti .λti .λQhe,ti : ∃!x[x ∈ C & P (t)(x)].Q(ιx.P (t)(x))

J -kii Kw,t,g = λPhe,iti .λti .λQhe,ti : ∃t0 ∃!x[t0 ≺ t & x ∈ C & P (t0 )(x)].∃t0 [t0 ≺

t & Q(ιx.P (t0 )(x))]

(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 637)

According to these authors, the cessation inference comes about when speakers reason about the use of the less informative past tensed -kii. In the broadest of strokes,
Grice's Maxims of Quantity and Quality together require a speaker to be as informative as possible without saying anything false. If a speaker chooses to use the
less informative past tense form, their interlocutor draws the conclusion that they
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consider the more informative present tense form to be false. As a result, when -kii
occurs with a temporary property such as student in (5) (repeated from Chapter 5),
pragmatic reasoning will lead to the implicature that the individual was a student
at some past time but is not a student at the utterance time. Since Ivan & Özyldz
(2016) derive the cessation inference as a pragmatic implicature, it is easily cancelled
as seen in (6) (repeated from Chapter 5).
(5)

Context: We are talking about several students. Maxamed is the one who
dropped out of college/ graduated.
arday-dii

Maxamed waa

hore.

det.f.pst.pl before

Maxamed decl students-

`Maxamed is one of the former students.'
(6)

arday-dii

Maxamed waa

Maxamed decl students-det.m.
ardayga

(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 632)
hore

ee

wali

pst.pl before which still

ah.

pres is

student-det.m.

`Maxamed is one of the previous students who is still a student.'
(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 632)
Ivan & Özyldz' approach takes inspiration from Thomas (2014) who proposes a
Scalar Implicature account of the nominal past -kue in Mbyá Guaraní, a closely related
language to Paraguayan Guaraní. Like its Paraguayan Guaraní cognate, Mbyá -kue
has the change of state, precedence, and existence properties that Tonhauser (2007)
identies. However, unlike Tonhauser's approach which encodes all three properties
in the lexical semantics of -kue, Thomas develops an account of Mbyá -kue in which
it only encodes temporal precedence. He derives the change of state property as an
embedded scalar implicature.
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To illustrate this, consider the following sentence in Mbyá. In this sentence, -kue
marks the dependent noun opygua `priest.'
(7)

.

A-ikuaa pete

1-know one

priest-

kue

opygua-kue.

`I know/knew one ex-priest.'

(Thomas 2014: 397)

Thomas adopts a DP structure in which the entity argument of the noun is abstracted
over. He assumes nouns are type he, iti and that the time argument of the noun
gets saturated by a temporal pronoun within the NP supplying the contextually
determined NP evaluation time (represented as NT in Thomas' structure).2
2 Musan

(1995) and Kusumoto (2005) demonstrate that, in English, nominal evaluation times
can receive co-varying interpretations. On the basis of this evidence, they argue that the structure
of nominals should not contain a free temporal variable but that the determiner introduces existential quantication over times. Schwarz (2012) proposes a modication to Kusumoto's semantics
that blends the two approaches; the determiner existentially quanties over sub-intervals of the contextually provided temporal variable. Note, however, that Schwarz (2012) frames this in situation
semantics, understanding situations to have temporal coordinates.
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Tensed DP Structure - Thomas (2014)

(8)

DP

het, ti
D

DP

hheti, het, tii

heti

pete

TP

λ2

one

t
T'

NT3

hiti
T

NP

hit, iti

hiti

-kue

x2

N

he, iti
opygua
priest
For Thomas, -kue has the semantics of a quanticational relative past tense. It
introduces a time in the past of the NT at which the nominal predicate holds.
(9)

J -kue Kc,w = [λPhiti .[λt.∃.t0 ≺ t ∧ P (t0 )]]

The denotation of a DP like the one in (7) is represented below.
(10)

J DP Kc,g = [λPheti .∃x.∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(3) & priest(x)(t0 )&P (x)]

Thomas uses the silent exhaustivity operator (exh) to derive grammatical scalar
implicatures within the DP (Magri 2009; Chierchia et al. 2012). exh applies to a
type t constituent (here the embedded TP) (11).
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(11)

[ DP pete λ2 [ exh [ TP1 NT3 [ T -kue ] [ NP x2 opygua ]]]]

exh has the eect of conjoining the TP (12-a) with the negation of its tenseless

alternative (12-b).
(12)

a.

[ TP1 NT3 [ T -kue ] [ NP x2 opygua ]]

b.

[ NP NT3 [ x2 opygua ]]

When exh is embedded, it results in the following denotation for the exhaustied
part of the structure.
(13)

J exh TP1 Kg,c = ∃t[t ≺ gc (3) & priest(w)(t)(gc (2))] & ¬priest(w)(gc (3))(gc (2))
(Thomas 2014: 397)

The above semantics assert the existence of a past time at which g(2) is a priest and
adds that g(2) is not a priest at the NP evaluation time, NT.
In Thomas' system, the cessation implicature associated with -kue is optional
when it serves as the clausal TT, but it is obligatory when it appears in the nominal
domain. He argues that this dierence is due to a pragmatic principle that requires
the alternatives to a DP to always include the noun evaluated at the NP evaluation
time. Because the alternative evaluated at NT is always an alternative, whenever

-kue occurs in an NP exh will generate a cessation implicature. Consequently, -kue
essentially entails cessation.
In summary, these two approaches have the desirable property of accounting for
the change of state meaning of an NTM without encoding it in the lexical semantics of
the NTM. They additionally do so using independently motivated hypotheses about
tense and pragmatic reasoning. The result of each analysis is to derive the change
of state meaning as an implicature on top of the basic temporal meaning of the
past NTM. Together, these approaches present a unied picture of NTMs in which
their main function is to shift the nominal predication time into the past of the
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NP evaluation time. All else being equal, the past NTM will lead to a cessation
implicature giving us a change of state meaning for the past tensed nominal. In the
Guaraní languages, the cessation implicature is obligatory; -kue only has a change of
state meaning. In Somali however, the implicature is optional and Somali -kii often
receives discourse related interpretations where no change of state is implied.
At rst, these pragmatic approaches look promising for accounting for Mvskoke's
NTMs. Two of Mvskoke's NTMs (Pasts 1 and 2) have both a Change of State
interpretation and Discourse Related interpretations as does Somali -kii. Ivan &
Özyldz' approach cannot account for P1 and P2. Although their approach accounts
for discourse related meanings, it derives cancellable cessation implicatures. As we
saw in Chapter 5, this makes the wrong prediction for Mvskoke P2 (and presumably
also P1) which has a non-cancellable change of state inference. Thomas' account is
more promising because it does derive a non-cancellable change of state inference
for past NTMs. In the next section, I apply Thomas' account to Mvskoke P2 and
P5. I show that it is able to account for Mvskoke's nominal P5, but it fails when
it comes to Mvskoke P1 and P2. Whereas the above approaches present a unied
picture of NTMs, I propose that the Mvskoke data supports a view in which there are
two types of NTMs cross-linguistically: Guaraní-type NTMs and Somali-type NTMs.
The former are lower in the structure of the DP and have obligatory change of state
implicatures; the later, as Lecarme suggests, are at the level of the determiner and
play a crucial role in determining the referent of the DP.

6.2 Evaluating Thomas (2014) for Mvskoke
In this section, I apply Thomas' (2014) analysis of Mbyá Guaraní -kue to Mvskoke
P2 and P5 and evaluate how well it is able to capture the Mvskoke facts. First, I
show that Thomas' analysis is able to capture the P5 data. I then discuss what goes
wrong when P2 is given the same semantics and position in the structure. (Due to the
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diculty of eliciting data on P1 change of state readings, I largely limit my discussion
to P2.)
For the purposes of this chapter, I do not use the evidential semantics that I gave
to verbal P2 in previous chapters. Instead I use as a placeholder a purely temporal
semantics for P2. I return to the question of what role evidentiality plays in the
nominal domain in my concluding chapters where I show how evidentiality could be
worked into the semantics of nominal P1 and P2 and the consequences of doing so.
In this chapter, I assume a much simplied denotation for P2. The denotation for P5
remains the same.
(14)

Simpied Denotations for P2 and P5
a.
b.

J P2 Kg,w = λPhiti .λt.∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t) & P(t0 )=T
J P5 Kg,w = λPhiti .λt.∃t0 .t0 ≺ t & P(t0 )=T

To illustrate how the analysis works for P2 and P5, I use the following example in
which P2 and P5 have a change of state interpretation, (15).
(15)

Mvhakv-cuko ohhēcv

(vnkē

maha:ka-cóko oh-hí:c-a

(=ankí: / =tá:ti:) ísti

p2

school-house loc-see.ipfv-nmlz (=

/

tatē)

p5)

/=

este

hērēt
hı̌n ìi:-t

person good.int-ss

owvnks.
ô:w-ánk-s
be.pfv-p2-ind
`The former school principal was a good man.'
For both NTMs, the tensed DP has the following structure. As Thomas hypothesizes, the noun combines with a relativizing operator which abstracts over the entity
argument of the noun, leaving an indexed trace, x1 , which is bound just below the
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determiner. In Thomas' approach, NTMs function as tense operators and take the
NP evaluation time (NT) as their reference time.
(16)

Thomas' (2014) LF with Mvskoke P2/P5
DP

e
D

XP2

hheti, ei

heti

∅def

XP1

λ1

t
TP

(exh)

t
NT2

T0

hiti
T

NP

hit, iti

hiti

P2/P5 x1

N

he, iti
school principal
I assume that the subject NP in (15) combines with a covert denite determiner.
The reader will remember that this accords with my hypothesized structure for bare
nouns from Chapter 2. In that chapter, I showed evidence in support of bare nouns
freely having denite interpretations, which I implement here as a covert denite
determiner.

6.2.1 A Thomasian analysis of P5
Thomas' analysis readily captures the following facts for nominal P5.
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1. Nominal P5/tatē is accompanied by a non-cancellable change of state inference.
2. Nominal P5/tatē can combine with denite and indenite noun phrases.
In this structure, P5 shifts the temporal argument of the noun phrase into the
past of the NP evaluation time (NT). NT, being a free temporal variable, receives its
value from the contextual assignent function g . The denotation of the structure at
the TP level is something of type t and has the truth conditions in (17).
(17)

DP with P5 J TP Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )

At this point in the derivation the exh operator combines with TP. Following
Thomas, the alternative to a tensed noun is the noun interpreted at the NT. There
are potentially additional alternative structures with P1 and P2. In the next section
I discuss the predictions of including these alternatives and conclude that P1 and P2
are not in fact alternatives to a P5-tensed nominal. As such, I do not represent them
here.
(18)

Alternative to (16)

J [NP NT2 [N x1 school-principal ]] Kw,g = school-principal(g(1))(g(2))
Applying exh to the TP yeilds the following embedded implicature.
(19)

J [ exh TP] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )

& ¬ school-principal(g(1))(g(2))

At this point, the relative operator abstracts over the individual argument (20-a)
and the now he, ti predicate combines with a covert denite determiner to yeild the
resulting semantics in (20-b).
(20)

a.

J XP2 Kw,g = [λx.∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(x)(t0 )
& ¬ school-principal(x)(g(2))]
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b.

J DP Kw,g = ιx.∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(x)(t0 )
& ¬ school-principal(x)(g(2))

only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C&∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(x)(t0 )
& ¬ school-principal(x)(g(2))
According to this denotation, the DP with P5 from (15) refers to the unique individual

x such that there was a time before g(2) when x was a principal and x is not a principal
at g(2). It will be dened only if there is exactly one individual x in the context for
which there is a time before g(2) when x was a principal and x isn't a principal at
g(2).
Keeping Thomas' pragmatic assumptions about the set of alternatives for an NP
(that it always contains the tenseless alternative evaluated at the NP evaluation
time), a P5 DP will always be accompanied by a cessation implicature. This derives
the non-cancellability of the inference associated with P5. This account predicts that
it should be possible to demonstrate that the inference is a cessation implicature with
P5-marked nouns in nominal predication sentences.
Because of the position of tense within the DP, Thomas' account also predicts that
P5 should be able to occur in a noun phrase regardless of the semantics of D0 . The
reader will recall from Chapter 2 that bare nouns in Mvskoke are compatible both
with contexts that support denite DPs and ones that support indenite DPs. As
such, Thomas' account ts seamlessly with my assumption that bare nouns combine
with phonologically null denite and indenite determiners. The account correctly
predicts that nominal P5 can occur with a bare nouns in contexts licensing indenite
interpretations, as it does in (21) (repeated from Chapter 5).
(21)

P5/P2 Indenite Change of State Context : Imagine that you and I are at the
Senior Center where we are organizing a hymn singing event. We know that
all these people have stepped down from their roles in the community and in
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the churches. You think it would be right to see if anyone present is a former
women's leader so that you can ask them to lead us in a song. I notice you
going around and talking to the ladies one after another. I ask Who are you

looking for?

tatē

hopot

Hoktvke

enhomahtv

hokt-akí

in-homáhta =tá:ti: hopó:-t

p5

woman-pl dat-leader =

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for a former women's leader.'
Speaker Comment: You may or may not know who I'm looking for.
(RMM-Mus-6/1/2021)
In summary, this section has shown that Thomas' system can be applied to P5 and
correctly captures that i) P5 has a non-cancellable change of state inference (on
Thomas' system, it is a cessation implicature), and ii) P5 is compatible with denite
and indenite DPs. The next section discusses some issues with trying to account for
P1 and P2 with Thomas' analysis.

6.2.2 Issues for Extending Thomas' Approach to P1/P2
Extending Thomas' account of NTMs to Mvskoke P1 and P2 poses some problems.
Specically, the approach fails to account for the deictic nature of the P1 and P2intervals, it has diculty explaining why DPs with P1 and P2 are necessarily denite
(as was seen in Chapter 5, section 5.4.3), and it makes wrong predictions regarding
the cessation implicature associated with P5.
To begin, consider the following denotation for the structure in (16) with P2. As
mentioned above, I use a simplied denotation for P2 and abstract away from the
precise semantics for the P2-interval as formalized in Chapter 4.
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(22)

DP with P2

J TP Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
At the level of the TP, this structure combines with an implicit exhaust operator.
Following Magri (2009)'s theory of quantity implicatures, exhaust conjoins the TP
with the negation of all it's excludable alternatives. The alternatives to a P2-marked
TP include not only the tenseless alternative (as Thomas argues), but also the TP
with P1 substituted for P2 and the TP with P5 substituted for P2. The alternatives
and their denotations are given in (23).
(23)

Alternatives to (22)
a.
b.

J [NP NT2 [N x1 school-principal ]] Kw,g = school-principal(g(1))(g(2))

J [TP NT2 P1 [NP x1 [N school-principal ]]] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(g(2))

& school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
c.

J [TP NT2 P5 [NP x1 [N school-principal ]]] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & schoolprincipal(g(1))(t0 )

An excludable alternative is an alternative that is not entailed by the original proposition. Since the P2-interval is a more specic interval of past time, the proposition
with P2 entails the P5 alternative. As a result, the P5 alternative is excluded from the
alternatives that are negated through the application of exh. The result of applying
exh is the P2 proposition conjoined with the negation of (23-a) and (23-b).

(24)

J [ exh TP ] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 ) &

¬ school-principal(g(1))(g(2)) & ¬∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & t0 ∞ day(g(2)) & schoolprincipal(g(1))(t0 )

Thomas' theory predicts that P2 with a change of state meaning will entail both
that the nominal property does not hold at the NP evaluation time, as well as that
it does not hold at any past time in the day surrounding the NP evaluation time.
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Given the diculty of creating pragmatically natural contexts where an individual
just stopped being a principal today (see section 5.3.2), I was not able to carefully
test this prediction.
When the rest of the structure is composed and combines with the null denite
determiner, a P2-marked DP has the following denotation.
(25)

J DP Kw,g = ιx.∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(x)(t0 )

& ¬ school-principal(x)(g(2))

& ¬∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
only dened if ∃!x : x ∈ C&∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(x)(t0 )
& ¬ school-principal(g(1))(g(2)) & ¬∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(g(2))
& school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
Thomas' approach yeilds the denotation above for a P2-marked DP and makes several demonstrably inaccurate predictions about nominal P2 with a change of state
meaning.

6.2.2.1 Relative vs Deictic P1/P2-interval
The rst problem with applying Thomas' approach to a P2-marked DP is that
it predicts the P2-interval to be relative to an NP evaluation time and not deictic
(i.e. relative to the UT). In the semantics in (25), P2 shifts the nominal predication
time back from an NP-evaluation time g(2) as did P5. Because g(2) is independent
and free in argument DPs, there is a prediction here that it should be possible to
provide a contextually salient NP evaluation time and the P1 and P2-intervals will
be evaluated relative to that NP evaluation time.
In Mbyá and Paraguayan Guaraní, Thomas (2014) and Tonhauser (2007) demonstrate that a temporal adverbial can locate the NP evaluation time. When it does,

-kue necessarily indicates that the change of state took place before that time. Consider their examples below.
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(26)

Ambue ary-pe
other

pete doytor-kue o-mo-nguera

year-pe one doctor-

iñ-angiru-pe

kue a3-caus-healthy 3-friend-pe

i-mba'asy.
3-sickness
`Last

year, an ex-doctor healed his friend's sickness.'
(Tonhauser 2007: 855)

(27)

Amboae jaxy py, pete poropoanoa-gue o-mo-nguera
other
`Last

moon in one doctor-

kue

che-ir
u.

3-cause-healthy 1-friend

month, an ex-doctor cured my friend.'

(Thomas 2014: 408)

In the Paraguayan Guaraní sentence (26), the temporal adverbial Ambue ary-pe `last
year' arguably provides the temporal location of the NP evaluation time in addition to
the verbal TT. Similarly, in the Mbyá Guaraní sentence (27), the temporal adverbial

amboae jaxy py `last month' is supposed to locate the NP evaluation time and the
verbal TT. In both cases, -kue shifts the time of being a doctor into the past of
those particular times. Tonhauser (2007) reports that her consultants strongly prefer
the interpretation where the person is no longer a doctor at the time of the healing.
Thomas' Mbyá Guaraní consultants also interpret (27) as implying the individual was
no longer a doctor when he cured the speaker's friend.
This interpretation is possible for a P2-marked DP, but not necessary. In (28),
Mvskoke speakers accepted both interpretations where the doctor was a doctor at the
time of healing (28-b) and those where he was retired at the time of healing (28-c).
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(28)

Ohrolopē hvnkēvnkē,

vnhessē

ohìolopí: hânki:=ankí:, an-híssi
one=p2

year

1sg.dat-friend

hēcan

vcakkayimvts.

hi:c-â:n

acakk-â:y-ey-mát-s

vlēkcv vnkē
alí:kca =ankí:
doctor =p2

see.ipfv-comp.ds comm-go.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind
Cvfeknicemvts.
cakn-êyc-imát-s
be.well-caus.pfv-p3-ind
`One

year ago, when my friend was seeing the (past) doctor, I went with

her. He healed her.'

(RMM-Mus-9/21/2020)

a. #Current Doctor Scenario: Imagine your town has always had one doctor.
The current doctor has been there for 10 years. Your friend was very
sick a year ago, but you went with her to the doctor and he cured her.
You are telling this to a friend from your town.
Speaker Comment: This would be specifying it's the past doctor, not
the present doctor, the previous doctor (who transferred maybe).
b.

X Transferred Doctor Scenario (Later than Matrix): Imagine your town
has always had one doctor, until he transferred to another hospital a few
months ago. A year ago before he left you went with your friend to see
him and he cured your friend. You are telling this to a friend from your
town.

c.

X Retired Doctor Scenario (Backshifted): Imagine your town has always
had one doctor, until he retired 5 years ago. Your friend, who was very
sick a year ago, went to see him anyway and he cured her. You went
with her. You are telling this to a friend from your town.
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Although this would seem to support the possibility that the P2-interval can be
evaluated relative to a contextually determined NP evaluation time, I argue that
there is another explanation. Because there is no nominal P3, P2 has no competitor
that would restrict its interval to times more recent than a year ago. As a result,
nominal P2 is compatible with times in the verbal P2-interval and P3-interval. Thus,
nominal P2 can refer to a time earlier than a verbal P2 or P3 TT without necessarily
begin evaluated relative to a time other than the UT.
Although the absence of a nominal P3 makes it impossible to test whether the
P2-interval can be relative to an NP evaluation time, it is possible to test P1. The
P1-interval is restricted to past time within the day surrounding the reference time.
Consider the context in (29). The time of the deacon's change of state is earlier in
the day of the P2 verbal TT. Thus the time of the state-change is in the P1-interval
relative to the P2 TT, but in the P2-interval relative to the UT.
(29)

Backshifted Former Deacon Context : On Sunday morning (a few days ago),
they gave a deacon the authority to preach. Then he gave his rst sermon. I
knew they were giving this deacon (that we both know) the authority to be
a preacher, but I wasn't at his ordination and I didn't know he preached the
sermon because I wasn't there on Sunday. I ask, Who preached on Sunday?
a.

Cuko-vfastv

vnkē

coko-afá:sta

=ankí: iìkináka ha:<hô:>y-in

p2

house-caretaker =

erkenvkv hahoyen

preacher make<pass.pfv>-ds

erkenakvnks.
iìkinâ:k-ánk-s
preach.pfv-p2-ind
`They made the former deacon a preacher, and he preached.'
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b.

#Cuko-vfastv

isē

coko-afá:sta

=eysí: iìkináka ha:<hô:>y-in

p1

house-caretaker =

erkenvkv hahoyen

preacher make<pass.pfv>-ds

erkenakvnks.
iìkinâ:k-ánk-s
preach.pfv-p2-ind
Speaker comment: This means he was a deacon more recently.
(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)
As the speaker judgment demonstrates, it is impossible for the P1-interval to be
interpreted relative to a reference time other than the UT.

6.2.2.2 Deniteness of P1/P2 Nominals
As we saw with P5, Thomas' approach predicts that NTMs occupying a tense
position within the noun phrase should be able to appear in DPs regardless of the
semantics of the D. On the view that Mvskoke bare nouns combine with either a null
denite or a null indenite determiner, P1 and P2 should be able to appear with
indenite noun phrases at least on their change of state reading. This prediction is
a problem for applying Thomas' approach to P2 and P1. A P2 tensed nominal (and
presumably also a P1 tensed nominal) cannot be interpreted as an indenite DP.
Compare nominal P5 and P2 in the context below, repeated from (21).
(30)

P5/P2 Indenite Change of State Context : Imagine that you and I are at the
Senior Center where we are organizing a hymn singing event. We know that
all these people have stepped down from their roles in the community and in
the churches. You think it would be right to see if anyone present is a former
women's leader so that you can ask them to lead us in a song. I notice you
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going around and talking to the ladies one after another. I ask Who are you

looking for?
a.

tatē

Hoktvke

enhomahtv

hokt-akí

in-homáhta =tá:ti: hopó:-t

p5

woman-pl dat-leader =

hopot

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for a former women's leader.'
Speaker Comment: You may or may not know who I'm looking for.
b.

#Hoktvke enhomahtv
hokt-akí

vnkē

hopot

in-homáhta =ankí: hopó:-t

p2

woman-pl dat-leader =

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

I'm looking for that former women's leader.
Speaker Comment: This is the one women's leader that you and I know.
(RMM-Mus-6/1/2021)
I can see one straightforward way to account for the deniteness restriction of
nominal P2 in Thomas' system. Drawing on the insights from Musan (1995) and
Kusumoto (2005), we could hypothesize that only denite D's select for a TP. This
would restrict P2 to denite DPs. (31) illustrates what denite and indenite DPs
would look like on this approach.
(31)

a.

Denite DPs: [ DP Ddef λ1 exh [ TP NT2 [ T P2/P5 ] [ NP x1 N ]]]

b.

Indenite DPs: [ DP Dindef λ1 exh [ NP NT2 [ N0 x1 N ]]]

Indenite DPs would lack a TP, but still have the temporal pronoun NT as would
bare nouns. This approach, however, would have the eect of restricting P5 to denite
DPs as well. An alternative that is explored in Chapter 7 is whether the evidentiality
associated with P2 is responsible for the denitness eect in nouns. As will be seen,
the evidential component of P2 cannot on its own fully account for the deniteness
eect of nominals with P1/P2.
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6.2.2.3 (Lack of) Competition between P1/P2 and P5
A nal challenge to giving nominal P2 a Thomas-style account is that Thomas'
account would predict that P1, P2, and P5 should compete with each other as structural alternatives. If they did, we would expect to see a temporal remoteness inference
associated with P5 in addition to its cessation implicature. If P1, P2, and P5 were
all exponents of the Tense head inside nominals, then in addition to the tenseless
alternative, a P5-tensed nominal would also have P1 and P2 alternatives.
(32)

Set of Structural Alternatives to a P5-tensed nominal
a.
b.

J [NP NT2 [N x1 school-principal ]] Kw,g = school-principal(g(1))(g(2))

J [TP NT2 P1 [NP x1 [N school-principal ]]] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(g(2))

& school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
c.

J [TP NT2 P2 [NP x1 [N school-principal ]]] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2))
& school-principal(g(1))(t0 )

Given that excludable alternatives are the alternatives that are entailed by the P5
nominal, none of the above alternatives could be excluded in the calculation of the
embedded implicature. Since both P1 and P2 provide more restricted intervals of past
time, they entail the P5 alternative and not the other way around. As a result, the
embedded implicature for a P5 nominal would include not only the negation of the
tenseless alternative, but the negation of both the P1 and P2 alternatives. Example
(33) illustrates the result of applying the exhaust operator to the P5 TP.
(33)

J [ exh TP(P5) ] Kw,g = ∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
& ¬ school-principal(g(1))(g(2))
& ¬ ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P1-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
& ¬ ∃t0 .t0 ⊆ P2-interval(g(2)) & school-principal(g(1))(t0 )
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A nominal P5 should be accompanied by both a cessation implicature and a temporal
remoteness implicature. In other words, a nominal with P5 should entail that the
nominal property ceased to hold of the individual at a past time prior to the P1 and
P2-intervals. With the absence of a nominal P3, nominal P2 covers past times up to
60 or so years ago. As a result, using nominal P5/tatē should only be felicitous if the
change of state happened very early in the speaker's childhood, more than about 60
years ago.
P5/tatē is not limited to remote times. In fact, nominal P5 is acceptable at
the same past times as nominal P2. Consider the following example, where a speaker
accepted both P5 and P2 to describe the former chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.
The elicitation took place in 2021 and Principal Chief James Floyd left oce in 2020.
The change of state happened one year before the elicitation.
(34)

Context: Imagine that two years ago you went to visit James Floyd while he
was chief.
Ohrolopē hokkolvnkē,

vnmēkko

ohìolopí: hokkô:l=ankí: an-mí:kko
year

two=p2

{tatē

/

{=tá:ti: /

p5

1sg.dat-chief {=

/

vnkē}
=ankí:}
=p2}

encukopericimvts.
in-cokopiìêyc-ey-mát-s
3.dat-visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind

`Two years ago, I visited my former chief.'

(RMM-Mus-7/13/2021)

According to Thomas' reasoning about the relevance set for a DP, the tenseless alternative (the alternative evaluated at the topical time for the noun phrase) is always
a relevant alternative. However, one might imagine that the P1 and P2 alternatives
are not always in the relevance set for a P5 DP. One key dierence between P1/P2
and P5 is that the former do not allow decessive interpretations but the latter does.
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When P5 has a decessive interpretation, it would be reasonable to assume that the
P1 and P2 alternatives are irrelevant and hence P5 would lack a temporal remoteness implicature. The empirical facts suggest the situation is more complex than
this model of competition. When P5 has a decessive interpretation, it appears to be
limited to times more remote than 1 year ago even though supposedly P2 is not a
relevant alternative. As a result the P5 nominal with a P2-tensed verb is anomalous,
as in (35).
(35)

#Fvccēcv

tatē

faccí:ca

=tá:ti: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s

judge

=

p5

emponayiyvnks.

p2-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

Intended: I spoke to the late judge.
Speaker Comment: Really? [That means] you're talking to him from beyond
the grave.

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

Speakers accept a decessive interpretation of P5/tatē with more remote verbal tenses
like P3. In (36) the speaker comment locates the time of death after the verbal TT
between 1 and 5 years ago.
(36)

Fvccēcv

tatē

emponayimvts.

faccí:ca =tá:ti: im-ponâ:y-ey-mát-s
judge

p5

=

p3-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I spoke to the late judge.'
Speaker Comment: That's saying I talked to him when he was living, maybe
1-5 years ago.

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

This section has demonstrated that the predictions regarding potential competition and interaction between P1, P2, and P5 are not borne out. If all three NTMs
occupied the same position within the DP, then they would be structural alternatives
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and P5 should be accompanied by a temporal remoteness implicature. The above
data suggested that P5 lacks this implicature in contexts where we would expect it
to arise and appears to have the implicature in contexts where we would not expect
it to arise.3 As such, the data motivate a view in which P1 and P2 are not lexical
alternatives to P5.
In summary, we have seen that Thomas' analysis can be extended to Mvskoke P5
but runs into several problems when applied to P1/P2. The advantage of Thomas'
approach is that it derives the obligatory nature of the cessation implicature associated with P5 and P2 without encoding it in their lexical semantics. However, it
makes several wrong predictions if P2 (and P1) are given the same semantics and
syntactic location as P5 and Guaraní -kue. First, Thomas' approach predicts the P1
and P2-interval should be able to take a reference time other than the UT. As we
saw in section 6.2.2.1, the P1-interval must be interpreted relative to the UT and
there was not convincing evidence that the P2-interval could be interpreted relative
to a dierent reference time. Second, Thomas' approach predicts that P1 and P2
(at least on their change of state interpretations) should be able to mark indenite
noun phrases. Section 6.2.2.2 demonstrated that P1 and P2 are restricted to denites and are best understood as necessarily co-occuring with Mvskoke's null denite
determiner. Finally, Thomas' approach incorrectly predicts that P1, P2, and P5 are
lexical alternatives and that competition with P1 and P2 should result in a temporal
remoteness implicature for P5. For these reasons, in the next section I present a
new proposal for P1 and P2 that captures both their change of state and discourse
related meanings. Specically, I propose that P1 and P2 are not in the same syntactic
location as P5 but are located at the level of the determiner.
3 The

nature of the temporal inference evidenced by (35) and (36) is a topic for further study.
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6.3 Mvskoke Nominal Tenses as Resource Situation Modiers
In this section I present an analysis of discourse related NTMs like P1 and P2 as
modiers of resource domain restriction variables, or `resource situations' (Schwarz
2009). I demonstrate how this analysis can account for P1/P2's change of state
and discourse related meanings. On this proposal, P1/P2 and P5 occupy dierent
syntactic position within the DP and their change of state inferences are dierent in
nature. After introducing resource domains/ situations, I demonstrate how P1 and
P2's change of state readings can be derived on this approach. I then address how the
various discourse related meanings of P1 and P2 are to be accounted for. Finally, I
address some predictions of the account and how P5 ts into this picture of Mvskoke
nominals and NTMs.

6.3.1 Domain Restriction and the Temporal Interpretation of Nominals
Quanticational noun phrases implicitly restrict the set in the domain of quantication to contextually relevant individuals. To account for this von Fintel (1994)
proposes that determiners are indexed with a C-variable. This variable picks out
a property when it is given a value from the assignment function g . This property intersects with the nominal restrictor to limit the individuals quantied over
to a contextually relevant set (i.e. the set which has the property identied by the
C-variable). Moreover, von Fintel demonstrates that each DP must have its own
`resource domain.' In the example below, most people in the second sentence is most
naturally interpreted as being restricted by the C-variable in (38).
(37)

Sweden is a funny place. ... Most people really dislike foreign tennis players.
(von Fintel 1994: 41, modeled after an example from Westerstahl 1984)

(38)

g(C) = λw.λx.x is a Swede in w
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However, the DP foreign tennis players clearly must have a dierent C-variable as
the set of individuals who are foreign tennis players (from the perspective of most
Swedes) has no intersection with the set of individuals who are Swedes.
Schwarz (2009) motivates a situation semantic account of resource domains in
which they are syntactically represented situation arguments of determiners. Nouns
have been independently shown to need their own world arguments to account for
transparent and opaque readings as well as for scope paradoxes with conditionals.
Consider example (39) from Keshet (2008).
(39)

If everyone in this room were outside, the room would be empty.
(Keshet 2008)

This example demonstrates that the DP everyone in this room must be interpreted
in a dierent world from the predicate be outside since the two are incompatible.
However, the correct reading of the sentence cannot be achieved by having the DP
scope above the if-clause in order to be interpreted in the actual world. If it did
scope above the if-clause, the sentence would have the incorrect reading that for each
individual x in this room in the actual world, if that particular person x were outside,
then the room would be empty. This incorrect interpretation would only be true if
there were just one person in the room in the actual world.
Since scoping the DP outside the if-clause cannot be responsible for the DP being
interpreted in the actual world, this example supports a view in which world pronouns
are syntactically represented, as I sketch in (40).
(40)

λw0 [ If λw0 [everyone in this room in w0 ] were outside in w0 , the room would
be empty in w0 ].

Similarly Enç (1981), Musan (1995), and Tonhauser (2006) have shown that nouns
can be interpreted at times that are distinct from the time the entire sentence is
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interpreted at. These observations, reviewed in Chapter 5, lead Tonhauser (2006,
et. seq.) to argue that the NP evaluation time is free and contextually determined.
Thomas (2014) implemented this with the free temporal variable, NT, bearing an
index and receiving a value from the context. As situations have both world and
temporal coordinates, Schwarz' account is able to capture both the intensional and
temporal independence of nouns.
In Schwarz' situation semantics, the resource domain of strong Ds is provided by a
resource situation variable. This variable is the rst argument of the determiner and
provides the situation argument for the noun. Schwarz argues that resource situations
are only syntactically represented for strong determiners. Crucially for Schwarz, denite determiners have resource situation variables (represented as a situation variable
with the index r: sr ). The resource situation for a denite determiner provides the
context in which the uniqueness presupposition is evaluated. His semantics for a weak
denite determiner is represented in (41).
(41)
(42)

J

the K = [λsr : [λPhe,sti : ∃!x[P (x)(sr )].ιx.P (x)(sr )]]

(Schwarz 2009: 148)

LF for a denite DP
DP
D

NP

D sr
In this system, the NP evaluation time of a nominal is provided by the resource
situation pronoun. As I show below, Mvskoke provides evidence for both the resource
situation and an NP evaluation time variable represented in the structure of a noun.
I return to this in more detail in section 6.5.
The key intuition that I wish to model with Schwarz' semantics is that Mvskoke
nominal P1 and P2 restrict the temporal location of the context in which the indi-
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vidual bearing the nominal property is unique. Consider a Shared Past Experience
meaning of P1 in (43), repeated from Chapter 5, example (3).
(43)

P1 Shared Past Experience Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get
approval for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and
language teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving
each other updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You
ask me: Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yes, I spoke with the judge (that

we just saw).'
(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

I propose that what P1 contributes in this sentence is time of the situation in which
there is just one judge that both interlocutors are familiar with. The resource situation is essentially the situation just a few moments ago (the P1-interval) when
the interlocutors saw Judge Mary. In what follows, I develop a temporal version of
Schwarz' proposal to account for nominal P1 and P2.

6.3.2 P1 and P2 as Modiers of Resource Intervals
Treating nominal P1 and P2 as modiers of resource situation variables is able to
account for both the Change of State and Discourse Related meanings of these NTMs.
I argue that nominal P1 and P2 only ever appear as features of a resource situation, at
the D-level. They never appear in the lower, NP-internal tense position which hosts
P5. As such, their change of state inferences cannot be accounted for in the same
way. Instead, I propose that the change of state inference is dierent in nature from
the one associated with P5. It results from a default value for the resource situation
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when it is not provided by the context. Discourse Related interpretations of P1 and
P2 come about when the resource situation does receive a value from context.
To maintain a consistent semantic framework for my account of the Mvskoke
tenses, I develop my proposal for P1 and P2 using a purely temporal version of
Schwarz' resource situations. Since situations have temporal coordinates, my proposal
should not be seen as a substantive change to Schwarz' original proposal. Where it
is helpful, I provide additional discussion of the intuitions of the proposal in terms of
situations.
I propose that P1 and P2 are partial identity functions modifying the resource
interval for a strong D. The resource interval is a temporal variable with an index
that receives its value through the contextual variable assignment function g . P1 and
P2 introduce a presupposition as to the temporal location of that interval relative to
the time of evaluation t0 (here represented as a parameter on the denotation function).
(44)

Nominal P1 and P2
a.
b.

J P1 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t0 ). t0 ]

J P2 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t0 ). t0 ]

In a DP structure, P1 and P2 are features modifying the resource interval. The
resource interval is sister to a null denite determiner and saturates the NP evaluation
time variable of the embedded NP. In this way, P1/P2 eectively saturate the nominal
predication time of the noun. The resource interval and the nominal predication time
can in principal be distinct and I return to this in more detail in section 6.5.
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(45)

A DP structure with P1 and P2
DP
XP

D
XP

∅def

XP

λ1

tr P1/P2

λ2

NP
NT2

N0

x1 N
Furthermore, I argue that the resource interval is responsible for discourse related
meanings of NTMs since it essentially provides the temporal location of a situation
relevant for the identication of the DP's referent. As such, I argue that P5 cannot
appear in this higher D-level position as evidenced by its inability to receive discourse
related interpretations. As a nal note on this structure, my proposal correctly predicts that P5 is able to co-occur with P1 and P2. It further predicts that when they
do co-occur, P5 should shift the nominal predication time back from the resource
interval. I also return to these predictions in section 6.5.
I give the null denite determiner a temporal version of Schwarz' (2009) semantics
for a weak denite determiner.
(46)

J ∅def K = [λtr : [λPhe,iti : ∃!x[x ∈ C&P (x)(tr )].ιx.P (x)(tr )]]

As desired, P1 and P2 provide the time at which the uniqueness presupposition is
evaluated. Since resource intervals are only present with strong D's and the only
strong D's in Mvskoke are (to my knowledge) demonstratives and the denite D, this
derives the obligatory deniteness of nominals with P1 and P2.
On this approach, a tenseless bare noun in Mvskoke is ambiguous between a denite DP with a featureless resource interval and an indenite with a free NP evaluation
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time variable. Bare nouns, regardless of their interpretation, appear to be temporally
independent (as seen in Chapter 5). This proposal captures their temporal independence without needing to suppose indenites also have resource interval variables.
Whichever variable saturates the temporal argument of a tenseless nominal is free
to refer to past and present times. Since the tenseless nominals are compatible with
past NP evaluation times, I correctly predict NTMs to be optional.4
(47)

Tensed Nominals
a.

b.

J [Ddef tr P1 λ2 [NT2 NP ]] Kg,t0 = ιx. JNK(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C& JNK(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P1-interval(t0 )

J [Ddef tr P2 λ2 [NT2 NP ]] Kg,t0 = ιx. JNK(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C& JNK(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
(48)

Tenseless Nominals
a.

b.

J [Ddef tr λ2 [NT2 NP ]] Kg,t0 = ιx. JNK(x)(g(r))
only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C& JNK(x)(g(r))

J [Dindef [NT2 NP ]] Kg,t0 = [λPheti : ∃x. JNK(x)(g(2)) & P(x)]

Tensed and Tenseless DPs in Mvskoke are thus parallel to tensed and tenseless
CPs in Cable's (2017) analysis of Tlingit. Just as Mvskoke past NTMs are optional,
Tlingit is a language with optional past tense. Both tenseless alternatives are able
to cover nonfuture times. Cable argues that Tlingit cessation implicatures are due to
competition between the tensed and tenseless alternatives. He proposes a principal,
4 According

to my proposal, tensed nominals have an additional temporal presupposition which
tenseless nominals lack. Consequently, one might expect Maximize Presupposition to require the
addition of a tense feature in contexts that support that presupposition. However, ? has argued that
if the structure lacks a tense feature altogether (i.e. it has an unmodied T head), it will not be a
presuppositional alternative to the structure with a tense feature. As such, Maximize Presupposition
will not govern the choice of one structure over the other.

307

repeated below from Chapter 5, example(70), that requires the use of the tenseless
alternative whenever the speaker's knowledge entails it.
(49)

Include UT inside the TT, whenever possible

If all the following conditions hold, then the speaker must use sentence S1,
and not S2:
a.

Sentences S1 and S2 are identical except for their T-heads (T1 and T2).

b.

J T1 Kw,t,g contains both t0 and t, while J T2 Kw,t,g = t0 .

c.

Both S1 and S2 are `assertable' (i.e., the speaker's knowledge entails

them).
(Cable 2017: 659)
A past tense utterance in Tlingit has a cessation implicature, unless the speaker
states that they don't know whether the tenseless alternative is true. If the cessation
implicatures of Mvskoke nominal P1 and P2 were generated in the same way, it should
be possible to cancel them with a statement of ignorance. However, as was shown in
Chapter 5, the change of state inference associated with P2 is not cancellable.
I propose that the change of state inference of P2 is dierent in nature from the
cessation implicature of P5 and verbal cessation implicatures such as those in Tlingit.
It is not the result of competition and pragmatic reasoning. Instead, I argue that
the interval picked out by g(r) determines the interpretation of P1 and P2. When
g(r) refers to a contextually salient interval in discourse (like a shared past experience
interval), then the NTM receives a discourse related meaning. When there is no
salient interval in context, g(r) receives a default value leading to a change of state
inference. I turn now to how the change of state inference arises.
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6.3.3 Accounting for the Change of State inference of P2
Although the most readily available meanings of P1 and P2 are their discourse
related meanings (especially the Shared Past Experience meaning), in certain contexts
they receive a change of state interpretation. These contexts are ones where the
existence presupposition of the denite determiner is satised, but there is no shared
past experience of the entity or previous mention in discourse. In just these cases
a speaker can use P2 (and presumably also P1) to indicate a change of state. A
key element of this type of context is that they support weak familiarity of the NP's
referent. According to Roberts (2002), an NP is weakly familiar if one of the three
conditions below applies.
(50)

Taxonomy of weak familiarity
a.

The entity is globally familiar from general culture or to the discourse
participants through perceptual acquaintance.

b.

The entity is entailed by context.

c.

The entity is accomodated by giving it a functional interpretation.
(adapted from Roberts 2002: 112)

With functional interpretations (50-c), Roberts includes relations such as those
triggered by possessive constructions. We see this with P2 in (51) where the possessive
DP Sam's ex-wife introduces a relation between Sam and his wife. The addressee
accommodates the existence of a unique wife of Sam's, making the DP weakly familiar.
In (51) nominal P2 receives a change of state interpretation.
(51)

Sam em

pvlse

mvyvnkē ares.

Sam im-

pálsi

ma=ankí: a:ì-ís

p2

Sam 3.dat- spouse dem=
`Sam's

ex-wife is here.'

go.about.sg.ipfv-ind
(PF-Mus-07/28/2021)
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Another context where a change of state meaning of P2 occurs is when the existence
of the entity is entialed by context (50-b). In (52), repeated from Chapter 5 example
(34), the context of the utterance (waiting in the district court judge's oce) and
world knowledge about the position entails the existence of a previous judge. Here,
too, P2 receives a change of state interpretation.
(52)

P2 Change of State Context: The position of district court judge is always
held by someone until he steps down and another judge takes his place. You
know both the current and the previous judges quite well, but I don't know
anything about them and haven't met them. You and I go to see the current
judge about a language project of ours. We have to wait to see him, which
is something the previous judge never did. While we are waiting to see him
you want to tell me this.
a.

Mehakt

owēyan,

(i)m-íha:k-ít

o:w-iy-â:n

wait.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1pl.ag-comp.ds
pumvlvkekot

os.

pom-alak-íko-:-t

ô:-s

1pl.dat-arrive.sg-neg-dur-ss be.pfv-ind

`We are waiting and he has not come.'
b.

Fvccēcv vnkē

tat

mehakēsekot

faccí:ca

=ankí: =ta:t (i)m-iha:k-í:-siko-:-t

judge

=

p2

=foc 3.dat-wait.ipfv-1pl.ag-neg-dur-ss

owvnks.
ô:w-ánk-s
be.pfv-p2-ind
`We never waited for the previous judge.'
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(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)

It is only these contexts in which P2 has a change of state inference. If the presupposition of the denite determiner cannot be accommodated, even if the context supports
a change of state interpretation, a P2 tensed nominal is simply infelicitous. An example of this is the P2 tensed nominal in (53), repeated from Chapter 5, example
(79).
(53)

P2 Indenite Change of State Context : Imagine that you and I are at the
Senior Center where we are organizing a hymn singing event. We know that
all these people have stepped down from their roles in the community and in
the churches. You think it would be right to see if anyone present is a former
women's leader so that you can ask them to lead us in a song. I notice you
going around and talking to the ladies one after another. I ask Who are you

looking for?
#Hoktvke enhomahtv
hokt-akí

vnkē

hopot

in-homáhta =ankí: hopó:-t

p2

woman-pl dat-leader =

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for that former women's leader.'
Speaker Comment: This is the one women's leader that you and I know.
(RMM-Mus-6/1/2021)
In these contexts, speakers regularly oer a correction of the context in which is supports a shared past experience or discourse anaphoric reading. If the presuppositions
of the denite determiner can be accommodated, then there appears to be a default
strategy of interpreting P2 as change of state.5
5I

do not have clear negative empirical evidence that the change of state interpretation of P1 and
P2 cannot appear on DPs that are strongly familiar. On the other hand, the only clear examples of
P1 and P2 with a change of state meaning are in contexts where the DP is only weakly familiar.
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There are two central facts that motivate the need to account for the change of
state inference of P1 and P2 in a dierent way from P5.
1. Nominals with P1/P2 cannot receive an indenite construal.
2. Nominals with P5 cannot receive discourse related construals.
These two facts are explained if P1/P2 must modify a resource interval of a strong
D (and therefore cannot appear in indenite DPs), but P5 cannot modify a resource
interval of a strong D (and therefore cannot receive discourse related interpretations).
This structural dierence between P1/P2 and P5 also explains why P1 and P2 are
not pragmatic competitors for P5 as we saw in Section 6.2.2.3. Because of their
dierent position and role, P1/P2 cannot be analyzed like the Mbyá Guaraní NTM

-kue. Consequently it is necessary to nd a dierent account of the change of state
inferences of P1 and P2 that i) explains why the inference only arises in context where
the DP is weakly familiar, ii) derives the non-cancellability of the inference, and iii)
works with the structural and interpretational dierences between Mvskoke NTMs
outlined above.
I propose that in contexts like (51) and (52), where there is no contextually salient
past situation to serve as a referent for the resource situation (g(r)), g(r) is by default
identied as a maximal situation exemplifying the noun phrase predicate. Following
Kratzer (2007), a situation s exemplies a proposition containing a stative predicate
i the proposition is true in all subsituations of s.6 In other words, if there is no part
of s where the proposition is not true. By this denition, situations exemplifying the
6 Kratzer

(2007) provides a denition for exemplication that is able to account for both homogenous and quantized situations. For propositions describing homogenous situations/states like there
is mud, an exemplifying situation has the denition I gave in my prose. For propositions describing
quantized situations like there are three teapots, an exemplifying situation is a minimal situation.
A minimal situation for a proposition p is a situation that has no proper parts in which p is true.
Since I am dealing solely with nominal predicates which are homogenous, I will only use the rst
half of Kratzer's denition for exemplication.
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proposition `x is a judge' will be all situations where x is a judge is true throughout
the situation. It will rule out any situation which has a subsituation where x is not a
judge. In eect, an exemplifying situation will be all and only those situations with
un-interrupted judgehood.
A situation is maximal i there is no larger situation where the predicate is true.
Taken together, a maximal exemplifying situation will pick out the largest situation
of un-interrupted judgehood. Any larger situation will necessarily include some parts
where x is not a judge. When g(r) is interpreted as the maximal exemplifying situation
for the nominal property it will identify a situation where x is a judge for the entirety
of that situation. When P2 modies the situation, it places it entirely in the past.
As a result, fvccēcv vnkē `judge P2' in (52) entails that x stopped being a judge after
that past situation.
To translate this to temporal semantics, the temporal trace of a maximal exemplifying situation will be the largest interval of time throughout which x bears the
NP property. It cannot be interrupted by an interval of time where the NP property
didn't hold of x. That is, it needs to be a connected interval which is homogenous
with respect to the nominal property. I dene temporal connectedness as in (54).
(54)

Temporal Connectedness: two moments m and m' are connected w.r.t. a
property P and an entity x i P (m)(x) ∧ P (m0 )(x) ∧ ¬∃m00 .[m ≺ m00 ≺

m0 ∧ ¬P (m00 )(x)]
Two moments are temporally connected with respect to a property and an individual
if there is no moment between the two at which the property doesn't hold of the
individual. This temporally connected interval additionally needs to be maximal.
Without maximality, P2 on a change of state reading could be compatible with the
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nominal property continuing to hold at the UT. I dene maximality for this interval
as in (55).7
(55)

Maximality: an interval t is maximal w.r.t a property P and an entity x i

P (t)(x) ∧ ¬∃t0 [t ⊂ t0 ∧ P (t0 )(x)]
If an interval is maximal, there is no larger interval throughout which the nominal
property holds. When g(r) refers to this maximally connected interval (which I will
abbreviate as τ (N P (x))) and there is a temporal presupposition that the interval is
past, the denotation of the DP will entail that the interval ended. I illustrate this for
the DP fvccēcv vnkē `the previous judge' in (52).
7 This

denition of maximality is drawn from Tonhauser's (2006) denition for states. Tonhauser
(2006) assumes that nominal predicates have a state eventuality argument instead of a temporal
argument. In her semantics for -kue, she makes use of the maximal temporal extension of the state
to encode -kue 's change of state property. I do not represent a state eventuality argument, but make
use of the same intuition about the maximality of this state.
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(56)

LF for `the previous judge'
DP

e
D

XP2

hhe, iti, ei

he, iti

∅def

XP3

hi, hhe, iti, eii

i

XP1

λ1

hiti

tr vnkē

NP

λ2

t
NT2

N0

hiti
x1

N

he, iti
fvccēcv
(57)

Terminal Node Denotations
a.
b.
c.

(58)

J fvccēcv Kg,t0 = [λx : [λt : judge(x)(t)]]

J P2 Kg,t0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t0 ). t0 ]

J ∅def Kg,t0 = [λtr : [λPhe,iti : ∃!x[P (x)(tr )].ιx.P (x)(tr )]]

Derivation of (56)
a.
b.
c.
d.

J NP Kg,t0 = judge(g(1))(g(2))

J XP1 Kg,t0 = [λt : judge(g(1))(t)]

J XP2 Kg,t0 = [λx : [λt : judge(x)(t)]]

J D Kg,t0 = [λPhe,iti : ∃!x[P (x)(g(r))].ιx.[P (x)(g(r))]

only dened if g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
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e.

J DP Kg,t0 = [λPhe,iti : ∃!x[P (x)(g(r))].ιx.[P (x)(g(r))]([λx : [λt : judge(x)(t)]])

only dened if g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
f.

J DP Kg,t0 = ιx. judge(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x[judge(x)(g(r))] & g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
In the context for (52), there is no salient referent for g(r) so it receives it's default
interpretation as τ (judge(x)). The denotation of the DP will be as in (59).
(59)

J DP Kg,t = ιx. judge(x)(τ (judge(x)))

only dened if ∃!x[judge(x)(τ (judge(x))) & τ (judge(x)) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
These denedness conditions will be met if 1) there is exactly one x who is a judge
throughout the maximal, connected interval for which x is a judge, and 2) the maximal, connected interval for which x is a judge precedes the evaluation time t0 (i.e. the
utterance time) but follows a time 60 years in the past of t0 . Judge in the context in
(52) is enriched and understood to mean the district court judge for the interlocutors'
district.8 As a result, the presuppositions will be met only if there is only ever one
district court judge at a time for their district. This accords with the world knowledge
made explicit in the context.
The temporal presupposition will require that the unique x the speaker is refering
to was a judge throughout a maximal, connected interval in the past. That is, it will
require that x stopped being the district court judge for their district, but it leaves
open the possibility that another such interval is ongoing at the utterance time. This
derives a change of state (as opposed to cessation) inference for P2. This is another
important dierence between the inference associated with P2 and P5. Not only are
they generated in very dierent ways, but one is a cessation implicature and the other
is a change of state inference.
8 This

enrichment is assumed to be a phenomenon that is distinct from contextual domain
restriction. As such, I don't discuss the phenomenon further.
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The reader may wonder why this would be the default referent for g(r). The idea
that maximal, self-connected entities are the most salient kinds of entities comes from
the philosophical and semantic discussion of objects and counting principle. Kratzer
(2007) discusses this issue as it pertains to dening minimal situations.
(60)

Minimality:

A situation is a minimal situation in which a proposition p is

true i it has no proper parts in which p is true.

(Kratzer 2007)

This denition is particularly important when considering situations that contain
count nouns. If we want a minimal situation for the proposition There are three

teapots, a situation containing exactly three teapots needs to satisfy this denition.
The problem arises when we consider whether a part of a teapot is still a teapot.
Kratzer summarizes the reasoning in this way:
(61)

My teapot would remain a teapot if we chipped of a tiny piece. Chipping o
pieces from teapots doesn't create new teapots, so...upon reection we might
have to acknowledge that there are in fact many overlapping entities that all
have legitimate claims to teapothood.

(Kratzer 2007)

This is not, however, the way that we go about counting teapots. We do not count
each one of these sub-parts of a teapot; rather we count the largest, self-connected
object that is a teapot, whether or not it is chipped. The most salient entities for
counting are maximal, self-connected entities (Casati & Varzi 1999).The notions of
maximality and self-connectedness are also relevant when dealing with mass nouns
or a-telic eventualities such as the state of an individual bearing a nominal property.
Take for example a mass noun like water and a situation with puddles of water on
the oor. When counting those puddles, we do not count half a puddle as a puddle.
Rather all the water that is not separated by dry oor is counted as one puddle. In
the same way, I propose that, for a state, the maximal, temporally connected interval
is the most salient unit for g(r) to refer to.
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In this section I demonstrated how my proposed analysis of P1 and P2 as modiers
of resource intervals/situations was able to derive the non-cancellable change of state
inference associated with these NTMs change of state meaning. In the next section,
I address how the various discourse related meanings of P1 and P2 are accounted for
on my analysis.

6.4 Discourse Related Meanings of P1 and P2
As I made clear in the previous section, P1 and P2 receive discourse related interpretations when the resource situation/interval is contextually supplied. There are
two main types of discourse related interpretations a nominal P1 and P2 can receive:
a Shared Past Experience (SPE) meaning and a Discourse Anaphoric meaning. In
this section I address the nature of the resource situation for these avors of meaning and how it is identied. As will become clear, a situation semantic approach is
more accurate in characterizing the discourse related meanings of P1 and P2 as situations are able to be small enough to satisfy the uniqueness condition of the denite
determiner. Evaluating the uniqueness presupposition using intervals is too strong.
Consequently, I frame the discussion in this section in situation semantics and address
the limitations of a temporal semantic framework.

6.4.1 Shared Past Experience
When asked to describe the meaning contribution of a nominal P1 and P2, most
Mvskoke speakers say that the tenses locate a time when the interlocutors saw the
intended referent of the NP. In other words, the tenses provide the time of a Shared
Past Experience of the NP's referent. This is illustrated for P1 and P2 in the examples
below, repeated from Chapter 5, section 5.3.1.
(62)

P1 Shared Past Experience Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get
approval for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and
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language teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving
each other updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You
ask me: Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yes, I spoke with the judge (that

we just saw).'
(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

(63)

P2 Shared Past Experience Context : One year ago I visited that current
teacher of mine that we saw at the grocery store the other day.
Ohrolopē hvnkevnkē, (mv) vmvhayv

vnkē

ohìolopí: hânki=ankí: (má) am-ahá:ya

=ankí:

year

one=p2

p2

(dem) 1sg.dat-teacher =

encukopericvyvnks.
in-cokopiìêyc-ey-ánk-s
3.dat-house.visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`One year ago I visited my teacher (that

we saw before).'

(RMM-Mus-11/19/2020, PF-Mus-3/22/2021)
For each example, the speaker translated the contribution of the NTM with the
bolded English expression in parentheses. As the translations in parentheses suggest,
the resource situation is a situation in the interlocutors' mutual past when they were
visually aquainted with the intended referent of the NP. We might characterize the
resource situation for (62) as in (64).
(64)

sr = ιs. speaker and hearer saw Mary in s
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When P1 modies the resource situation, it locates that situation within the P1interval (just now up to last night). Since the situation took place shortly before the
utterance, it is presumably present in each person's representation of the common
ground and easily identied by the addressee. The P1 DP fvccēcv isē `the judge (we
just saw)' will refer to the unique judge in the situation in (64).
Using intervals would require that there be just one judge in the resource interval,
the time surrounding the interlocutors conversation with Judge Mary. This would
minimally require there not to be other judges perceptually accessible to the interlocutors during that time. While this may be the case for (63), it is much less likely
to be the case in (65).
(65)

P1 Context : You and I went to a hymn singing last night and met a preacher
who was leading the hymns. Today at church, that preacher is here as a guest
pastor. We both see him and recognize him. You notice he dropped his hymn
book and want to mention that to me.
(Mv) erkenvkv

isē

esyvhiketv

(má) iìkináka =eysí: is-yaheyk-itá

p1

(dem) preacher =

cokv
có:ka

inst-sing-nmlz book

atakwihkes.
a:-tak-wéy<h>k-is
dir-loc-quit<pfv.p1>-ind

`(That)/The preacher (we met at another time) just dropped the hymnal.'
(RMM-Mus-4/6/2021)
The relevant resource interval for (65) is the interval surrounding the hymn singing
gathering the night prior to the utterance. It is unlikely, given the nature of the
gathering, that the intended referent of the DP erkenvkv `preacher' was the only
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individual satisfying that description during the interval in queston. With situations,
it is possible for the resource situation to be a minimal acquaintance situation. That
is, it's a situation containing the interlocutors and the preacher during their meeting
and nothing else.
The nature of the resource situations considered so far all involve visual acquaintance with the intended referent of the NP. With discourse related interpretations
of P1 and P2 there is a clear preference for the resource situation to involve visual
acquaintance. This is especially true when the NTM appears with a proper name. In
these cases, visual acquaintance seems to be obligatory. In (66), the speaker rejected
P1 and P2 if she and her interlocutor hadn't seen the individual in person.
(66)

Proper Name - No Visual Acquaintance Context : Imagine that you and your
spouse read an article about a Seminole artist, Shawn Harjo. You've never
seen the artist in person. One day you're at a gallery with your spouse and
see a picture with Shawn Harjo's signature on it. You tell your spouse:
Heyv vhakat,

Shawn Harjo (#vnkē/

#isē)

hiyá ahá:ka-t,

Shawn Harjo (#=ankí:/

#=eysí:)

p2/ #=p1)

this picture-nom Shawn Harjo (#=

vhayvtēt
aha:y-atí:-t
make.ipfv-p5-ss

os.
ô:-s
be.pfv-ind
`This picture, Shawn Harjo has made it.'
Speaker Comment: To use vnkē or isē, we would have to have met or seen
Shawn Harjo.

(RMM-Mus-2/4/2021)

When the proper name was substituted with a common noun, this speaker then felt
that visual acquaintance wasn't necessary. In (67), as in (66), the interlocutors know
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about the artist through an article. With a common noun, P1 does not require the
interlocutors to have seen the individual.
(67)

Common Noun - No Visual Acquaintance Context: Imagine you and your
spouse read an article this morning about a Seminole artist who is famous
for drawing scissor-tail ycatchers in all his art. You've never seen this artist
in person. You and your spouse want to see his art, so you go to an art
gallery. While you are there, you see a picture with a scissor-tail ycatcher.
That's the artist's trademark, so you call your spouse over and say:

isē

Heyv vhakvt,

nak-vhayv

hiyá ahá:ka-t

na:k-ahá:ya =eysí: aha:y-atí:-t

p1

vhayvtēt

os.
ô:-s

this picture-nom artist

=

`This picture, the artist (from

this morning) made this.'

make.ipfv-p5-ss be.pfv-ind

Speaker Comment: This would be like refreshing [my spouse's] memory about
the artist we read about.

(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)

The visual acquaintance requirement of proper nouns is a subject in need of further
research. It is interesting to note, however, that a similar requirment seems to hold
with English from -phrases. The English example in (68) is strange in the context in
(66) where there is no visual acquaintance with the individual.
(68)

Shawn Harjo from this morning/ from yesterday drew this picture.

(68) improves if the interlocutors have seen or met the artist in person.
As (67) demonstrates, the resource situation of a DP marked with P1 or P2 can
be a situation where the interlocutors were acquainted with the individual through
some means other than sight. When the individual is known to the interlocutors
from discourse as opposed to a physical encounter in the past, P1 and P2 have what I
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label Discourse Anaphoric construals. In these cases, the resource situation arguably
involves a more abstract notion of acquaintance.

6.4.2 Previous Mention & Discourse Anaphora
While discourse related constuals pf P1 and P2 frequently involve visual acquaintance, it is not the only means by which the interlocutors can be familiar with the
intended referent of the NP. As example (67) demonstrates, it is sucient for the discourse referent to be established in the common ground from previous conversation.
Discourse Anaphoric uses of P1 and P2 can i) refer to a time when the interlocutors
talked about the entity or, for a DP that is anaphoric to a linguistic antecedent, they
can ii) refer to an interval of time that was introduced with the discourse referent.
To illustrate the rst of these uses, consider (69). The context for the two utterances in (69-a) and (69-b) is a conversation in which the speaker rst introduces one
young man and then introduces a second young man. The conversation took place
entirely in the P1-interval, but the speaker can use P1 and P2 to distinguish between
the two young men by refering to their relative distance in conversation.
(69)

Previous Mention P1 & P2 Context : You are telling me about two young
men you teach Mvskoke to. You tell me rst about a young man who is very
analytical and tries to understand the grammar. Then you talk to me about
a second young man who is really good a picking up ways of saying things
and speaks very well. How would you tell me that you saw this young man
three months ago, but the rst young man visited you this morning.
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a.

isē

Hvse

tuccēnvnkē, este

mvnette {

hasí

toccî:n-ankí: ísti

manítti { =eysí: /

month three-p2

/

p1

person young

{=

/

apunicvyisē

} hēcvyvnks.

a:poneyc-ay-eys-í:

} hî:c-ay-ánk-s

talk.about.ipfv-1sg.ag-p1-nmlz } see.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind
`Three months ago, I saw the young man (I was just talking about).'
b.

Hvthvyvtkē-isē

este

hathayatkí=eysí: ísti
morning=p1

mvnette {

vnkē

/

manítti { =ankí: /

person young

p2

{=

/

apunvyicēyvnkē

} vncukoperihces.

a:poneyc-vy-ank-í:

} an-cókopiìéy<h>c-is

talk.about.ipfv-1sg.ag-p2-nmlz } 1sg.dat-visit<pfv.p1>-ind
`This morning, the young man (we talked about earlier) just visited me.'
(RMM-Mus-1/14/2021)
In contexts like these, P1 identies the referent most recently talked about and
P2 identies the referent talked about at an earlier time, very much like English the

former and the latter. When serving this kind of function, P1 and P2 don't refer
to the objective P1 and P2-intervals. (Nominal P2 in (69-b) doesn't mean that the
interlocutors talked about the young man at a time prior to today.) Instead, P1
and P2 indicate relative distance of their mention in discourse.9 Previous Mention
uses also seem to involve a more abstract resource situation. This situation wouldn't
necessarily be a situation with the entity refered to by the NP. Instead, it would be
9 The

exibility of the P1 and P2 intervals is an open question in the semantics of Mvskoke's
graded tenses. It has been addresses variously in the literature on graded tenses, but I do not
attempt address it further here.
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the situation of the interlocutors' conversation in which the discourse referent was
introduced.
Nominal P2 can also appear with a discourse anaphoric DP where it refers not to
the time of the previous mention, but to the time the speaker has a past experience
of the discourse referent. To illustrate consider the following two examples. In (70),
the sentence introducing kērrv `fortune teller' indicates that the speaker saw them at
a P2-time. Now that the time of the speaker's acquaintance with the fortune teller
is established in the common ground, the speaker can sux the second occurrence of

kērrv with P2. As the speaker comment indicates, this P2 claries that the fortune
teller refered to is the one from yesterday.
(70)

a.

Paksvnkē cokv-mvhayv ton

kērrv

paksankí: co:ka-mahá:ya ton

kí:ììa

yesterday book-teacher and

fortune.teller

tepakan,

hecakiyvnks.

iti-pâ:k-a:n

hic-â:k-ey-ánk-s

recip-be.with.pfv-comp.ds see-pl.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yesterday I saw a teacher and a fortune teller together.'
b.

Kērrv-vnkē

emponayiyvnks.

kí:ììa=ankí:

im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s

fortune.teller=p2 3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`I talked to the fortune teller.'
Linguist: Does this mean the fortune teller is retired, or that it's the one
from yesterday.
Speaker Comment: No, he's not retired. It's the one from yesterday.
(JWH-Sem-09/25/2020)

325

(71)

a.

Hvse

hvnkēvnkē

mvhayv

hasí

hanki:-ankí:

mahá:ya món faccí:ca

month one-p2

teacher

mon fvccēcv

and judge

etekērrēyvnks.
iti-ki:ìì-i:-ánk-s
recip-know.ipfv-1pl.ag-p2-ind

`One month ago I met with a teacher and a judge.'
b.

Mucv nettv hvtvm

mvhayv (vnkē)

hehcis.

móca nítta hatám

mahá:ya (=ankí:)

hí<h>c-ey-s

this

teacher

see<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

day

again

p2)

(=

`Today I saw the teacher again.'
c.

Mvhayvyē

monkvt os,

kihces.

mahá:y-ay-í:

mónka-t ô:-s

kéy<h>c-is

teach.ipfv-1sg.ag-dur still-ss

be.pfv-ind say<pfv.p1>-ind

`She said I'm still teaching. '

(RMM-Mus-04/06/2021)

Similarly for (71), the speaker introduces both a teacher and a P2-time of visual
acquaintance with the teacher into the discourse. This makes the discourse referent
and the past experience familiar enough for the speaker to later use a nominal P2. In
neither case does the nominal P2 indicate change of state.
For these Discourse Anaphoric uses it appears that the past experience is only
`shared' because it is established in discourse. I propose that the resource situations
for mvhayv `teacher' in (71) and kērrv `fortune teller' in (70) are the situations in
which the speaker only was visually acquainted with the discourse referent.
(72)

a.

sr = ιs. the speaker saw the fortune teller in s

b.

sr = ιs. the speaker met the teacher in s
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This resource situation can be identied by the addressee because it's been introduced
by the speaker along with the NP. In these cases, P1 and P2 provide the objective
time of the situation as indicated by the verbal tense on the preceding sentence. A
further question that should be addressed for this type of example is whether the
resource situation has to involve visual acquaintance between the speaker and the
NP's referent.
Having seen that P1 and P2 involve an evidential component in their verbal uses,
the fact that most of the resource situations for discourse related uses of P1 and P2
involve acquaintance is suggestive of a similar evidential component in their nominal
uses. One might suppose that to use a nominal P1 or P2, the speaker must be
personally acquainted with the NP's referent. There are several challenges to this
hypothesis. The rst challenge comes from the previous mention uses of P1 and P2,
especially the one in example (67). In this context, the speaker only knows of the NP's
referent through a secondary source. This would be a challenge for an evidential view,
but is compatible with the deniteness analysis that I take here because, regardless
of the evidential source, the discourse referent of the NP in (67) is already established
in the common ground. A second challenge is that an evidential analysis of nominal
P1 and P2 would have to either derive the deniteness eects through other means
or the evidential semantics would need to be in addition to the restriction to denite
DPs. This is because a purely evidential account would not rule out the use of P1
and P2 on indenites provided the speaker is acquainted with the entity intended to
witness the truth of the NP.

6.4.3 Invisibility Inferences
Past NTMs in many languages are accompanied by an inference that the entity
refered to by the NP is not visible to the interlocutors. Somali past tense determiner,
for instance, can be used to indicate that the NP's referent is not visible to the
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interlocutors. Lecarme (2008) reports that (73) is unacceptable in a context where
the daughter is visible to the interlocutors.
(73)

Inántaa-dii

úur

bay

leedahay.

girl-f.poss.2sg-def.f.past pregnancy foc.3.f.sg has.3.f.sg
Doctor to Mother: `Your daughter is pregnant.'

(Lecarme 2008: 213)

Additionally, Somali's present tensed determiner is unacceptable in contexts where
the NP's referent is not visible.
(74)

a.

Qálinkáy-(gii/*-gu)
pen.m.poss.1sg-

méeyey?

def.m.pst/*-def.m.pres q.is.m.sg

`Where is my pen?'
b.

Khaanád-da

buu

kú jiraa.

drawer-def.f.pres foc.3.m.sg in stay.pres.gen
`In the drawer.'

(Lecarme 2008: 212)

According to Lecarme, the present tensed determiner is unacceptable because it conicts with the sincerity condition of the question, i.e. that the speaker does not yet
know which answers to the question are true. The speaker would know the answer if
the pen were visible.
Similar invisibility inferences are reported for Salish languages with demonstrative systems that may encode tense information. Ivan & Özyldz (2016) propose a
pragmatic reasoning account for the invisibility inferences in Somali. They argue that
these inferences should only arise on permanent properties where a cessation inference is implausible, such as with a globally unique entity like the sun. When the past
tensed determiner appears on sun, Ivan & Özyldz report that speakers conclude the
sun is eclipsed.
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(75)

Shalay

waxa=an rinayay cadcee-dii.

det.pst

yesterday foc=1sg look.pst sun`Yesterday I looked at the sun.' ≡

eclipsed

(Ivan & Özyldz 2016: 634)

These authors propose that when the cessation implicature is calculated for (75),
there is a clash with world knowledge. The cessation implicature is that x is not a
sun in context C at the TT. At this point the speaker reasons that the sun cannot
stop being the sun, so the it must be that x is not in context C at the TT. If the sun
is not in C, then the sun must not be visible in C.
Reasoning of this kind is not necessary to account for the invisibility inference of
P1 and P2 on their SPE meanings. I propose that the inference that the entity is not
in the present context is simply a reection of the type of contexts where NTMs are
most common. These inferences are not limited to a particular kind of nominal (such
as a permanent property) and they are easily defeated.
To illustrate, speakers often describe the meaning of P1 under an SPE meaning
as in (76) below.
(76)

Mv erkenvkv

isē

vnmēkosapvnks.

má iìkináka =yeysí: an-mi:kosâ:p-ánk-s

p1

dem preacher =

`That preacher (that

1sg.dat-pray-p2-ind

was just here) prayed for me (once before).'

Speaker Comment: Like he was here, but now he's gone.
(PF-Mus-10/29/2020)
The inference associated with P1 in this example is that the preacher the speaker
is refering to was present and visible to the interlocutors at the P1-interval, but is
no longer present or visibile to the interlocutors at the UT. This inference can be
defeated by a context like those in (77) and (78). These contexts establish both a

329

moment of shared past experience in the P1/P2-interval and the preacher's presence
in the utterance context.
In (77), the interlocutors met the preacher in the P1-interval (last night). He is
in the utterance context and seen by both interlocutors before they talk about him,
identifying him from the other preachers as the one they know from the P1-interval.
In this context, the speaker can still use nominal P1 on the noun preacher.
(77)

P1 Context : You and I went to a hymn singing last night and met a preacher
who was leading the hymns. Today at church, that preacher is here as a guest
pastor. We both see him and recognize him. You notice he dropped his hymn
book and want to mention that to me.
(Mv) erkenvkv

isē

esyvhiketv

(má) iìkináka =eysí: is-yaheyk-itá

p1

(dem) preacher =

cokv
có:ka

inst-sing-nmlz book

atakwihkes.
a:-tak-wéy<h>k-is
dir-loc-quit<pfv.p1>-ind

`(That)/The preacher (we met at another time) just dropped the hymnal.'
(RMM-Mus-4/6/2021)
Similarly for P2, the context in (78) establishes a time of shared past experience in
the P2-interval and the preacher's presence in the utterance context. The interlocutors
can still refer to the preacher with P2, identifying him as the preacher they know from
the P2-interval, but without generating an invisibility inference.
(78)

P2 Context : You and I went to a prayer meeting last week and met a preacher
who was leading the prayer meeting. Today at church, that preacher is there
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as a guest pastor. We both see him and recognize him. You notice he doesn't
look very well, and want to mention that to me.
Mv erkenvkv

vnkē

(takhuerat)

enhereko

má iìkináka =ankí: (tak-hôyì-a:t)

p2

dem preacher =

omēt

ares.

ó:m-i:-t

a:ì-ís

in-hiì-íko-:

(loc-stand.sg.pfv-comp) 3.dat-good-neg-dur

be.like-dur-ss go.about.sg.ipfv-ind
`That preacher (we

met before)

(standing there), is going about like he's

not well.'
Speaker comment: without takhuerat, we'd need to nod in his direction or do
lip pointing.

(RMM-Mus-4/6/2021)

A key feature of the contexts is that there are multiple entities that t the NP
description. As a result, the speaker needs to add more information to help the
addressee identify the intended referent. As the speaker comment in (78) makes clear,
the speaker must accompany the NTM with a deictic gesture. Together the NTM
and the deictic gesture provide the addressee with both an indication of the location
of the individual and a time of shared past experience of the particular individual.
If the entity were physically present and unique in the context of utterance, simply
using a demonstrative NP (perhaps accompanied by a deictic gesture) would suce to
indicate the intended referent. When the entity is not physically present, the speaker
needs to include more information in order for the addressee to identify the referent.
Thus, contexts where the entity is not present are the most readily imagined contexts
when an NTM would be needed.
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6.5 Resource Domains and NP Evaluation Times
In this nal section, I address the distinction between resource domains and NP
evaluation times. In the structure and semantics I have proposed, when P1 or P2
modify the resource interval of a strong D, they end up also restricting the nominal
predication time. They do so because the resource interval saturates the temporal
argument of the noun. To see how this comes about consider the structure in (79).
(79)

Structure of a P1/P2 DP embedding a tenseless NP
DP
XP2

D

∅def

XP3

XP1

λ1

tr P1/P2

λ2

NP
NT2

N0

x1 N
In the above structure, the strong D with P1 and P2 embeds a tenseless NP and
the resource interval binds the NP evaluation time (NT). As has been noted since
Tonhauser (2007), with tenseless nouns the nominal predication time and the NP
evaluation time are not distinct. One can only tell them apart if the NP has an NTM
like Guaraní -kue or Mvskoke P5/tatē which shifts the nominal predication time into
the past of the NP evaluation time. In the resulting denotation of this referential DP,
the temporal argument of the nominal predicate is g(r).
(80)

J N P2 Kg,t0 = ιx. N(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x ∈ C. N(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
My proposal thus predicts that P1/P2 not only restrict the time of the resource
domain, but also the nominal predication time.
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This is a desireable result because, in Mvskoke, this prediction is borne out. The
context of (81) sets up a time of shared past experience of an individual (Melanie)
which is distinct from the time that the nominal predicate cokv-hēcv `student' was
true of her. Since the interlocutors know this individual as a student, do not know
any other nominal predicate that would be true of her, and cannot remember her
name, cokv-hēcv is the only appropriate nominal predicate for them to use. (81-a)
tests whether they can use P1 to indicate the time of shared past experience but
use the a nominal predicate that was true of her at a more remote time. If it were
acceptable, this would show that the SPE-time and the nominal predication time are
independent of each other.
(81)

Imagine that Sue and Jimmy used to work in the cafeteria at a boarding
school. There were several students who occasionally helped in the kitchen
and Melanie was one of them. Jimmy and Sue have both been retired for
many years. This morning Sue and Jimmy are in town and they see Melanie.
They remember she was a student at the boarding school but can't remember
why they recognize her (and they can't remember her name). Then an hour
or so later, Sue exclaims...
a.

Hompetv-cuko vtotkēyof,

mv {hoktē /

hompita-cokó ato:tk-i:-ô:f

ma {hoktí: /

food-house
#cokv-hēcv}

work.ipfv-1pl.ag-when dem {woman /

isē

(Melanie hocefkv) pumvnicēt

#co:ka-hí:ca} =eysí: (Melanie hocífkv) pom-anéyc-í:-t
#student}

p1

=

(Melanie name)

owemvts.
ô:w-imát-s
be.pfv-p3-ind
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1pl.dat-help-dur-ss

`When we worked in the kitchen, that {woman / #student} (that

we

just saw) (Melanie is her name) used to help us.'
Speaker Comment: No, that makes me think that Melanie is still a
student. It would assume that Jim and Sue retired more recently and
Melanie had a few more years of school to go.
b.

vnkē

Hompetv-cuko vtotkēyof,

mv cokv-hēcv

hompita-cokó ato:tk-i:-ô:f

ma co:ka-hí:ca =ankí:

food-house

work.ipfv-1pl.ag-when dem student

(Melanie hocefkv) pumvnicēt

owemvts.

(Melanie hocífkv) pom-anéyc-í:-t

ô:w-imát-s

(Melanie name)

p2

=

1pl.dat-help-dur-ss be.pfv-p3-ind

`When we worked in the kitchen, that former student (Melanie is her
name) used to help us.'

(RMM-Mus-6/22/2021)

According to the speaker comment, the infelicity of using the noun cokv-hēcv `student'
in (81-a) is due to the inference that the nominal property student holds of the
individual (Melanie) at the P1 interval (the SPE-time). Instead, the speaker can
refer to Melanie with another nominal predicate such as hokte `woman' which holds
at the time of SPE. Or they can use P2 on its change of state meaning as in (81-b),
not to indicate the most recent shared past experience of Melanie, but to emphasize
that the nominal predicate student no longer holds of her.
This example points to the NTM temporally locating the nominal predication
time in addition to a time of the resource domain. There is only one situation in
which my analysis predicts the resource interval and the nominal predication time
to be distinct - when a DP is marked with both P5 and P1/P2. I have proposed a
structure for DPs which can, in principle, accommodate both the discourse related
NTMs (P1 and P2) and the change of state NTM (P5/tatē). Such a DP would have
the structure represented in (82) where a strong D embeds a tensed NP.
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(82)

Structure of a P1/P2 DP embedding a tensed NP
DP
XP3

D

∅def

XP4

XP2

λ1

tr P1/P2

XP1

λ2

TP

(exh)
NT2

T0
T

NP

P5 x1 N
In a DP of this kind, P5 would shift the nominal predication time into the past
of the NP evaluation time. The NP evaluation time, being bound by the resource
interval, would be temporally located by the higher NTM. An example denotation
for a DP with P2 and P5 is given in (83).
(83)

J N P5 P2 Kg,t0 = ιx.∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(r) & JNK(x)(t0 ) & ¬ JNK(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x : x ∈ C&∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(r) & JNK(x)(t0 ) & ¬ JNK(x)(g(r)) &
g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )

This doubly tensed NP might be interpreted as refering to the unique x who bore
the N property at a time before the P2-time, but ceased to bear the N property by
the P2-time. If P2 is interpreted as a time of SPE, this might mean the interlocutors
encountered a former N at a P2 time.
There is textual and elicited data supporting the possibility of P5 co-occuring with
P1/P2. The textual example below comes from a recent interview transcribed as part
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of the Muskogee (Creek/Seminole) Documentation Project. As a naturally occuring
example, I take this as evidence that the combination is possible in Mvskoke.
(84)

mv vculvke

vnkē

ma acol-akí

=ankí: =tá:ti: ma foll-atí:

p2

dem edler-gpl =

tatē

p5

=

`when our elders were here...'

mv fullvtē

tat
=ta:t

dem go.about.tpl-p5 =atn

(Robin Soweka Interview, 0:06:48-0:06:53)

The meaning of such DPs is, as yet, unclear. Several of the speakers I have consulted
with do not accept multiple NTMs in a DP. For those that do, they feel uncertain
about the interpretation of such DPs. A survey of a larger number of speakers has
potential to shed light on both what sub-dialects of Mvskoke allow these multiple
NTM constructions and what the possible meaning combinations are. My analysis
makes several predictions about these constructions.
First, I predict that P1 and P2 should not be able to co-occur in a single DP
because they occupy the same structural position and each strong D has only one
resource domain variable. Secondly, as the denotation in (83) shows, my analysis
predicts that the two NTMs should not be independent of each other. The lower
P5/tatē should take the time indicated by the P1/P2-modied resource interval as
its NP evaluation time. This feature of my analysis in particular predicts that only
certain meaning combinations should be possible. I predict that the most natural
interpretation of a multiple NTM construction would involve an SPE interpretation
of P1/P2 and a Change of State interpretation of P5/tatē. Such combinations would
indicate a shared past experience of an entity that has already ceased to bear the
nominal property. A less probable combination, but which might be possible in
certain contexts, is an SPE interpretation of P1/P2 with a Decessive interpretation
of P5/tatē. These constructions might indicate a shared past experience of an already
deceased individual. One consultant oered a context where she and her interlocutor
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had just visited someone's grave. Combinations where P1/P2 receive Change of State
interpretations should be marginal or completely ruled out. If both NTMs received
a Change of State interpretation, we might expect the two to cancel each other out.
A former former chief would be a former chief who was re-instated. The nal
combination of a Change of State P1/P2 and a decessive P5 should be completely
ruled out. There can be no further change of state for a deceased individual.
If my analysis is incorrect and the resource domain and NP evaluation times are
independent of each other, all the meaning combinations would be plausible. This
would be due to the possibility that the change of state or time of death indicated by
P5/tatē be interpreted relative to the UT and the higher NTM. A P2-P5 combination,
for instance, could indicate an SPE of a now deceased individual or it could indicate
a past change of state for a now deceased individual. Further research is needed to
test these predictions.
To summarize, in my current proposal, the only situation when the resource interval and the nominal predication time are distinct times is in multiple NTM constructions. Furthermore, the resource interval and the NP evaluation time are never
independent. My proposal that the resource interval binds the NP evaluation time
accurately accounts for the judgments in example (81) above, where P1 indicates not
only the time of the shared past experience, but also the nominal predication time.
However in her 1995 dissertation, Musan actually argues that the two are independent of each other based on data from English (tenseless) DPs. The conicting
data from English raises the question of whether it is correct to analyze Mvskoke P1
and P2 as temporally modifying the domain restriction variable of nominals. In the
remainder of this section, I review Musan's data and argument for separating the
resource domain from the NP evaluation time. I then provide evidence from Mvskoke
and from English that suggests temporal modication of the resource domain is at
the heart of the disparity between Musan's English data and the Mvskoke data.
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Musan (1995) develops a stage-based account of temporally dependent and independent noun phrases. The data that leads her to use stages are examples like that
in (85). The context for (85) provides the value for the quantier's resource domain,
that is the people who were in the speaker's class when she was in school. Crucially,
the resource domain variable C cannot apply to the same spatio-temporal stage of
an individual as the nominal property. The individuals quantied over are not in the
speaker's class and scientists at the same time.
(85)

Now imagine we have a conversation about the people that were in my class
when I went to school. Thinking about what these people are doing today, I
state [the following sentence].
Most scientists are unmarried.

(Musan 1995: 111)

Examples like this one lead Musan to conclude that what is quantied over by the
presuppositional determiner most is temporal parts of individuals and not maximal individuals. She uses the notion of stages from Carlson (1977), that is, spatio-temporal
parts of spatially and temporally extended individuals.
With this stage-based semantics for individuals and with the background that
quanticational determiners come with contextually-provided domain restriction variables, Musan accounts for what makes presuppositional NPs temporally independent,
but cardinal NPs temporally dependent. For Musan, the dierence is in where the
nominal property is mapped: to the quantier's restrictor for presuppositional NPs
and to the quantier's nuclear scope for cardinal NPs. The dierence between them
is nicely illustrated by her semantics for the two following sentences.
(86)

Most students were sick.
a.

mostx−st C [student] [sick]

b.

For most maximal stages xst
such that ∃yst , zst such that xst = yst ⊕ zst ,
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and JCK(yst )=1 and J student K (zst )=1,

xst has a part vst ,

such that JsickK(vst )=1.
(87)

There were few students sick.
a.

fewx−st C [student & sick]

b.

For few maximal stages xst
such that JCK(xst )=1,

xst has a part vst ,

such that JstudentK(vst )=1 and JsickK(vst )=1.
For (86), separating the stages eectively separates the predication times of each
predicate in the clause (including the contextually supplied resource domain). In (87),
mapping the nominal predicate to the nuclear scope of the quantier ensures that the
nominal predicate and the main predicate apply to the same spatio-temporal stage
of xst .
Later in her discussion, Musan addresses overt temporal adverbs and their ability
to temporally modify the resource domain of the noun. She particularly addresses

in -temporal adverbials in English and German. In both of the sentences below, the
in -phrase provides the temporal location of the resource domain variable.
(88)

a.

In 1993, most students were sick.
Temporally independent meaning: most individuals in 1993 who are students now were sick in 1993.

b.

In 1993, there were few students sick.
Temporally dependent meaning: few individuals in 1993 who were students and sick in 1993.
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The dierence between the possible temporal interpretations of the nominal predicate
follow from the semantics Musan lays out in (86) and (87).
In the semantic analysis I develop for Mvskoke nominal tenses, I too have argued
that these nouns have resource domains which are temporally restricted. However,
this discussion of Musan's semantics does not t the interpretation of Mvskoke tensed
nominals. To illustrate this, consider the English version of an SPE P1 sentence.
(89)

I spoke-P2 to the judge P1.
a.

thex−st P1 [judge] [I-spoke-to]

b.

The unique xst such that

∃yst , zst such that xst = yst ⊕ zst ,
and [λx.∃t. the speaker and hearer saw x at t](yst )=1 and [λx.x is a
judge](zst )=1,

xst has a part vst ,
such that [λx.∃t0 .t0 ≺ tc & sp(c) came to believe at t0 that sp(c) spoke to

x at t0 ](vst )=1.
Applying Musan's semantics with P1 modifying the resource domain yields the wrong
results. In particular, it predicts that the time of the shared past experience of x need
not be the same time as the nominal predicate judge holds of that individual. There
is no reason why the time of the shared past experience should overlap with the
nominal predication interval. Consider for example the context from (81), repeated
in (90) below. In this context the interlocutors have a shared past experience of
someone whom they both know as a student from a prior time when they worked
at a school. Furthermore, these interlocutors may have reason to believe that this
individual is no longer a student, but nevertheless wish to refer to the individual
as a student (for instance, if they do not remember that person's name). Musan's
semantics predicts that a Mvskoke speaker could use the DP mv cokv-hēcv isē `that

340

student (from earlier)' to point out such an individual. This prediction, however, is
demonstrably incorrect for Mvskoke SPE tensed nominals, as seen in (90).
(90)

Imagine that Sue and Jimmy used to work in the cafeteria at a boarding
school. There were several students who occasionally helped in the kitchen
and Melanie was one of them. Jimmy and Sue have both been retired for
many years. This morning Sue and Jimmy are in town and they see Melanie.
They remember she was a student at the boarding school but can't remember
why they recognize her (and they can't remember her name). Then an hour
or so later, Sue exclaims...
Hompetv-cuko vtotkēyof,

mv {hoktē / #cokv-hēcv}

hompita-cokó ato:tk-i:-ô:f

ma {hoktí: / #coka-hí:ca}

food-house

isē

work.ipfv-1pl.ag-when dem {woman / #student}

(Melanie hocefkv) pumvnicēt

=eysí: (Melanie hocífka) pom-anéyc-í:-t

p1

=

(Melanie name)

owemvts.
ô:w-imát-s

1pl.dat-help-dur-ss be.pfv-p3-ind

`When we worked in the kitchen, that {woman / #student} (that

we just

saw) (Melanie is her name) used to help us.'
Speaker Comment: No, that makes me think that Melanie is still a student.
It would assume that Jim and Sue retired more recently and Melanie had a
few more years of school to go.

(RMM-Mus-6/22/2021)

This example points to the NTM temporally locating the nominal predication time
in addition to a time of shared past experience. Given that Musan separates the
temporal location of resource domain and the nominal predication time, is it correct
to analyze Mvskoke nominal tenses as temporally modifying the domain restriction
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variable of nominals? Another possibility would be that the time of shared past
experience is just a modier of the nominal predication time.
To further investigate this question, let us consider two other temporal modiers
that appear in English noun phrases: future and from -temporal adverbials. In earlier
sections, I often translate the contribution of P1 and P2 on their SPE meaning with
phrases like from yesterday or from this morning. The change of state meaning of
NTMs is most often translated with English former. In English, fomer and future
shift the nominal predication time of a noun, but a from -temporal adverbial can be
shown to temporally locate the nominal predication time. Consider the two sentences
below. The noun phrase two UN delegates is temporally independent in (91-a) and
temporally dependent in (91-b).
(91)

a.

In 1973, two UN delegates were attending Boerne High School.

b.

In 1973, there were two UN delegates attending Boerne High School.

In the rst example, we understand the sentence to be asserting that two current
UN delegates attended Boerne High School in 1973 before they were UN delegates.
The second example can only receive the strange interpretation in which the two
individuals in question were both UN delegates and high school students in 1973.
Adding future to the (b) example shifts the nominal predication time of UN del-

egate. The resulting interpretation is approximately that of (91-a).
(92)

In 1973, there were two future UN delegates attending Boerne High School.

However, a from -temporal adverbial does not x the unnatural interpretation that
(91-b) receives. Instead, (93) requires the individuals to both be UN-delegates a few
years prior to the present as well as being UN-delegates in 1973. At best this sentence
seems to involve time travel; at worst it is nonsensical.
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(93)

In 1973, there were two UN delegates from recent years attending Boerne
High School.

Thus a from -temporal adverbial is not able to shift the nominal predication time,
however it does temporally locate it similarly to Pasts 1 and 2 on their SPE meaning.
Also similar to Mvskoke SPE tenses, English from -temporal adverbials must locate
both the time of shared past experience and the nominal predication time. Consider
this variation on (90).
(94)

Context: Sue and Jimmy are teachers at a high school. The school newsletter
routinely publishes the pictures, names, and occupations of distinguished
alumni. Jimmy and Sue were in town this morning and saw someone they
recognized from the distinguished alumni newsletter. They know this person
was a student at the high school, but they cannot remember the name of the
student or what they are doing now. An hour or so later, Sue exclaims...
??The high school student from this morning is a UN delegate now.

Having demonstrated that Mvskoke SPE P1 and P2 and English from -temporal adverbials temporally locate a time of shared past experience and the nominal predication
time, I now show evidence that they both also must locate the resource domain.
Consider a variation of Musan's scientist example. The context establishes a
domain restriction to the two individuals in my cohort as well as a moment of shared
past experience earlier this morning that overlaps with the nominal predication time.
(95)

Context: This morning I introduced you to several professors, one of which
was in my cohort when I was in school. Imagine that later that day I am
talking about the two people in my cohort when I was in school. Thinking
about what they are doing today, I say...
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a.

I had two people in my cohort when I was in school. They have both
gone on to do very dierent things.

b.

The business woman misses doing research, and the professor complains
about his work-life balance.

c. #The business woman misses doing research, and the professor from this

morning complains about his work-life balance.
The dierence between these sentences has to do with subtly dierent predictions
concerning the uniqueness requirement of the denite determiner. There is exactly one
individual who was in my cohort and is now a business woman; there is also exactly
one individual who was in my cohort and who was a professor in the shared past
experience situation this morning. However there is more than one individual that is
a professor in the shared past experience situation this morning. Consider Musan's
stage semantics if the from -temporal adverbial located the nominal predication time,
but not the resource domain.
(96)

The professor from this morning complains...
a.

thex−st C [professor from this morning] [complains]

b.

The unique xst such that

∃yst , zst such that xst = yst ⊕ zst ,
and [λx. x is in the speaker's cohort](yst )=1 and [λx.∃t0 .x is a professor
at t0 & t0 is included in this morning](zst )=1,

xst has a part vst ,
such that [λx.x complains](vst )=1.
The semantics above would be true in the situation in (95). This is because the
uniqueness requirement of the denite article would be satised. Even though the
professor in my cohort is one of several professors at the meeting this morning, he is
the only one who is both in my cohort and a professor at the meeting this morning.
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Consider, however, a semantics in which from this morning provides the content
for the resource domain.
(97)

The professor from this morning complains...
a.

thex−st [C from this morning] [professor] [complains]

b.

The unique xst such that

∃yst , zst such that xst = yst ⊕ zst ,
and [λx.∃t0 . the interlocutors met x at t0 and t0 is this morning](yst )=1
and [λx.x is a professor](zst )=1,

xst has a part vst ,
such that [λx.x complains](vst )=1.
In the formula in (97-b), the uniqueness requirement is evaluated in the meeting
situation this morning. This predicts (95-c) to be infelicitous in the context provided
because the uniqueness requirement is not met. This accords with the intuition
presented above. Thus, a from -temporal adverbial restricts the resource domain and
aects the uniqueness requirement of the denite article.
The judgment reported in (95-c) requires careful consideration of the context,
the meaning of the denite determiner, and the contribution of the from -phrase.
Furthermore, it crucially relies on so-called bridging uses of English denites (Clark
1977). It is not yet clear that Mvskoke bare nouns, tensed nominals, or demonstrative
NPs are acceptable in bridging contexts. For all these reasons, eliciting a judgment
for a similar example in Mvskoke was unsuccessful and requires further investigation.
I have argued, based on data from Mvskoke SPE tensed nominals and English

from -temporal adverbials, that an overt temporal restriction on the resource domain
obligatorily restricts the nominal predication time. The Schwarz-style situation semantics for resource domain restriction that I have used predicts this bundling of the
resource domain and nominal predication time. In Schwarz's (2009) semantics, strong
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determiners (quantiers and denite determiners) are projected with a resource situation variable as their rst argument. Situations, as Schwarz notes, have temporal
dimensions and thus serve the role of both world pronouns and temporal pronouns.
The resource situation variable thus serves as both a restrictor to the quantier or
denite determiner and as the temporal argument of the noun (and thereby serves to
locate the nominal predication time).
Schwarz' situation pronouns are thus able to capture the temporal independence
of presuppositional noun phrases in sentences like Enç's (1981) example in (98).
(98)

Every fugitive is in jail.

Schwarz' semantics for the determiner every, assigns dierent situation variables to the
restrictor and the nuclear scope of the quantier. The nominal predicate (mapped to
the restrictor) is evaluated in the resource situation; the verbal predicate is evaluated
in the clause's topic situation.
(99)
(100)

J every K = λsr .λPhe,sti .λQhe,sti .λs.∀x[P (x)(sr ) → Q(x)(s)]
J (98) K = λs.∀x.[fugitive(x)(sr ) → in-jail(x)(s)]

Since the resource situation has temporal coordinates and is independent of the topic
situation, the nominal predicate is able to hold at a dierent time from the verbal
predicate. The resource situation denes a situation which restricts the domain of
quantication of the determiner and provides the situation in which the nominal
predicate is to be evaluated. The meaning could be paraphrased as follows: for every
individual x who was a fugitive in some contextually salient past situation, that
individual is now in jail.
This kind of semantics, which I have used for the Mvskoke NTMs, predicts that a
resource situation modier will modify not only the domain of quantication but also
the nominal predication time. Consider my temporal semantics for the DP in (81-a).
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(101)

J mv cokv-hēcv isēr Kg,t0 = ιx. student(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x.student(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P1-interval(t0 )
The interval g(r) serves to restrict the domain in which the uniqueness requirement
is evaluated and is the temporal argument for the noun. Since it serves this dual
function, the temporal location of the resource domain and the nominal predication
time cannot be dissociated.
This approach accounts for the Mvskoke SPE data and the English from -temporal
adverbial data. However, Musan's initial example is left unaccounted for. Her scientist example (repeated as (102)) clearly demonstrated that the resource domain and
nominal predication time can be distinct. An answer to this comes from Schwarz'
(2012) proposal for extending his account to capture Kusumoto's (2005) account of
temporally independent nouns.
(102)

Now imagine we have a conversation about the people that were in my class
when I went to school. Thinking about what these people are doing today,
I state [the following sentence].
Most scientists are unmarried.

(Musan 1995: 111)

Kusumoto (2005) argues against noun phrases having free temporal pronouns. Her
main piece of evidence is that the sentence in (98) can be true in a slightly dierent scenario where the individuals are fugitives at dierent times in the past (Kusumoto 2005:
342). The correct semantic representation of (99) must therefore allow for the temporal/situation argument to vary from fugitive to fugitive. Kusumoto achieves this
by having strong determiners introduce existential quantication over times. To extend his situation semantics to account for this interpretation, Schwarz (2012) slightly
modies his denition in (99) to include existential quantication over sub-situations.
(103)

J every K = λsr .λPhe,sti .λQhe,sti .λs.∀x.[∃s0 .[s0 ≤ sr &P (x)(s0 )] → Q(x)(s)]
(Schwarz 2012: 455)
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On this semantics sr denes a broader situation covering all the occassions on which
the individuals were fugitives. For each one there is a (possibly dierent) sub-situation
in which they are fugitives. Schwarz' semantics retains the contextually supplied
situation that restricts the domain of quantication, but allows for co-varying subsituations for each individual in that domain. To extend this to Musan's scientist
example, the resource domain could be broad enough to cover the individuals from
the time they were in the speaker's class up to the present. That broad situation
would have sub-situations in which certain individuals were scientists. This broad
resource situation would also need to be rather thin so as to include only the relevant
individuals from the time they were students to the present. This would rule out the
situation accidentally including any individuals in addition to the group of students
in the speaker's class who happen to be scientists throughout the interval.

Figure 6.1.

Broad resource domain analysis of (85).

I propose that the relevant dierence between Musan's scientist example in (102)
and the Mvskoke SPE tensed nominals and English nominals with from -temporal
adverbials is that resource domain in (102) is temporally unrestricted. The resource
interval/situation in a simple English noun phrase is free to pick up a referent that
covers past and present times. But when the noun phrase contains a from -temporal
adverbial it restricts the temporal location of the resource interval/situation. Simi-
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larly, Mvskoke P1 and P2 modify the resource interval and thereby the sub-interval
that serves as the nominal predication time.
I propose the following nal denotation for a Mvskoke SPE tensed nominal like
the one in (81-a). Since the resource interval (entirely contained in the P1-interval) is
a super-interval of the nominal predication time t0 , this denotation correctly predicts
the P1 nominal to be unacceptable in the context in (81).
(104)

J mv cokv-hēcv isē Kg,t0 = ιx.∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(r) & student(x)(t0 )

only dened if ∃!x.∃t0 .t0 ⊆ g(r) & student(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P1-interval(t0 )
This predicts that tenseless nominals in Mvskoke should allow for a very broad resource interval, as in English. Testing this prediction is a subject for future eldwork.
In summary, this section has examined the dierence that Musan (1995) noted
between resource domains and nominal predication times. By examining English

from -temporal adverbials and Mvskoke's SPE nominal temporal morphemes, it was
shown that when the resource domain is temporally restricted, the nominal predication time is similarly restricted. I proposed that examples like Musan's scientist
example are only possible when the resource domain is free to take a very broad
interval as it's referent.

6.6 Conclusions
The last two chapters have presented a detailed descriptive presentation of Mvskoke
NTMs and proposed a split analysis to capture the dierent features and interpretations of the NTMs. I proposed a separation in the type of meaning an NTM can
have cross-linguistically. While some NTMs (like Somali denite determiners) have
Discourse Related interpretations, others (like Mbyá and Paraguayan Guaraní) have
Change of State interpretations. Discourse Related interpretations dier from Change
of State in that only the later entail that the nominal property has ceased to hold.
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(105)

Interpretations of NTMs
a.

Discourse Related
(i)

Discourse Anaphoric

(ii)

Previous Mention

(iii) Shared Past Experience
b.

Change of State
(i)

Change of State

(ii)

Decessive

Each category includes two or more sub-types of interpretations. Discourse Related meanings include those refering back to a linguistic antecedent (Discourse
Anaphoric) or a mention in previous conversation (Previous Mention), as well as
Shared Past Experience (which is prominent in Mvskoke). Change of State meanings
include Change of State and Decessive meanings. Both involve the nominal property ceasing to hold of the individuals, but the Decessive meaning indicates that the
property no longer holds because the individual no longer exists.
Chapter 5 identied several dierences between Mvskoke P1/P2 and P5. P1 and
P2 exhibit both Discourse Related interpretations and Change of State interpretations, though they lack a Decessive meaning. Mvskoke P5, on the other hand, exhibits
both Change of State and Decessive meanings, but lacks any Discourse Related meaning. The change of state inference for P2 and P5 were shown to be non-cancellable
inferences. Furthermore, I provided evidence that nominals with P1 or P2 are necessarily denite, but nominals with P5 can be indenite. Because of these dierences
(summarize in Table 6.1), I developed separate analyses of P1/P2 and P5.
I argued that Thomas' (2014) analysis of Mbyá Guaraní -kue could be directly
extended to P5/tatē. On this analysis, P5/tatē is a tense operator that occurs lower
in the noun phrase. It takes an NP evaluation time variable, NT, as its temporal
argument. This temporal variable is present in all Mvskoke NPs and accounts for
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Table 6.1.
NTM
P1/P2
P5/tatē

Summary of Dierences between P1, P2, and P5

Discourse Related Change of State
3
3
7
3
P2 & P5: Non-cancellable change

Decessive Denite
7
3
3
3
of state inference

Indenite
7
3

the temporal independence of bare nouns as well as larger NPs. Due to obligatory
competition with tenseless NPs (which are evaluated at the NT), a P5 nominal is
always accompanied by an embedded cessation implicature.
(106)

Structure of a nominal with P5
DP
D

XP2
XP1

∅def /indef λ1

TP

(exh)
NT2

T0
T

NP

P5 x1 N
On this approach, P5 receives the same denotation that it does on verbs. It is a
relative, non-restricted past tense. Due to its position in the DP, P5 is compatible
with a denite or indenite nominal (whether indenites are accompanied by a null
determiner or are derived through type-shifting). The exhaust operator generates
an embedded cessation implicature. Consequently, a nominal marked with P5 will
entail that the nominal predicate does not hold at the NP evaluation time. A sample
denotation of an indenite DP with P5 is given in (107-b).
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(107)

a.
b.

J P5 Kg,t0 = [λPhiti .[λt.∃t0 .t0 ≺ t & P(t0 )=T]]

J Dindef N P5 Kg,t0 = [λQ.∃x.[∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(2) & N(x)(t0 ) & ¬ N(x)(g(2))]

&Q(x) = T ]
Following work by Schwarz (2012) and (Keshet 2010), I proposed a structure for
nominals that has two locations for a temporal pronoun.10 The lower position is the
one occupied by the NP evaluation time variable (NT) and the higher position is
occupied by a temporal variable restricting the time of the resource situation. My
proposal for P1 and P2 is that they are features modifying this temporal variable,
which I dub the resource interval.
In a nominal with P1 or P2, the resource interval locally binds the NT within the
NP. This structure is represented below.
(108)

Structure of a P1/P2 DP embedding a tenseless NP
DP
XP2

D

∅def

XP3

XP1

λ1

tr P1/P2

λ2

NP
NT2

N0

x1 N
On this analysis, P1 and P2 as NTMs have quite dierent semantics from their
verbal uses. I propose that in DPs, they are partial identify functions on the resource
interval and introduce a presupposition restricting the interval to the P1-interval
10 Schwarz

(2012) and Keshet (2010) motivate a structure of this type for situation pronouns.

352

(109-a) or the P2-interval (109-b). In the next chapter, I explore two paths to unifying
my account of P1 and P2.
(109)

a.
b.

J P1 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ P1-interval(t0 ). t0 ]

J P2 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ⊆ P2-interval(t0 ). t0 ]

As resource situations are arguably only introduced with strong D's (Schwarz 2009),
P1 and P2 are correctly predicted to be incompatible with indenite NPs. In the
denotations below, P1 and P2 temporally restrict the resource interval, which is the
interval in which the entity is unique.
(110)

a.

J Ddef N P1 Kt0 = ιx. N(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C& N(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P1-interval(t0 )
b.

J Ddef N P2 Kt0 = ιx. N(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x.x ∈ C& N(x)(g(r)) & g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )

Although for the sake of continuity I framed these denotations in temporal semantics,
they could easily be reframed with situation semantics. In this case, P1 and P2 would
provide the temporal location of a situation.
(111)

a.
b.

J P1 Kt0 = [λsr : τ (sr ) ⊆ P1-interval(t0 ). sr ]
J P2 Kt0 = [λsr : τ (sr ) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 ). sr ]

I derive the two meanings of P1 and P2 NTMs through two dierent values for g(r). 1)
Discourse Related meanings come about when the resource situation is contextually
provided. And 2) Change of State meanings come about when the resource situation
receives a default value as the maximal situation exemplifying N(x). When this
situation is placed entirely in the past, the P1/P2 tensed nominal entails change of
state. The dierences between the NTMs on my analysis are summarized in Table
6.2.
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Table 6.2.
Height
Function
Change of State

Dierences between Analyses of P1/P2 and P5
P1/P2
D-level
Partial Identity Function
Change of State Entailment

P5/tatē
NP-internal
Tense Operator
Cessation Entailment11

Finally, as was discussed in the preceding section, my proposal correctly predicts
that P5 is able to co-occur with P1 and P2. Further investigation of these complex
NTM constructions will potentially shed light on i) whether the current analysis is
on the right track, and ii) whether the resource situation and the NP evaluation time
are in a binding relationship or are independent of each other.
On my proposal, the split between Mvskoke NTMs parallels the split I proposed
for Mvskoke verbal tenses. Just as P5 was proposed to be a relative past tense on
verbs with the ability to be the lower of two tenses in a complex tense construction
(Chapter 3), I proposed that P5 as an NTM occurs in a lower position in a noun
phrase and is relative to the NP evaluation time. P1 and P2 were shown to only
occur in the highest TP in the verbal domain; my proposal for their role in noun
phrases has them higher in the structure and relative to the UT, which I represent as
a parameter of evaluation on the denotation function. Importantly, P1-P3 on verbs
were argued to encode a moment of coming to believe the proposition. This is a
substantial dierence between my analysis of the NTMs and the verbal tenses. In the
next chapter, I pursue two avenues to unifying my approach to P1 and P2 and rene
the open questions for the project of unication.

11 The reader will recall that Thomas' (2014) anlaysis derived the change of state inference of P5
as an obligatory cessation implicature. As such it is in a sense an entailment.
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CHAPTER 7
BROADER QUESTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In preceding chapters, I examined three complex properties of the Mvskoke past
tense system. First, in Chapter 3, I analyzed the evidential inferences associated with
the tenses. Specically, we saw that Pasts 1-3 imply the speaker has direct evidence
while Past 5 implies the speaker has indirect evidence. Secondly, in Chapter 4, I
examined the graded intervals that the tenses cover and demonstrated that Pasts
1-3 indicate how far in the past the event happened but Past 5 is a general past tense.
Thirdly, in Chapters 5 and 6, I described and analyzed the nominal uses of Pasts 1,
2, and 5. What appeared to be a one-dimensional, graded tense system was shown to
be a multi-faceted tense system operating in both the verbal and nominal domain.
In the verbal domain, I motivated a split between Pasts 1-3 and Past 5 illustrated
in Figure 7.1 (repeated from Chapter 4, Figure 4.4). Represented above the time
line, Past 5 is a general past tense and does not encode any type of evidential restriction or belief predicate. Represented below the time line, Pasts 1-3 encode specic,
overlapping intervals of past time as well as a belief predicate responsible for the direct evidence (and simultaneous learning) inferences. I furthermore demonstrated a
structural asymmetry between Pasts 1-3, which only ever occur as the highest tense
in a complex tense construction, and Past 5, which can occur as a lower tense. This
is schematized in (1).
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Past 5
60 yrs 10 yrs

1 yr

Yest.

Past 3

Now

Past 1
Past 2

Figure 7.1.
(1)

Times Covered by Past Tenses

Structural Asymmetry between P1-P3 and P5 in a TP
TP1
P1-P3/P5 →

T

*P1-P3/P5 →

TP2
T AspP
...

In the nominal domain, we saw this split again between the graded, nominal Past 1
and Past 2 and the non-graded, nominal Past 5. With nouns, two dierences between
these nominal pasts became apparent. First, P1 and P2 are restricted to denite
DPs and P5 is compatible with indenite DPs. And secondly, nominal P1 and P2
were shown to exhibit a Discourse Related meaning in addition to the Change of
State meanings that all three nominal pasts communicate. These dierences led me
to propose a parallel structural asymmetry in the nominal domain. P1 and P2 were
argued to sit higher in the DP structure as sister to the D head where they modify
the resource situation (which I called the resource interval). Past 5 was argued to sit
lower in the structure within an NP-internal TP projection (following Thomas 2014).
A schematization of the proposed structure is given below
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(2)

Structural Asymmetry between P1/P2 and P5 in a DP
DP
D

P1/P2 →

D tr NT

P5 →

TP
T0
T NP

I argued that the higher position can result in both Discourse Related and Change
of State interpretations, but the lower position is only associated with a Change of
State interpretation. Furthermore, the two Change of State interpretations must be
derived in dierent ways.
In this chapter, I rene some broader questions concerning a unied account of
the tenses across the verbal and nominal domains and sketch two possible avenues
towards unication. I then briey address the lack of interaction between nominal
and verbal tenses. In section 7.3, I discuss how the study of Mvskoke aects the
cross-linguistic picture of evidential-tenses, of graded tenses, and of nominal tense.
Finally, I acknowledge some outstanding issues and conclude.

7.1 Towards a unied approach to Mvskoke tenses
In attempting to unify my approach to the Mvsoke tenses, this discussion focuses
on the central dierence between my accounts - evidentiality. There are, however,
inferences associated with P1 and P2 in both domains that could be characterized as
evidential. Before discussing possibilities for unication, I review what those inferences are and how they were derived in my approach to verbal and nominal tense.
The reader will recall that the proposed Belief-State Change analysis for verbal
P1-P3 was built almost entirely around the evidential inferences associated with P1P3. Specically, it was designed to capture the intuition that P1-P3 require the
speaker to have learned about the proposition as it was happening. This most often
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manifests itself as an inference that the speaker has direct evidence for their assertion.
This is illustrated in (3), repeated from Chapter 3, example (2).
(3)

P1 Reportative Context: Your friend Mary tells you that she talked to the
chief today. How would you tell me Mary talked to the chief today?
a.

Mary mucv-nettv Mēkko emponayvtēs.
Mary moca-nítta mí:kko im-ponâ:y-ati:-s.
Mary this-day

chief

3.dat-talk.pfv-

p5-ind

`Mary talked to the chief today.'
Linguist: Could you say (3-b)?
b.

#Mary Mēkko emponayis.
Mary

mí:kko ím-pona:y-êys-s.

Mary

chief

3.dat-talk.ipfv-

p1-ind

`Mary talked/was talking to the chief.'
Speaker Comment: No, that would be if you saw her talking to him.
(DLR-Mus-06/17/2019)
Consequently, verbal P1-P3 were given semantics wherein they are temporally anchored belief predicates. I proposed that they encode a come-to-believe predicate
as in (4), repeated from Chapter 4.1
(4)

a.

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhi,ti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t & g(i) ∞ day(t).

come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) ]]

b. J P2i Kc,g = [λPhi,ti .[λti : 60.years.ago(t) ≺ g(i) ≺ t.
come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) ]]

1 To facilitate a comparison with nominal P1 and P2, I have omitted the world variable in the
semantics in (4).
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b.

J P3i Kc,g = [λPhi,ti .[λti : 60.years.ago(t) ≺ g(i) ≺ t &

far(t,g(i)) > s(far).

come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),P(g(i))) ]]

The come-to-believe predicate identies a moment when the speaker changes
their beliefs, when they go from being agnostic about the proposition to believing
that proposition to be true. In monoverbal constructions like the one in (3-b), a
Past 1 sentence will assert that the speaker came to believe that Mary was talking
to the chief while it was happening. This will most often result in an inference that
the speaker has direct evidence for their assertion. In auxiliary constructions like
(5-a) (repeated from Chapter 3, example (30)), which I argued were past perfect
constructions, a Past 1 sentence will assert that the speaker came to believe that her
friend cut his hair after the fact. This results in an inference that the speaker has
indirect evidence for their assertion.
(5)

Past 1 Learning After-the-Fact : Imagine your friend Bill called you on the
phone just now and told you he just cut his hair.
a.

Vnhesset

vnhuehiket

ekv-esse

an-híssi-t

an-hoyh<êy>k-it

iké-yssi

1sg.dat-friend-nom 1sg.dat-call.<pfv>-ss head-hair

warehpvt

hakis.

wa:ì-í<h>p-át

ha:k-éys-s

p5 become.ipfv-p1-ind

cut-ip<pfv>-

`My friend called, he cut his hair.'
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b.

#Vnhesset

vnhuehiket

ekv-esse

an-híssi-t

an-hoyh<êy>k-it

iké-yssi

1sg.dat-friend-nom 1sg.dat-call<pfv>-ss head-hair

wahres.
wá<h>ì-is
cut

<pfv.p1>-ind

Speaker Comment: No, you'd say (5-a).

(IAH-Mus-11/2018)

These inferences are not encoded in the semantics for each tense in (4) per se,
but are inferred from the context and the temporal relation between the moment of
coming-to-believe and the run-time of the event. This is a crucial dierence between
P1-P3 and P5; P5 does not encode coming-to-believe (6). Although P5 is most often
used in indirect evidence contexts, I demonstrated that P5 is compatible with both
direct and indirect evidence.
(6)

J P5i Kc,g = [λPhi,ti .[λti : g(i) ≺ t. P(g(i)) ]]

I argued that P5 is only associated with an indirect evidence implicature at times
in the P1-P3 intervals when P1-P3 are conversationally relevant competitors. When
P1-P3 aren't relevant competitors, P5 is not associated with any evidential inferences.
There are two dierences between a P1-P3 sentence and a P5 sentence that lead
to the evidential inferences for the former and none for the latter. First, while an
assertion with P5 commits the speaker to believing the truth of the proposition (because of felicity conditions on assertion), a P1-P3 assertion commits the speaker not
only to believing the truth of the proposition, but also to having evidence to back up
that belief. The strength of a P1-P3 assertion lead me to consider the possibility of
these tenses encoding a factive predicate, i.e. come-to-know instead of come-tobelieve. The second dierence is that the come-to-believe predicate asserts the

existence of a particular moment when the speaker learned of the proposition. This is
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not to say that there was not a moment when the speaker came to believe a P5 proposition. Presumably, if a speaker is asserting a proposition, they, at some moment or
other, added that proposition to their beliefs. Rather, in choosing P1-P3 over P5,
a speaker identies that moment as the topic time. The existence of an identiable
and salient moment of belief-state change invokes the idea that there was a particular
situation that led the speaker to add the proposition to their beliefs. A situation
that would justify believing a proposition is most likely a situation with some strong
evidence for the truth of the proposition. When the moment of encountering that
evidence situation (the moment of learning) overlaps with the event time, one infers
evidence is direct. When the moment follows the event, one infers that evidence is
indirect. In this way, my proposal indirectly invokes the idea of an evidence situation
or event of acquiring evidence which is foundational to approaches to evidential-tenses
(see discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.3). This evidence situation gives us a way to
think about how evidentiality might be invoked with the nominal tenses.
An evidential component was notably absent from my proposal for nominal P1
and P2. They were given purely temporal semantics as partial identity functions on
resource intervals. Their denotations are repeated below.
(7)

a.
b.

J P1 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ≺ t0 &t0 ∞ day(t0 ). t0 ]

J P2 Kt0 = [λt0 : 60.years.ago(t0 ) ≺ t0 ≺ t0 .t0 ]

If there is evidentiality at play with tensed nominals, it is most likely to be found in
the Shared Past Experience (SPE) meanings of P1 and P2. As discussed in Chapter 6,
section

??, an SPE meaning requires either i) that the interlocutors became visually

acquainted with the entity x or ii) that the interlocutors are familiar with x from
previous discourse. These two construals of the SPE meaning are illustrated below
(repeated from Chapter 6, examples (62) and (69)).
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(8)

P1 Shared Past Experience Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get
approval for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and
language teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving
each other updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You
ask me: Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yes, I spoke with the judge (that

we just saw).'
(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

(9)

P1 Previous Mention Context : You are telling me about two young men you
teach Mvskoke to. You tell me rst about a young man who is very analytical
and tries to understand the grammar. Then you talk to me about a second
young man who is really good a picking up ways of saying things and speaks
very well. How would you tell me that you saw this young man three months
ago...

isē

Hvse

tuccēnvnkē, este

mvnette {

hasí

toccî:n-ankí: ísti

manítti { =eysí: /

month three-p2

person young

p1

{=

/

/

apunicvyisē

} hēcvyvnks.

a:poneyc-ay-eys-í:

} hî:c-ay-ánk-s

talk.about.ipfv-1sg.ag-p1-nmlz } see.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind
`Three months ago, I saw the young man (I
(RMM-Mus-1/14/2021)
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was just talking about).'

In Chapter 6, the requirements of the SPE meaning were enforced through the presence of a covert denite determiner. The determiner's uniqueness presupposition
ensured that the individual modied by the nominal P1 or P2 was already in the
common ground or their existence was entailed by the common ground. Both mutual visual acquaintance and a previous mention in discourse serve to add a discourse
referent to the common ground. Change of State interpretations of nominal P2 were
also denite and were shown to arise in contexts where the existence of the individual
were entailed by the common ground.
However, one may reasonably wonder whether the deniteness eects are a byproduct of the evidential semantics of P1 and P2 and not vice versa. For instance,
if nominal P1 and P2 encoded a similar belief predicate to their verbal counterparts,
this predicate might require that the speaker came to know of the individual at the
time indicated by the tense. In the general case, this leads to the inference that the
speaker encountered the individual in their physical context. But in some cases, this
might be satised if the speaker came to know of the individual through their mention
in previous discourse. In both cases the situation of coming to know the individual
might be reasonably assumed to include just that individual and the speaker. If
this situation served as the domain of quantication, NPs with a nominal P1 or P2
might end up being interpreted as denites since there would be only one individual
in the small domain of quantication who satises the NP predicate. This idea takes
inspiration from Schwarzschild (2002).
In this section I explore two paths to a unied account of the tenses. First, I
explore the possibility that both verbal and nominal instances of P1 and P2 encode
similar belief predicates. In the verbal domain, the belief predicate is responsible for
the evidential inferences of P1-P3; in the nominal domain, the belief predicate is
responsible for the deniteness eects of P1 and P2 as well as the avors of the SPE
and discourse anaphoric meanings. Second, I explore the possibility that P1-P3 do
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not encode evidentiality at all. On this approach, the evidential inferences associated
with the verbal tenses would be due to a functional head not present in DPs. The SPE
and discourse anaphoric interpretations of P1 and P2 would be due, as I've sketched
in previous chapters, to the presupposition of the covert denite determiner and the
presence of g(r) in the context. I discuss possible implementations and consequences
of each option.

7.1.1 Unication Option 1: Encoding evidentiality for P1-P3 in both
domains
There are two parts to the project of exploring whether nominal P1 and P2 encode
evidentiality just as they do in the verbal domain. The rst project is to nd a way
to derive the deniteness eects from the evidential semantics of the tenses instead
of the covert denite determiner posited in Chapter 6. The second project is to
work evidentiality into the semantics of the nominal tenses in a similar fashion to
the evidential semantics of the verbal tenses. As the reader will have noticed, it
would be a curious coincidence if the very tenses which on nouns are accompanied
by denite semantics and shared past experience interpretations are accompanied by
evidential inferences on verbs that could be described as indicating familiarity with the
eventuality described by the proposition. This section renes the project of unifying
the tenses as evidential morphemes and claries where the work of unication leads
and what questions remain.
To begin, I discuss the similarities between the evidential meanings of verbal
and nominal tenses that motivate this approach. The most natural interpretation
of nominal P1 and P2 is indicating a past time of visual acquaintance. One could
imagine this to be the nominal equivalent of the direct witness inferences associated
with P1-P3 in the verbal domain. In Chapter 3, we saw that this direct witness
inference was just one possible way that a speaker could have learned about an event
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as it happened. However, for the sake of argument, I set that data aside and imagine
that the direct witness inference is indeed semantically encoded by the verbal tenses.
If this were so, we might characterize direct witness as involving an encounter with an

eventuality in the actual world and visual acquaintance as involving an encounter with
an entity in the actual world. In a similar way, one might view previous discourse as
a secondary source through which one can become acquainted with an entity, just as
reports and live TV were secondary sources through which one could learn about an
eventuality. Given these similarities, P1 and P2 in the nominal domain might encode
a moment of acquaintance with an entity. Marking a noun with P1, for instance,
would indicate a P1-time when the interlocutors became acquainted with the entity
described by the nominal predicate. This acquaintance could be either through direct
visual perception or through the introduction of the entity as a discourse referent in
conversation.
If the interlocutors are acquainted with an entity, it follows that the entity is represented in the common ground. The evidential meaning of the tenses could therefore
be potentially responsible for the deniteness restrictions imposed by nominal P1 and
P2. Ideally, a tensed bare noun would be indenite as I've argued for tenseless bare
nouns (in Chapter 2), and the uniqueness/maximality of the entity would come about
entirely because of the evidential and temporal semantics of nominal P1 and P2.
As attractive as this approach might seem, a signicant challenge is that it is
not clear how exactly the uniqueness requirement found with P1- and P2-marked
NPs would follow from a simple Share Past Experience meaning. As we saw earlier,
it is easy to imagine a situation which would license an indenite DP with a SPE
interpretation. Consider the context in (10) (repeated from Chapter 5, example (80)).
In this context, the interlocutors have a shared past experience of a group of ve elders
from the night before (a P1 time). Although the SPE meaning of the nominal tense is
supported in the context, a P1 tensed nominal is nevertheless anomalous. According
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to the speaker comment, the reason is that uniqueness is not satised. Although a
bare noun in (10-b) can receive an indenite interpretation, a tensed bare noun in
(10-a) must refer to a unique elder from the P1-interval that both interlocutors are
able to identify.
(10)

Group Shared Past Experience P1 Context: Last night you and I went and
sat in a waiting room hoping to be cast in a TV show. There were ve
elders there. We had to leave early. When we went back this morning, you
started looking for any one of the ve elders from last night to ask them what
happened after we left. I don't know which one you are looking for and you
don't have any particular one in mind. I ask, `Who are you looking for?' Can
you answer with (a)?
a.

#Este vcule
ísti

isē(n)

hopot

owis

acóli =eysí:-(n) hopó:-t

person old

.

o:w-éy-s

p1-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

=

# `I'm looking for that elder (from last night).'
Speaker Comments: That's one certain elder...the one you and I knew
specically.
b.

Este

vcule(n)

hopot

ísti

acóli-(n) hopó:-t

owis.
o:w-éy-s

person old-(acc) look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind
`I'm looking for an elder (any elder).'
(RMM-Mus-5/25/2021 & PF-Mus-5/18/2021)
Similarly, P2 cannot mark an indenite, cardinal DP even in a context which
supports the interlocutors having a shared past experience of the larger group. In
(11), the interlocutors both saw all ten students at a time in the P2-interval. However,
using P2 on the DP `two students' is infelicitous. As the speaker comment suggests,
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the interlocutors have to be able to identify a unique pair of two students refered to
by the DP.
(11)

Group Shared Past Experience P2 Context : Imagine I'm teaching a class with
10 students and you come in to give an announcement in the rst portion
of the class. You see the ten students. Then you leave. The next day, I am
talking to you about the class and mention that I asked a question that I
didn't expect anyone to be able to answer, but when I asked the question,
two students answered me back.
a.

Vpohkv enhayin,

cokv-hēcv hokkolvtēket

apóhka in-hâ:y-ey-n

coka-hí:ca hokkô:l-atî:k-it

question 3.dat-make.pfv-1sg.ag-ds student

two-up.to-ss

vmvyoposkakvnks.
am-áyoposk-â:k-ánk-s
1sg.dat-answer-pl.pfv-p2-ind

`When I asked the question, (up to) two students answered me back.'
b.

#Vpohkv enhayin,

cokv-hēcv hokkolvnkē

apóhka

coka-hí:ca hokkô:l=ankí:

in-hâ:y-ey-n

question 3.dat-make.pfv-1sg.ag-ds

student

two=p2

vmvyoposkakvnks.
am-áyoposk-â:k-ánk-s
1sg.dat-answer-pl.pfv-p2-ind

`When I asked the question,

those two students answered me back.'

Speaker Comment: I would have to know who these two persons are;
perhaps the two that you pointed out to me among the ten.
(RMM-Mus-02/18/2021 & JWH-Sem-10/13/2020)
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These examples challenge the notion that the Shared Past Experience component
to nominal P1 or P2 is sucient to explain the observed uniqueness/maximality
associated with tensed nominals. Uniqueness appears to be a requirement on top of
the evidential meaning.
An additional challenge to this idea comes from Change of State construals of
nominal P2. In (12) (repeated from Chapter 5, example (79)), there again appears
to be no obvious connection between the uniqueness requirement and evidentiality.
(12)

P2 Indenite Change of State Context : Imagine that you and I are at the
Senior Center where we are organizing a hymn singing event. We know that
all these people have stepped down from their roles in the community and in
the churches. You think it would be right to see if anyone present is a former
women's leader so that you can ask them to lead us in a song. I notice you
going around and talking to the ladies one after another. I ask Who are you

looking for?
#Hoktvke enhomahtv
hokt-akí

vnkē

hopot

in-homáhta =ankí: hopó:-t

p2

woman-pl dat-leader =

owis.
o:w-éy-s

look.for.ipfv-ss be.ipfv-1sg.ag-ind

`I'm looking for that former women's leader.'
Speaker Comment: This is the one women's leader that you and I know.
(RMM-Mus-06/01/2021)
In the above example, the Change of State use of P2 is also associated with uniqueness.
However, it is unclear that Change of State contexts involve the same evidential
meaning we see with Shared Past Experience construals of P2. If P1 and P2 encode
shared acquaintance, then that meaning should be present whenever P1 or P2 is
licensed. However, Change of State construals of P2 do not require both interlocutors
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to be acquainted with the entity. In example (13) (repeated from Chapter 5, example
(34)), the context is careful to establish that there is no shared past experience of the
previous (district court) judge.
(13)

P2 Change of State Context : The position of district court judge is always
held by someone until he steps down and another judge takes his place. You
know both the current and the previous judges quite well, but I don't know
anything about them and haven't met them. You and I go to see the current
judge about a language project of ours. We have to wait to see him, which
is something the previous judge never did. While we are waiting to see him
you want to tell me this.

Fvccēcv vnkē

tat

mehakēsekot

faccí:ca

=ankí: =ta:t (i)m-iha:k-í:-siko-:-t

judge

=

p2

=foc 3.dat-wait.ipfv-1pl.ag-neg-dur-ss

owvnks.
ô:w-ánk-s
be.pfv-p2-ind
`We never waited for the previous judge.'

(RMM-Mus-7/20/2021)

This example has demonstrated that the shared nature of the acquaintance with
the entity in SPE uses of P1 and P2 does not extend to the Change of State uses
of P2. It is unclear whether a Change of State use of P2 requires acquaintance in
the relevant sense. The context in (13) is compatible with the speaker having a past
experience of the entity, but I currently do not have evidence showing that this is
necessary for a Change of State use of P2. For the sake of the discussion here, I will
assume that P1 and P2 do require the speaker to be acquainted with the entity either
from a past experience or a past mention. Consequently, a unied account of P1 and
P2 should not require the evidence for the entity to be shared by the interlocutors.
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This conclusion nds support in the literature on evidentiality. Evidence has been
argued to be priviledged information and pattern with subjective expressions like
rst-person belief (Korotkova 2016). This view aligns with the account I gave of
the evidential component of the verbal tenses wherein P1-P3 are sensitive only to
the speaker's beliefs. This discussion has led us to the conclusion that the nominal
tenses (if they encode evidentiality) encode only the speaker's evidence. The shared
component of the SPE meaning needs to be derived in some other way.
Given the questionable status of evidentiality in Change of State contexts and the
persistence of the uniqueness requirement, it is doubtful that uniqueness is related to
or derived from any evidential meaning of the nominal tenses. Another possibility,
however, is that the deniteness eects of the nominal tenses might ultimately be due
to the way in which those tenses restrict the resource situation of the nominal. The
view of specic indenites proposed by Schwarzschild (2002) provides a possible path
to explaining the deniteness eects of tensed nominals. Schwarzschild proposes to
derive the exceptional scope of certain indenites as an eect of having a singleton
set as the domain of existential quantication. In the following example from Fodor
& Sag (1982), the indenite a friend of mine from Texas is interpreted as if it scopes
outside the if-clause.
(14)

If a friend of mine from Texas had died in the re, I would have inherited a
fortune.

The intuition behind the exceptional scope of (14) is the the speaker has a specic
individual in mind that the indenite refers to. Schwarzschild proposes that these socalled referential indenites are rendered scopally inert because they are implicitly
restricted by a domain of quantication whose extension is a singleton set. When the
domain of quantication is restricted to a singleton set, specic indenites behave
like denites in their scope-taking abilities and in refering to a unique entity.
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Mvskoke's nominal tenses could be understood to severely restrict the domain of
quantication and thereby account for the denite-like behavior of a tensed nominal.
One could imagine that the nominal tenses restrict the domain of quantication to
a singleton set containing a specic individual that the speaker encountered at the
past time. On this approach, we could think of P1 and P2 as signals of this singleton
restrictor like the English adjectives certain or specic. By obligatorily narrowing
the restrictor to a singleton set, P1 and P2 would have the eect of limiting the
denotation of the NP to unique individuals. The precise details of an approach of
this kind are left for future work.
For the sake of this discussion, let us suppose that the deniteness eects of
tensed nominals can be accounted for along these lines. It was also noted that the
evidentiality encoded by nominal P1 and P2 is quite similar to the belief-predicate
encoded by the verbal tenses. As a rst pass towards a unied account, we might
try to give nominal P1 and P2 the same semantics they were given in Chapter 3 (see
(4)). This denotation for P1 and P2 would t into a Thomas (2014) style nominal
structure, as illustrated below. Since on this approach the deniteness eects of
tensed nominals are derived, I represent tensed nominals as combining with a covert
indenite determiner.
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(15)

Thomas-style Nominal Structure
DP2

het, ti
D

DP1

hheti, het, tii

heti

∅∃

2

TP
t
tN T

T'

hiti
T

NP

hit, iti

hiti

isēi
P1i

t2

N

he, iti
fvccēcv
judge

This structure is not the one I ultimately proposed for P1 and P2. Rather it is
parallel to the structure I gave to P5/tatē. When the structure is composed as in
(17), a P1 tensed nominal receives the (ultimately incorrect) denotation in (16-e).
(16)

Derivation of ∅∃ fvccēcv isē
a.
b.

J NP Kc,g = [λt. judge(g(2))(t)]

J T0 Kc,g = [λti : g(i) ≺ t & g(i) ∞ day(t). come-to-believe

(sp(c),g(i),judge(g(2))(g(i)))]
c.

J TP Kc,g = come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),judge(g(2))(g(i)))
only dened if g(i) ≺ g(NT) & g(i) ∞ day(g(NT))
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d.

J DP1 Kc,g = [λx. come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),judge(x)(g(i)))]
only dened if g(i) ≺ g(NT) & g(i) ∞ day(g(NT))

e.

J DP2 Kc,g = [λQheti .∃x.[come-to-believe(sp(c),g(i),judge(x)(g(i)))
∧Q(x)]]
only dened if g(i) ≺ g(NT) & g(i) ∞ day(g(NT))

These semantics assert the existence of an entity x that the speaker came to believe
was a judge at the contextually given time g(i). It will be only be dened if g(i) is
in the P1-interval. What this yields is a meaning where the speaker introduces an
entity that they rst learned was a judge at a P1-time. Given the semantics of the
come-to-believe predicate, this requires that the speaker not know x is a judge

prior to the P1-time. Later-Than-Matrix SPE uses of Past 1 are a problem for this
predicted semantics. One such example is illustrated in (17) (repeated from Chapter
5, example (26)).
(17)

P1 Shared Past Experience Context : Imagine you and I are trying to get
approval for our language project and we are trying to speak to judges and
language teachers. Yesterday I spoke with Judge Mary. Today we are giving
each other updates and Judge Mary walks past, greets us, and walks on. You
ask me: Have you spoken with anyone about our project?
Ehe, fvccēcv

isē

emponayiyvnks.

h, faccí:ca =eysí: im-ponâ:y-ey-ánk-s
yes, judge

p1

=

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`Yes, I spoke with the judge (that

we just saw).'
(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

In the context in (17), the interlocutors are intending to speak with people who are
either judges or teachers. It is reasonable to assume that the speaker knew that Mary
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was a judge when she spoke to her yesterday (a P2-time). What the speaker intends
to communicate by using a nominal P1 is not that she just learned that Mary was a
judge at the P1-time (and didn't know that when she spoke with her), but that she
and her interlocutor just had an encounter with the relevant judge.
There are several elements of the above semantics that go wrong for the nominal
tenses. First, instead of encoding a rst moment of coming to believe, a nominal tense
needs to encode just some moment of encountering or acquaintance. As discussed
above, the speaker is not refering to the rst time they encountered the individual,
but the last relevant time they encountered them. A second element that goes wrong
for the nominal tenses is that the come-to-believe predicate takes a proposition
as an argument. For the verbal tenses, the speaker came to believe a proposition was
true. However, for the nominal tenses, the speaker did not come to believe something

about the entity, rather it is more accurate to say that she was in a situation where
the entity was accessible or salient (either from the physical surroundings as in SPE
contexts or from the previous discourse for discourse anaphoric contexts).
These two points highlight a central dierence between the role of verbal P1-P3
and the role of nominal P1 and P2. The evidential inferences of verbal P1-P3 are
concerned with belief and propositions. The struggle for giving nominal tenses a
parallel treatment is determining the appropriate notion of belief for nominal tense.
The idea behind terms like acquaintance and accessibility is that nominal P1 or P2
is providing temporal information to help the addressee access the mental le (Heim
2002) for the intended referent of the nominal expression. The tense is giving a time
from which the referent is not only accessible to the speaker (and presumably also the
addressee), but is salient and recognized by the interlocutors as a discourse referent.
To address these two points, instead of the come-to-believe predicate dening
a rst moment of belief, nominal tenses would need to encode something along the
lines of the acquainted predicate that I have dened below.
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(18)

acquainted(x, y, t) = T i y is salient to x at t and x adds y to their

representation of the common ground at t.
With this predicate, we can reframe the desired semantics for a P1-tensed nominal
as in (19).
(19)

J ∅∃ tN T fvccēcv isēi Kc,g =

[λQhe,ti .∃x.[judge(x)(g(i)) ∧ acquainted(sp(c),x,g(i))] ∧Q(x)]
only dened if g(i) ≺ g(NT) & g(i) ∞ day(g(NT))

The above denotation features several non-trivial alterations from the predicted semantics in (16-e). First, the nominal predicate is separated from the meta-language
predicate acquainted and not an argument of it. Secondly, the temporal argument
(g(i)) applies to both the nominal predicate and the acquainted predicate. This is
necessary in order for the nominal predicate to hold of the entity at the time of acquaintance; we saw empirical evidence for this requirement in Chapter 6, section 6.5.
Finally, the acquainted predicate, as is clear from the denition in (18), takes the
entity argument instead of a propositional argument. In order for a tensed nominal
to have the semantics in (19) and encode a moment of acquaintance with the entity,
nominal tense would have to be a modier of type hhe, iti, he, itii. P1 (and P2) would
need to have semantics like that in (20).
(20)

J P1i Kc,g = [λPhe,iti .[λxe .[λti : g(i) ≺ t & g(i) ∞day(t).P (x)(g(i))
& acquainted(sp(c), x,g(i))]]]

In this section, I demonstrated that the come-to-believe semantics of verbal P1-P3
can not be extended as is to nominal P1 and P2. However, it may be possible to take
the lexical entry involving acquaintance in (20) and extend it to the verbal cases.
With the verbal tenses, the acquainted predicate would need to give us a time at
which the speaker i) became aware of the eventuality described by the proposition
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and ii) added that proposition to their beliefs. The acquainted predicate does
not dene this as the rst moment of acquaintance, but this might follow from a
fundamental dierence between entities and eventualities. Whereas entities persist
over time so that there are many moments when one could come into contact with
them, an eventuality only exists during its run-time. Consequently, perhaps the only
time to become acquainted with an event in the relevant sense could be the event
time. While this would derive the direct witness uses of P1-P3, more would need to
be said in order to extend this idea to capture the simultaneous learning and learning
after-the-fact uses of P1-P3.2 Giving P1-P3 a parallel lexical entry to (20) would
involve a substantial revision of the semantics I have motivated for the verbal tenses
in Chapter 3.

7.1.2 Unication Option 2: No evidentiality in the meaning of P1-P3
In the previous section I explored the possibility of giving nominal P1 and P2
evidential semantics along the lines of my proposal for verbal P1-P3. The second
possibility for a unied account would be to keep the non-evidential approach to
nominal P1 and P2 and to remove evidentiality from the lexical semantics of verbal
P1-P3. Instead, the evidential inferences associated with the verbal uses of P1-P3
would be due to another functional projection. This functional projection would be
associated with the VP and somehow coalesce with P1-P3 whenever they appear with
it. Crucially, this projection would have to be absent from DPs, perhaps because the
functional category of meaning is one that doesn't play a role in DPs. As a result, the
evidentiality we nd with P1-P3 as verbal tenses would not be present in the nominal
domain. The evidential avor of SPE interpretations of nominal P1 and P2 would
2 Curiously,

this characterization of P1-P3 is surprisingly similar to the spatial approaches discussed in Chapter 3. And, as Matthewson (2010) points out for St'át'imcets lákw7a, this type of
analysis for P1-P3 means they would have to operate at the event level. This would have implications
for the structural position of P1-P3.
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be entirely due to the interaction of the presuppositions of the denite determiner
and the temporal semantics of the nominal tense, as spelled out in Chapter 6.
There are several questions that need to be answered to work out this approach to
uniciation. First, if a functional projection is responsible for the Belief-State Change
semantics of verbal P1-P3, what is the nature of this projection? And why does it not
produce the same evidential inferences in P5-marked clauses? In sketching possible
ways to separate the Belief-State Change semantics from the tense information, I
consider two approaches drawing on modal and non-modal analyses of evidentials.
The central challenge for this option is explaining how the tense information interacts
with the come-to-believe predicate to provide the moment of coming to believe.

7.1.2.1 A modal approach
In modal approaches to evidentials, the evidential requirement is usually encoded
in the modal base of an epistemic modal (Izvorski 1997; Matthewson et al. 2007;
von Fintel & Gillies 2010; a.o.). Although epistemic modals typically scope over
tense and are evaluated with respect to what is known at the utterance time (see
Condoravdi 2002 and Hacquard 2011), Rullmann & Matthewson (2018) have argued
that epistemic modals can occur below past tense and be evaluated with respect
to what was known at that past time. With this kind of approach, P1-P3 could
combine with a lower covert evidential/epistemic modal having the semantics of the
come-to-believe predicate.

To apply this type of approach to Mvskoke, the come-to-believe predicate
would need to be factored out of the denotation for Pasts 1-3. The tenses would be
purely temporal and could have much the same denotation in main clauses as they
do in noun phrases. In both locations, they could be partial identity functions as in
(21).
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(21)

a.
b.
c.

J P1 Kt0 = [λt0 : t0 ≺ t0 &t0 ∞day(t0 ).t0 ]

J P2 Kt0 = [λt0 : 60.years.ago(t0 ) ≺ t0 ≺ t0 .t0 ]

J P3 Kt0 = [λt0 : 60.years.ago(t0 ) ≺ t0 ≺ t0 &

far(t0 , t0 ) > s(far). t0 ]

To t in the compositional analysis proposed by Rullmann & Matthewson (2018),
I modify the denotation of the come-to-believe predicate so that it is anchored to
the speaker and is the appropriate type for the structure.
(22)

J come-to-believe Kc = [λPhi,sti .[λti .[λws .∀t0 : t0 ≺ t.¬∀w0 ∈ bel(sp(c), w, t0 ).P (w0 , t)
& ∀t00 : t  t00 .∀w00 ∈ bel(sp(c), w, t00 ).P (w00 , t)]]]

A monoverbal P1-P3 sentence, on this approach, would have a structure like the one
in (23) following the structure proposed by Rullmann & Matthewson (2018).
(23)

LF for a P1-P3 Sentence
TP

hsti
ModP

T

hi, sti
AspP

P1-3 Ti ∅come-to-bel

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti
Asp

VP

hh, sti, hi, stii h, sti
(im)pfv

...

With this type of structure, the come-to-believe predicate takes the tense node
(modied by P1-P3) as its temporal argument. Consequently, P1-P3 still provide the
temporal location of the moment of coming to believe as in my original analysis.
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Since P5 co-occurs with Pasts 1-3 in auxiliary constructions, I assume P5 has
the same semantics I gave it in Chapter 3 and that it appears below the cometo-believe predicate, possibly in an aspectual projection like perfect aspect. The

overall logical form for a Mvskoke auxiliary construction is sketched in (24).
(24)

LF for a Mvskoke Auxiliary Construction
TP

hsti
ModP

T

hi, sti
AspP

P1-3 Ti ∅come-to-bel

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti
Asp

AspP

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti

P5

Asp

VP

hh, sti, hi, stii h, sti
(im)pfv

...

In an auxiliary construction, the lower Past 5 still contributes a precedence relation
between the time of coming to believe and the event time, as it was shown to do in
Chapter 3.
This structure also gives us a way of thinking about present tense auxiliary constructions. Recall from the introduction to the auxiliary construction in Chapter 2,
that Mvskoke hymns contain older present tensed forms of the construction used as
rhetorical questions. Example (19) is repeated from Chapter 2, example (39).
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(25)

Aeha! Kut! Cv Hesayecv At The Cross
a.

Aeha! Kut! Cv

Hesayecv

ca-

hisa:yí:ca

eyhá: kót

excl excl 1sg.pat- savior

`Alas! My savior'
b.

Catv pvlatkvt

haks?

cá:ta palâ:tk-át

hâ:k-s

blood fall.tpl.pfv-

p5 become.pfv-ind

`Did his blood really spill?'
Taking the structure for auxiliary constructions in (24) as a model, we could imagine
that (25-b) has a structure like that in (26) in which P5 combines with a higher covert
present tense and a covert come-to-believe predicate.
(26)

Possible Structure for Present Tense Auxiliary Constructions
TP

hsti
T'

ModP

i

hi, sti
AspP

∅P res Ti ∅come-to-bel
hi, ii

i

hhi, sti, hi, stii

hi, sti
Asp

AspP

hhi, sti, hi, stii hi, sti
P5

...

If the analysis of these expressions that I have just sketched is on the right track,
it makes several interesting predictions about the auxiliary expression in (25). First,
we should nd that these expressions pattern with other auxiliary constructions in
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simultaneous learning and learning after-the-fact contexts. Secondly, these expressions should mean the speaker is coming to believe at the present moment that a past
event took place. This could explain the mirative avor of the rhetorical question
use of this expression. Mvskoke auxiliary constructions are not well studied; this
dissertation represents the rst attempt at providing a formal analysis and the most
extensive source of data on them. Testing these predictions and understanding the
inferences of the declarative and interrogative uses of these constructions is a vast
topic for future research.
To summarize, I have suggested an avenue of unication in which the cometo-believe predicate is not part of the meaning of P1-P3, but occupies a position

below past tense that has been argued to exist for epistemic and circumstanial modals
(Rullmann & Matthewson 2018). There are three challenges that such an approach
faces: 1) how to account for monoverbal P5 sentences, 2) how to accommodate other
modal/evidential morphemes in Mvskoke, and 3) how to explain the apparent factivity
of Mvskoke P1-P3.
The rst challenge for this analysis is how to account for monoverbal P5 sentences.
The questions to be answered are: where is P5 structurally in monoverbal sentences?
and why does it not interact with the come-to-believe predicate as P1-P3 do? If
P5 is still a perfect aspectual operator in monoverbal constructions, then it won't ever
appear above the come-to-believe modal (and therefore won't provide a moment of
coming to believe) due to the xed order of phrases hypothesized above. However, we
are left with the puzzle of how its temporal argument is saturated. Are all monoverbal
P5 sentences present perfect constructions as illustrated in (27)?3
3 This

is not an outlandish possibility. The fact that the higher present tense is phonologically
empty may mean that it does not trigger the insertion of the auxiliary to repair a feature conict (as
I proposed happens in auxiliary constructions in Chapter 3). Another possibility is that monoverbal
P5 sentences are nominalized AspP's. A hint that this might be so is the presence of the nal -ē
(/-i:/) on P5 and the future tense in monoverbal constructions. This nal vowel is absent in auxiliary
constructions. Furthermore, the -ē (/-i:/) morpheme appears in a wide range of contexts with an
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(27)

Monoverbal P5 as Present Perfect Sentence
TP

hsti
T'

AspP

i

hi, sti

∅P res Ti
hi, ii

i

Asp

AspP

hhi, sti, hi, stii hi, sti
P5

...

If, however, P5 is structurally in the same position as P1-P3 in monoverbal sentences,
then we have to stipulate that it cannot combine with the come-to-believe modal
(although it can combine with other modals in Mvskoke such as witēs an epistemic
possibility modal). This is illustrated in (28).4
equally wide range of functions - nominalizer, stativizer, an ending for non-nal relative clauses
(Hardy 1988; Martin 2011). Finally, Martin (2011) notes that Mvskoke uses the same question
marker for P5 and future sentences as it does for making nouns into questions, e.g. wvnayvtē tē
(tie-P5 Q) `Did he/she tie it?' and pokko tē? (ball Q) `is it a ball?' (Martin 2011: 288-9).
4 This option also raises the question of the semantic type of P5 in monoverbal sentences.

Pursuing
this option additionally means supposing that what I've been labelling P5 are not all instances of
the same morpheme. The morpheme -vtē (/-ati:/), on this approach, would be a tense feature that
modies the tense node as P1-P3 are hypothesized to do in (24). This would be the morpheme present
in monoverbal P5 sentences. The morpheme -vt (/-át/) would be the perfect aspect operator present
in auxiliary constructions. And the morpheme tatē (/tá:ti:/) would be a nominal tense operator.
This approach misses some generalizations, including the similar temporal semantics of all three
morphemes and the parallel to future tense in auxiliary constructions (see discussion in Chapter 2,
section 2.3.4).
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(28)

Monoverbal P5 as Tense Feature
TP

hsti
T'

ModP

i

hi, sti

P5

Ti

hi, ii

i

witēs

AspP

*∅come-to-bel hi, sti

hhi, sti, hi, stii

...

These are open questions that future research and a better understanding of Mvskoke
syntax will hopefully elucidate.
The second challenge this analysis faces concerns the nature of the supposed
come-to-believe evidential head itself. There are several other aspectual, modal,

and evidential morphemes in Mvskoke that appear in various orders with the tenses.
However, not all orders of morphemes t with the structure proposed in (26). Specifically, if come-to-believe is the head of the phrase responsible for evidentials and
modals, then we would expect come-to-believe to be in complementary distribution with other evidential/modal morphemes supposedly heading the same projection. Some of the modal morphemes in Mvskoke (such as witēs `might' and tayēs
`can/should' (Martin 2011: 304-5)) are auxiliary verbs and therefore would appear in
a bi-clausal structure. In these cases, two modal/evidential phrases are possible.
However, others like the inferential evidential -vcok (discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2) seem to behave like verbal axes. As an ax, -vcok appears in monoclausal, monoverbal constructions and should not co-occur with the supposed cometo-believe evidential. Contrary to this prediction, -vcok does co-occur with P2, and

by hypothesis the come-to-believe in simultaneous learning contexts. An example
of this is repeated below from Chapter 3, example (26).
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(29)

P2 Simultaneous Auditory Evidence : Imagine yesterday you were going by
the church and heard the sound of people singing.
Paksvnkē mēkusvpkv-cuko ahoyanvyan,
paksankí: mi:kosapka-cokó á:-hoya:n-ay-â:n
yesterday prayer-house

dir-pass.byipfv-1sg.ag-comp.ds

yvhihokvcokvnks.
yahéy<ho:>k-acók-ánk-s
sing.ipfv<pass>-infr-

p2-ind

`Yesterday as I was coming by the church, someone was singing.'
(IAH-Sem-06/07/2019)
This would suggest that there needs to be an additional evidential projection for

-vcok. Whether this analysis is appropriate for Mvskoke will depend on a deeper
understanding of the tense, aspectual, modal, and evidential morphology and their
morphosyntactic status.
Finally, the challenge is that, while this approach appeals to a modal/evidential
projection below tense, Mvskoke P1-P3 do not behave like epistemic modals. In
particular, Mvskoke P1-P3 sentences do not have the same inferences as past epistemic
sentences in other languages. Rullmann & Matthewson (2018) discuss examples of
epistemic modals under past tenses in English, Dutch, Gitskan, and St'át'imcets. In
the Dutch and English examples in particular, there is a strong inference that the
prejacent proposition doesn't follow from the speaker's current epistemic state.
(30)

Context: Yesterday, when I wanted to go to work, I couldn't nd my key
anywhere. I tried to remember where I might have left it the previous night.
I felt in the pocket of my pants, looked in my nightstand, and even searched
the waste basket, but all in vain. Suddenly I knew.
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had to be in the kitchen drawer.

a.

It

b.

De sleutel
the key
`The key

moest

(wel)

in de la

ligg-en.

nec.pst.3.sg (ptcl) in the drawer lie-inf

had to be in the drawer.'

(Rullmann & Matthewson 2018: 290)
Both the Dutch and English examples in (30) are compatible with the speaker knowing
now that the key was not, in fact, in the drawer. This is due to the epistemic modality
in these sentences. The prejacent proposition is required to be true in all worlds
compatible with the speaker's past epistemic state, but it is not required to be true
in the actual world or in the worlds compatible with the speaker's current epistemic
state.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Mvskoke P1-P3 sentences do commit the speaker to
believing the proposition at the utterance time. They cannot be used to communicate
a past belief that turned out to be false. To do that, a Mvskoke speaker must use P5
instead of one of the evidential sentences. Consider the two examples below. In both
contexts, the speaker held a false belief at a Past 3 time and later learned they were
wrong. They can use P3 on the main predicate kometv (also pronounced kowetv ) `to
think/believe', but using it on the embedded sentence implies that they still believe
the embedded sentence.
(31)

Wrong Belief Context : When I was young, my grandmother had lots of cow
decorations around her house. I assumed she liked cows a lot. But later when
I was grown up, I learned from my grandmother that she never liked cows;
people just assumed she did.
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a.

Cvpuse

mowēt wakv emvkvsvmkv ocēt

ca-pósi

mó:wi:t wá:ka im-akasámka ó:c-i:-t

1sg.pat-grandmother really

cow

3.dat-praise have-dur-ss

on

art

{owvtēs

/ #owemvc},

ô:-n

á:ì-t

{o:w-atí:-s

/ #o:w-imát-s},

be.pfv-ds go.about.sg.ipfv-ss {be.ipfv-p5-ind / be.ipfv-p3-ind}
kowiyemvc.
kô:w-ey-imát-s
believe.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind
`I thought my grandmother went about having a great aection for cows.'
Speaker Comment: [If you say] art owemvc, it means that was true [that
she liked cows].
b.

Mowis

emvkvsvmkv ocekot

mo:wêys im-akasámka ó:c-íko-:-t

on,
ô:-n

however 3.dat-praise have-neg-dur-ss be.pfv-ds
kerriyemvc.
kî:ìì-ey-mát-s
know.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind
`However I learned she did not have that sentiment.'
(RH-Sem-6/28/2019)
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(32)

Wrong Belief Context : When I was young, I thought my grandfather had
been in the army since all my friends' dads used to be in the army. But when
I got older, I learned that he was not.
a.

Cvpuca

soletawv mvt

{owvtēs

/

ca-pocá:

solitá:wa ma-t

{ô:w-atí:-s

/

1sg.pat-grandfather soldier

dem-nom {be.pfv-

#owemvc},

kowiyemvc.

#ô:w-imát-s}

kô:w-ey-mát-s

be.pfv-

p5-ind /

p3-ind} believe.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind

`I thought that my grandfather had been a soldier.'
(RH-Sem-7/13/2019)
These examples demonstrate that the come-to-believe predicate is stronger than
an epistemic necessity modal. They are also somewhat problematic if the predicate is
factive. A factive presupposition (that the prejacent proposition is true) can usually
be locally accommodated when embedded under an attitude predicate, as the English
example below demonstrates.
(33)

I thought I knew my grandmother liked cows. (But I was wrong.)

Local accommodation doesn't seem to be available for Mvskoke P1-P3. Instead these
examples point to the factive presupposition projecting. Clearly, this is not the behavior we expect from an epistemic modal. Thus, while the compositional semantics
sketched here seems to work for Mvskoke, more would need to be said about the
status of this come-to-believe predicate as distinct from modals.

7.1.2.2 A non-modal approach
Given these problems, I would like to discuss another possibility drawing on
Faller's (2002) non-modal approach to evidentials. In Faller's account, Cuzco Quechua
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evidentials are illocutionary operators that modify the speech act of the proposition
they appear with. In Speech Act Theory (Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken
1990, 1991), assertion speech acts are accompanied by a sincerity condition that
the speaker believes the proposition (Bel(sp,p)). Faller proposes that the Cuzco
Quechua direct evidential -mi serves to add a sincerity condition that the speaker
has Best Possible Grounds (bpg) for believing the proposition, (34).
(34)

-mi :

assert(p)
sinc={Bel(sp,p) }

→

assert(p)
sinc={Bel(sp,p), BPG(sp,Bel(sp,p)) }

(Faller 2002: 167)
As we saw from the examples in (31) and (32), Mvskoke P1-P3 sentences pattern with
factive predicates in requiring the speaker to believe the proposition at the utterance
time. On Faller's approach, this is accomplished with the rst sincerity condition on
assertions. To extend this to Mvskoke, we might suppose that P1-P3 are accompanied
by a covert illocutionary operator. This operator adds as a sincerity condition for a
P1-P3 assertion that the speaker came to believe p as p was happening. To do this,
the sincerity condition would need to provide a relation between the speaker, the time
provided by tense, and the proposition.
Kratzer's (2004) idea of an assert function is one way to model this. For Kratzer
the assert function provides a relation between the topic situation and a property of
situations (a proposition of type hs, ti). As mentioned earlier, Kratzer (2007) proposes
that verbal tense tracks the time of the topic situation. In this system, tense features
modify the topic situation and introduce a presupposition about the temporal trace of
that situation. If, as Kratzer argues, assertion is a speech act that provides the state
of aairs for a topic situation, it is reasonable to think that the sincerity conditions
on assertion could encode the speaker's mental attitude towards the state of aairs
and the topic situation.
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As I've done in Chapter 6, I sketch this approach with intervals instead of situations. assert thus is of type hit, iti and it takes as arguments a property of times
and a topic interval. The sincerity conditions encode the speaker's mental attitude
towards the property of times and the topic interval.
(35)

J assert Kw,t,g,c = [λPhi,ti .[λt0i : [∀w0 ∈ Bel(sp(c), w, t).P (t0 , w0 )=T].P (t0 )]]

In order to model the additional sincerity condition of P1-P3, one could suppose that
in certain languages assert comes in another avor - let us call it assertstrong . This
strong assertion has an additional sincerity condition essentially encoding that the
speaker came to believe the proposition at the topic interval. In Faller's formalism
this would take the form in (36).
(36)

assertstrong (P,t):

assert(p(t))
sinc={Bel(sp,p(t)), Come-to-Bel(sp,t,p(t)) }

I reframe this in Kratzer's system below. Notice that now the come-to-believe
predicate needn't include the information that the speaker believes the proposition
from the topic interval to the present. Instead, this is inferred from the original
sincerity condition that the speaker believes the proposition at the present and the
requirement in come-to-believe that they believed the propositon at the topic
interval.
(37)

J assertstrong Kw,t,g,c = [λPhi,ti .[λt0i : ∀w0 ∈ Bel(sp(c), w, t).P (t0 , w0 ) = T and

∀t00 : t00 ≺ t0 .¬∀w00 ∈ Bel(sp(c), w, t00 ).P (t0 , w00 ) = T &∀w000 ∈ Bel(sp(c), w, t0 ).
P (t0 , w000 )=T.P (t0 )]]

In the Mvskoke system, P1-P3 would need to select for assertstrong (this is illustrated in (38)), but other assertions (including P5 assertions) would have the plain
assert function.
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(38)

Potential Structure for P1-P3 Strong Assertions

TP

t
T

XP

i

hi, ti

P1-P3 Ti assertstrong

AspP

hit, iti

hi, ii

hi, ti
P5

AspP

hit, iti

hi, ti

Assuming the same semantics for the tenses as I did above, we are still left with a
puzzle regarding monoverbal P5 assertions. Both approaches work best with monoverbal P5 sentences being present perfect constructions. This is illustrated below in (39).
(39)

Potential Structure for P5 Plain Assertions

TP

t
T

XP

i

hi, ti

Present Ti assert

hi, ii

AspP

hit, iti
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hi, ti
P5

AspP

hit, iti

hi, ti

Just as with the evidential/modal approach, it is an open question why assertstrong is not available in monoverbal P5 sentences.

Consequently, on either

approach, it is necessary to stipulate the obligatory co-occurrence of P1-P3 with
whatever functional head contains the come-to-believe semantics.
In conclusion, I explored two avenues to unication. I rst explored the possibility
that P1-P3 encode a moment of Belief-State Change in both the verbal and nominal
domains. We saw that the semantics I propose for the verbal tenses cannot be directly
applied to the nominal tenses. Instead, to account for the interpretations of nominal
P1 and P2 it was necessary to modify the semantics of the come-to-believe predicate so that it encoded a moment of acquaintance with an individual. In the end, a
unied account of this kind would require reworking the evidential semantics of the
verbal tenses and dening acquaintance for events or propositions. It is also unclear
how the Change of State construals of nominal P1 and P2 would be derived on this
approach.
The second possibility I explored is that P1-P3 are purely temporal in both domains, but the verbal domain contains an extra functional projection hosting the
come-to-believe predicate. I considered two types of functional projections that

might do the work of the come-to-believe predicate - an evidential/modal projection and a functional projection for assertion. The main task for both these approaches was to allow the come-to-believe predicate to interact with tense. In
both cases, I resorted to similar structures which placed the functional projection
below tense but above aspect (which I assumed hosted P5). These approaches ran
into trouble dealing with monoverbal P5 sentences and predicted wrongly that the
functional projection could co-occur with P5 even in monoverbal constructions. The
result was that attempts to unify the tenses by separating the come-to-believe
semantics from P1-P3 have to stipulate that only P1-P3 sentences contain this functional projection. I suggested that the haketv `become' auxiliary might be indicative
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of the presence of come-to-believe semantics. Testing this hypothesis and the
predictions for the interpretation of auxiliary constructions is a subject for future
eldwork.

7.2 Independence and interaction between nominal and verbal
tense
Given the presence of tense in the verbal and nominal domains, one may well
wonder whether the nominal and verbal tense systems interact with each other. The
data point to complete independence for nominal P1 and P2 and limited interaction
for nominal P5/tatē.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that nominal tenses were not instances of tense
agreement. They are free to mismatch with other verbal past tenses and to co-occur
with future tense. Additionally, the tense of the main clause can be shown to have no
eect on the possibility of a Shared Past Experience or Change of State reading for the
nominal tense. In examples (40) and (41) (repeated from Chapter 6, example(78)),
P2 can be interpreted as indicating eith a change of state or a shared past experience
when the main clause is in the present tense.
(40)

P2 Change of State, Verbal Present Tense : Imagine that the former chief of
your tribe is in the room. I don't know this person, but I know he is there.
I ask you to point out your former chief to me.
Vnmēkko

vnkē

an-mí:kko

=ankí: aséy-n

p2

1sg.dat-chief =

vsin

ares.
a:ì-ís

yonder-acc go.about.sg.ipfv-ind

`My former chief is over there.'
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)
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(41)

P2 SPE, Verbal Present Tense : You and I went to a prayer meeting last week
and met a preacher who was leading the prayer meeting. Today at church,
that preacher is there as a guest pastor. We both see him and recognize him.
You notice he doesn't look very well, and want to mention that to me.
Mv erkenvkv

vnkē

enhereko

(takhuerat)

má iìkináka =ankí: (tak-hôyì-a:t)

p2

dem preacher =

omēt

ares.

óm-i:-t

a:ì-ís

in-hiì-íko-:

(loc-stand.sg.pfv-comp) 3.dat-good-neg-dur

like-dur-ss go.about.sg.ipfv-ind
`That preacher (we

met before)

(standing there), is going about like he's

not well.'
(RMM-Mus-4/6/2021)
A verbal Past 1 also has no eect on the interpretation of a nominal P2. It can receive
either Change of State (42) or Shared Past Experience readings (43).
(42)

P2 Change of State, Verbal P1 (constructed sentence oered to consultant
for translation)
Fvccēcv vnkē

emponahyis.

faccí:ca =ankí: im-poná<h>y-ey-s
judge

=p2

3.dat-speak<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

`I just talked to the former judge.'
Speaker Comment: That means, `I just talked to the one who used to be a
judge.'
(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)
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(43)

P2 SPE, Verbal P1 : Imagine you and I met the principal of a certain school
a couple days ago. You saw that same principal again last night. You want
to tell me this.
Mv ohhēcv

vnkē

ma oh-hí:c-a

=ankí: niìi:-yeysí: hí<h>c-ey-s

p2

dem loc-see.ipfv-nmlz =

`I saw that principal (from

nerē-isē

hehcis.

night-last see<pfv.p1>-1sg.ag-ind

a few days ago) last night.'
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)

Similarly, when nominal P2 is more recent than the verbal tense, it can receive either
Change of State or SPE interpretations - whichever the context supports. In (44) the
P2 nominal `my teacher' can receive either an SPE or a Change of State interpretation.
In both cases, the verb is inected for P2; the time indicated by the nominal P2,
however, is a more recent P2-time than the verbal TT.
(44)

Ohrolopē hvnkevnkē, (mv)

vmvhayv

vnkē

ohìolopí: hánki-ankí: (má)

am-ahá:ya

=ankí:

year

one-p2

dem) 1sg.dat-teacher =p2

(

encukopericvyvnks.
in-cokopiìêyc-ey-ánk-s
3.dat-visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p2-ind

`One year ago I visited my (former) teacher./ my teacher (that we saw before).'
a.

P2 Change of State, Verbal P2 : One year ago I visited the lady who
used to be my teacher.

b.

P2 SPE, Verbal P2 : One year ago I visited that current teacher of mine
that we saw at the grocery store the other day.
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(RMM-Mus-11/19/2020, PF-Mus-3/22/2021)
In the next two examples, a P2 tensed noun is able to receive a Change of State
interpretation (45) or an SPE interpretation (46) when the verb is inected for P3.
(45)

P2 Change of State, Verbal P3 : Imagine your town has always had one
doctor, until he retired 5 years ago. Your friend, who was very sick a year
ago, went to see him anyway and he cured her. You went with her. You are
telling this to a friend from your town.
Ohrolopē hvnkēvnkē, vnhessē

vlēkcv vnkē

hēcan

ohìolopí: hânki:-ankí:, an-híssi

alí:kca =ankí:

hi:c-â:n

year

one-p2

1sg.dat-friend

doctor =p2

vcakkayimvts.

Cvfeknicemvts.

acakk-â:y-ey-mát-s

cakn-êyc-imát-s

see.ipfv-comp.ds

comm-go.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind be.well-caus.pfv-p3-ind

`One year ago, when my friend was seeing the doctor, I went with her. He
healed her.'
(46)

(RMM-Mus-9/21/2020)

P2 SPE, Verbal P3 : Imagine you and I met the principal of a certain school
a couple days ago. You want to tell me that you visited that principal a year
ago.
Mv ohhēcv

vnkē

ma oh-hí:c-a

=ankí: in-cokopiìêyc-ey-mát-s

p2

dem loc-see.ipfv-nmlz =

encukopericimvts.

3.dat-visit.pfv-1sg.ag-p3-ind

`I visited that principal (from a few days ago ) (long ago).'
(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)
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To summarize, the interpretation of nominal P2 is not aected in any way by choice
of verbal tense. I have shown that it receives Change of State and SPE interpretations
when the context supports them, regardless of the tense on the verb.
Nominal P5 (tatē) does show minimal interactions with verbal tenses, disallowing
its Decessive interpretation with certain predicates inected for present tense, P1,
and P2. This is chiey due to the clash between existence presuppositions of certain
predicates and the entailment that the entity is deceased. Musan (1997) demonstrates individual-level and stage-level predicates as predicates imposing an existence
presupposition on their argument. This presupposition requires the entity to be alive
at the time the predicate holds of the entity. These dier from existence-independent
predicates like famous which can be predicated of an entity even if they are not alive.
Consider the three English examples below.
(47)

a.

Gregory is from America.

b.

Gregory is happy.

c.

Gregory is famous.

individual-level
stage-level
existence-independent

(Musan 1997: 277)
Examples (47-a) and (47-b) are infelicitous if they are uttered in a context where
Gregory is dead. Example (47-c), however, is perfectly natural in such a context.
P5/tatē, on its decessive interpretation, is not able to refer to a recently deceased
individual. As a result, if P5/tatē is interpreted as a decessive, using it in a present
or P2 (and presumably also a P1) tensed sentence is anomolous.
(48)

#Mēkko

tatē

mí:kko

=tá:ti: asêy-n

chief

=

p5

vsin

ares.
a:ì-ís

yonder-acc go.about.sg.ipfv-ind

Intended: The late chief is over there.
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(RMM,LT,PF-Mus-10/23/2021)

(49)

#Fvccēcv

tatē

faccí:ca

=tá:ti: im-ponâ:y-ay-ánk-s

judge

=

p5

emponayvyvnks.

p2-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

Intended: I spoke to the late judge.
Speaker Comment: Really? [That means] you're talking to him from beyond
the grave.

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

P5/tatē is able to receive decessive interpretations with predicates with existence
presuppositions at more remote times. Thus it is compatible with P3 and P5 as
verbal tenses.
(50)

Fvccēcv

tatē

emponayimvts.

faccí:ca =tá:ti: im-ponâ:y-ey-mát-s
judge

p5

=

p3-ind

3.dat-speak.pfv-1sg.ag-

`I spoke to the late judge.'
Speaker Comment: That's saying I talked to him when he was living, maybe
1-5 years ago.
(51)

Fvccēcv

tatē

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)
emponayvyvtēs.

faccí:ca =tá:ti: ím-pona:y-ay-áti:-s
judge

p5

=

p5-ind

3.dat-speak.ipfv-1sg.ag-

`I spoke to the late judge.'
Speaker Comment: I talked to him when he was living, more than 5 years
ago.

(RMM-Mus-8/27/2020)

For speakers who allow it to receive a Change of State meaning, P5/tatē is compatible
with any verbal tense. Change of State is also the only possible interpretation with
the more recent tenses.
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7.3 Consequences for the Crosslinguistic Picture
The nature of the Mvskoke tense system is such that this dissertation was able to
provide an in-depth examination of three topics of interest with temporal morphemes:
graded tenses, evidential tenses, and nominal tenses. While Mvskoke has been considered in the literature on graded tenses (see for example Martin 2010; Botne 2012),
this work is the rst to examine the evidential nature of the tenses as well as the rst
work to examine the nominal use of the tenses in detail. In this nal section, I would
like to address the cross-linguistic picture of two these phenomena and how Mvskoke
impacts our understanding of the typology and open questions in the study of graded
tenses and nominal tenses.

7.3.1 Graded Tenses
A question which was central to my investigation of Mvskoke graded tenses in
Chapter 4, and which has been central in recent formal semantic investigations of
graded tense, is whether graded tenses cover disjoint temporal intervals or overlapping
intervals. Using remoteness indeterminacy contexts (Hayashi 2011) has revealed
that graded tense systems come in at least two types. Based on the reuslts of applying the remoteness indeterminacy diagnostic, Mucha (2017) has argued that graded
temporal morphemes in Medumba cover disjoint temporal intervals. Applying the
same diagnostic to South Ban Inuktitut (Hayashi 2011; Hayashi & Oshima 2015),
Gk
uy
u (Cable 2013), and Luganda (Bochnak & Klecha 2015; Klecha & Bochnak
2016), these authors demonstrate that graded tenses in these languages cover overlapping intervals of time. In Chapter 4, I argued for an analysis of Mvskoke Pasts
1-3 in which Past 2 covers the largest interval and Past 1 and Past 3 cover restricted
intervals nested within the P2-interval (though they are disjoint from each other).
Mvskoke constitutes the second language, after South Ban Inuktitut, to have a system of this type of overlapping interval structure as conrmed through the application
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of the remoteness indeterminacy diagnostic. This structure contrasts with the nested
interval structure of Gk
uy
u and Luganda graded tenses in which the recent past is
nested within the intermediate past interval which is nested within the remote past
interval.
My analysis of Mvskoke also provides further support for a dual-layered approach
to graded tenses set forth in Hayashi & Oshima (2015). In Hayashi & Oshima's
system a language may have tenses in a `primary' layer and tenses in a `secondary'
layer. The `primary' layer tenses reference objective or external measures of time.
The `secondary' layer tenses reference more subjective, mind-internal measures of
time. Hayashi & Oshima (2015) build on Botne & Kershner's (2008) and Botne's
(2012) theory of graded tenses which appeals to two domains in which a tense
might operate: in one domain - the P-Domain - intervals of time are dened in the
actual world, and in the other - the D-Domain - they are dened in a mental world
where the speaker's subjective conception of time is represented. Hayashi & Oshima
(2015) propose that which domain/layer a tense belongs to determines what cycle
of time it is sensitive to. Thus, tenses in the primary layer divide time in terms of
the natural, objective daily cycle. Tenses in the secondary layer divide time using
subjective measures like recent or distant. Their Dual-Layer system is ilustrated in
Table 7.1.

Table 7.1.

Hayashi & Oshima (2015) Dual-Layer Approach

Primary Layer
Secondary Layer

objective units of time
subjective units of time

day
distant, recent

These authors point out that if the dual-layer approach is correct, a pattern
emerges in which the most remote tense in the primary layer covers the broadest
interval. Consider Figure 7.2 illustrating the South Ban Inuktitut and Mvskoke
style systems and Figure 7.3 representing the Gk
uy
u and Luganda style systems. In

399

Figure 7.2.

SB Inuktitut and Mvskoke style system

Figure 7.3.

Gk
uy
u and Luganda style system

South Ban Inuktitut (and Mvskoke), it appears on the surface as if the middle tense
(P2) covers the largest interval of time. However, if the tenses are separated based
on the objective-subjective distinction, then the most remote (graded) tense (P3 and

-lauqsima in SB Inuktitut) actually belongs to the secondary layer (represented below
the dashed line in Figure 7.2). This leaves just two tenses in the primary layer (P1
and P2), with the most remote of these (P2) covering the largest interval of time. For
graded tense systems like the ones in Gk
uy
u and Luganda, all three tenses lie in the
primary layer and the most remote tense (P3) covers the largest interval (Figure 7.3).
The dierence between the languages boils down to the number of primary tenses
and whether there are any secondary tenses.
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There are a remarkable number of graded tense systems in the world's languages,
each making slightly dierent distinctions in time. While the vast majority of these
languages divide time based on the daily cycle, there are a non-trivial number that
make additional divisions in time (Botne 2012). One language Botne raises as an
example is Kiksht or Upper Chinook, spoken until recently in Oregon. Kiksht has
four past tenses which roughly cover the intervals listed in table 7.2.

Table 7.2.
Tense
i(g)na(l)ni(g)ga(l)

Kiksht (Chinookan) Graded Past Tenses
Time interval
just now to earlier today
yesterday to a week ago
last week to a year ago
a year ago to more than 10 years ago

Additionally, according to Hayashi (2011) and Hayashi & Oshima (2015), South
Ban Inuktitut makes multiple subjective distinctions. South Ban Inuktitut has
three tenses on the secondary layer, one covering subjectively distant times (-lauqsima
or P3 in Figure 7.2) and another two covering subjectively recent times (-kainnaq and

-rataaq, which I have not represented in Figure 7.2).
Languages like these raise the question of how many dierent units of time graded
tenses are sensitive to. Botne (2012) proposes that, for languages like Kiksht, there
are two abstract units of time that can be scaled to culturally available objective
time units. The two abstract units he proposes are the Current Time Unit (CurTU)
and the Adjacent Time Unit (AdjTU). Languages may make use of objective time
units such as the day based on the solar cycle, the month based on the lunar cycle, or
the year or seasonal cycle (Botne 2012: 554). On Botne's analysis, the Kiksht system
can be reframed so that the rst two tenses are sensitive to the daily cycle and the
nal two are sensitive to the yearly cycle. I recreate his graphic representation of the
tense system below.
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Table 7.3.

Botne's analysis of Kiksht tenses

Objective Unit
Day

CurTU

Year

ni(g)-

AdjTU

i(g)-

same day
same year

na(l)-

more than a day ago

ga(l)-

more than a year ago

The CurTU is dened by the objective unit (day, month, year, etc) and the AdjTU
is a left-open unit of time, covering all times prior to the CurTU. The rst tense i(g)covers time within the day of the utterance and na(l)- covers times prior to the day of
utterance. The third tense ni(g)- covers times within the same year as the utterance
and ga(l)- covers times prior to the year of the utterance. Implicit in Botne's analysis
is the division of labor between the pre-Hodiernal na(l)- and the Annual ni(g)-. It is
unclear how this system predicts the boundary between na(l)- and ni(g)- to fall at a
week ago, but his system appears to predict that boundary to be quite exible. On
Botne's analysis, complex graded tense systems encode just one of two units (CurTU
and AdjTU) and the languages may choose days, weeks, months, years, seasons, or a
life span as salient objective time units.
Mvskoke appeared to have a complex graded tense system like Kiksht, especially
given the descriptions by Martin (2010) and earlier sources which listed divisions
at 2-3 weeks, 1-2 years, and 60 years. Martin's (2010) description of the older and
modern Mvskoke tense systems are repeated below from Chapter 2.
(52)

Older Tense System

(53)

Modern Tense System

P1

today  last night

P1

today  last night

P2

yesterday  2-3 weeks

P2

yesterday  1 year

P3

2-3 weeks 1-2 years

P3

1 year  20 years

P4

1-2 years  60 years

P4

- no longer used -

P5

60 years  ancient

P5

20 years  ancient
(Martin 2010: 54)
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If Botne's analysis of Kiksht were extended to Mvskoke, the tense system might
have been structured as in Table 7.4. Past 1 covers the day of utterance and Past
2 would be a left-open interval covering times before today. We might think of Past
3 as a tense covering the year of utterance and Past 4 covering times more than a
year ago. (For Botne, remote tenses stand apart from the graded system.) With the
shift in the tense system and the loss of Past 4, we might imagine that Past 3 shifted
to cover times more than a year ago, as illustrated in Table 7.5. This would predict
the general boundary between Past 2 and 3 at one year ago, but would also allow for
overlap between P2 and P3. This system would also correctly predict the use of P2
in remoteness indeterminacy contexts where the speaker doesn't know if the event
happened in the P2 or P3-interval.

Table 7.4.

Botne's analysis extended to Mvskoke's older system

Objective Unit
Day
Year

Table 7.5.

CurTU
AdjTU
Past 1
Past 2
same day more than a day ago
Past 3
Past 4
same year more than a year ago
Past 5 - Remote

Botne's analysis extended to Mvskoke's newer system

Objective Unit
Day
Year

CurTU
AdjTU
Past 1
Past 2
same day more than a day ago

Past 3

more than a year ago
Past 5 - Remote

However, Botne's system does not predict that Past 2 is also used in remoteness
indeterminacy contexts when the speaker doesn't know whether the event happened
in the P1 or P2-interval. Botne's analysis predicts that Past 2 should never be used
for times within the day of utterance. As such, my investigation of Mvskoke tenses
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lends additional support to a theory of overlapping or nested intervals. Chapter
4 demonstrated that the Mvskoke system can be accounted for with graded tenses
encoding just two units of time: the day of utterance and the subjective unit distant.
It remains to be seen whether a restrictive theory of this kind can account for other
complex systems of graded tense.
Botne (2012) lists several languages with remote tenses that appear to stand
apart from the graded tense system. Recalling the above discussion of Botne and
Kershner's (2008) domains, they argue that these tenses operate in the domain
representing one's mental conception of time. Botne and Kershner's denition of
this subjective domain is in fact quite dierent from the subjectivity that Hayashi
& Oshima (2015) talk about with their secondary layer. The subjectivity involved
in Hayashi & Oshima's secondary layer has to do with the vague, gradable notions
of distant and recent. For Botne and Kershner, the mental, subjective domain - the
D-domain - reects epistemic remoteness or dissociation from the actual world (Botne
2012: 549).
The Mvskoke system gives us a new way of thinking about this idea of epistemic
remoteness and Botne and Kershner's domains. Past 5 is predominantly used for
eventualities which the speaker did not learn about as they happened. In this way,
these eventualities are often conceptually more remote for the speaker; they are distant in the sense that the speaker didn't see them or encounter strong evidence for
them. However, the Mvskoke data presented here pushes us to think about the distinction in the opposite way. Instead of Past 5 being epistemically remote, it is Pasts
1-3 that are epistemically close. Evaluating Botne and Kershner's theory of domains
through the lense of the Mvskoke tense system suggests that the relevant distinction
is not so-called domains but rather an evidential distinction similar to what I have
proposed for Mvskoke. This suggests an interesting correlation between these domains and evidentiality. It suggests that we might nd evidential distinctions similar
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to those in Mvskoke in languages which have both graded tenses and what Botne and
Kirshner diagnose as remote, D-domain tenses.

7.3.2 Nominal Temporal Morphology
My analysis of Mvskoke motivates a new typological picture with two types of
NTMs associated with dierent positions and features.
The low, NP-internal NTMs entail Change of State. NTMs of this kind are Mbyá
and Paraguayan Guaraní -kue, Mvskoke P5/tatē, and possibly also the Halkomelen
past NTM. NTMs of this type dier in whether they have what Tonhauser (2007) calls
the Existence Property. NTMs like Guaraní -kue which have the Existence Property
cannot be used to mean something like English late and indicate that an entity has
ceased to exist. NTMs like Mvskoke P5/tatē and Halkomelem -elh which do not have
the Existence Property allow for both meanings like English late (Decessive) and
regular Change of State meanings.

Table 7.6.
Language
Guaraní -kue
Halkomelem -elh
Mvskoke P5/ tatē

NP-internal NTMs

Existence Property
Yes
No
No

Interpretations
Change of State
Decessive & Change of State
Decessive & Change of State

The higher NTMs are associated with D-level semantics and are often fused with
the language's determiners. NTMs of this kind are Somali's tensed determiners and
Mvskoke P1 and P2. Salish languages whose determiners have been argued to make
a visible/invisible distinction might also fall into this category. These NTMs may
display a greater range of interpretations including Change of State and other Discourse Related meanings, such as (shared) past experience, invisibility inferences, and
discourse anaphoric uses.
I propose that Change of State inferences for these higher NTMs can come about
in one of two ways. They can be due to competition between a past and present
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NTM, as Ivan & Özyldz (2016) argue for Somali. In this case the Change of State
inference is cancellable. Or they can be due to a default interpretation for the resource
interval as a maximal, homogeneous interval in which the nominal predicate is true, as
I argue for Mvskoke. If the default interpretation is the only available interpretation
in a given context, then the Change of State inference is not cancellable. One open
questin is whether there are languages with D-level NTMs that do not have this
default mechanism and therefore lack a Change of State meaning altogether.
Languages with D-level NTMs vary in the types of discourse related meanings
those NTMs express. Invisibility inferences and discourse anaporic uses seem to
be common interpretations. Other discourse related meanings associated with past
NTMs are more irregular. Mvskoke NTMs have a very clear Shared Past Experience interpretation. According to Lowe 1999 (cited in Nordlinger & Sadler 2004),
Nambiquara denite nouns can have tense and evidential marking. Recent and midpast go with what Lowe calls `observational' evidentiality. These seem to receive
interpretations much like Mvskoke's Shared Past Experience.
(54)

wa3 lin3 -su3 -n3 ti2
manioc-cl.bone.like-

observ.rec.pst.given

`this manioc root that you and I saw recently'
(Lowe 1999, 282 ex.32, cited in Nordlinger & Sadler 2004, 784)
The Somali past tensed denite determiner, however, does not have a Shared Past
Experience reading (though it has invisibility inferences and discourse anaphoric intepretations as glossed below). Instead Lecarme (1999) reports that it has a referential or specic interpretation which she paraphrases with the bolded English
expression below.
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(55)

búug-gii
book-

wáa kan

det.m.pst foc det.m-dem

`Here is the book (distant but in sight / I

have in mind / I told you about)'
(Lecarme 1999: 337)

This meaning singles out a specic individual that the speaker has in mind. Lecarme
does not provide much information about the referential/specic interpretation. A
supercial comparison with Shared Past Experience suggests that it diers in not
requiring the addressee to be able to identify the individual and perhaps also in not
requiring a physical acquaintance with the individual.
The Salish language PayPǎuT@m (Reisinger et al. 2021) has determiners which
have been argued to make temporal and evidential distinctions as well. Determiners
in PayPǎuT@m distinguish between Current Direct Evidence (CDE), Previous Direct
Evidence (PDE), and an evidence and temporally neutral determiner. The PDE
determiner gives rise to invisibility inferences and seems to require the speaker to
have past direct evidence of the individual.
(56)

Context: I'm at your house, telling you about a bear I encountered this morning.

nEPoì

{#t@

/ šE

/ ?kw } mEXaì

niP-uì

{#t@

/ š@

/ ?kw } =mixaì
˙
/ det} =black.bear

be.there-pst {cde.det /

pde.det

P@ šEtT Pasq’ ič

skw ǐoì

P@=š@=@tT =Pasq’ iyč

skw ǐuì

obl=pde.det-1sg.poss=outside morning

`There was a bear in my yard this morning.'
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(Reisinger et al. 2021: 754)

This meaning appears to be more like Mvskoke's Shared Past Experience, except
that there is no requirement for the past experience to be shared with the addressee.
The various interpretations available to Discourse Related NTMs in the languages
discussed here are summarized in Table 7.7.
The puzzling variation in the meanings represented in the last column of Table 7.7
has potential to shed light on Discourse Related NTMs. Descriptively, the NTMs in
Mvskoke, Nambiquara, and PayPǎuT@m seem to show that nouns in these languages
can be marked with both tense and evidentiality, whereas Somali NTMs only encode
tense. On the other hand, my analysis in Chapter 6 demonstrates that the evidential
avor the Shared Past Experience meaning can be derived from the denite semantics
accompanying the NTM. Consequently, an alternative may be that the dierences
are due to the semantics of the determiners in these languages and the inventory of
NTMs. Somali and PayPǎuT@m have both past and present NTMs while in Mvskoke
nominals are either past tensed or tenseless. Additionally, PayPǎuT@m and Mvskoke
have tenseless/evidential neutral alternatives, but a denite expression in Somali must
be inected for tense. Careful semantic investigation of the inventory of NTMs and
the semantics of determiners in Nambiquara is needed to determine whether these
dierences coincide with dierences in the interpretation of NTMs.5 The possible
interaction between these factors and the interpretation of NTMs is a subject for
future cross-linguistic investigation.
Previous investigations focused on just one of the two types of NTMs (NP-internal
and D-level). A novel contribution of this dissertation is demonstrating that the two
types can co-occur in a single language. In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that there
was textual evidence for both P5/tatē and P2 co-occuring in a single nominal. The
crucial example is repeated in (57).
5 Nordlinger

& Sadler (2004) also note that grammatical descriptions of Nambiquara do not agree
on the inventory of NTMs and the range of interpretations that are possible.
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Table 7.7.
Language
Somali
Mvskoke
Nambiquara
PayPǎuT@m

(57)

D-level NTMs: Discourse Related Meanings

Invisibility Inference
Invisibility Inference
-missing dataInvisibility Inference

Interpretations
Discourse Anaphoric
Discourse Anaphoric
-missing data-missing data-

tatē

mv vculvke

vnkē

ma acol-akí

=ankí: =tá:ti: ma foll-atí:

p2

dem edler-gpl =

p5

=

`when our elders were here...'

Referential/Specic
Shared Past Experience
Shared Past Experience
Speaker's Past Experience

tat

mv fullvtē

=ta:t

dem go.about.tpl-p5 =atn

(Robin Soweka Interview, 0:06:48-0:06:53)

I suggest that some Salish languages also allow both types of NTMs. If the determiners in PayPǎuT@m are indeed fused with D-level NTMs as I've suggested, then
this would be a language that allows both types to co-occur. The example below
illustrates this with the noun great-grandmother. The noun is preceded by the PDE
determiner and suxed with a past marker presumably responsible for the decessive
interpretation (i.e. late grandmother).
(58)

’ w

k UnUxw oìč

’ w

k @n-@xw -uì=č

see-nctr-pst=1sg.subj

ì@tT čEčEmEqw oì
ì=@tT =čačamiqw -Puì

f.sg.pde.det=1sg.poss=great.grandmother-pst
`I saw my late great-grandmother.'

(Reisinger et al. 2021: 759)

My work thus motivates a typology with three types of languages that display temporal marking on nominals. Mbyá Guaraní-type languages have only low, NP-internal
NTMs; these always entail change of state. Somali-type languages have only higher,
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D-level NTMs. These are often fused with determiners and may have Change of State
readings along with possibly multiple avors of Discourse Related meanings. Finally,
Mvskoke-type languages have both low and high NTMs. I have also suggested that

PayPǎuT@m may be a language of this type. I illustrate this typology in Table 7.8.

Table 7.8.
NTMs
Low NTMs only
High NTMs only
Both

Typological Picture for Languages with NTMs

Languages
Mbyá and Paraguayan Guaraní (Tonhauser 2007; Thomas 2014)
Somali (Lecarme 1996: et seq.)
Mvskoke and PayPǎuT@m (Reisinger et al. 2021)

The data on NTMs in Mvskoke, in addition to motivating the beginnings of a
typology for NTMs, has implications for a debate on whether or not there is a category
nominal tense. Tonhauser (2006: et seq.) has argued that there is no evidence for a
nominal tense, but there is evidence for nominal aspect. She proposes the following
criteria for evaluating whether an NTM is tense in a technical sense.
(59)

The category nominal tense
A nominal tense marker has (at east) the following properties:
a.

The marker occurs on nominal expressions, and its meaning aects the
noun phrase it occurs with.

b.

The set of nominal tense markers of a language form a grammatical
paradigm.

c.

In those environments where nominal tense markers are required, the
markers are realized with nominal expressions without regard to the
semantics of the head noun.

d.

The marker encodes a temporal relation between the noun phrase time
and the utterance time (deictic tense), or between the noun phrase time
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and another contextually salient given perspective time (relative nominal
tense).
e.

A pure nominal tense does not encode a state change. If the marker
under consideration encodes a state change, it may be a tense/ aspect
combination.

f.

The noun phrase time may be anaphorically resolved in discourse.
(Tonhauser 2020: 15-16)

Tonhauser argues that Paraguayan Guaraní -kue and -rã (the future NTM) are
better analyzed as nominal aspect because they do not show the last four properties
listed above. 1) -kue has co-occurrence restrictions and does not appear on nouns
of certain semantic classes, such as permanent properties (Tonhauser 2007: 842). 2)
Tonhauser shows that -kue and -rã shift the nominal predication time away from
the noun phrase time (what I have been calling the NP evaluation time), essentially
indicating the nominal predicate held before or after the NP evaluation time. 3) Tonhauser argues that -kue and -rã encode change of state, something which tenses do
not do. And nally 4) -kue cannot be anaphorically resolved in discourse as pronominal tense can. Empirically, this means that it cannot receive discourse anaphoric
or shared past experience-type meanings. This was discussed in Chapter 5, section
5.4.1. Tonhauser argues that -kue is a nominal terminative aspect.
I would argue that Mvskoke nominal P1 and P2 provide the best evidence to
date for the category of nominal tense. On their SPE meaning, P1 and P2 satisfy
the properties in (59). As to property (59-a), we have seen that nominal P1 and
P2 are independent of verbal tense. They are not tense agreement and contribute
temporal information relevant only for the interpretation of the nominal. They also
satisfy property (59-b); P1 and P2 also form a grammatical paradigm and constitute
a sub-part of the larger verbal graded tense paradigm.
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Property (59-c) deserves some discussion. First of all, Mvskoke NTMs are entirely
optional. They are not required, even in contexts which do provide a salient moment
of shared past experience. However, on their SPE meaning, P1 and P2 can co-occur
with nominals of any semantic category. Although they are most often used on
nouns denoting humans (professions, human relations, permanent properties), they
are compatible with nouns denoting animals and inanimate objects. This is illustrated
in (60) for P16 and (61) for P2.
(60)

P1 SPE compatible with non-human nouns
a.

svtv isē
satá =eysí:
apple =p1
`the apple (that was just here)'

b.

(RMM-Mus-5/7/2021)

esletketv isē
islitkitá =eysí:
bike

=p1

`the bike (we saw earlier today)'

(RMM-Mus-9/24/2020,PF-Mus-

3/22/2021)
(61)

P2 SPE compatible with non-human nouns
a.

efv vnkē
ifá =ankí:
dog =p2
`that dog (that you and I know)'
(IAH-Sem-7/12/2018,PF-Mus-7/12/2018,RH-Sem-6/24/2019)

6 I currently lack an example of a noun denoting an animal appearing with P1, though I predict
it to be perfectly acceptable.
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b.

svtv vnkē
satá =ankí:
apple =p2
`the apple (I had/ we talked about)'

c.

(RMM-Mus-5/7/2021)

esletketv vnkē
islitkitá =ankí:
bike

=p2

`the bike (we saw before)'

(RMM-Mus-9/24/2020,PF-Mus-3/22/2021)

When P2 receives a change of state interpretation, it is no longer compatible with
permanent properties like those in the above examples. It cannot be used to mean a
deceased dog (IAH-Sem-7/12/2018,PF-Mus-7/12/2018), a rotten apple (RMM-Mus5/7/2021), or a broken bike (RMM-Mus-6/25/2019,PF-Mus-8/31/2021). I argue that
this doesn't mean that P2 fails the criteria in (59-c). Instead, this is due to P2
having what Tonhauser terms an Existence Property. How exactly to encode or
derive the Existence Property is a subject of debate. For Tonhauser (2007), the
lexical semantics of -kue requires that the existence of the entity described by the
nominal predicate include both the nominal predication time and the NP evaluation
time. Thomas (2014) derives the Existence Property as a lifetime eect in the sense
of Musan (1997). On this view, a nominal predicate comes with a presupposition
that the temporal trace of the entity (its lifetime) overlaps with the NP evaluation
time. I will not attempt to evaluate these two approaches for Mvskoke. However the
Existence Property is accounted for, it is the reason for the infelicity of P2 on its
Change of State reading with nouns denoting permanent properties. When P2 does
not entail Change of State - when it receives an SPE interpretation - it can combine
with nouns of any semantic category.
According to the analysis I presented in Chapter 6, Mvskoke P1 and P2 also
satisfy the property in (59-e). I argued that neither P1 nor P2 encode change of
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state. Rather, the change of state reading results from a default interpretation for
the resource interval. Thus P2 allows a change of state reading without encoding it.
The property in (59-d) reects the parallelism that Tonhauser assumes to exist
between temporal indices relevant for nouns and those relevant for verbs. In her theory, the NP evaluation time (noun phrase time in Tonhauser's terms) is the nominal
equivalent of the verbal topic time. Just as tense in the verbal domain relates the
TT to the UT (following Klein 1994), tense in the nominal domain should relate
the NP evaluation time to the UT. I argued in Chapter 6 that nominal P1 and P2
as modiers of resource intervals do provide the time at which the NP is evaluated.
They are, furthermore, deictic and always place the NP evaluation time within the
P1 or P2-interval relative to the UT. These graded past tenses never shift back from
another salient reference time (such as the verbal TT).
(62)

Context: Imagine that yesterday morning you and I went to a bike store and
saw a really cool red bike. You went back yesterday evening and bought that
bike for your grandson. Today, I ask you if you've decided what to get your
grandson for their birthday.
a.

vnkē

Paksvnkē

esletketv catē

paks-ankí:

islitkitá ca:tí: =ankí: am-osóswa

one.day.away-p2 bicycle

red

p2

=

vmososwv

1sg.dat-grandchild

rennehsis.

ì-in-níhs-ey-s
dir-3.dat-buy.pfv.p1-1sg.ag-ind

`Yesterday, I went and bought that red bike for my grandson.'
Speaker Comment: That ts with this scenario.
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b.

isē

#Paksvnkē

esletketv catē

paks-ankí:

islitkitá ca:tí: =eysí: am-osóswa

one.day.away-p2 bicycle

red

p1

=

vmososwv

1sg.dat-grandchild

rennehsis.

ì-in-níhs-ey-s
dir-3.dat-buy.pfv.p1-1sg.ag-ind

`Yesterday, I went and bought that red bike for my grandson.'
Speaker Comment: No, that would mean this morning we went to the
store and saw the bike.

(RMM-Mus-04/06/2021)

In (62), the context establishes a time of SPE that is yesterday morning and a
verbal topic time in the P1-interval (yesterday evening ). The time of SPE is in the
P2-interval with respect to the UT, but it is in the P1-interval with respect to the
verbal TT (i.e. it is earlier in the day of the buying event). Nevertheless, the noun

esletketv catē `red bike' cannot be marked with nominal P1. The speaker comment
indicates that this would mean the time of SPE was in the P1-interval with respect
to the UT.
Thomas (2014) argues that the dierence between the nominal predication time
and the NP evaluation time is not truly possible to detect without complex constructions like the pluperfect in English. In a Kleinian/Neo-Reichenbachian theory
of tense and aspect (as spelled out in Klein 1994), the distinction between ET and
TT can only be seen in constructions that have an aspectual operator that introduces
a precedence relation such as perfect or prospective. In simple constructions with
perfective or imperfective aspect, the ET and TT overlap. In English past perfect
constructions, however, the perfect aspect places the ET in the past of the TT and
the past tense places the TT in the past of the UT. In example (63), the when-phrase
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provides a past TT and the perfect aspect locates the leaving event in the past of
that TT.
(63)

When I arrived, Mary had already left.

Thomas argues that without similar complex tense constructions in noun phrases, we
cannot be sure that the nominal predication time is distinct from the NP evaluation
time. This kind of construction is not possible in Mbyá or Paraguayan Guaraní.
Mvskoke, however, can potentially provide the necessary data to tease apart nominal
predication time and NP evaluation time. Recall that Mvskoke allows P5/tatē to
co-occur with P1 or P2. Although complex NTM phrases are extremely rare, some
speakers do allow them. Further eldwork is needed to determine the range of possible
combinations and their interpretation. If P5/tatē shifts the nominal predication time
into the past of the NP evaluation time (as -kue is argued to), then in complex
constructions with P5 and P2 we would expect P2 to locate the time of the change
of state entailed by P5. For instance a noun phrase with the schematic structure
in (64-a) would be expected, on this theory, to have the interpretation in (64-b)
(repeated from Chapter 6, example (83)).
(64)

a.

[ DP D P2 [ NP P5 judge ] ]

b.

J (64-a) K = ιx.∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(r) & judge(x)(t0 ) & ¬judge(x)(g(r))

only dened if ∃!x : x ∈ C&∃t0 .t0 ≺ g(r) &judge(x)(t0 ) & ¬judge(x)(g(r))

& g(r) ⊆ P2-interval(t0 )
In other words, P2 should provide a time when the interlocutors encountered someone
who was no longer a judge. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4.7
7 The

other possibility is that P2 and P5 do not interact with each other but contribute independently to the interpretation of the noun phrase. This is a topic for future research.
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P5

Figure 7.4.

P2

t0

g(r)

judge

not judge/SPE

Now

Predicted Interpretation of a Doubly Tensed Nominal

7.4 Outstanding Issues & Conclusions
In this dissertation, I have presented novel empirical evidence motivating an analysis of the Mvskoke past tense system as a cross-categorial system of temporal marking
that encodes both specic intervals of past time as well as a belief predicate responsible for evidential inferences (e.g. that the speaker learned of the event as it took
place). The new patterns and generalizations this study has uncovered have raised
a considerable number of open questions, which I have attempted to ag throughout
the dissertation as they came up. There are at least two oustanding issues that I wish
to acknowledge. First, the reader will recall that Chapter 3 included much discussion of languages that have been claimed to have morphemes encoding both temporal
and evidential information. Prominent among these were Korean (Lee 2011, 2013;
Chung 2007), Bulgarian (Smirnova 2013; Arregui et al. 2017; Koev 2017), and Cuzco
Quechua (Faller 2004). These languages have been argued to have evidential-tense
that encode relations between the EAT and ET (temporal approaches) or a relation
between spatiotemporal traces (spatial approaches). Chapter 3 included some discussion of the dierent evidence types that are compatible with the evidential-tenses in
these languages. However, the question still stands whether my Belief-State Change
approach can be extended to account for the (seemingly similar) patterns in these
languages. A considerable challenge to extending the approach is the dierences in
evidence types compatible with the so-called evidential-tenses, as in some of these
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languages they are acceptable with more types of indirect evidence than Mvskoke
P1-P3 allow. However, as this analysis of Mvskoke has revealed, competition between evidential and non-evidential forms plays a big part in the distribution of
the tenses and the evidential inferences associated with them. Before concluding that
evidential-tenses are, in fact, a heterogeneous phenomna, we need a more holistic view
of the language and a better understanding of the competition and possible blocking
of evidential-tenses by non-evidential constructions.
A second oustanding issue, which the reader will no doubt have noticed, is the
marked absence of Past 3 in the nominal domain. Throughout this investigation of
the Mvskoke past tenses, Past 3 has stood somewhat apart from the rest of the tenses.
In Chapter 4, I discussed the exibility of the P3-interval and how the subjective or
vague analysis of the P3-interval made problematic predictions. In Chapter 5, it was
shown that elicited and textual data support the nominal use of Past 1, 2, (the now
defunct) 4, and 5. But neither older texts nor elicited data from modern speakers
contain a nominal use of Past 3. Past 3 is an outlier in both the nature of its temporal
interval and its absence from the nominal domain. Whether these two properties of
Past 3 are related is a fascinating question for future research.
My hope for this dissertation is that it proves to be a valuable resource both in
terms of its descriptive contribution and its theoretical impact. The empirical data in
the preceding chapters furthers the description of several under-studied phenomena
in Mvskoke. Chapter 2 includes data on strategies speakers use in indirect evidence
contexts; many of these strategies are under-documented and all of them deserve
greater attention. Chapter 3 contributes novel data with regards to the use of Past 5
to describe recent events and the direct evidence inferences of Pasts 1-3. As mentioned
before, the evidential inferences were hinted at in early documentary works, but
absent from current grammars of Mvskoke. In Chapter 4, I provide data answering
the question of which tense is used in questions about the time of an event. The
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use of (nominal) tenses on the wh -word estofv `when' and speakers' decided choice of
Past 2 in such questions are novel contributions to the documentation of the Mvskoke
language. Finally, Chapter 5 (and Chapter 6 to some extent) constitutes the most
extensive description to date of the nominal uses of Pasts 1, 2, and 5. Without the
documentation involved in this study, the theoretical and typological advances would
not have been possible.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1 rst person
2 second person
3 third person
acc accusative
ag agent argument
asrt aktionsart
caus causative
comm commitative
comp complementizer
cur current past
dat dative argument/ alienable possession
decl declarative particle
dem demonstrative
det determiner
dim diminutive
dir directional
ds dierent subject
dur durative
evid indirect evidential, -vttis
evp Bulgarian evidential participle
f feminine (in Somali examples)
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fgr Falling Tone Grade
foc focus marker
gpl group plural
hgr Aspirating Grade
ind indicative
infr inferential evidential, -vcok
inst instrumental
int intensier/ Nasalizing Grade
interj interjection
ip medio-passive/ spontaneous, -ep
ipfv imperfective aspect/ Lengthening Grade
loc locative
lgr lengthening grade
neg negation
nom nominative
m masculine (in Somali Examples)
nmzl nominalizer
nrp near past
nsubj non-subject case/ Accusative case
p1 recent past/ Past 1
p2 intermediate past/ Past 2
p3 distant past/ Past 3
p5 remote past/ Past 5
part participial mood (in South Ban Inuktitut examples) pass impersonal passive
pat patient argument/ inalienable possession
pfv perfective aspect/ Falling Tone Grade
pfv.p1 perfective aspect for Past 1/ Aspirating Grade
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pl plural
pst past
q question marker
recip reciprocal
remp remote past
sbjv subjunctive
sg singular
ss same subject
subj subject case/ Nominative case
te Korean past evidential-tense, -te
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